Financial Markets and Real Ecinomy: Four Essays in International Trade

Financial markets play an important role in an economy performing various functions like mobilizing and pooling savings, producing information about investment opportunities, screening and monitoring investments, implementation of corporate governance, diversification and management of risk. These functions influence saving rates, investment decisions, technological innovation and, therefore, have important implications for welfare. In my PhD dissertation I examine the interplay of financial and product markets by looking at different channels through which financial markets may influence an economy.My dissertation consists of four chapters. The first chapter is a co-authored work with Martin Strieborny, a PhD student from the University of Lausanne. The second chapter is a co-authored work with Melise Jaud, a PhD student from the Paris School of Economics. The third chapter is co-authored with both Melise Jaud and Martin Strieborny. The last chapter of my PhD dissertation is a single author paper.Chapter 1 of my PhD thesis analyzes the effect of financial development on growth of contract intensive industries. These industries intensively use intermediate inputs that neither can be sold on organized exchange, nor are reference-priced (Levchenko, 2007; Nunn, 2007). A typical example of a contract intensive industry would be an industry where an upstream supplier has to make investments in order to customize a product for needs of a downstream buyer. After the investment is made and the product is adjusted, the buyer may refuse to meet a commitment and trigger ex post renegotiation. Since the product is customized to the buyer's needs, the supplier cannot sell the product to a different buyer at the original price. This is referred in the literature as the holdup problem. As a consequence, the individually rational suppliers will underinvest into relationship-specific assets, hurting the downstream firms with negative consequences for aggregate growth. The standard way to mitigate the hold up problem is to write a binding contract and to rely on the legal enforcement by the state. However, even the most effective contract enforcement might fail to protect the supplier in tough times when the buyer lacks a reliable source of external financing. This suggests the potential role of financial intermediaries, banks in particular, in mitigating the incomplete contract problem. First, financial products like letters of credit and letters of guarantee can substantially decrease a risk and transaction costs of parties. Second, a bank loan can serve as a signal about a buyer's true financial situation, an upstream firm will be more willing undertake relationship-specific investment knowing that the business partner is creditworthy and will abstain from myopic behavior (Fama, 1985; von Thadden, 1995). Therefore, a well-developed financial (especially banking) system should disproportionately benefit contract intensive industries.The empirical test confirms this hypothesis. Indeed, contract intensive industries seem to grow faster in countries with a well developed financial system. Furthermore, this effect comes from a more developed banking sector rather than from a deeper stock market. These results are reaffirmed examining the effect of US bank deregulation on the growth of contract intensive industries in different states. Beyond an overall pro-growth effect, the bank deregulation seems to disproportionately benefit the industries requiring relationship-specific investments from their suppliers.Chapter 2 of my PhD focuses on the role of the financial sector in promoting exports of developing countries. In particular, it investigates how credit constraints affect the ability of firms operating in agri-food sectors of developing countries to keep exporting to foreign markets.Trade in high-value agri-food products from developing countries has expanded enormously over the last two decades offering opportunities for development. However, trade in agri-food is governed by a growing array of standards. Sanitary and Phytosanitary standards (SPS) and technical regulations impose additional sunk, fixed and operating costs along the firms' export life. Such costs may be detrimental to firms' survival, "pricing out" producers that cannot comply. The existence of these costs suggests a potential role of credit constraints in shaping the duration of trade relationships on foreign markets. A well-developed financial system provides the funds to exporters necessary to adjust production processes in order to meet quality and quantity requirements in foreign markets and to maintain long-standing trade relationships. The products with higher needs for financing should benefit the most from a well functioning financial system. This differential effect calls for a difference-in-difference approach initially proposed by Rajan and Zingales (1998). As a proxy for demand for financing of agri-food products, the sanitary risk index developed by Jaud et al. (2009) is used. The empirical literature on standards and norms show high costs of compliance, both variable and fixed, for high-value food products (Garcia-Martinez and Poole, 2004; Maskus et al., 2005). The sanitary risk index reflects the propensity of products to fail health and safety controls on the European Union (EU) market. Given the high costs of compliance, the sanitary risk index captures the demand for external financing to comply with such regulations.The prediction is empirically tested examining the export survival of different agri-food products from firms operating in Ghana, Mali, Malawi, Senegal and Tanzania. The results suggest that agri-food products that require more financing to keep up with food safety regulation of the destination market, indeed sustain longer in foreign market, when they are exported from countries with better developed financial markets.Chapter 3 analyzes the link between financial markets and efficiency of resource allocation in an economy. Producing and exporting products inconsistent with a country's factor endowments constitutes a serious misallocation of funds, which undermines competitiveness of the economy and inhibits its long term growth. In this chapter, inefficient exporting patterns are analyzed through the lens of the agency theories from the corporate finance literature. Managers may pursue projects with negative net present values because their perquisites or even their job might depend on them. Exporting activities are particularly prone to this problem. Business related to foreign markets involves both high levels of additional spending and strong incentives for managers to overinvest. Rational managers might have incentives to push for exports that use country's scarce factors which is suboptimal from a social point of view. Export subsidies might further skew the incentives towards inefficient exporting. Management can divert the export subsidies into investments promoting inefficient exporting.Corporate finance literature stresses the disciplining role of outside debt in counteracting the internal pressures to divert such "free cash flow" into unprofitable investments. Managers can lose both their reputation and the control of "their" firm if the unpaid external debt triggers a bankruptcy procedure. The threat of possible failure to satisfy debt service payments pushes the managers toward an efficient use of available resources (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990; Hart and Moore, 1995). The main sources of debt financing in the most countries are banks. The disciplining role of banks might be especially important in the countries suffering from insufficient judicial quality. Banks, in pursuing their rights, rely on comparatively simple legal interventions that can be implemented even by mediocre courts. In addition to their disciplining role, banks can promote efficient exporting patterns in a more direct way by relaxing credit constraints of producers, through screening, identifying and investing in the most profitable investment projects. Therefore, a well-developed domestic financial system, and particular banking system, would help to push a country's exports towards products congruent with its comparative advantage.This prediction is tested looking at the survival of different product categories exported to US market. Products are identified according to the Euclidian distance between their revealed factor intensity and the country's factor endowments. The results suggest that products suffering from a comparative disadvantage (labour-intensive products from capital-abundant countries) survive less on the competitive US market. This pattern is stronger if the exporting country has a well-developed banking system. Thus, a strong banking sector promotes exports consistent with a country comparative advantage.Chapter 4 of my PhD thesis further examines the role of financial markets in fostering efficient resource allocation in an economy. In particular, the allocative efficiency hypothesis is investigated in the context of equity market liberalization.Many empirical studies document a positive and significant effect of financial liberalization on growth (Levchenko et al. 2009; Quinn and Toyoda 2009; Bekaert et al., 2005). However, the decrease in the cost of capital and the associated growth in investment appears rather modest in comparison to the large GDP growth effect (Bekaert and Harvey, 2005; Henry, 2000, 2003). Therefore, financial liberalization may have a positive impact on growth through its effect on the allocation of funds across firms and sectors.Free access to international capital markets allows the largest and most profitable domestic firms to borrow funds in foreign markets (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). As domestic banks loose some of their best clients, they reoptimize their lending practices seeking new clients among small and younger industrial firms. These firms are likely to be more risky than large and established companies. Screening of customers becomes prevalent as the return to screening rises. Banks, ceteris paribus, tend to focus on firms operating in comparative-advantage sectors because they are better risks. Firms in comparative-disadvantage sectors finding it harder to finance their entry into or survival in export markets either exit or refrain from entering export markets. On aggregate, one should therefore expect to see less entry, more exit, and shorter survival on export markets in those sectors after financial liberalization.The paper investigates the effect of financial liberalization on a country's export pattern by comparing the dynamics of entry and exit of different products in a country export portfolio before and after financial liberalization.The results suggest that products that lie far from the country's comparative advantage set tend to disappear relatively faster from the country's export portfolio following the liberalization of financial markets. In other words, financial liberalization tends to rebalance the composition of a country's export portfolio towards the products that intensively use the economy's abundant factors.

Procompetitive Losses from Trade

We argue that the procompetitive effect of international trade may bring about significant welfare costs that have not been recognized. We formulate a stylized general equilibrium model with a continuum of imperfectly competitive industries to show that, under plausible conditions, a trade-induced increase in competition can actually amplify monopoly distortions. This happens because trade, while lowering the average level of market power, may increase its cross-sectoral dispersion. Using data on US industries, we document a dramatic increase in the dispersion of market power overtime. We also show evidence that trade might be responsible for it and provide some quantifications of the induced welfare cost. Our results suggest that, to avoid some unpleasant effects of globalization, trade integration should be accompanied by procompetitive reforms (i.e., deregulation) in the nontraded sectors.

Asymmetric information and trade policy

Economists understand protectionism as a costly mechanism to redistribute from the average citizen to special-interest groups; yet political platforms that deviate from free trade have surprising popular appeal. I present an explanation based on heterogeneous information across citizens whose voting decision has an intensive margin. For each politician and each sector, the optimal trade-policy choice caters to the preferences of those voters who are more likely to be informed of that proposal. An overall protectionist bias emerges because in every industry producers are better informed than consumers. This asymmetry emerges in equilibrium because co-workers share industry-specific knwoledge, and because producers have greater incentives to engage in costly learning about their sector. My model implies that more widespread information about trade policy for an industry is associated with lower protection. Cross-sectoral evidence on U.S. non-tariff barriers and newspaper coverage is consistent with this prediction.

Trade, Extent of the Market, and Economic Growth 1960-1996

We find that trade and domestic market size are robust determinants of economic growth over the 1960-1996 period when trade openness is measured as the US dollar value of imports and exports relative to GDP in PPP US$ ('real openness'). When trade openness is measured as the US dollar value of imports and exports relative to GDP in exchange rate US$ ('nominal openness') however, trade and the size of domestic markets are often non-robust determinants of growth. We argue that real openness is the more appropriate measure of trade and that our empirical results should be seen as evidence in favor of the extent-of-the-market hypothesis.

Intra-Industry Trade, Multilateral Trade Integration, and Invasive Species Risk, December 2006

We analyze the linkage between protectionism and invasive species (IS) hazard in the context of two-way trade and multilateral trade integration, two major features of real-world agricultural trade. Multilateral integration includes the joint reduction of tariffs and trade costs among trading partners. Multilateral trade integration is more likely to increase damages from IS than predicted by unilateral trade opening under the classic Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) framework because domestic production (the base susceptible to damages) is likely to increase with expanding export markets. A country integrating its trade with a partner characterized by relatively higher tariff and trade costs is also more likely to experience increased IS damages via expanded domestic production for the same reason. We illustrate our analytical results with a stylized model of the world wheat market.

The capital gains from trade are not enough: Evidence from the environmental accounts of Venezuela and Mexico

In principle, a country can not endure negative genuine savings for longperiods of time without experiencing declining consumption. Nevertheless,theoreticians envisage two alternatives to explain how an exporter ofnon-renewable natural resources could experience permanent negativegenuine savings and still ensure sustainability. The first one allegesthat the capital gains arising from the expected improvement in theterms of trade would suffice to compensate for the negative savings ofthe resource exporter. The second alternative points at technologicalchange as a way to avoid economic collapse. This paper uses the dataof Venezuela and Mexico to empirically test the first of these twohypotheses. The results presented here prove that the terms oftrade do not suffice to compensate the depletion of oil reservesin these two open economies.

The impact of trade liberalization on skill upgrading. Evidence from Argentina

In this paper I study the effects of a regional free trade agreement on the demand for skill.I start by documenting a series of facts to shed light on the determinants of a steep increasein the relative demand of skilled labor in a panel of Argentinean industrial firms covering thetrade liberalization period. First, this is not explained by labor reallocation across industriesor firms but by skill upgrading within firms. Second, exporters upgrade skill faster than nonexporters. Third, firms upgrading skill also upgrade technology. These findings are consistentwith a model where a reduction in trading partner s tariffs induces the most productive firms(exporters) to adopt skill-intensive production technologies. Indeed, I find that the reduction inBrazil s tariffs induces the most productive Argentinean firms to upgrade skill, while the leastproductive ones downgrade. One third of the increase in the relative demand for skill can beattributed to the reduction in Brazil s tariffs.

The skill bias of world trade

Under plausible assumptions about preferences and technology, the model in this papersuggests that the entire volume of world trade matters for wage inequality. Therefore,trade integration, even among identical countries, is likely to increase the skill premium.Further, we argue that empirical evidence of a falling relative price of skill-intensive goods can be reconciled with the fast growth of world trade and that the intersectoral mobility of capital exacerbates the effect of trade on inequality. We provide new empirical evidence in support of our results and a quantitative assessment of the skill bias of world trade.

The economic effects of a Spanish trade boycott against Catalan products

We study the potential consequences of a hypothetical trade boycott against Catalan products organized by some sectors of the Spanish society mainly for political reasons. A symmetric trade boycott would have two effects: a reduction of Catalan exports to Spain and a partial process of import substitution in Catalonia. In order to quantify the economic impact of the boycott, we compare the "actual" Catalan economy, as described in the input-output table for 2005, with a "simulated" Catalan economy that takes into account the effects of a boycott on the trade exchanges between Catalonia and Spain.

Heterogeneous information and trade policy

Protectionism enjoys surprising popular support, in spite of deadweight losses. At thesame time, trade barriers appear to decline with public information about protection.This paper develops an electoral model with heterogeneously informed voters whichexplains both facts and predicts the pattern of trade policy across industries. In themodel, each agent endogenously acquires more information about his sector of employment. As a result, voters support protectionism, because they learn more about thetrade barriers that help them as producers than those that hurt them as consumers.In equilibrium, asymmetric information induces a universal protectionist bias. Thestructure of protection is Pareto inefficient, in contrast to existing models. The modelpredicts a Dracula effect: trade policy for a sector is less protectionist when there ismore public information about it. Using a measure of newspaper coverage across industries, I find that cross-sector evidence from the United States bears out my theoreticalpredictions.

Learning ability and longevity: a symmetrical evolutionary trade-off in Drosophila.

Learning ability can be substantially improved by artificial selection in animals ranging from Drosophila to rats. Thus these species have not used their evolutionary potential with respect to learning ability, despite intuitively expected and experimentally demonstrated adaptive advantages of learning. This suggests that learning is costly, but this notion has rarely been tested. Here we report correlated responses of life-history traits to selection for improved learning in Drosophila melanogaster. Replicate populations selected for improved learning lived on average 15% shorter than the corresponding unselected control populations. They also showed a minor reduction in fecundity late in life and possibly a minor increase in dry adult mass. Selection for improved learning had no effect on egg-to-adult viability, development rate, or desiccation resistance. Because shortened longevity was the strongest correlated response to selection for improved learning, we also measured learning ability in another set of replicate populations that had been selected for extended longevity. In a classical olfactory conditioning assay, these long-lived flies showed an almost 40% reduction in learning ability early in life. This effect disappeared with age. Our results suggest a symmetrical evolutionary trade-off between learning ability and longevity in Drosophila.

On the role of retaliation in trade agreements

This paper analyzes the role of retaliation in trade agreements. It shows that, in the presenceof private information, retaliation can always be used to increase the welfare derived from suchagreements by the participating governments. In particular, it is shown that retaliation is anecessary feature of any efficient equilibrium.We argue that retaliation would not be necessary if governments could resort to internationaltransfers or export subsidies to compensate for terms-of-trade externalities. Within the currentworld trading system, though, in which transfers are seldom observed whereas export subsidiesare prohibited, the use of the remaining trade instruments in a retaliatory fashion might beoptimal. The model is used to interpret the retaliatory use of antidumping observed in the lastdecades, and the proliferation of these measures relative to other trade remedies.

Is the person trade-off a valid method for allocating health care resources? Some caveats

The Person Trade-Off (PTO) is a methodology aimed at measuring thesocial value of health states. The rest of methodologies would measure individualutility and would be less appropriate for taking resource allocation decisions.However few studies have been conducted to test the validity of the method.We present a pilot study with this objective. The study is based on theresult of interviews to 30 undergraduate students in Economics. We judgethe validity of PTO answers by their adequacy to three hypothesis of rationality.First, we show that, given certain rationality assumptions, PTO answersshould be predicted from answers to Standard Gamble questions. This firsthypothesis is not verified. The second hypothesis is that PTO answersshould not vary with different frames of equivalent PTO questions. Thissecond hypothesis is also not verified. Our third hypothesis is that PTOvalues should predict social preferences for allocating resources betweenpatients. This hypothesis is verified. The evidence on the validity of themethod is then conflicting.

Aggregate fluctuations and the network structure of intersectoral trade

This paper analyzes the flow of intermediate inputs across sectors by adopting a network perspective on sectoral interactions. I apply these tools to show how fluctuationsin aggregate economic activity can be obtained from independent shocks to individualsectors. First, I characterize the network structure of input trade in the U.S. On thedemand side, a typical sector relies on a small number of key inputs and sectors arehomogeneous in this respect. However, in their role as input-suppliers sectors do differ:many specialized input suppliers coexist alongside general purpose sectors functioningas hubs to the economy. I then develop a model of intersectoral linkages that can reproduce these connectivity features. In a standard multisector setup, I use this modelto provide analytical expressions linking aggregate volatility to the network structureof input trade. I show that the presence of sectoral hubs - by coupling productiondecisions across sectors - leads to fluctuations in aggregates.

Geographical effects on the accuracy of textile trade data:an international approach for 1913

Foreign trade statistics are the main data source to the study of international trade.However its accuracy has been under suspicion since Morgernstern published hisfamous work in 1963. Federico and Tena (1991) have resumed the question arguing thatthey can be useful in an adequate level of aggregation. But the geographical assignmentproblem remains unsolved. This article focuses on the spatial variable through theanalysis of the reliability of textile international data for 1913. A geographical biasarises between export and import series, but because of its quantitative importance it canbe negligible in an international scale.