The European Court of Human Rights and Domestic Violence

Domestic violence is an issue that affects vast numbers of women throughout the world. It seems to constitute a clear violation of at least three articles of the European Convention on Human Rights, however it has only been recognised as being a human rights issue relatively recently. Indeed, until 2007 domestic violence had not been directly addressed by the European Court of Human Rights. However, the Court has now addressed the issue in a series of recent cases. This paper discusses what positive obligations states parties to the Convention now have in relation to the issue of domestic violence. It proceeds to discuss the gaps in the Court’s jurisprudence in this area at present and how the case law of the Court may develop in the future.

Realising political equality: the European Court of Human Rights and positive obligations in a democracy'

The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) speaks of the importance of an “effective political democracy” in its Preamble, though it is only in Article 3 of Protocol 1 (P1-3) that we find a right to free elections. This paper discusses the role of “positive obligations” under P1-3. This paper outlines the positive obligations in P1-3 focusing on obligations where the state is required to do more than just change the law. This may mean providing resources or facilities, adopting regulatory frameworks or creating new institutions. The paper highlights specific positive obligations that need to be further developed in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Sometimes these can be developed by analogy with positive obligations recognised in other areas of ECtHR jurisprudence. However, beyond these cases, states should ensure that members of vulnerable and disadvantaged minorities are able to participate in the electoral process and should ensure that dominant political groups cannot abuse their political power to exclude other parties unfairly. This is necessary to realise equal political rights. The second section of this paper sketches some preliminary points about the Strasbourg institutions’ approach to P1-3. After that, the third section identifies circumstances where the ECtHR should apply a more intense scrutiny in P1-3 cases. The fourth, fifth and sixth sections look at positive obligations relating to the right to vote, the right to run for election and the regulation of political parties.

Human Dignity and judicial Interpretation of Human Rights

The Universal Declaration on Human Rights was pivotal in popularizing the use of 'dignity' or 'human dignity' in human rights discourse. This article argues that the use of 'dignity', beyond a basic minimum core, does not provide a universalistic, principled basis for judicial decision-making in the human rights context, in the sense that there is little common understanding of what dignity requires substantively within or across jurisdictions. The meaning of dignity is therefore context-specific, varying significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and (often) over time within particular jurisdictions. Indeed, instead of providing a basis for principled decision-making, dignity seems open to significant judicial manipulation. increasing rather than decreasing judicial discretion. That is one of its significant attractions to both judges and litigators alike. Dignity provides a convenient language for the adoption of substantive interpretations of human rights guarantees which appear to be intentionally, not just coincidentally. highly contingent on local circumstances. Despite that, however, I argue that the concept of 'human dignity' plays an important role in the development of human rights adjudication, not in providing an agreed content to human rights but in contributing to particular methods of human rights interpretation and adjudication.

Civil society versus nationalizing state?:Advocacy of minority rights in the post-socialist Baltic states

Strong civil society provides individuals with arenas to bring their interests to the attention of policymakers. In so doing, civil society organizations (CSOs) can support state policies, but can also criticize policies. This paper argues that most minority rights advocacy CSOs in the Baltic states have little say in the crafting of policy and are compartmentalized into the existing agendas, with only a few groups able to evaluate policies independently. It concludes that the Baltic civil society is weak because the CSOs working on minority issues ask policymakers either too much, or too little. The findings suggest that policymakers quell criticism of their work from the side of the CSOs by ignoring their activities. Alternatively, by funding the CSO that shores up the state agenda, policymakers delegate their responsibilities to civic actors, keep critical voices from public debates and claim that their policies have the full support of a vibrant civil society. This paper investigates the options available for civil society actors to relate to policymakers in a nationalizing state by drawing on the data collected in 77 semi-structured interviews with the CSOs working with Russian and Polish minorities in the Baltic states between 2006 and 2009. © 2011 Association for the Study of Nationalities.