Social capital and government in the production of public goods

As a response to the rapidly growing empirical literature on social capital and the evidence of its correlation with government performance, we build a theoretical framework to study the interactions between social capital and government's action. This paper presents a model of homogeneous agents in an overlapping generations framework incorporating social capital as the values transmitted from parent to child. The government's role is to provide public goods. First, government expenditure is exogenously given. Then, it will be chosen at the preferred level of the representative agent. For both setups the equilibrium outcomes are characterized and the resulting dynamics studied. Briefly we include an analysis of the effect of productivity growth on the evolution of social capital. The results obtained caution caution against both the crowding out effect of the welfare state and the impact of sustained economic growth on social capital.

How universal is behavior? A four country comparison of spite, cooperation and errors in voluntary contribution mechanisms

This paper studies behavior in experiments with a linear voluntary contributions mechanism for public goods conducted in Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and the USA. The same experimental design was used in the four countries. Our 'contribution function' design allows us to obtain a view of subjects' behavior from two complementary points of view. If yields information about situations where, in purely pecuniary terms, it is a dominant strategy to contribute all the endowment and about situations where it is a dominant strategy to contribute nothing. Our results show, first, that differences in behavior across countries are minor. We find that when people play "the same game" they behave similarly. Second, for all four countries our data are inconsistent with the explanation that subjects contribute only out of confusion. A common cooperative motivation is needed to explain the date.

Bidding for the surplus: realizing efficient outcomes in general economic environments

In this paper, we consider two classes of economic environments. In the first type, agents are faced with the task of providing local public goods that will benefit some or all of them. In the second type, economic activity takes place via formation of links. Agents need both to both form a network and decide how to share the output generated. For both scenarios, we suggest a bidding mechanism whereby agents bid for the right to decide upon the organization of the economic activity. The subgame perfect equilibria of this game generate efficient outcomes.

Polarització comarcal de rendes a Catalunya

Sovint parlem de les comarques catalanes en termes de grups més o menys homogenis. Per exemple, les segmenten en riques i pobres, en dinàmiques i estancades, en interiors o costaneres, etc. Apart de l'interès com a instrument de síntesi, el grau de formació de grups cohesionats i distants entre si pot ser un assumpte rellevant en termes de la cohesió territorial. En aquestes circumstàncies, la disponibilitat d'una mesura específica que permeti la quantificació precisa d'aquest fenomen sembla particularment útil. En aquest sentit, la literatura ens ha suggerit diverses mesures de polarització, entre les que s’haurien de destacar els Índexos de Polarització Generalitzada (Esteban, Gradín i Ray (1999)). El principal objecte d'aquest treball consisteix a aplicar aquestes mesures a la distribució comarcal de la renda a Catalunya al llarg del període 1990-2002. El principal resultat obtingut apunta cap a una creixent polarització econòmica de les comarques que, conjuntament amb l'increment observat en les desigualtats, recolzaria una actitud molt més decidida per part de l'administració en el reequilibri del territori.