Network externalities across financial institutions

We propose and estimate a financial distress model that explicitly accounts for the interactions or spill-over effects between financial institutions, through the use of a spatial continuity matrix that is build from financial network data of inter bank transactions. Such setup of the financial distress model allows for the empirical validation of the importance of network externalities in determining financial distress, in addition to institution specific and macroeconomic covariates. The relevance of such specification is that it incorporates simultaneously micro-prudential factors (Basel 2) as well as macro-prudential and systemic factors (Basel 3) as determinants of financial distress. Results indicate network externalities are an important determinant of financial health of a financial institutions. The parameter that measures the effect of network externalities is both economically and statistical significant and its inclusion as a risk factor reduces the importance of the firm specific variables such as the size or degree of leverage of the financial institution. In addition we analyze the policy implications of the network factor model for capital requirements and deposit insurance pricing.

Self-Fulfilling Crises in the Eurozone: An Empirical Test. CEPS Working Document No. 366, 22 June 2012

This paper tests the hypothesis that government bond markets in the eurozone are more fragile and more susceptible to self-fulfilling liquidity crises than in stand-alone countries. We find evidence that a significant part of the surge in the spreads of the PIGS countries (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain) in the eurozone during 2010-11 was disconnected from underlying increases in the debt-to-GDP ratios and fiscal space variables, and was the result of negative self-fulfilling market sentiments that became very strong since the end of 2010. We argue that this can drive member countries of the eurozone into bad equilibria. We also find evidence that after years of neglecting high government debt, investors became increasingly worried about this in the eurozone, and reacted by raising the spreads. No such worries developed in stand-alone countries despite the fact that debt-to-GDP ratios and fiscal space variables were equally high and increasing in these countries.

The creation of euro area financial safety nets. Bruegel Working Paper 2012/09, July 2012

The financial crisis has exposed the need to devise stronger and broader international and regional safety nets in order to deal with economic and financial shocks and allow for countries to adjust. The euro area has developed several such mechanisms over the last couple of years through a process of trial and error and gradual enhancement and expansion. Their overall architecture remains imperfect and leaves areas of vulnerabilities. This paper provides an overview of the recent financial stability mechanisms and their various shortcomings and tries to brush the outline of a more comprehensive safety net architecture that would coherently address the banking, sovereign and external imbalances crises against both transitory and more permanent shocks. It aims to provide a roadmap for further improvements of the current mechanism and the creation of new devices including a banking resolution mechanism and amore powerfulmechanismto provide financial assistance addressing both the sovereign and external dimensions of the shocks thereby reducing the need for the ECB to fill the current void.

International financial centres, office market rents and volatility

Despite continuing developments in information technology and the growing economic significance of the emerging Eastern European, South American and Asian economies, international financial activity remains strongly concentrated in a relatively small number of international financial centres. That concentration of financial activity requires a critical mass of office occupation and creates demand for high specification, high cost space. The demand for that space is increasingly linked to the fortunes of global capital markets. That linkage has been emphasised by developments in real estate markets, notably the development of global real estate investment, innovation in property investment vehicles and the growth of debt securitisation. The resultant interlinking of occupier, asset, debt and development markets within and across global financial centres is a source of potential volatility and risk. The paper sets out a broad conceptual model of the linkages and their implications for systemic market risk and presents preliminary empirical results that provide support for the model proposed.

The role of Investment Management Systems in regulatory compliance: a Post-Financial Crisis study of displacement mechanisms

The financial crisis of 2007–2009 and the resultant pressures exerted on policymakers to prevent future crises have precipitated coordinated regulatory responses globally. A key focus of the new wave of regulation is to ensure the removal of practices now deemed problematic with new controls for conducting transactions and maintaining holdings. There is increasing pressure on organizations to retire manual processes and adopt core systems, such as Investment Management Systems (IMS). These systems facilitate trading and ensure transactions are compliant by transcribing regulatory requirements into automated rules and applying them to trades. The motivation of this study is to explore the extent to which such systems may enable the alteration of previously embedded practices. We researched implementations of an IMS at eight global financial organizations and found that overall the IMS encourages responsible trading through surveillance, monitoring and the automation of regulatory rules and that such systems are likely to become further embedded within financial organizations. We found evidence that some older practices persisted. Our study suggests that the institutionalization of technology-induced compliant behaviour is still uncertain.

Do IMF and World Bank programs induce government crises? an empirical analysis

We examine whether and under what circumstances World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs affect the likelihood of major government crises. We find that crises are, on average, more likely as a consequence of World Bank programs. We also find that governments face an increasing risk of entering a crisis when they remain under an IMF or World Bank arrangement once the economy's performance improves. The international financial institution's (IFI) scapegoat function thus seems to lose its value when the need for financial support is less urgent. While the probability of a crisis increases when a government turns to the IFIs, programs inherited by preceding governments do not affect the probability of a crisis. This is in line with two interpretations. First, the conclusion of IFI programs can signal the government's incompetence, and second, governments that inherit programs might be less likely to implement program conditions agreed to by their predecessors.

Economic growth in Sweden, 2000-2010 : The dot-com bubble and the financial crisis

    Economic growth is the increase in the inflation-adjusted market value of the goods and services produced by an economy over time. The total output is the quantity of goods or servicesproduced in a given time period within a country. Sweden was affected by two crises during the period 2000-2010: a dot-com bubble and a financial crisis. How did these two crises affect the economic growth?     The changes of domestic output can be separated into four parts: changes in intermediate demand, final domestic demand, export demand and import substitution. The main purpose of this article is to analyze the economic growth during the period 2000-2010, with focus on the dot-com bubble in the beginning of the period 2000-2005, and the financial crisis at the end of the period 2005-2010. The methodology to be used is the structural decomposition method.     This investigation shows that the main contributions to the Swedish total domestic output increase in both the period 2000-2005 and the period 2005-2010 were the effect of domestic demand. In the period 2005-2010, financial crisis weakened the effect of export. The output of the primary sector went from a negative change into a positive, explained mainly by strong export expansion. In the secondary sector, export had most effect in the period 2000-2005. Nevertheless, domestic demand and import ratio had more effect during the financial crisis period. Lastly, in the tertiary sector, domestic demand can mainly explain the output growth in the whole period 2000-2010.

Speculative attacks, openness and crises

In this paper we propose a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to evaluate financial adjustments that some emerging market economies went through to overcome external crises during the latest decades, such as default and local currency devaluation. We assume that real devaluation can be used to avoid external debt default, to improve trade balance and to reduce the real public debt level denominated in local currency. Such effects increase the government ability to deal with external crisis, but also have costs in terms of welfare, related to expected inflation, reductions in private investments and higher interest to be paid over the public debt. We conclude that openness improves expected welfare as it allows for a better devaluation-response technology against crises. We also present results for 32 middle-income countries, verifying that the proposed model can indicate, in a stylized way, the preferences for default-devaluation options and the magnitude of the currency depreciation required to overcome 48 external crises occurred as from 1971. Finally, as we construct our model based on the Cole-Kehoe self-fulfilling debt crisis model ([7]), adding local debt and trade, it is important to say that their policy alternatives to leave the crisis zone remains in our extended model, namely, to reduce the external debt level and to lengthen its maturity.

Crises financeiras recentes e poupança externa

A Década de 90 foi Marcada Pela Ocorrência de Crises Financeiras. este Trabalho Investiga a Ligação entre a Recorrência À Poupança Externa, a Deterioração das Restrições de Solvência e Liquidez e a Eclosão das Crises Financeiras.

A cross-country study on trade credit supply and financial crisis

O objetivo deste trabalho de pesquisa é investigar a oferta de crédito comercial durante períodos de crise financeira em seis países diferentes: Brasil, França, Alemanha, Itália, Espanha e Reino Unido, foram utilizadas informações de empresas de capital aberto entre 2000 e 2011. A literatura internacional documenta que durante o pico de crises financeiras a oferta de crédito comercial aumenta pois as companhias usam o crédito comercial como substituto e/ou complemento ao crédito bancário, apesar de após o momento de pico esta oferta diminui significantemente porque as empresas enfrentam problemas de liquidez causado por escassez de crédito. Mesmo que somente existam evidências pontuais de que a oferta de crédito comercial aumentou durante a crise financeira global de 2008, o efeito pós-crise é perceptível durante a crise Europeia de 2011, pois as empresas europeias diminuíram a oferta de crédito comercial, também evidenciando que estas companhias estavam confrontando problemas de administração de liquidez. Em relação ao uso de crédito comercial como ferramenta de transmissão de capital, nenhuma evidência foi encontrada para provar sua existência em tempo de crise financeira.

Financial disruption as a cost of sovereign default

This dissertation analyses quantitatively the costs of sovereign default for the economy, in a model where banks with long positions in government debt play a central role in the financial intermediation for private sector's investments and face financial frictions that limit their leverage ability. Calibration tries to resemble some features of the Eurozone, where discussions about bailout schemes and default risk have been central issues. Results show that the model captures one important cost of default pointed out by empirical and theoretical literature on debt crises, namely the fall in investment that follows haircut episodes, what can be explained by a worsening in banks' balance sheet conditions that limits credit for the private sector and raises their funding costs. The cost in terms of output decrease is though not significant enough to justify the existence of debt markets and the government incentives for debt repayment. Assuming that the government is able to alleviate its constrained budget by imposing a restructuring on debt repayment profile that allows it to cut taxes, our model generates an important difference for output path comparing lump-sum taxes and distortionary. For our calibration, quantitative results show that in terms of output and utility, it is possible that the effect on the labour supply response generated by tax cuts dominates investment drop caused by credit crunch on financial markets. We however abstract from default costs associated to the breaking of existing contracts, external sanctions and risk spillovers between countries, that might also be relevant in addition to financial disruption effects. Besides, there exist considerable trade-offs for short and long run path of economic variables related to government and banks' behaviour.

Banco Central e a administração de crises bancárias

Crises bancárias podem implicar uma alta redistribuição de recursos em uma sociedade. O interesse público em manter os bancos em funcionamento demanda o desenho de regimes eficazes de resolução, pois a falência desordenada desses intermediários pode ser uma fonte de risco sistêmico. O Banco Central, autoridade responsável por zelar pela higidez do sistema financeiro, pode se valer de diversos instrumentos para reestruturar ou liquidar um banco em dificuldade financeira. De modo a prevenir a propagação do risco sistêmico, as regras jurídicas conferem ao Banco Central uma ampla margem de discricionariedade no julgamento de quais bancos merecem receber assistência financeira e na escolha dos métodos de resolução bancária. O caráter globalizado das finanças exige uma maior coordenação entre autoridades domésticas na resolução de bancos que operam em múltiplas jurisdições. Algumas iniciativas de órgãos internacionais no período pós-crise de 2007-2008 têm buscado instituir, em nível global, um marco normativo para gerenciamento de crises bancárias, através da harmonização de regimes domésticos de resolução. O histórico de crises do sistema financeiro brasileiro levou ao desenvolvimento de uma rede de proteção bancária em momentos anteriores à crise financeira global de 2007-2008. Assim, o sistema financeiro brasileiro apresentou bom funcionamento mesmo nas fases mais agudas. Não tendo experimentado uma crise sistêmica no período recente, o Brasil não está passando por reformas profundas na estrutura institucional do seu sistema financeiro, a exemplo de países como Estados Unidos e Reino Unido. No entanto, desafios impostos pela crescente globalização das finanças e peculiaridades locais motivam reformas e mudanças discretas nos padrões de governança da rede de proteção brasileira. Através da reconstituição da atuação do Banco Central em três momentos de crise no Brasil, o presente trabalho busca analisar criticamente a rede de proteção bancária brasileira e os mecanismos jurídicos de accountability da autoridade financeira no exercício da supervisão e administração de crises bancárias.

Banks, liquidity crises and economic growth

How do the liquidity functions of banks affect investment and growth at different stages of economic development? How do financial fragility and the costs of banking crises evolve with the level of wealth of countries? We analyze these issues using an overlapping generations growth model where agents, who experience idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, can invest in a liquid storage technology or in a partially illiquid Cobb Douglas technology. By pooling liquidity risk, banks play a growth enhancing role in reducing inefficient liquidation of long term projects, but they may face liquidity crises associated with severe output losses. We show that middle income economies may find optimal to be exposed to liquidity crises, while poor and rich economies have more incentives to develop a fully covered banking system. Therefore, middle income economies could experience banking crises in the process of their development and, as they get richer, they eventually converge to a financially safe long run steady state. Finally, the model replicates the empirical fact of higher costs of banking crises for middle income economies.

The development of the private equity industry since the 2008 financial crisis

The private equity industry was experiencing a phenomenal boom at the turn of the century but collapsed abruptly in 2008 with the onset of the financial crisis. Considered one of the worst crises since the Great Depression of the 1930s, it had sent ripples around the world threatening the collapse of financial institutions and provoking a liquidity crunch followed by a huge downturn in economic activity and recession. Furthermore, the physiognomy of the financial landscape had considerably altered with banks retracting from the lending space, accompanied by a hardening of financial regulation that sought to better contain systemic risk. Given the new set of changes and challenges that had arisen from this period of financial turmoil, private equity found itself having to question current practices and methods of operation in order to adjust to the harsh realities of a new post-apocalyptic world. Consequently, this paper goes on to explore how the private equity business, management and operation model has evolved since the credit crunch with a specific focus on mature markets such as the United States and Europe. More specifically, this paper will aim to gather insights on the development of the industry since the crisis in Western Europe through a case study approach using as a base interviews with professionals working in the industry and those external to the sector but who have/have had considerable interaction with PE players from 2007 to the present.

A note on financial regulation and the brazilian response to the 2008‐09 financial crisis

Brazil was frequently criticized for its interventionist and heavy financial regulation up until the 2008‐09 world financial crisis.  According to the neo‐liberal or pro‐market view that predominated in academic and financial circles during the early 2000s, economic development came together with financial deepening, which in its turn could only be achieved through financial liberalization and deregulation. The currency crises of the 1990s notwithstanding, by the mid‐2000s Brazil’s segmented financial market and its restrictive reserve and capital requirements were seen as a symbol of inefficiency and backwardness by most financial specialists.  To the luck of the Brazilian population, most of the advices of such specialists were ignored by the Brazilian authorities, so that, when the 2008 financial crisis hit the world economy, Brazil still had powerful and efficient instruments to deal with the problem.  The objective of this note is to present the mains aspects of the Brazilian financial regulation and how they helped the economy to deal with the consequences of 2008‐09 financial meltdown.