Making the Most of EU Labour Mobility. Report of a CEPS Task Force in Cooperation with the Bertelsmann Foundation. CEPS Task Force Report, 7 October 2014

This Task Force report combines the most recent data from Eurostat with national sources to highlight the most significant labour mobility trends within the EU. Overall, the recent recession has not induced previously immobile workers to become more mobile, at least not in the larger member states. Mobility flows have moved away from crisis countries in response to the economic downturn but the desired increase in south-north mobility has not been observed so far. This leads the authors to conclude that successfully fostering mobility within EU15 countries requires tremendous effort. It is important that workers who are willing and able to move are not discouraged from doing so by unnecessary barriers to mobility. Improving the workings of the EURES system and its online job-matching platform; better cooperation of national employment agencies; streamlining the recognition of qualifications; and supporting language training within the EU are important contributions to labour mobility. The authors conclude that the EU is right to defend the free movement of workers. National governments should keep in mind that their ability to tap into an attractive foreign labour supply also hinges upon the perception of how mobile workers are treated in destination countries. If the political imperative requires regulations to be changed, such as the one guiding the coordination of social security, it is essential that no new mobility barriers are put in place.

The Challenges of the EU Banking Union - will it succeed in dealing with the next financial crisis? Bruges European Economic Policy Briefings 36/2015

The EU Banking Union combines micro- and macro-prudential regulation. It aims at breaking the “doom loop” between banks and sovereign debt, promoting financial stability and mitigating the next financial shock to the real EU economy, at the lowest possible cost to the financial institutions and to the taxpayers. Success, or failure, is determined by how the banking union copes with the challenges to its two main pillars, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). Under the SSM, in its new supervisory role, the ECB may be subject to conflicts between the objectives of price and financial stability, and the single-supervisor role may be sub-optimal. Two regulators might have been preferable and more focus on ECB accountability will now be required. The shock-absorbing Single Resolution Fund (SRF), which is part of the SRM, may not have the capacity to deal with a crisis of the size of the one of 2008. Especially as the nature and severity of a future financial crisis cannot be forecasted. The design of the banking union is not the result of theoretical studies, but a political compromise to deal with an acute crisis. The theoretical studies that are included in this paper are not supportive of the banking union in its current form. Nevertheless, there is a good chance that the EU Banking Union may succeed, as ECB supervision of the 123 systemically important banks should contain potential demands on the SRM. In the event of a crisis that is too severe for the banking union to absorb with its current capability, the crucial assumption is that there is political will to rapidly provide new resources. The same applies, if a major financial crisis develops before the banking union is fully operational.

The Challenges of the EU Banking Union - will it succeed in dealing with the next financial crisis? Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefings 36/2015

The EU Banking Union combines micro- and macro-prudential regulation. It aims at breaking the “doom loop” between banks and sovereign debt, promoting financial stability and mitigating the next financial shock to the real EU economy, at the lowest possible cost to the financial institutions and to the taxpayers. Success, or failure, is determined by how the banking union copes with the challenges to its two main pillars, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). Under the SSM, in its new supervisory role, the ECB may be subject to conflicts between the objectives of price and financial stability, and the single-supervisor role may be sub-optimal. Two regulators might have been preferable and more focus on ECB accountability will now be required. The shock-absorbing Single Resolution Fund (SRF), which is part of the SRM, may not have the capacity to deal with a crisis of the size of the one of 2008. Especially as the nature and severity of a future financial crisis cannot be forecasted. The design of the banking union is not the result of theoretical studies, but a political compromise to deal with an acute crisis. The theoretical studies that are included in this paper are not supportive of the banking union in its current form. Nevertheless, there is a good chance that the EU Banking Union may succeed, as ECB supervision of the 123 systemically important banks should contain potential demands on the SRM. In the event of a crisis that is too severe for the banking union to absorb with its current capability, the crucial assumption is that there is political will to rapidly provide new resources. The same applies, if a major financial crisis develops before the banking union is fully operational.

The Pentateuch in contrast with the science and moral sense of our age.

Each part has separate t.-p.: part 6 has title: The Pentateuch and book of Joshua in face of the science and moral sense of our age.

Outline for a laboratory course in genetics, recommended for use in connection with the text-book Genetics and eugenics,

Mode of access: Internet.

The charter of the Albany and Greenbush Bridge Company : and a statement of its claims on the public interest in connection with the Boston, Hoosac Tunnel and Albany Railroad.

"J.W. Gascoigne, secretary."