Fertilizer policy in the developing countries: the case of Brazil

This paper deals initially with the role of mineral fertilizers in increasing agricultural production: the relationship between the two variables is illustrated within global, regional national and local contexts. The pattern and trends in fertilizer usage in Brazil are presented next, namely: increase in consumption in the period 1950/72; regional distribution; consumption as related to crops and cultivated land. It is shown that in less than a quarter or century fertilizer use has increased in the country nearly 12 fold, whereas world consumption was raised 7 fold, thus exceeding estimates based in several criteria. Steps taken to secure the raise in fertilizer consumption above the historical trend are discussed: research experience for outlining fertilization recomendations; the transfer of the knowledge to the farmer by the extension work both official and private; the credit policy and special incentives for the purchase of fertilizer; the national policy for minumum proces of agricultural products; the implantation of a national fertilizer industry. It is considered that the Brazilian experience adapted to similar local conditions in other developing countries, presents a possibility for achieving beneficial results without inflationary reflexes in the economy.

Financial Distress in Chinese Industry: Microeconomic, Macroeconomic and Institutional Infuences

We study the impact of both microeconomic factors and the macroeconomy on the financial distress of Chinese listed companies over a period of massive economic transition, 1995 to 2006. Based on an economic model of financial distress under the institutional setting of state protection against exit, and using our own firm-level measure of distress, we find important impacts of firm characteristics, macroeconomic instability and institutional factors on the hazard rate of financial distress. The results are robust to unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level, as well as those shared by firms in similar macroeconomic founding conditions. Comparison with related studies for other economies highlights important policy implications.

How much does industry matter in an emerging market economy?

Theories of firm profitability make different predictions about the relative importance of firm, industry and time specific factors. We assess, empirically, the relevance of these effects over a sixteen year period in India, as a regime of control and regulation, pre 1985, gave way to partial liberalisation between 1985 and 1991 and to more decisive liberalisation after 1991. We find that firm effects are important throughout, when rent seeking opportunities proliferated, as well as when competitive forces were enhanced by institutional change. In contrast, industry effects significantly increased after liberalisation, suggesting that industry structure matters more within competitive markets. These findings help understand the relevance of different models over different stages of liberalisation, and have important implications for both theory and policy.

Industrial district effects and innovation in the Tuscan shipbuilding industry

The aim of the present work is to investigate innovative processes within a geographical cluster, and thus contribute to the debate on the effects of industrial clusters on innovation capacity. In particular, we would like to ascertain whether the advantages of industrial districts in promoting innovation, as already revealed by literature (diffusion of knowledge, social capital and trust, efficient networking), are also keys to success in the Tuscan shipbuilding industry of pleasure and sporting boats. First, we verify the existence of clusters of shipbuilding in Tuscany, using a specific methodology. Next, in the identified clusters, we analyse three innovative networks financed in a policy to support innovation, and examine whether the typical features of a cluster for promoting innovation are at work, using a questionnaire administered to 71 actors. Finally, we develop a performance analysis of the cluster firms and ascertain whether their different behaviours also lead to different performances. The analysis results show that our case records effects of industrial clustering on innovation capacity, such as the important role given to trust and social capital, the significant worth put in interfirm relations and in each partner’s specific competencies, or even the distinctive performance of firms belonging to a cluster.

Three Essays on the Formation and Impact of Economic Policy

Introduction In my thesis I argue that economic policy is all about economics and politics. Consequently, analysing and understanding economic policy ideally has at least two parts. The economics part, which is centered around the expected impact of a specific policy on the real economy both in terms of efficiency and equity. The insights of this part point into which direction the fine-tuning of economic policies should go. However, fine-tuning of economic policies will be most likely subject to political constraints. That is why, in the politics part, a much better understanding can be gained by taking into account how the incentives of politicians and special interest groups as well as the role played by different institutional features affect the formation of economic policies. The first part and chapter of my thesis concentrates on the efficiency-related impact of economic policies: how does corporate income taxation in general, and corporate income tax progressivity in specific, affect the creation of new firms? Reduced progressivity and flat-rate taxes are in vogue. By 2009, 22 countries are operating flat-rate income tax systems, as do 7 US states and 14 Swiss cantons (for corporate income only). Tax reform proposals in the spirit of the "flat tax" model typically aim to reduce three parameters: the average tax burden, the progressivity of the tax schedule, and the complexity of the tax code. In joint work, Marius Brülhart and I explore the implications of changes in these three parameters on entrepreneurial activity, measured by counts of firm births in a panel of Swiss municipalities. Our results show that lower average tax rates and reduced complexity of the tax code promote firm births. Controlling for these effects, reduced progressivity inhibits firm births. Our reading of these results is that tax progressivity has an insurance effect that facilitates entrepreneurial risk taking. The positive effects of lower tax levels and reduced complexity are estimated to be significantly stronger than the negative effect of reduced progressivity. To the extent that firm births reflect desirable entrepreneurial dynamism, it is not the flattening of tax schedules that is key to successful tax reforms, but the lowering of average tax burdens and the simplification of tax codes. Flatness per se is of secondary importance and even appears to be detrimental to firm births. The second part of my thesis, which corresponds to the second and third chapter, concentrates on how economic policies are formed. By the nature of the analysis, these two chapters draw on a broader literature than the first chapter. Both economists and political scientists have done extensive research on how economic policies are formed. Thereby, researchers in both disciplines have recognised the importance of special interest groups trying to influence policy-making through various channels. In general, economists base their analysis on a formal and microeconomically founded approach, while abstracting from institutional details. In contrast, political scientists' frameworks are generally richer in terms of institutional features but lack the theoretical rigour of economists' approaches. I start from the economist's point of view. However, I try to borrow as much as possible from the findings of political science to gain a better understanding of how economic policies are formed in reality. In the second chapter, I take a theoretical approach and focus on the institutional policy framework to explore how interactions between different political institutions affect the outcome of trade policy in presence of special interest groups' lobbying. Standard political economy theory treats the government as a single institutional actor which sets tariffs by trading off social welfare against contributions from special interest groups seeking industry-specific protection from imports. However, these models lack important (institutional) features of reality. That is why, in my model, I split up the government into a legislative and executive branch which can both be lobbied by special interest groups. Furthermore, the legislative has the option to delegate its trade policy authority to the executive. I allow the executive to compensate the legislative in exchange for delegation. Despite ample anecdotal evidence, bargaining over delegation of trade policy authority has not yet been formally modelled in the literature. I show that delegation has an impact on policy formation in that it leads to lower equilibrium tariffs compared to a standard model without delegation. I also show that delegation will only take place if the lobby is not strong enough to prevent it. Furthermore, the option to delegate increases the bargaining power of the legislative at the expense of the lobbies. Therefore, the findings of this model can shed a light on why the U.S. Congress often practices delegation to the executive. In the final chapter of my thesis, my coauthor, Antonio Fidalgo, and I take a narrower approach and focus on the individual politician level of policy-making to explore how connections to private firms and networks within parliament affect individual politicians' decision-making. Theories in the spirit of the model of the second chapter show how campaign contributions from lobbies to politicians can influence economic policies. There exists an abundant empirical literature that analyses ties between firms and politicians based on campaign contributions. However, the evidence on the impact of campaign contributions is mixed, at best. In our paper, we analyse an alternative channel of influence in the shape of personal connections between politicians and firms through board membership. We identify a direct effect of board membership on individual politicians' voting behaviour and an indirect leverage effect when politicians with board connections influence non-connected peers. We assess the importance of these two effects using a vote in the Swiss parliament on a government bailout of the national airline, Swissair, in 2001, which serves as a natural experiment. We find that both the direct effect of connections to firms and the indirect leverage effect had a strong and positive impact on the probability that a politician supported the government bailout.

The de facto independence of regulatory agencies and its consequences for policy making and regulatory outcomes

This dissertation focuses on the practice of regulatory governance, throughout the study of the functioning of formally independent regulatory agencies (IRAs), with special attention to their de facto independence. The research goals are grounded on a "neo-positivist" (or "reconstructed positivist") position (Hawkesworth 1992; Radaelli 2000b; Sabatier 2000). This perspective starts from the ontological assumption that even if subjective perceptions are constitutive elements of political phenomena, a real world exists beyond any social construction and can, however imperfectly, become the object of scientific inquiry. Epistemologically, it follows that hypothetical-deductive theories with explanatory aims can be tested by employing a proper methodology and set of analytical techniques. It is thus possible to make scientific inferences and general conclusions to a certain extent, according to a Bayesian conception of knowledge, in order to update the prior scientific beliefs in the truth of the related hypotheses (Howson 1998), while acknowledging the fact that the conditions of truth are at least partially subjective and historically determined (Foucault 1988; Kuhn 1970). At the same time, a sceptical position is adopted towards the supposed disjunction between facts and values and the possibility of discovering abstract universal laws in social science. It has been observed that the current version of capitalism corresponds to the golden age of regulation, and that since the 1980s no government activity in OECD countries has grown faster than regulatory functions (Jacobs 1999). Following an apparent paradox, the ongoing dynamics of liberalisation, privatisation, decartelisation, internationalisation, and regional integration hardly led to the crumbling of the state, but instead promoted a wave of regulatory growth in the face of new risks and new opportunities (Vogel 1996). Accordingly, a new order of regulatory capitalism is rising, implying a new division of labour between state and society and entailing the expansion and intensification of regulation (Levi-Faur 2005). The previous order, relying on public ownership and public intervention and/or on sectoral self-regulation by private actors, is being replaced by a more formalised, expert-based, open, and independently regulated model of governance. Independent regulation agencies (IRAs), that is, formally independent administrative agencies with regulatory powers that benefit from public authority delegated from political decision makers, represent the main institutional feature of regulatory governance (Gilardi 2008). IRAs constitute a relatively new technology of regulation in western Europe, at least for certain domains, but they are increasingly widespread across countries and sectors. For instance, independent regulators have been set up for regulating very diverse issues, such as general competition, banking and finance, telecommunications, civil aviation, railway services, food safety, the pharmaceutical industry, electricity, environmental protection, and personal data privacy. Two attributes of IRAs deserve a special mention. On the one hand, they are formally separated from democratic institutions and elected politicians, thus raising normative and empirical concerns about their accountability and legitimacy. On the other hand, some hard questions about their role as political actors are still unaddressed, though, together with regulatory competencies, IRAs often accumulate executive, (quasi-)legislative, and adjudicatory functions, as well as about their performance.

Sixth Annual Report of the Independent Monitoring Group for A Vision for Change - the Report of the Expert Group on Mental Health Policy - July 2012

Sixth Annual Report of the Independent Monitoring Group for A Vision for Change – the Report of the Expert Group on Mental Health Policy – July 2012 This is the 6th Annual Report of the Independent Monitoring Group for A Vision for Change (IMG) and the final report of the Second Group. It is clear to the IMG that the implementation of A Vision for Change (AVFC) to date including 2011 has been slow and inconsistent. There is a continued absence of a National Mental Health Service Directorate with authority and control of resources. Such a body has the potential to give strong corporate leadership and act as a catalyst for change. Click here to download HSE National and Regional Progress ReportsHSE – 6th Annual Report HSE – National and Regional Progress Report Progress Reports from Government DepartmentsDepartment of Children and Youth AffairsDepartment of Education and SkillsDepartment of Health Department of Justice and Equality Department of Social ProtectionDepartment of Environment, Community & Local Government National Mental Health Programme Plan Consultation Document What We Heard Submissions Received by the IMGAmnesty International Ireland submission Association of Occupational Therapists submission College of Psychiatry of Ireland submissionCollege of Psychiatry of Ireland – Press Release regarding Social Psychiatry and Recovery Conference College of Psychiatry of Ireland – regarding Psychotherapy Training for Psychiatric TraineesCollege of Psychiatry of Ireland – regarding relationship with Pharmaceutical Industry College of Psychiatry of Ireland – Mental Health in Primary CareDisability Federation of IrelandHealth Research Board submission Irish Association of Social Workers – Adult Mental Health Irish Association of Social Workers – Child and Adolescent Mental Health Irish College of General PractitionersMental Health CommissionMental Health ReformPharmaceutical Society of IrelandIrish Advocacy Network Childrens Mental Health CoalitionNational Disability AuthorityNational Service Users ExecutiveNational Service Users Executive – Second Opinions ReportNational Federation of Voluntary BodiesHeadstrong  

National Alcohol Policy Ireland

The National Alcohol Policy is directed at reducing the prevalence of alcohol-related problems through an emphasis on moderation in alcohol consumption. The importance of a comprehensive alcohol policy was highlighted when Ireland endorsed the European Charter on Alcohol in December 1995 along with 48 other Member States of the WHO European Region. The alcohol-related problems are multidimensional, therefore the solutions most be multi-sectoral. This means that commitment to the National Alcohol Policy must be on the agenda of policy makers in all sectors and at all levels. An Alcohol Policy requires both environmental and individual strategies. There is strong evidence that policies which influence access to alcohol, control pricing through taxation and other public health measures, can have a positive impact on curtailing the health and social burden resulting from drinking (Edwards et al. 1994). However, a key to the effectiveness of such strategies is public support, enforcement and maintenance of the policies. In examining the rationale for a National Alcohol Policy a number of elements have been identified. Research is urgently required to identify attitudes and patterns of alcohol consumption across the population and within sub-groups of the population. Based on sound research, a sensible drinking message of Less is Better should form an educational empowerment programme with regional and local initiatives as a required and integral part of such a campaign. A health education programme in all schools should be part of the core curriculum. The availability and effectiveness of treatment services need to be established. Action to contain the availability of alcohol could be achieved by reducing the number of special exemptions for longer opening hours and controlling access to underage drinking by ID schemes nation-wide. The enforcement of drink driving legislation including random breath testing needs to be continued to reduce alcohol-related traffic accidents. All levels of the Drinks Industry should recognise that people have the right to be safeguarded from pressures to drink. Finally, a National Alcohol Policy could be co-ordinated by a wider National Substance Use Surveillance Unit.This resource was contributed by The National Documentation Centre on Drug Use.

Nanoparticle usage and protection measures in the manufacturing industry : a representative survey

Addressing the risks of nanoparticles requires knowledge about release into the environment and occupational exposure. However, such information currently is not systematically collected; therefore, this risk assessment lacks quantitative data. The goal was to evaluate the current level of nanoparticle usage in Swiss industry as well as health, safety, and environmental measures, and the number of potentially exposed workers. A representative, stratified mail survey was conducted among 1626 clients of the Swiss National Accident Insurance Fund (SUVA), which insures 80,000 manufacturing firms, representing 84% of all Swiss manufacturing companies (947 companies answered the survey for a 58.3% response rate). The extrapolation to all Swiss manufacturing companies results in 1309 workers (95% confidence interval [CI]: 1073 to 1545) potentially exposed to nanoparticles in 586 companies (95% CI: 145 to 1027). This corresponds to 0.08% of workers (95% CI: 0.06% to 0.09%) and to 0.6% of companies (95% CI: 0.2% to 1.1%). The industrial chemistry sector showed the highest percentage of companies using nanoparticles (21.2%). Other important sectors also reported nanoparticles. Personal protection equipment was the predominant protection strategy. Only a few applied specific environmental protection measures. This is the first nationwide representative study on nanoparticle use in the manufacturing sector. The information gained can be used for quantitative risk assessment. It can also help policymakers design strategies to support companies developing a safer use of nanomaterial. Notingthe current low use of nanoparticles, there is still time to proactively introduce protective methods. If the predicted "nano-revolution" comes true, now is the time to take action. [Supplementary materials are available for this article. Go to the publisher's online edition of Journal of occupational and Environmental Hygiene for the following free supplemental resource: a pdf file containing a detailed description of the approach to statistical analyses, English translation of the questionnaire, additional information for Figure 1, and additional information for the SUVA-code.] [Authors]

Dairy Food Consumption, Production, and Policy in Japan, August 2005

We explore and investigate Japanese dairy markets. We first provide an overview of consumer demand and how it evolved after World War II. Using historical data and econometric estimates of Japanese dairy demand, we identify economic, cultural, and demographic forces that have been shaping consumption patterns. Then we summarize the characteristics of Japanese milk production and dairy processing and policies affecting them. We next describe the import regime and trade flows in dairy products. The analysis of the regulatory system of the dairy sector shows how its incentive structure affects the long-term prospects of various segments of the industry. The paper concludes with policy recommendations of how to reform the Japanese dairy sector.

Pharmaceutical Generics, Vertical Product Differentiation, and Public Policy

This paper studies oligopolistic competition in off-patent pharmaceutical markets using a vertical product differentiation model. This model can explain the observation that countries with stronger regulations have smaller generic market shares. It can also explain the differences in observed regulatory regimes. Stronger regulation may be due to a higher proportion of production that is done by foreign firms. Finally, a closely related model can account for the observed increase in prices by patent owners after entry of generic producers.

Asymmetric information and trade policy

Economists understand protectionism as a costly mechanism to redistribute from the average citizen to special-interest groups; yet political platforms that deviate from free trade have surprising popular appeal. I present an explanation based on heterogeneous information across citizens whose voting decision has an intensive margin. For each politician and each sector, the optimal trade-policy choice caters to the preferences of those voters who are more likely to be informed of that proposal. An overall protectionist bias emerges because in every industry producers are better informed than consumers. This asymmetry emerges in equilibrium because co-workers share industry-specific knwoledge, and because producers have greater incentives to engage in costly learning about their sector. My model implies that more widespread information about trade policy for an industry is associated with lower protection. Cross-sectoral evidence on U.S. non-tariff barriers and newspaper coverage is consistent with this prediction.

First impressions matter: Signalling as a source of policy dynamics

We first establish that policymakers on the Bank of England's Monetary PolicyCommittee choose lower interest rates with experience. We then reject increasingconfidence in private information or learning about the structure of the macroeconomy as explanations for this shift. Instead, a model in which voters signal theirhawkishness to observers better fits the data. The motivation for signalling is consistent with wanting to control inflation expectations, but not career concerns orpleasing colleagues. There is also no evidence of capture by industry. The papersuggests that policy-motivated reputation building may be important for explainingdynamics in experts' policy choices.

The Spanish motor industry in the first third of the 20th Century: A lost opportunity

The Spanish automobile industry had a late start. Although the country proved capable of short production runs of high-quality vehicles during the first third of the century it never managed to build up its own industry, unlike Great Britain, France, or Italy. What then, were the critical shortcomings that prevented the establishment of large Spanish motor manufacturers? Put another way, why did all of the companies set up during the first half-century fail to survive? This paper attempts to shed some light on these questions, employing a wide-ranging analysis of both internal and external factors affecting the industry. A feeble internal market, lack of resources and production factors are usually adduced as reasons, as are Spain's general economic backwardness and the role played by the public authorities. However, this paper mainly focuses on the internal factors concerning company strategy and organisation. A comparison with the Italian case helps put the traditional arguments in proper perspective and highlights those covering business strategies. Finally, we argue that a broad range of factors needs to be analysed to fully understand why Spain failed to establish a motor industry.

Research joint ventures and optimal R&D policy with asymmetric information

When to allow Research Joint Ventures (RJVs) or not is an importantinstrument in the development of an optimal R&D policy. Theregulator, however, is unlikely to know all the relevant informationto regulate R&D optimally. The extent to which there existappropriability problems between the firms is one such variable thatis private information to the firms in the industry. In a duopolysetting we analyze the characteristics of a second-best R&D policywhere the government can either allow RJVs or not and give lump-sumsubsidies to the parties involved. The second-best R&D policy withoutsubsidies will either block some welfare improving RJVs or allow somewelfare reducing ones. With lump-sum subsidies, the second-best policytrades off the expected subsidy cost with allowing welfare decreasingRJVs or blocking welfare increasing ones.