Privatisation, empowerment and accountability: What are the policy implications for establishing effective farmer organisations?

Weak institutional development and information flows have constrained the extent to which the small-holder farming sector in developing countries can significantly drive growth and poverty reduction. Thisis despite widely implemented economic liberalisation policies focussing on market efficiency. Farmerorganisations are viewed as a potential means of addressing public and private institutional failure but thishas frequently been limited by inequalities in access to power and information. This article investigatestwo issues that have received little research attention to date: what role downward accountability plays inenabling farmer organisations to improve services and markets, and what influences the extent to whichdownward accountability is achieved. Kenya Tea Development Agency (KTDA), one of the largest farmerorganisations in the world (>400,000 farmers) is examined alongside wider literature. Mixed methodswere used including key informant interviews, and eight months of participant observation followedby a questionnaire survey. The article concludes that without effective downward accountability farmerorganisations can become characterised by institutions and mechanisms that favour elites, restrictedweak coordination and regulation, and manipulated information flows. This in turn reduces individuals’incentives to invest. If farmer organisations are to realise their potential as a means of enabling the small-holder sector to significantly contribute to economic growth and poverty reduction, policy and researchneeds to address key factors which influence accountability including: how to ensure initial processes information of farmer organisations establish appropriate structures and rules; strong state regulation toenhance corporate accountability; transparent information provision regarding actions of farmer organi-sation leaders; and the role independent non-government organisations can play. Consequently attentionneeds to focus on developing means of legitimising rights, building poor people’s capacity to challengeexclusion, and moving from rights to obligations regarding information provision.

Circles of support and accountability: criminal justice volunteers as the 'Deliberative public'

This paper provides a review of the role played by volunteers within one particular offender management and reintegration scheme in the United Kingdom. Circles of Support and Accountability (COSA) draw on the expertise of volunteer members of the public to create supportive monitoring frameworks around sex offenders following their release from prison. The paper presents evidence as to the motivations of these volunteers, and argues that they play a crucial role in the success of the scheme, as they provide an instrumentally-useful form of reintegrative social contact to a socially-excluded offender population, and perform a symbolically important role as representatives of the wider community in taking ownership of offender management practices on behalf of the wider society. This is particularly significant in grounding those processes in the communicative practices of the social sphere, providing powerful reasons for intervention that reinforce the work that COSA do.

Strengthening citizen agency and accountability through ICT

We investigated the role of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT, namely mobile phones) in support of citizen agency and its potential in calling authorities to account. We focused on Eastern Africa and we used a mixed methodology, which allowed us to explore the current uses of ICT to strengthen accountability and to forecast the growth of mobile phones' adaption in that region. Evidence from both analyses suggests that there are two main areas where citizen agency and ICT can reinforce each other in bottom–up and horizontal processes: participation and engagement of citizens, and the diffusion of information.

Separating real incentives and accountability

In experimental investigations of the effect of real incentives, accountability—the implicit or explicit expectation of a decision maker that she may have to justify her decisions in front of somebody else—is often confounded with the incentives themselves. This confounding of accountability with incentives makes causal attributions of any effects found problematic. We separate accountability and incentives, and find different effects. Accountability is found to reduce preference reversals between frames, for which incentives have no effect. Incentives on the other hand are found to reduce risk seeking for losses, where accountability has no effect. In a choice task between simple and compound events, accountability increases the preference for the simple event, while incentives have a weaker effect going in the opposite direction. It is thus shown that the confounding of accountability and incentives is relevant for studies on the effect of the latter, and that existing conclusions on the effect of incentives need to be reconsidered in light of this issue.

Presidents, assemblies, and accountability

Much research has explored the relationship between economics and elections, and scholars have begun to explore how institutions mediate that link. However, the relationship between presidential institutions and electoral accountability remains largely unexplored in comparative politics. Because voters in presidential systems can cast votes for executive and legislative elections separately, we have good reasons to suspect that the institutions of presidentialism might generate different forms or degrees of accountability than parliamentarism. Powell and Whitten (1993) suggest that the partisan or institutional “clarity of responsibility” might mediate the relationship between economics and elections: when responsibility for outcomes is clear, the relationship should be strong, and vice-versa. I develop this notion for use in presidential systems, and explore executive and legislative elections in 24 countries. The results indicate that economics always influences the incumbent vote in executive elections, regardless of the partisan or institutional clarity of responsibility. Economics also affects vote swings in legislative elections, but the institutional clarity of responsibility does mediate this relationship: legislative accountability for national economic outcomes is lowest when clarity of responsibility is highest, a situation that arises when the president is relatively more powerful and the bases for electing legislators and the president differ. By providing an empirical basis for a discussion of accountability under presidentialism, these findings contribute to important debates in comparative politics.

Reformas del esquema de gestión de la CEPAL: delegación de autoridad y rendición de cuentas = Reform of the ECLAC management scheme: delegation of authority and accountability = Réforme du mécanisme de gestion de la CEPALC: délégation de pouvoirs et justification de l'emploi des fonds

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Bad Medicine: Homework or Headache? Responsibility and Accountability for Middle Level Mathematics Students

In this action research study of my 5th grade mathematics class, I investigated the issue of homework and its relationship with students and parents. I made some interesting observations and discovered that the majority of students and parents felt that the math homework that was given was fairly easy, yet issues of incomplete assignments and failing homework quizzes were notorious for some individuals. Comments were also made to make homework even easier and have shortened assignments despite the already indicated ease of the work. As a result of this research, I plan to look more closely at the history and development of homework, as well as the psychological implications and “hereditary” issues involving homework, which I believe are passed from one generation of learners to the next. My intent is to continue to study this phenomenon in future school years, trying to develop methods of instilling successful, intrinsic motivational skills to aid students in their homework endeavors. Finally, I will take a close inventory of my own beliefs and understandings toward homework: What is the purpose of having students do work away from the classroom, and how can homework serve as a proactive service for all who are involved?

Knuckling Under? School Superintendents and Accountability-Based Educational Reform

The goal of this article is to explore the various ways that superintendents have responded to accountability-based educational reform efforts such as No Child Left Behind, the factors that have influenced their responses, and the implications of these responses for current and future educational leaders. With respect to the first issue, empirical data from a number of nationai studies (T. E. Glass & Franceschini, 2007; Johnson, Arumi, & Ott, 2006; Johnstone, Dilkkers, & Luedeke, 2009; Stecher et al., 2008) make clear that while there have been a variety of responses from superintendents to accountability-based reform efforts, superintendents have mostly played a supportive role. Examining the situation more fully suggests that the driving factors behind superintendent support for accountability-based educational reform are complex and are often deeply embedded within the "DNA" of the role of superintendent. This article examines the structure of this DNA by looking at the factors that influence superintendents' views of accountability-based educational reform from historical, political, and institutional perspectives. This muitifaceted approach provides new insights into the complex relationship that exists between the structure of the role of superintendent and the agency of the individuals who inhabit that role.

Two risky and costly end-user related taboos when developing information systems: qualifications and accountability

This work highlights two critical taboos in organizations: 1)taking for granted the quality of certain capabilities and attitudes of the end-user representatives (EUR) in information systems development projects (ISDP), and 2) the EUR´s inherent accountability for losses in IS investments. These issues are neither addressed by theory nor research when assessing success/ failure. A triangulation approach was applied to combine quantitative and qualitative methods, having convergent results and showing that in problematic cases, paradoxically, the origin of IS rejection by end users (EU) points towards the EUR themselves. It has been evaluated to what extent some EUR factors impacted a macro ISDP involving an enterprise resource planning (ERP) package, ranking the ‘knowledge of the EUR’ as the main latent variable. The results validate some issues found throughout decades of praxis, confirming that when not properly managed the EUR role by itself has a direct relationship with IS rejection and significant losses in IS investments.