Effect of dietary supplementation of different oils during the first or second half of pregnancy on the glucose tolerance of the sow

Poor glucose tolerance may be an under-researched contributory factor in the high (10% to 20%) pre-weaning mortality rate observed in pigs. Insulin resistance commences at around week 12 of gestation in the sow, although there are conflicting reports in the literature about the extent to which insulin resistance is modulated by maternal diet. The aim of the study was to determine the effects of supplementing the maternal diet with different dietary oils during either the first half or the second half of gestation on the glucose tolerance of the sow. Sows were offered the control (C: n = 5) diet as pellets or the C diet plus 10% extra energy (h = 16 per group) derived from either. (i) extra pellets; (ii) palm oil; (iii) olive oil; (iv) sunflower oil; or (v) fish oil. Experimental diets were fed during either the first (G1) or second (G2) half of gestation. A glucose tolerance test (GTT) was conducted on day 108 of gestation by administering 0.5g/kg glucose i.v. Blood samples were taken every 5 to 10 min for 90 min post administration. The change in body weight and backfat thickness during gestation was similar but both type and timing of dietary supplementation influenced litter size and weight. With the exception of the sunflower oil group, supplementing the maternal diet in G1 resulted in larger and heavier litters, particularly in mothers offered palm oil. Basal blood glucose concentrations tended to be more elevated in G1 than G2 groups, whilst plasma insulin concentrations were similar Following a GTT, the adjusted area under the curve was greater in G1 compared to G2 sows, despite no differences in glucose clearance. Maternal diet appeared to influence the relationship between glucose curve characteristics following a GTT and litter outcome. In conclusion, the degree of insulin sensitivity can be altered by both the period during which maternal nutritional supplementation is offered and the fatty acid profile of the diet.

Cheap dates and the delusion of gratification: are votes sold or traded in the EU Council of Ministers?

Each year, small Member States receive a disproportionate share of the European Union's (EU's) budget. A prominent explanation for this is that Council decision-making involves a healthy dose of vote selling, whereby large Member States offer small states generous fiscal transfers in exchange for influence over policy. But nobody has investigated whether net budget contributors actually get anything for their money. In this paper I identify the vote selling model's observable implications and find virtually no evidence consistent with Council cash-for-votes exchanges. I also show that a compromise model – the leading model of EU decision-making to date – modified to incorporate vote selling does not outperform a standard one that assumes votes are traded rather than sold. Taken together, the results suggest that Council decision-making operates with little or no vote selling, and that regardless of whatever they think they might be buying, net budget contributors get little or nothing in return for their money. These findings call for further investigation into how Member States approach the issue of fiscal transfers, and into the factors other than formal voting weight that affect the power of actors engaged in EU decision-making.

How the European Union does not work: national bargaining success in the Council of Ministers

We know surprisingly little about whether the content of European Union legislation reflects the preferences of some Member States more than others. The few studies that have examined national bargaining success rates for EU legislation have conceptual and methodological weaknesses. To redress these problems I use a salience-weighted measure to gauge the relative success of Member States in translating their national preferences into legislation, and test two plausible, competing hypotheses about how the EU works: that no state consistently achieves more of what it really wants than any other, and that large Member States tend to beat small ones. Neither hypothesis receives empirical support. Not only do states differ far more significantly in their respective levels of bargaining success than previously recognised, but some of the smaller states are the ones that do especially well. The paper‟s main contribution -- demonstrating that the EU does not work as most people think it does -- sets the stage for new research questions, both positive and normative. In the last section I make a tentative start answering two of the most important: which factors explain the surprising empirical results, and whether differential national bargaining success might undermine the legitimacy of the integration process.