Deferred effects of nursery school on adolescents' school performance in Spain

This research analysis the long-term effects of nursery school attendance before the age of three in Spain. The effects are measured when the individuals are adolescents and attend secondary school. The article deals with the controversy over the long-term effects of nursery school attendance and its potential effect on reducing inequalities and social exclusion. The results estimate a significant long-term effect of nursery school attendance on improving educational performance, although the beneficial effects are lower among adolescents residing in the lower status households.

Paternal involvement and children's developmental stages in Spain

How does fathering change across children’s developmental stages and how do these changes vary by educational levels and women’s employment? To investigate this, I use the „2003 Spanish Time Use Survey‟ (N = 2,941) for a sample of heterosexual couples with children of different ages. I differentiate between physical (i.e. feeding, supervising, putting children to bed) and interactive child care activities (i.e. speaking to, playing with, teaching the child). Fathers‟ education strongly influences how much fathers participate in physical care in families with preschoolers, a stage in which these activities are particularly important for children’s physical, social, and emotional development. For interactive care, a significant education gradient emerges when the youngest child is aged 3 to 5, when the acquisition of complex linguistic, conceptual, and social skills is critical for later school success. Mother’s employment significantly influences father’s physical child care with preschoolers. This suggests that empowering Spanish women to participate in the labor market promotes gender equity in the household division of child care.

The Effect of occupational sex-composition on earnings: job-specialisation, sex-role attitudes and the division of domestic-labour in Spain

Important theoretical controversies remain unresolved in the literatire on occupational sex-segregation and the gender wage-gap. A useful way of summarising these controversies is viewing them as a debate between - cultural -socialisation. The paper discusses these theories in detail and carries out a preliminary test of the relative explanatory performance of some of their most consequential predictions. This is done by drawing on the Spanish sample of the second wave of the European Social Survey, ESS. The empirical analysis of ESS data illustrates the notable analytical pay-offs that can stem from using rich individual-level indicators, but also exemplifies the statistical llimitations generated by small sample size and high rates of non-response. Empirical results should, therefore, be taken as preliminary. They seem to suggest that the effect of occupational sex-segregation on wages could be explicable by workers' sex-role attitutes, their relative input in domestic production and the job-specific human capital requirements of their jobs. Of these three factors, job-specialisation seeems clearly the most important one.

Regional child care availability and fertility decisions in Spain

In this paper I explore two hypotheses: (1) Formal child care availability for children under three has a positive effect across contexts, according to the degree of adaptation of social institutions to changes in gender roles. Event history models with regional fixed effects are applied to data from the European Community Household Panel (1994-2001). The results show a significant and positive effect of regional day care availability on both, first and higher order births, while results are consistent with the second hypothesis only for second or higher order births.

Explaining parental dedication to child care in Spain

The quality of the time dedicated to child care has potential positive effects on children’s life chances. However, the determinants of parental time allocation to child care remain largely unexplored, particularly in context undergoing rapid family change such as Spain. We assess two alternative explanations for differences between parents in the amount of time spent with children. The first, based in the relative resources hypothesis, links variation in time spent with children to the relative attributes (occupation, education or income) of one partner to the other. The second, derived from the social status hypothesis, suggests that variation in time spent with children is attributable to the relative social position of the pair (i.e. higher status couples spend more time with children regardless of within-couple difference).To investigate theses questions, we use a sample of adults (18-50) from the Spanish Time Use Survey (STUS) 2002-2003 (n=7,438). Limiting the analysis to adults who are married or in consensual unions, the STUS allows to assess both the quantity and quality of parental time spent with children. We find little support for the “relative resources hypothesis”. Instead, consistent with the “social status hypothesis”, we find that time spent on child care is attributable to the social position of the couple, regardless of between-parent differences in income of education.

The drift of public spending towards the elderly: A generational analysis of the trend of public policies in Spain

The tendency for public welfare spending to be increasingly aimed at the elderly has been pointed out for the US and other developed countries. While population ageing is a common trend, it is not obvious why the shift in spending exceeds the trend in ageing, or why per capita spending on the elderly increases.We show that this is the case in Spain, identify the losers from this development, discuss the policies that underlie this trend, and propose adjustments based on Musgrave s fixed proportions rule as an inter-generationally fair distribution.

Social security, retirement, and the single-mindedness of the electorate

We propose a positive theory that is consistent with two important featuresof social security programs around the world: (1) they redistributeincome from young to old and (2) they induce retirement. We construct avoting model that includes a political campaign or debate prior to theelection. The model incorporates single-mindedness of the groups that donot work: while the workers divide their political capital between their age concerns and occupational concerns , the retired concentrate alltheir political capital to support their age group. In our model, theelderly end up getting transfers from the government (paid by the young)and distortionary labor income taxes induce the retirement of the elderly.In addition, our model predicts that occupational groups that work morewill tend to have more political power. The opposite is true fornon-occupational groups (such as the elderly). We provide some evidencethat supports these additional predictions.

Social security and democracy

Many political economic theories use and emphasize the process of votingin their explanation of the growth of Social Security, governmentspending, and other public policies. But is there an empirical connectionbetween democracy and Social Security program size or design? Using somenew international data sets to produce both country-panel econometricestimates as well as case studies of South American and southern Europeancountries, we find that Social Security policy varies according toeconomic and demographic factors, but that very different politicalhistories can result in the same Social Security policy. We find littlepartial effect of democracy on the size of Social Security budgets, onhow those budgets are allocated, or how economic and demographic factorsaffect Social Security. If there is any observed difference, democraciesspend a little less of their GDP on Social Security, grow their budgetsa bit more slowly, and cap their payroll tax more often, than doeconomically and demographically similar nondemocracies. Democracies andnondemocracies are equally likely to have benefit formulas inducingretirement and, conditional on GDP per capita, equally likely to induceretirement with a retirement test vs. an earnings test.

What social security: Beveridgean or Bismarckian?

Why are Bismarckian social security systems associated with largerpublic pension expenditures, a smaller fraction of private pension andlower income in-equality than Beveridgean systems? These facts arepuzzling for political economy theories of social security whichpredict that Beveridgean systems, involving intra-generationalredistribution, should enjoy larger support among low-income people andthus be larger. This paper explains these features in a bidimensionalpolitical economy model. In an economy with three income groups,low-income support a large, redistributive system; middle-income favoran earning-related system, while high-income oppose any public system,since they have access to a superior saving technology, a privatesystem. We show that, if income inequality is large, the voting majorityof high-income and low-income supports a (small) Beveridgean system,and a large private pillar arises; the opposite occurs with lowinequality. Additionally, when the capital market provides higherreturns, a Beveridgean system is more likely to emerge.

Is altruism important for understanding the long-run effects of social security?

This paper quantifies the effects of social security on capital accumulation and wealth distribution in a life cycle framework with altruistic individuals. The main findings of this paper are that the current U.S. social security system has a significant impact on capital accumulation and wealth distribution. I find that social security crowds out 8\% of the capital stock of an economy without social security. This effect is driven by the distortions of labor supply due to the taxation of labor income rather than by the intergenerational redistribution of income imposed by the social security system. In contrast to previous analysis of social security, I found that social security does not affect the savings rate of the economy. Another interesting finding is that even though the current U.S. social security system is progressive in its benefits, it may lead to a more disperse distribution of wealth.

Trade-off between formal and informal care in Spain

The remarkable growth of older population has moved long term care to the front ranks of the social policy agenda. Understanding the factors that determine the type and amount of formal care is important for predicting use in the future and developing long-term policy. In this context we jointly analyze the choice of care (formal, informal, both together or none) as well as the number of hours of care received. Given that the number of hours of care is not independent of the type of care received, we estimate, for the first time in this area of research, a sample selection model with the particularity that the first step is a multinomial logit model. With regard to the debate about complementarity or substitutability between formal and informal care, our results indicate that formal care acts as a reinforcement of the family care in certain cases: for very old care receivers, in those cases in which the individual has multiple disabilities, when many care hours are provided, and in case of mental illness and/or dementia. There exist substantial differences in long term care addressed to younger and older dependent people and dependent women are in risk of becoming more vulnerable to the shortage of informal caregivers in the future. Finally, we have documented that there are great disparities in the availability of public social care across regions.

Pay-as-you-go social security and the distribution of bequests

This paper studies the impact of an unfunded social security system on the distribution of bequests in a framework where savings are due both by life cycle and by random altruistic motivations. We show that the impact of social security on the distribution of bequests depends crucially on the importance of the bequest motive in explaining savings behavior. If the bequest motive is strong, then an increase in the social security tax raises the bequests left by altruistic parents. On the other hand, when the importance of bequests in motivating savings is sufficiently low, theincrease in the social security tax could result in a reduction of the bequests left by altruistic parents under some conditions on the attitude of individuals toward risk and on the relative returns associated with private saving and social security. Some implications concerning the transitional effects of introducing an unfunded social security scheme are also discussed.

The intra-generational redistributive effects of social security

This paper provides a quantitative evaluation of the intra--cohortredistributive elements of the United States social security system in thecontext of a computable general equilibrium model. I determine how thewell--being of individuals that differ across {\sl gender, race} and {\sl education}is affected by government social security policy. I find that females, whitesand non--college graduates stand less to gain (lose) from reductions(increases) in the size of social security than males, non--whites andcollege graduates, respectively. Differences in mortality risk and laborproductivity translate into differences in the magnitudes of capitalaccumulation and labor supply distortions, that are responsible for theobserved welfare difference between types. Results imply that the currentprogram is lifetime progressive across gender and education, yet lifetimeregressive across race.

The impact of Economics on health policy and management in Spain

BackgroundDespite the intrinsic value of scientific disciplines, such as Economics, it is appropriate to gauge the impact of its applications on social welfare, or at least Health Economics (HE) case- its influence on health policy and management.MethodsThe three relevant features of knowledge (production, diffusion and application) are analyzed, more from an emic perspective the one used in Anthropology relying on the experience of the members of a culture- than from an etic approach seated on material descriptions and dubious statistics.ResultsThe soundness of the principles and results of HE depends on its disciplinary foundations,whereas its relevance than does not imply translation into practice- is more linked with the problems studied. Important contributions from Economics to the health sphere are recorded.HE in Spain ranks seventh in the world despite the relatively minor HE contents of its clinical and health services research journals.HE has in Spain more presence than influence, having failed to impregnate sufficiently thedaily events.ConclusionsHE knowledge required by a politician, a health manager or a clinician is rather limited; the main impact of HE could be to develop their intuition and awareness.

Gerontocracy, retirement, and social security

Why are the old politically successful? We build a simple interest group model in which political pressure is time-intensive, showing that in the political competitive equilibrium each group lobbies for government policies that lower their own value of time but the old do so to a greater extent and as a result are net gainers from the political process. What distinguishes the elderly from other political groups (and what makes them more succesful) is that they have lower labor productivity and/or that we are all likely to become elderly at some point, while we are relatively unlikely to change gender, race, sexual orientation, or even ocupation, The model has a variety of implications for the design of social security programs, which we test using data from the Social Security Administration. For example, the model predicts that social security programs with retirement incentives are larger and that the old are more "single-minded" in their politics, implications which we verify using cross-country government finance data and cross-country political participation surveys. Finally, we show that the forced savings programs intended to "reform" the social security system may increase the amount of intergenerational redistribution. As a model for evaluating policy reforms, ours has the attractive feature that reforms must be time time consistent from a political point of view rather than a public interest point of view.