A new compact linear programming formulation for choice network revenue management

The choice network revenue management model incorporates customer purchase behavioras a function of the offered products, and is the appropriate model for airline and hotel networkrevenue management, dynamic sales of bundles, and dynamic assortment optimization.The optimization problem is a stochastic dynamic program and is intractable. A certainty-equivalencerelaxation of the dynamic program, called the choice deterministic linear program(CDLP) is usually used to generate dyamic controls. Recently, a compact linear programmingformulation of this linear program was given for the multi-segment multinomial-logit (MNL)model of customer choice with non-overlapping consideration sets. Our objective is to obtaina tighter bound than this formulation while retaining the appealing properties of a compactlinear programming representation. To this end, it is natural to consider the affine relaxationof the dynamic program. We first show that the affine relaxation is NP-complete even for asingle-segment MNL model. Nevertheless, by analyzing the affine relaxation we derive a newcompact linear program that approximates the dynamic programming value function betterthan CDLP, provably between the CDLP value and the affine relaxation, and often comingclose to the latter in our numerical experiments. When the segment consideration sets overlap,we show that some strong equalities called product cuts developed for the CDLP remain validfor our new formulation. Finally we perform extensive numerical comparisons on the variousbounds to evaluate their performance.

Simple models for multi-attribute choice with many alternatives: When it does and does not pay to face tradeoffs with binary attributes

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Choice of partners in multiple two-person prisoner's dilemma games: An experimental study

We examine the effect of unilateral and mutual partner selection in the context of prisoner's dilemmas experimentally. Subjects play simultaneously several finitely repeated two-person prisoner's dilemma games. We find that unilateral choice is the best system. It leads to low defection and fewer singles than with mutual choice. Furthermore, with the unilateral choice setup we are able to show that intendingdefectors are more likely to try to avoid a match than intending cooperators. We compare our results of multiple games with single game PD-experiments and find no difference in aggregate behavior. Hence the multiple game technique is robust and might therefore be an important tool in the future for testing the use of mixed strategies.

Health care provider choice in the case of patient-initiated contacts. An extended version of discrete choice of model demand

This paper analyzes the nature of health care provider choice inthe case of patient-initiated contacts, with special reference toa National Health Service setting, where monetary prices are zeroand general practitioners act as gatekeepers to publicly financedspecialized care. We focus our attention on the factors that mayexplain the continuously increasing use of hospital emergencyvisits as opposed to other provider alternatives. An extendedversion of a discrete choice model of demand for patient-initiatedcontacts is presented, allowing for individual and town residencesize differences in perceived quality (preferences) betweenalternative providers and including travel and waiting time asnon-monetary costs. Results of a nested multinomial logit model ofprovider choice are presented. Individual choice betweenalternatives considers, in a repeated nested structure, self-care,primary care, hospital and clinic emergency services. Welfareimplications and income effects are analyzed by computingcompensating variations, and by simulating the effects of userfees by levels of income. Results indicate that compensatingvariation per visit is higher than the direct marginal cost ofemergency visits, and consequently, emergency visits do not appearas an inefficient alternative even for non-urgent conditions.

Host sex and ectoparasites choice: preference for, and higher survival on female hosts.

1. Sex differences in levels of parasite infection are a common rule in a wide range of mammals, with males usually more susceptible than females. Sex-specific exposure to parasites, e.g. mediated through distinct modes of social aggregation between and within genders, as well as negative relationships between androgen levels and immune defences are thought to play a major role in this pattern. 2. Reproductive female bats live in close association within clusters at maternity roosts, whereas nonbreeding females and males generally occupy solitary roosts. Bats represent therefore an ideal model to study the consequences of sex-specific social and spatial aggregation on parasites' infection strategies. 3. We first compared prevalence and parasite intensities in a host-parasite system comprising closely related species of ectoparasitic mites (Spinturnix spp.) and their hosts, five European bat species. We then compared the level of parasitism between juvenile males and females in mixed colonies of greater and lesser mouse-eared bats Myotis myotis and M. blythii. Prevalence was higher in adult females than in adult males stemming from colonial aggregations in all five studied species. Parasite intensity was significantly higher in females in three of the five species studied. No difference in prevalence and mite numbers was found between male and female juveniles in colonial roosts. 4. To assess whether observed sex-biased parasitism results from differences in host exposure only, or, alternatively, from an active, selected choice made by the parasite, we performed lab experiments on short-term preferences and long-term survival of parasites on male and female Myotis daubentoni. When confronted with adult males and females, parasites preferentially selected female hosts, whereas no choice differences were observed between adult females and subadult males. Finally, we found significantly higher parasite survival on adult females compared with adult males. 5. Our study shows that social and spatial aggregation favours sex-biased parasitism that could be a mere consequence of an active and adaptive parasite choice for the more profitable host.

Notes on stochastic choice

A general formalism on stochastic choice is presented. Tje Rationalizability and Recoverability (Identification) problems are discussed. For the identification issue parametric examples are analyzed by means of techniques of mathematical tomography (Random transforms).

Setting the rules of the game: The choice of electoral systems in advanced democracies

The origins of electoral systems have received scant attention in the literature. Looking at the history of electoral rules in the advanced world in the last century, this paper shows that the existing wide variation in electoral rules across nations can be traced to the strategic decisions that the current ruling parties, anticipating the coordinating consequences of different electoral regimes, make to maximize their representation according to the following conditions. On the one hand, as long as the electoral arena does not change substantially and the current electoral regime serves the ruling parties well, the latter have no incentives to modify the electoral regime. On the other hand, as soon as the electoral arena changes (due to the entry of new voters or a change in their preferences), the ruling parties will entertain changing the electoral system, depending on two main conditions: the emergence of new parties and the coordinating capacities of the old ruling parties. Accordingly, if the new parties are strong, the old parties shift from plurality/majority rules to proportional representation (PR) only if the latter are locked into a 'non-Duvergerian' equilibrium; i.e. if no old party enjoys a dominant position (the case of most small European states)--conversely, they do not if a Duvergerian equilibrium exists (the case of Great Britain). Similarly, whenever the new entrants are weak, a non-PR system is maintained, regardless of the structure of the old party system (the case of the USA). The paper discusses as well the role of trade and ethnic and religious heterogeneity in the adoption of PR rules.

A dynamic choice model of hybrid behavior in the attribute-space

This paper presents a dynamic choice model in the attributespace considering rational consumers that discount the future. In lightof the evidence of several state-dependence patterns, the model isfurther extended by considering a utility function that allows for thedifferent types of behavior described in the literature: pure inertia,pure variety seeking and hybrid. The model presents a stationaryconsumption pattern that can be inertial, where the consumer only buysone product, or a variety-seeking one, where the consumer buys severalproducts simultane-ously. Under the inverted-U marginal utilityassumption, the consumer behaves inertial among the existing brands forseveral periods, and eventually, once the stationary levels areapproached, the consumer turns to a variety-seeking behavior. An empiricalanalysis is run using a scanner database for fabric softener andsignificant evidence of hybrid behavior for most attributes is found,which supports the functional form considered in the theory.

Relying on the agent in charge of production for project evaluation

I study the optimal project choice when the principal relies on the agent in charge of production for project evaluation. The principal has to choose between a safe project generating a fixed revenue and a risky project generating an uncertain revenue. The agent has private information about the production cost under each project but also about the signal regarding the profitability of the risky project. If the signal favoring the adoption of the risky project is goods news to the agent, integrating production and project evaluation tasks does not generate any loss compared to the benchmark in which the principal herself receives the signal. By contrast, if it is bad news, task integration creates an endogenous reservation utility which is type-dependent and thereby generates countervailing incentives, which can make a bias toward either project optimal. Our results can offer an explanation for why good firms can go bad and a rationale for the separation of day-to-day operating decisions from long-term strategic decisions stressed by Williamson.

Take-the-best and other simple strategies: Why and when they work 'well' in binary choice

The effectiveness of decision rules depends on characteristics of bothrules and environments. A theoretical analysis of environments specifiesthe relative predictive accuracies of the lexicographic rule 'take-the-best'(TTB) and other simple strategies for binary choice. We identify threefactors: how the environment weights variables; characteristics of choicesets; and error. For cases involving from three to five binary cues, TTBis effective across many environments. However, hybrids of equal weights(EW) and TTB models are more effective as environments become morecompensatory. In the presence of error, TTB and similar models do not predictmuch better than a naïve model that exploits dominance. We emphasizepsychological implications and the need for more complete theories of theenvironment that include the role of error.

Cumulative dominance and heuristic performance in binary multi-attribute choice

Several studies have reported high performance of simple decision heuristics multi-attribute decision making. In this paper, we focus on situations where attributes are binary and analyze the performance of Deterministic-Elimination-By-Aspects (DEBA) and similar decision heuristics. We consider non-increasing weights and two probabilistic models for the attribute values: one where attribute values are independent Bernoulli randomvariables; the other one where they are binary random variables with inter-attribute positive correlations. Using these models, we show that good performance of DEBA is explained by the presence of cumulative as opposed to simple dominance. We therefore introduce the concepts of cumulative dominance compliance and fully cumulative dominance compliance and show that DEBA satisfies those properties. We derive a lower bound with which cumulative dominance compliant heuristics will choose a best alternative and show that, even with many attributes, this is not small. We also derive an upper bound for the expected loss of fully cumulative compliance heuristics and show that this is moderateeven when the number of attributes is large. Both bounds are independent of the values ofthe weights.

Revenue management under general discrete choice model of consumer behavior

Customer choice behavior, such as 'buy-up' and 'buy-down', is an importantphe-nomenon in a wide range of industries. Yet there are few models ormethodologies available to exploit this phenomenon within yield managementsystems. We make some progress on filling this void. Specifically, wedevelop a model of yield management in which the buyers' behavior ismodeled explicitly using a multi-nomial logit model of demand. Thecontrol problem is to decide which subset of fare classes to offer ateach point in time. The set of open fare classes then affects the purchaseprobabilities for each class. We formulate a dynamic program todetermine the optimal control policy and show that it reduces to a dynamicnested allocation policy. Thus, the optimal choice-based policy caneasily be implemented in reservation systems that use nested allocationcontrols. We also develop an estimation procedure for our model based onthe expectation-maximization (EM) method that jointly estimates arrivalrates and choice model parameters when no-purchase outcomes areunobservable. Numerical results show that this combined optimization-estimation approach may significantly improve revenue performancerelative to traditional leg-based models that do not account for choicebehavior.

Satisfaction in choice as a function of the number of alternatives: When "goods satiate" but "bads escalate"

Whereas people are typically thought to be better off with more choices, studiesshow that they often prefer to choose from small as opposed to large sets of alternatives.We propose that satisfaction from choice is an inverted U-shaped function of thenumber of alternatives. This proposition is derived theoretically by considering thebenefits and costs of different numbers of alternatives and is supported by fourexperimental studies. We also manipulate the perceptual costs of information processingand demonstrate how this affects the resulting satisfaction function. We furtherindicate that satisfaction when choosing from a given set is diminished if people aremade aware of the existence of other choice sets. The role of individual differences insatisfaction from choice is documented by noting effects due to gender and culture. Weconclude by emphasizing the need to have an explicit rationale for knowing how muchchoice is enough.

Country asymmetries, endogenous product choice and the speed of trade liberalization

In a world with two countries which differ in size, we study theimpact of (the speed of) trade liberalization on firms' profitsand total welfare of the countries involved. Firms correctlyanticipate the pace of trade liberalization and take it intoaccount when deciding on their product choices, which areendogenously determined at the beginning of the game. Competitionin the marketplace then occurs either on quantities or on prices.As long as the autarkic phase continues, local firms are nationalmonopolists. When trade liberalization occurs, firms compete in aninternational duopoly. We analyze trade effects by using twodifferent models of product differentiation. Across all thespecifications adopted (and independently of the price v. quantitycompetition hypothesis), total welfare always unambiguously riseswith the speed of trade liberalization: Possible losses by firmsare always outweighed by consumers' gains, which come under theform of lower prices, enlarged variety of higher average qualitiesavailable. The effect on profits depends on the type of industryanalyzed. Two results in particular seem to be worth of mention.With vertical product differentiation and fixed costs of qualityimprovements, the expected size of the market faced by the firmsdetermines the incentive to invest in quality. The longer the periodof autarky, the lower the possibility that the firm from the smallcountry would be producing the high quality and be the leader in theinternational market when it opens. On the contrary, when trade opensimmediately, national markets do not play any role and firms fromdifferent countries have the same opportunity to become the leader.Hence, immediate trade liberalization might be in the interest ofproducers in the small country. In general, the lower the size of thesmall country, the more likely its firm will gain from tradeliberalization. Losses from the small country firm can arise when itis relegated to low quality good production and the domestic marketsize is not very small. With horizontal product differentiation (thehomogeneous good case being a limit case of it when costs ofdifferentiation tend to infinity), investments in differentiationbenefit both firms in equal manner. Firms from the small country do notrun the risk of being relegated to a lower competitive position undertrade. As a result, they would never lose from it. Instead, firms fromthe large country may still incur losses from the opening of trade whenthe market expansion effect is low (i.e. when the country is very largerelative to the other).