Gazprom���s evolving strategy in a new commercial and political context: how should the EU react? EPC Policy Brief, 27 April 2015

After years of unchallenged commercial domination of a sizeable portion of the EU's gas market, Gazprom is confronted with a statement of objections issued on 22 April by the EU Commission for abusing its dominant market position. The company was already prevented from going ahead with its South Stream project aimed at consolidating Gazprom's grip on Southeast Europe's markets by bypassing Ukraine ��� due to alleged non-compliance of intergovernmental agreements with the EU regulatory framework. Furthermore, it walked away from negotiations that could have allowed it to access more than 50% of the OPAL pipeline ��� an onshore branch of the offshore Russian German Nord Stream pipeline ���, whilst its attempts to go downstream through the acquisition of European distribution and transmission operators, such as Wingas and DESFA, failed due to current political tensions and the risk of a negative Commission ruling on the operation. Does this mean that the Russian gas behemoth ��� so often portrayed as the energy arm of the Kremlin ��� is not so powerful after all? This Policy Brief aims to frame the erosion of Gazprom's power in a wider perspective, analysing its peculiar position at a time of transition, with the global gas business going from a sellers' to a buyers' market, and providing recommendations on how Europe should deal with it. It will be argued that Gazprom ��� despite still being affected by the Kremlin's political priorities ��� is moving towards more commercially sound behavior. The EU should profit from this evolution without being tempted by mercantilist options, and rather use the political momentum provided by the energy union to remove barriers to solidarity and to increase competition on the trading platforms.

Consensus, contradiction, and conciliation of interests: the geo-economics of the Energy Union. EPC Policy Brief, 8 July 2015

European Union energy policy calls for nothing less than a profound transformation of the EU's energy system: by 2050 decarbonised electricity generation with 80-95% fewer greenhouse gas emissions, increased use of renewables, more energy efficiency, a functioning energy market and increased security of supply are to be achieved. Different EU policies (e.g., EU climate and energy package for 2020) are intended to create the political and regulatory framework for this transformation. The sectorial dynamics resulting from these EU policies already affect the systems of electricity generation, transportation and storage in Europe, and the more effective the implementation of new measures the more the structure of Europe's power system will change in the years to come. Recent initiatives such as the 2030 climate/energy package and the Energy Union are supposed to keep this dynamic up. Setting new EU targets, however, is not necessarily the same as meeting them. The impact of EU energy policy is likely to have considerable geo-economic implications for individual member states: with increasing market integration come new competitors; coal and gas power plants face new renewable challengers domestically and abroad; and diversification towards new suppliers will result in new trade routes, entry points and infrastructure. Where these implications are at odds with powerful national interests, any member state may point to Article 194, 2 of the Lisbon Treaty and argue that the EU's energy policy agenda interferes with its given right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, the choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply. The implementation of new policy initiatives therefore involves intense negotiations to conciliate contradicting interests, something that traditionally has been far from easy to achieve. In areas where this process runs into difficulties, the transfer of sovereignty to the European level is usually to be found amongst the suggested solutions. Pooling sovereignty on a new level, however, does not automatically result in a consensus, i.e., conciliate contradicting interests. Rather than focussing on the right level of decision making, European policy makers need to face the (inconvenient truth of) geo-economical frictions within the Union that make it difficult to come to an arrangement. The reminder of this text explains these latter, more structural and sector-related challenges for European energy policy in more detail, and develops some concrete steps towards a political and regulatory framework necessary to overcome them.

Financial regulation in the European Union: A research agenda. CES Papers - Open Forum #10, 2012

Over the past two decades, the European Union (EU) has become a central actor in financial regulation and developed complex institutions to fulfill its roles. Pre-financial crisis scholarship has provided key insights into the functioning of this institutional cobweb and its evolution over time. However, the financial crisis has highlighted four facets of EU financial regulation (EUFR) that deserve more scholarly attention than they have received so far: (1) the permissive pre-crisis consensus on the merits of financial liberalization and integration, (2) the embeddedness of financial regulation in the political economy of EU integration at large, (3) preference formation of public and private stakeholders in EUFR, and (4) the global economic and regulatory context of EUFR. This paper presents the key scholarly challenges across these four areas. Addressing them promises not only academic insights but also promotes the relevance of EUFR research for real-world policy dilemmas.

Sustainability, Resource Efficiency and Competitiveness. An Assessment of Resource Efficiency Policies in the European Union. Bruges European Economic Research Papers (BEER) 32/2015.

Addressing high and volatile natural resource prices, uncertain supply prospects, reindustrialization attempts and environmental damages related to resource use, resource efficiency has evolved into a highly debated proposal among academia, policy makers, firms and international financial institutions (IFIs). In 2011, the European Union (EU) declared resource efficiency as one of its seven flagship initiatives in its Europe 2020 strategy. This paper contributes to the discussions by assessing its key initiative, the Roadmap to a Resource Efficient Europe (EC 2011 571), following two streams of evaluation. In a first step, resource efficiency is linked to two theoretical frameworks regarding sustainability, (i) the sustainability triangle (consisting of economic, social and ecological dimensions) and (ii) balanced sustainability (combining weak and strong sustainability). Subsequently, both sustainability frameworks are used to assess to which degree the Roadmap follows the concept of sustainability. It can be concluded that it partially respects the sustainability triangle as well as balanced sustainability, primarily lacking a social dimension. In a second step, following Steger and Bleischwitz (2009), the impact of resource efficiency on competitiveness as advocated in the Roadmap is empirically evaluated. Using an Arellano���Bond dynamic panel data model reveals no robust impact of resource efficiency on competiveness in the EU between 2004 and 2009 ��� a puzzling result. Further empirical research and enhanced data availability are needed to better understand the impacts of resource efficiency on competitiveness on the macroeconomic, microeconomic and industry level. In that regard, strengthening the methodologies of resource indicators seem essential. Last but certainly not least, political will is required to achieve the transition of the EU-economy into a resource efficient future.

What do Eurozone academics think about EMU reform? On broad support and German exceptionalism. Bruges Political Research Papers 41/2015.

This paper is an empirical contribution to the literature on the formation of policy preferences on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) reform within its Member States. In the aftermath of the euro crisis, many proposals to ���complete��� EMU have been tabled. However, discord among Member States has led to a piecemeal restructuring of EMU. For this paper, a survey has been conducted among euro area academic experts, gauging preferences on EMU reform. We find that general consensus masks significant discord among academics from different Member States. Our data indicates the existence of conflicting national epistemic communities, bound by shared causal beliefs on macro-economic policy. Academics within the key creditor Member State, Germany, assume an outlier position. Within the sample of German academics, economists are particularly strongly opposed to all moves in the direction of fiscal or social union. As economists are those academic experts most likely to influence the economic policy beliefs dominant among the German policy elite, these results are highly politically salient. We confront these findings with the literature on the exceptionalism of German economics. We contend that our results substantiate the claim that inadequate EMU reform and, more generally, the EU approach to the Eurozone crisis, can be partially explained by the firm grip these economic doctrines hold over the economics profession and policy-making circles in Germany.

Brexit ��� lessons from four referenda on the European Union (EU) in Denmark. EU Centre, Policy Brief No. 8, June 2015

From 1972 to 1993 Denmark staged four referenda on the EU. Two of them in particular hold valuable lessons for Britain seeking new terms - in June 1992 on the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty), the Danes voted ���NO��� with a slim majority; this was followed by another vote on the treaty in May 1993 on the Edinburgh Agreement with a ���YES��� vote. Joergen Oerstroem Moeller was directly involved in all four referenda and served 1989-1997 as State-Secretary in the Royal Danish Foreign Ministry. The result of a referendum may and often will be decided by policy decisions shaping the electorates��� perception long before the voting takes place. The majority votes according to instinct and intuition and is often guided by emotions. The Danish case highlights the importance of defining clearly specific exceptions, working hard to explain the case (at home and abroad), establishing good-will, and conveying that exceptions are in principle temporary and do not require treaty changes. The objectives laid out at the start of the process must be achievable. The member state in question should not manoeuvre itself into humiliating back-pedalling at the final negotiation round: if so it arouses suspicion among the electorate that it is being manipulated and deceived. During the campaign media attention will primarily focus on dissent and scepticism presenting the establishment with the tedious task of confuting accusations of all kinds. The YES camp will be pushed into the defensive by the NO camp setting the agenda. Time and effort and political capital needed to be invested for the positive outcome.

Light and shadows in Europe���s new Action Plan for Capital Markets Union. ECMI Commentary No. 40/5 October 2015

The European Commission���s Action Plan consists, in a nutshell, of a short list of technical proposals and a longer one of (rather general) potential actions. Overall, the plan indeed proposes to achieve some short-term objectives, such as a reduction of listing costs for SMEs, but it lacks long-term vision. The plan bundles actions under rather generic objectives of long-term finance or cross-border investing. Improving the informational infrastructure (e.g. accounting standards, company data) and cross-border enforcement of rules is left to vaguely defined future actions, but these constitute the core of the capital markets infrastructure. Without a well-defined set of measurable objectives, the whole plan may lose political momentum and become an opportunity for interested parties to cherry pick their pet provisions. Building a single market, i.e. removing cross-border obstacles to capital circulation, is too challenging a task to simply appear as one of many items on a long list of general objectives, which incidentally do not include institutional reform. The ultimate risk is that the Commission may just miss a unique opportunity to revamp and improve the financial integration process in Europe after almost a decade of harmful financial retrenchment.

Taiwanese Lobbying in the European Union: ���Workable Diplomacy��� and its Limitations. EU Diplomacy Paper 8/2015

The policy of the European Union (EU) towards Taiwan has mostly been analysed either as a by-product of EU-China relations or with reference to the general lack of a European geopolitical approach towards East Asia. By adopting a lobbying approach which focusses on Taiwan���s different ���channels of influence��� within the complex European foreign policy system in Brussels, this study provides new insights into the functioning of EU-Taiwan relations. It also sheds new light on the implications of the radical change in Taiwanese diplomacy after 2008, when Chen Shui-bian���s assertive and identity-based diplomacy was replaced with the Kuomintang���s new dogma of ���workable diplomacy���. Based on semi-guided interviews with Taiwanese and European actors, this paper examines why Taiwanese lobbying in Brussels, albeit very active and professional, is not salient enough to meet the challenges arising from the overwhelming Chinese competition and from the increasing proliferation of regional trade agreements ��� with active EU participation ��� in the Asia-Pacific region. It argues that the pragmatic ���workable diplomacy��� approach, while smoothing out working-level relations between Taiwan and the EU, fails to attract a sufficient degree of political and public attention in Europe to the Taiwan question and thus fosters the neglect of Taiwan by European foreign policy-makers. The main challenge faced by Taiwanese diplomacy, however, is not simply one of convincing through technical arguments, but one of agenda setting, that is, of redefining European priorities in Taiwan���s favour.

The Limited Influence of the European Union in Armenia and Azerbaijan: A Domestic Explanation. EU Diplomacy Paper 9/2015

This paper seeks to explain why the European Union (EU) has had limited influence in Armenia and Azerbaijan in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Combining approaches from external governance, norm diffusion and structural foreign policy, it offers an explanation based on domestic factors in the two countries: the political regime, state capacity, political structures, domestic incentives and the perceived legitimacy of EU rules. Although willingness to reform appears to exist in Armenia, such willingness remains constrained by the country���s vulnerable geopolitical location and high dependence on Russia. By contrast, none of the domestic preconditions for EU influence identified by the analytical framework were found in Azerbaijan. The author argues that the Eastern Partnership has not properly addressed the extent to which the clan structures feed into informal political practices and enforce the sustainability of an existing regime in both countries, and that, in addition, the EU has underestimated the multipolar environment which the two countries have to operate in, making it unlikely that the current policy can reach its objectives in Armenia and Azerbaijan.

One market, two monies: the European Union and the United Kingdom. Bruegel Policy Brief Issue 2016/01 January 2016

Access to the single market is one of the core benefits of the United Kingdom���s membership of the European Union. A vote to leave the EU would trigger difficult negotiations on continued access to that market. However, the single market is not static. One of the drivers of change is the necessary reforms to strengthen the euro. Such reforms would not only affect the euro���s fiscal and political governance. They would also have an impact on the single market, in particular in the areas of banking, capital markets and labour markets. This is bound to affect the UK, whether it remains in the EU or not.

Challenges for the European Union in times of crisis: reactions

Since the beginning of its existence in the form of communities, this entity faced a lot of challenges that could had been stopped the European dream without the fast, prompt and appropriate reaction of the decision makers. There were a lot of difficult times in its history of more than 60 years but the ambition and need of going forward on the way of integration prevailed and today we can talk about European Union as one of the most important global players, having one of the most complex and fascinating political systems. The tenacity and the willing to succeed off the decision makers made this possible. Moments like ���The Empty Chair Crisis���, changes with regards to the decision- making process, convenient for ones but inconvenient for the others, lack of consensus with regards to the new accessions, the big changes that Europe went through in the late 80s etc. showed that the decision makers can have an appropriate response whatever the problem would be and that we must stay together and go on dreaming to a united nation in the form of a federation. Nowadays we are facing maybe the most difficult moment in European Union history. Many of the member states were and still are on the edge. A lot of immediate and prompt actions were taken since the start of financial crisis, either political or economic, drove by the need of going on. We are too much into the integration process, too much dependent one of each other so that we cannot stop and simply go back only to the concept of national state.

Should the ���outs��� join the European banking union? Bruegel Policy Contribution Issue 2016/03 February 2016

For political reasons, European Union member states��� opinions on joining banking union range from outright refusal to active consideration. The main stance is to wait and see how the banking union develops. The wait-and-see positions are often motivated by the consideration that joining banking union might imply joining the euro. However, in the long term, banking union���s ultimate rationale is linked to cross-border banking in the single market, which goes beyond the single currency. This Policy Contribution documents the banking linkages between the nine ���outs��� and 19 ���ins��� of the banking union. We find that some of the major banks based in Sweden and Denmark have substantial banking claims across the Nordic and Baltic regions. We also find large banking claims from banks based in the banking union on central and eastern Europe. The United Kingdom has a special position, with London as both a global and European financial centre. We find that the out countries could profit from joining banking union, because it would provide a stable arrangement for managing financial stability. Banking union allows for an integrated approach towards supervision (avoiding ring fencing of activities and therefore a higher cost of funding) and resolution (avoiding coordination failure). On the other hand, countries can preserve sovereignty over their banking systems outside the banking union.

The Eurasian Economic Union: a time of crisis. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 195/27.01.2016

The Eurasian Economic Union (EaEU), a project forced through by Russia which links it to Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, is currently struggling with serious problems. The economic crisis in Russia ��� mainly caused by the fall in the price of oil on world markets and exacerbated by sanctions imposed by Western countries in connection with the Ukraine conflict ��� is affecting these uncompetitive post-Soviet economies which are dependent on Russia. This has resulted in increased economic and political tension among the members of the EaEU. From Russia���s point of view, however, the EaEU project remains useful, because it is not economic integration that is Moscow���s priority. The Union remains its most important instrument for implementing the Kremlin���s geo-political objectives, in particular maintaining its sphere of influence and preventing post-Soviet countries from integrating with the West, as well as restricting their rapprochement with China. Moscow is pushing for the EaEU to include new countries, strengthening its tools for political dominance within the Union, and promoting its project on the international stage. However, the future of this project will depend on both the continued determination of the Kremlin, and whether the other countries can change the rules for integration by taking advantage of the current crisis.

Which fiscal union for the euro area? Bruegel Policy Contribution ISSUE 2016/05, February 2016

At the current level of political and societal integration, a large federal budget is unrealistic in the euro area. The authors make three recommendations that would lead national fiscal policies to be more stabilising with respect to the economic cycle, while achieving long-term sustainability. They also recommend a move towards a European unemployment insurance scheme targeted at ���large��� shocks, and a minimum set of labour-market harmonisation criteria.

The Challenges of the EU Banking Union - will it succeed in dealing with the next financial crisis? Bruges European Economic Policy Briefings 36/2015

The EU Banking Union combines micro- and macro-prudential regulation. It aims at breaking the ���doom loop��� between banks and sovereign debt, promoting financial stability and mitigating the next financial shock to the real EU economy, at the lowest possible cost to the financial institutions and to the taxpayers. Success, or failure, is determined by how the banking union copes with the challenges to its two main pillars, the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). Under the SSM, in its new supervisory role, the ECB may be subject to conflicts between the objectives of price and financial stability, and the single-supervisor role may be sub-optimal. Two regulators might have been preferable and more focus on ECB accountability will now be required. The shock-absorbing Single Resolution Fund (SRF), which is part of the SRM, may not have the capacity to deal with a crisis of the size of the one of 2008. Especially as the nature and severity of a future financial crisis cannot be forecasted. The design of the banking union is not the result of theoretical studies, but a political compromise to deal with an acute crisis. The theoretical studies that are included in this paper are not supportive of the banking union in its current form. Nevertheless, there is a good chance that the EU Banking Union may succeed, as ECB supervision of the 123 systemically important banks should contain potential demands on the SRM. In the event of a crisis that is too severe for the banking union to absorb with its current capability, the crucial assumption is that there is political will to rapidly provide new resources. The same applies, if a major financial crisis develops before the banking union is fully operational.