853 resultados para costs agreements


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This work concerns itself with the possibility of solutions, both cooperative and market based, to pollution abatement problems. In particular, we are interested in pollutant emissions in Southern California and possible solutions to the abatement problems enumerated in the 1990 Clean Air Act. A tradable pollution permit program has been implemented to reduce emissions, creating property rights associated with various pollutants.

Before we discuss the performance of market-based solutions to LA's pollution woes, we consider the existence of cooperative solutions. In Chapter 2, we examine pollutant emissions as a trans boundary public bad. We show that for a class of environments in which pollution moves in a bi-directional, acyclic manner, there exists a sustainable coalition structure and associated levels of emissions. We do so via a new core concept, one more appropriate to modeling cooperative emissions agreements (and potential defection from them) than the standard definitions.

However, this leaves the question of implementing pollution abatement programs unanswered. While the existence of a cost-effective permit market equilibrium has long been understood, the implementation of such programs has been difficult. The design of Los Angeles' REgional CLean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) alleviated some of the implementation problems, and in part exacerbated them. For example, it created two overlapping cycles of permits and two zones of permits for different geographic regions. While these design features create a market that allows some measure of regulatory control, they establish a very difficult trading environment with the potential for inefficiency arising from the transactions costs enumerated above and the illiquidity induced by the myriad assets and relatively few participants in this market.

It was with these concerns in mind that the ACE market (Automated Credit Exchange) was designed. The ACE market utilizes an iterated combined-value call market (CV Market). Before discussing the performance of the RECLAIM program in general and the ACE mechanism in particular, we test experimentally whether a portfolio trading mechanism can overcome market illiquidity. Chapter 3 experimentally demonstrates the ability of a portfolio trading mechanism to overcome portfolio rebalancing problems, thereby inducing sufficient liquidity for markets to fully equilibrate.

With experimental evidence in hand, we consider the CV Market's performance in the real world. We find that as the allocation of permits reduces to the level of historical emissions, prices are increasing. As of April of this year, prices are roughly equal to the cost of the Best Available Control Technology (BACT). This took longer than expected, due both to tendencies to mis-report emissions under the old regime, and abatement technology advances encouraged by the program. Vve also find that the ACE market provides liquidity where needed to encourage long-term planning on behalf of polluting facilities.

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30 p.

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35 p.

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With the installation by the Pacific Electric Railway of a bus system in Pasadena to supplant most of its trolley lines, the problem of the comparison of the costs of the two systems naturally presented itself. The study here undertaken was originally started as just a comparison of the motor bus and Birney Safety Car, but as the work progressed it seemed advisable to include the trolley bus as well - a method of transportation that is comparatively new as far as development is concerned, but which seems to be finding increasing favor in the East.

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No contexto de avanço da globalização, o Investimento Estrangeiro Direto (IED) mostra-se como um dos principais veículos para a inserção internacional dos países. Como os objetivos das empresas transnacionais e dos Estados hospedeiros não são os mesmos, há a necessidade de adoção de políticas que levem à convergência. No plano legal, observou-se nas últimas décadas a consolidação do regime internacional dos investimentos, com o crescimento exponencial do número de tratados de investimento e de arbitragens investidor-Estado fundadas nos mesmos. Mas há insatisfações de parte a parte com o sistema. Por um lado, os países tentam limitar o ativismo dos árbitros mediante a revisão de seus tratados. Por outro, tanto os investidores como os Estados começam a perceber que não há vencedores reais na arbitragem, dadas as suas diversas deficiências. Nomeadamente: custos elevados, longa duração, incoerência nas decisões e desgaste para as relações investidor-Estado no longo prazo. Nesse diapasão, surgem propostas de alternativas. Pensadores do sistema, valendo-se do Planejamento de Sistemas de Disputas, têm desenvolvido Políticas de Prevenção de Controvérsias. Tais políticas fundamentam-se nas dinâmicas de busca de soluções baseadas em interesses contrapostas às baseadas na força e nos direitos seguindo processos de administração precoce de conflitos. Diversos países, em diferentes níveis de desenvolvimento, têm tido êxito na implementação dessas políticas. A difusão das melhores práticas, movimento apoiado por organizações internacionais, oferece oportunidades para a melhora da governança, através da promoção de maior coerência e coordenação nas ações do Estado, da transparência e do império da lei. O tema é de interesse para o Brasil, país que, diferentemente dos demais, nunca ratificou um único tratado de investimento. Isso porque já surgem vozes na indústria clamando por uma mudança de posição, diante da emergência do país também como um exportador de capital. Caso tal inflexão se confirme, o Brasil tem a oportunidade de tomar partido das melhores experiências internacionais, usando tais tratados como instrumentos na sua estratégia de desenvolvimento.

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The report begins with an overview of the current status of world aquaculture. It then goes on to describe an approach for estimating the current combined biophysical resource demands of aquaculture for producer countries and regions. Following a comparison of these results with those available for other animal food production sectors the report then examines the consequences of likely future trends in production on the environmental impacts of aquaculture. Finally, the policy implications of the report’s findings are discussed along with the research agenda that should be pursued to meet the challenge of sustainable food production.

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Fisheries co-management is increasingly seen as a solution to the problems of resource use conflicts and overexploitation. The importance of transactions costs may not have been given adequate attention. The transaction costs are 1) information costs, 2) collective decisionmaking tools, and 3) collective operational costs. The various components of transaction costs of fisheries co-management systems are described in this paper. These costs need to be determined for evaluating the feasibility of a co-managed fishery compared to a centrally managed one.

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Some interesting ideas on improving the cost-effectiveness of feeding in semi-intensive finfish aquaculture are presented.

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It is generally accepted that co-management systems are more cost-effective than centralized management of natural resources. However, no attempts have been made to empirically verify the transaction costs involved in fisheries co-management. Some estimates of transaction costs of fisheries co-management in San Salvador Island, Philippines, are presented in this paper. These estimates are used to compare the various transaction costs in co-managed and in centrally managed fisheries in San Salvador Island.

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Fisheries agreements with the European Community (EC) are an important component of the fisheries sector in Cape Verde and São Tomé e Príncipe, constituting today a key source of income for the respective fisheries administration. In spite of this, and of the fact that these agreements have been renewed several times over the past decades, challenges remain in domains such as control and communication of fishing activities, follow-up of financial counterparts, and integration of European fleets’ operations with the Cape Verdean and Santomean economies. This paper analyzes the EC fisheries agreements with Cape Verde and São Tomé e Príncipe in terms of those domains, considering both the contents of the agreements and their practical implementation. The fisheries sector in each of these countries is reviewed, as are some of the fundamentals and criticisms of EC fisheries agreements. It is argued that the agreements with Cape Verde and São Tomé e Príncipe will not live up to the stated objectives of sustainability and responsibility in fisheries until improvements are made to the control of EC vessels, the follow-up of funds paid by the EC, and the size and diversity of benefits accruing to the fisheries and related sectors in the two countries