Letter of notification to S.D. Woodruff from George H. Gillespie that a meeting of the Board of Directors has been called

Letter of notification to S.D. Woodruff from George H. Gillespie that a meeting of the Board of Directors has been called, Oct. 20, 1869.

Map (printed) of the state of Missouri issued by the State Board of Immigration

Map (printed) of the state of Missouri issued by the State Board of Immigration (50 cm. x 58 cm.), n.d.

The political economy of maritime industry non-reform in interwar Australia: the establishment of the Maritime Services Board of New South Wales

From the First World War Australian port administration came under criticism from exporters, shipping companies and the Commonwealth government, all of whom argued that port authorities charges imposed an excessive burden on exporters. They sought the replacement of public port authorities by trusts representative of business interests. The campaign for port administration reform also diverted farmers from criticism of shipping freights and to secure their acquiescence in anti-competitive practices in the shipping industry. The formation of the Australian Overseas Transport Association in 1929 was the culmination of this campaign. Elite conservative political support for such anti-competitive practices reflected a belief that competitive capitalism was inherently unstable. The Scullin Labor of 1929-31 government abandoned Labor's earlier hostility to shipping companies to support cartelisation. Conservative state governments, in a more competitive electoral position than their federal counterparts and under greater financial pressure, deflected business calls for port administration reform. Business groups expected the NSW conservative government elected in 1932 to reform port administration towards a representative model, but the Maritime Services Board established in 1935 merely rationalised existing administrative structures. In the 1980s international economic instability legitimated the project of microeconomic reform, particularly in the maritime sector, but in the interwar period a different balance of capital, labour and the state meant that economic isolationism rather than integration was the policy outcome.

New Zealand Boards of Trustees' selection of primary school principals

This study's investigation of selection practices of principals by governing boards showed gendered preferences dominated even within a policy environment of equal opportunities. Boards influenced my market values did select the 'best person for the job' and many women were appointed because equally competent men were unavailable.

A delayed inheritance: The Medical Board of Victoria's 75-year wait to find doctors guilty of "infamous conduct in a professional respect"

The Medical Board of Victoria (Board) was created in 1844 to register “legally qualified medical practitioners”. It was not until 1933, however, that the Board attained the power to remove from its register a doctor who had engaged in “infamous conduct in a professional respect” (the power), even though the General Council of Medical Education and Registration of the United Kingdom on which the Board was modelled had been granted the power 75 years earlier. This article argues that the delay in the Board’s inheritance was attributable to successive Victorian Parliaments’ distrust of the Board and that this attitude was unwarranted, at least from early in the 20th century. The article maintains that the granting of the power to the Board was a crucial event in the history of the regulation of the Victorian medical profession. This is illustrated both by the difficulty encountered by the medical profession in dealing with doctors’ unethical conduct before 1933, and the Board’s concern to use its new authority responsibly and appropriately to protect the public and the profession in the three years after it attained the power.

March 2004: Film Festival Honors Brown v. Board of Education

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Board of directors and top management team: a study on CEO relative power and financial return

Best corporate governance practices published in the primers of Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission and the Brazilian Corporate Governance Institute promote board independence as much as possible, as a way to increase the effectiveness of governance mechanism (Sanzovo, 2010). Therefore, this paper aims at understanding if what the managerial literature portraits as being self-evident - stricter governance, better performance - can be observed in actual evidence. The question answered is: do companies with a stricter control and monitoring system perform better than others? The method applied in this paper consists on comparing 116 companies in respect to the their independence level between top management team and board directors– being that measured by four parameters, namely, the percentage of independent outsiders in the board, the separation of CEO and chairman, the adoption of contingent compensation and the percentage of institutional investors in the ownership structure – and their financial return measured in terms return on assets (ROA) from the latest Quarterly Earnings release of 2012. From the 534 companies listed in the Stock Exchange of Sao Paulo – Bovespa – 116 were selected due to their level of corporate governance. The title “Novo Mercado” refers to the superior level of governance level within companies listed in Bovespa, as they have to follow specific criteria to assure shareholders ´protection (BM&F, 2011). Regression analyses were conducted in order to reveal the correlation level between two selected variables. The results from the regression analysis were the following: the correlation between each parameter and ROA was 10.26%; the second regression analysis conducted measured the correlation between the independence level of top management team vis-à-vis board directors – namely, CEO relative power - and ROA, leading to a multiple R of 5.45%. Understanding that the scale is a simplification of the reality, the second part of the analysis transforms all the four parameters into dummy variables, excluding what could be called as an arbitrary scale. The ultimate result from this paper led to a multiple R of 28.44%, which implies that the combination of the variables are still not enough to translate the complex reality of organizations. Nonetheless, an important finding can be taken from this paper: two variables (percentage of outside directors and percentage of institutional investor ownership) are significant in the regression, with p-value lower than 10% and with negative coefficients. In other words, counter affirming what the literature very often portraits as being self-evident – stricter governance leads to higher performance – this paper has provided evidences to believe that the increase in the formal governance structure trough outside directors in the board and ownership by institutional investor might actually lead to worse performance. The section limitations and suggestions for future researches presents some reasons explaining why, although supported by strong theoretical background, this paper faced some challenging methodological assumptions, precluding categorical statements about the level of governance – measured by four selected parameters – and the financial return in terms of financial on assets.

The relationship between board of director's nationality diversity and financial performance

Companies are moving to a more international structure; going into new markets and having an increased competition in all fronts. Therefore, the practices that lead companies to a more efficient and competitive position are praised. The management of the workforce comes as one of the main concerns of companies, aiming at performance enhancing and at creating better environments that both attract and maintain the professional talents. In an increasingly international environment, companies tend to look for the specialists and best professionals, regardless of their nationality. This new structure with several different nationalities working together poses new challenges for companies. Understanding if and how a more diverse has a relationship with financial performance is the starting point for better managing this new corporate structure.