Price synchronicity:the closing call auction and the London Stock Market

In this paper, we consider the impact of the introduction of a closing call auction on market quality of the London Stock Exchange. We employ the market model, RDD and MEC metrics of market quality. These signify substantial improvements to market quality at both the close and open for migrating stocks.We note that these improvements are larger at the open than the close. An important contribution of our paper is that we show that changes to market quality are stronger in those securities that have the lowest liquidity in the pre-call period. In contrast, market quality changes following the introduction of a closing call auction are approximately neutral for high-liquidity securities. We conclude that the implementation of a closing call auction, for high-liquidity securities may not enhance market quality.

The impact of the closing call auction:an examination of effects in London

This article examines the impact on market quality that the introduction of a closing call auction had at the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Using the market model approach of Cohen et al. (1983a, b) OpenURL Aston University, b) we show that opening and closing market quality improved for those Financial Times and Stock Exchange 100 (FTSE 100) securities participating in the closing call. A control sample of stocks is not characterized by discernable changes to market quality.

How many contracts in an auction sale

Making sense of auction sales, in terms of English contract law, is no easy task. Despite the common perception of hammers hitting blocks, signifying the creation of the basic sale contract,1 a typical auction sale necessarily involves the making of several forms of contract other than the obvious primary sale agreement. The purpose of this article, therefore, is threefold, namely, to (1) examine these various forms of contractual relationship2 which may come into existence as a result of a traditional (face to face) auction sale; (2) consider specifically the selling of land at public auction with a view to advocating a change in the law requiring the formality of writing for sales contracts of land for both private and public auctions, and (3) compare briefly the contractual elements of an online ascending model of auction sale typified by the eBay phenomenon.

Optimal Choice of a Firm in Conducting Auction

Силвия К. Баева, Цветана Хр. Недева - Важен аспект в системата на Министерството на регионалното развитие и благоустройство е работата по Оперативна програма “Регионално развитие” с приоритетна ос “Устойчиво и интегрирано градско развитие” по операция “Подобряване на физическата среда и превенция на риска”. По тази програма са включени 86 общини. Финансовият ресурс на тази операция е на стойност 238 589 939 евро, от които 202 801 448 евро са европейско финансиране [1]. Всяка от тези 86 общини трябва да реши задачата за възлагане на обществена поръчка на определена фирма по тази операция. Всъщност, тази задача е задача за провеждане на общински търг за избор на фирма-изпълнител. Оптималният избор на фирма-изпълнител е много важен. Задачата за провеждане на търг ще формулираме като задача на многокритериалното вземане на решения, като чрез подходящо изграждане на критерии и методи може да се трансформира до задача на еднокритериалната оптимизация.

Bi-directional double auction for financial market simulation

Typical Double Auction (DA) models assume that trading agents are one-way traders. With this limitation, they cannot directly reflect the fact individual traders in financial markets (the most popular application of double auction) choose their trading directions dynamically. To address this issue, we introduce the Bi-directional Double Auction (BDA) market which is populated by two-way traders. Based on experiments under both static and dynamic settings, we find that the allocative efficiency of a static continuous BDA market comes from rational selection of trading directions and is negatively related to the intelligence of trading strategies. Moreover, we introduce Kernel trading strategy designed based on probability density estimation for general DA market. Our experiments show it outperforms some intelligent DA market trading strategies. Copyright © 2013, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.

An incentivized auction based group-selling approach for demand response management in V2G systems

Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) system with efficient Demand Response Management (DRM) is critical to solve the problem of supplying electricity by utilizing surplus electricity available at EVs. An incentivilized DRM approach is studied to reduce the system cost and maintain the system stability. EVs are motivated with dynamic pricing determined by the group-selling based auction. In the proposed approach, a number of aggregators sit on the first level auction responsible to communicate with a group of EVs. EVs as bidders consider Quality of Energy (QoE) requirements and report interests and decisions on the bidding process coordinated by the associated aggregator. Auction winners are determined based on the bidding prices and the amount of electricity sold by the EV bidders. We investigate the impact of the proposed mechanism on the system performance with maximum feedback power constraints of aggregators. The designed mechanism is proven to have essential economic properties. Simulation results indicate the proposed mechanism can reduce the system cost and offer EVs significant incentives to participate in the V2G DRM operation.

Agency services for the management of distributed energy networks using parallel auction markets

[ES]En las próximas décadas, el sistema de generación, transmisión y distribución de energía eléctrica afrontará los retos más importantes de su historia. La escasez de los recursos energéticos tradicionales, los efectos de los gases invernadero y el aumento imparable ,de la demanda llaman a transitar hacia un nuevo tipo de infraestructura capaz de explotar el potencial que ofrecen las nuevas fuentes de energía renovable, y de conceder autonomía y capacidad de decisión a los usuarios. Este nuevo modelo de red eléctrica es conocido como Smart Grid, y es habitualmente propuesto como una red distribuida, reactiva e inteligente.

Uncertainty and Speculators in an Auction for Emissions Permits

Auctions have become popular as means of allocating emissions permits in the emissions trading schemes developed around the world. Mostly, only a subset of the regulated polluters participate in these auctions along with speculators, creating a market with relatively few participants and, thus, incentive for strategic bidding. I characterize the bidding behavior of the polluters and the speculators, examining the effect of the latter on the profits of the former and on the auction outcome. It turns out that in addition to bidding for compliance, polluters also bid for speculation in the aftermarket. While the presence of the speculators forces the polluters to bid closer to their true valuations, it also creates a trade-off between increasing the revenue accrued to the regulator and reducing the profits of the auction-participating polluters. Nevertheless, the profits of the latter increase in the speculators' risk aversion.

Auction sale to close estate of Mary P. Chrystie, dec'd, 23 building plots, also Harlem River water front, near Morris Heights stations, N.Y. Central and N.Y. & Northern railroads : Wednesday, November 22d, 1893, at 12 o'clock noon at no. 111 Broadway, New York Real Estate salesroom : by order of Morris & Steele, attorneys ... New York City /

Street map showing properties to be sold, existing buildings (some with owners' names), and railroad stations.

Dutch Auctions: The case of fish auction in Bermeo

In this work I will analyze fish auctions focusing on a particular case: fish auctions in Bermeo. The purpose is to explain if at present the Dutch auction is the appropriate mechanism in the field of fish auctions or there are better alternatives for the sale of fish. For the fulfillment of this essay, I will first introduce some general notions on auctions and more particularly on Dutch auctions describing their properties and limitations.

Biased Random-key Genetic Algorithms For The Winner Determination Problem In Combinatorial Auctions.

Abstract In this paper, we address the problem of picking a subset of bids in a general combinatorial auction so as to maximize the overall profit using the first-price model. This winner determination problem assumes that a single bidding round is held to determine both the winners and prices to be paid. We introduce six variants of biased random-key genetic algorithms for this problem. Three of them use a novel initialization technique that makes use of solutions of intermediate linear programming relaxations of an exact mixed integer-linear programming model as initial chromosomes of the population. An experimental evaluation compares the effectiveness of the proposed algorithms with the standard mixed linear integer programming formulation, a specialized exact algorithm, and the best-performing heuristics proposed for this problem. The proposed algorithms are competitive and offer strong results, mainly for large-scale auctions.

Causas de variação nos preços de bovinos nelore elite no Brasil

Este trabalho teve por objetivo estudar as causas de variação nos preços de bovinos da raça nelore pertencentes a rebanhos de seleção, os quais foram comercializados em leilões, para verificar as influências das avaliações genéticas e dos julgamentos de exterior sobre esses preços. Para tanto, foram computados os preços de venda de 426 bovinos da referida raça em 12 leilões ocorridos em diversas localidades brasileiras (regiões Centro-Oeste, Norte e Sudeste), entre os anos de 2002 e 2005. O valor médio foi de R$ 3.325,49, sendo o mínimo de R$ 1.400,00 e o máximo de R$ 10.500,00. Esses dados foram digitados juntamente com outras informações que eram apresentadas nos catálogos dos leilões. As informações registradas incluíram o sexo de cada animal, o nome do leilão e as DEPs informadas nos catálogos. Além da avaliação da influência das informações dos catálogos, também foi avaliada a influência das informações dos reprodutores, pais dos animais vendidos nos leilões, envolvendo suas DEPs publicadas em um sumário de reprodutores da raça e as pontuações de suas progênies em julgamentos. Os métodos estatísticos aplicados foram análises de variâncias e análises de agrupamento (método K-médias). Como resultado, foi observado que animais com superioridade genética em características relacionadas a desempenho ponderal, considerando-se os efeitos diretos e maternos, foram valorizados ao serem comercializados nos leilões. Em contra-partida, a pontuação dos reprodutores nos julgamentos não teve influência significativa sobre os preços médios de venda de suas progênies nos leilões.

Simultaneous pooled auctions

Suppose a seller wants to sell k similar or identical objects and there are n > k potential buyers. Suppose that each buyer wants only one object. In this case, we suggest the use of a simultaneous auction that would work as follows. Players are asked to submit sealed bids for one object. The individual with the highest bid chooses an object first; the individual with the second-highest bid chooses the next object; and this process continues until the individual with the kth highest bid receives the last object. Each individual pays the equivalent to his or her bid. When objects are identical, we show that the proposed auction generates the same revenue as a first-price sealed-bid sequential auction. When objects are perfectly correlated, there is no known solution for sequential auctions, whereas we can characterize bidding strategies in the proposed auction. Moreover, the proposed auction is optimal (given an appropriately chosen reserve price), and it may be easier and cheaper to run than a sequential auction.

A simple analysis of the US emission permits auctions

We examine a stylized version of EPA auctions when agents know the list of values of sellers and buyers. There are inefficient equilibria where no goods are traded and efficient equilibria where all exchange occurs at a uniform price. We also provide examples under incomplete information when the uniform price equilibrium holds and when it does not hold. (C) 1999 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved. JEL classification: D44; Q29.

Hybrid auctions

In this paper we analyze a hybrid auction that combines a first-price and a Vickrey auction. We show that this auction may generate more expected revenue than a standard first-price auction. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.