Assignment strategies for large proteins by magic-angle spinning NMR: the 21-kDa disulfide-bond-forming enzyme DsbA.

We present strategies for chemical shift assignments of large proteins by magic-angle spinning solid-state NMR, using the 21-kDa disulfide-bond-forming enzyme DsbA as prototype. Previous studies have demonstrated that complete de novo assignments are possible for proteins up to approximately 17 kDa, and partial assignments have been performed for several larger proteins. Here we show that combinations of isotopic labeling strategies, high field correlation spectroscopy, and three-dimensional (3D) and four-dimensional (4D) backbone correlation experiments yield highly confident assignments for more than 90% of backbone resonances in DsbA. Samples were prepared as nanocrystalline precipitates by a dialysis procedure, resulting in heterogeneous linewidths below 0.2 ppm. Thus, high magnetic fields, selective decoupling pulse sequences, and sparse isotopic labeling all improved spectral resolution. Assignments by amino acid type were facilitated by particular combinations of pulse sequences and isotopic labeling; for example, transferred echo double resonance experiments enhanced sensitivity for Pro and Gly residues; [2-(13)C]glycerol labeling clarified Val, Ile, and Leu assignments; in-phase anti-phase correlation spectra enabled interpretation of otherwise crowded Glx/Asx side-chain regions; and 3D NCACX experiments on [2-(13)C]glycerol samples provided unique sets of aromatic (Phe, Tyr, and Trp) correlations. Together with high-sensitivity CANCOCA 4D experiments and CANCOCX 3D experiments, unambiguous backbone walks could be performed throughout the majority of the sequence. At 189 residues, DsbA represents the largest monomeric unit for which essentially complete solid-state NMR assignments have so far been achieved. These results will facilitate studies of nanocrystalline DsbA structure and dynamics and will enable analysis of its 41-kDa covalent complex with the membrane protein DsbB, for which we demonstrate a high-resolution two-dimensional (13)C-(13)C spectrum.

Bringing game theory to hypothesis testing: Establishing finite sample bounds on inference

Small sample properties are of fundamental interest when only limited data is avail-able. Exact inference is limited by constraints imposed by speci.c nonrandomizedtests and of course also by lack of more data. These e¤ects can be separated as we propose to evaluate a test by comparing its type II error to the minimal type II error among all tests for the given sample. Game theory is used to establish this minimal type II error, the associated randomized test is characterized as part of a Nash equilibrium of a .ctitious game against nature.We use this method to investigate sequential tests for the di¤erence between twomeans when outcomes are constrained to belong to a given bounded set. Tests ofinequality and of noninferiority are included. We .nd that inference in terms oftype II error based on a balanced sample cannot be improved by sequential sampling or even by observing counter factual evidence providing there is a reasonable gap between the hypotheses.

An experimental study of adaptive behavior in an oligopolistic market game

We consider an oligopolistic market game, in which the players are competing firm in the same market of a homogeneous consumption good. The consumer side is represented by a fixed demand function. The firms decide how much to produce of a perishable consumption good, and they decide upon a number of information signals to be sent into the population in order to attract customers. Due to the minimal information provided, the players do not have a well--specified model of their environment. Our main objective is to characterize the adaptive behavior of the players in such a situation.

Setting the rules of the game: The choice of electoral systems in advanced democracies

The origins of electoral systems have received scant attention in the literature. Looking at the history of electoral rules in the advanced world in the last century, this paper shows that the existing wide variation in electoral rules across nations can be traced to the strategic decisions that the current ruling parties, anticipating the coordinating consequences of different electoral regimes, make to maximize their representation according to the following conditions. On the one hand, as long as the electoral arena does not change substantially and the current electoral regime serves the ruling parties well, the latter have no incentives to modify the electoral regime. On the other hand, as soon as the electoral arena changes (due to the entry of new voters or a change in their preferences), the ruling parties will entertain changing the electoral system, depending on two main conditions: the emergence of new parties and the coordinating capacities of the old ruling parties. Accordingly, if the new parties are strong, the old parties shift from plurality/majority rules to proportional representation (PR) only if the latter are locked into a 'non-Duvergerian' equilibrium; i.e. if no old party enjoys a dominant position (the case of most small European states)--conversely, they do not if a Duvergerian equilibrium exists (the case of Great Britain). Similarly, whenever the new entrants are weak, a non-PR system is maintained, regardless of the structure of the old party system (the case of the USA). The paper discusses as well the role of trade and ethnic and religious heterogeneity in the adoption of PR rules.

Adaptive approach heuristics for the generalized assignment problem

The Generalized Assignment Problem consists in assigning a setof tasks to a set of agents with minimum cost. Each agent hasa limited amount of a single resource and each task must beassigned to one and only one agent, requiring a certain amountof the resource of the agent. We present new metaheuristics forthe generalized assignment problem based on hybrid approaches.One metaheuristic is a MAX-MIN Ant System (MMAS), an improvedversion of the Ant System, which was recently proposed byStutzle and Hoos to combinatorial optimization problems, and itcan be seen has an adaptive sampling algorithm that takes inconsideration the experience gathered in earlier iterations ofthe algorithm. Moreover, the latter heuristic is combined withlocal search and tabu search heuristics to improve the search.A greedy randomized adaptive search heuristic (GRASP) is alsoproposed. Several neighborhoods are studied, including one basedon ejection chains that produces good moves withoutincreasing the computational effort. We present computationalresults of the comparative performance, followed by concludingremarks and ideas on future research in generalized assignmentrelated problems.

The credit ratings game

The collapse of so many AAA-rated structured finance products in 2007-2008has brought renewed attention to the causes of ratings failures and the conflicts of interestin the Credit Ratings Industry. We provide a model of competition among Credit RatingsAgencies (CRAs) in which there are three possible sources of conflicts: 1) the CRA conflictof interest of understating credit risk to attract more business; 2) the ability of issuersto purchase only the most favorable ratings; and 3) the trusting nature of some investorclienteles who may take ratings at face value. We show that when combined, these give riseto three fundamental equilibrium distortions. First, competition among CRAs can reducemarket efficiency, as competition facilitates ratings shopping by issuers. Second, CRAs aremore prone to inflate ratings in boom times, when there are more trusting investors, andwhen the risks of failure which could damage CRA reputation are lower. Third, the industrypractice of tranching of structured products distorts market efficiency as its role is to deceivetrusting investors. We argue that regulatory intervention requiring: i) upfront paymentsfor rating services (before CRAs propose a rating to the issuer), ii) mandatory disclosure ofany rating produced by CRAs, and iii) oversight of ratings methodology can substantiallymitigate ratings inflation and promote efficiency.

Impact of a board-game approach on current smokers: a randomized controlled trial.

ABSTRACT: BACKGROUND: The main objective of our study was to assess the impact of a board game on smoking status and smoking-related variables in current smokers. To accomplish this objective, we conducted a randomized controlled trial comparing the game group with a psychoeducation group and a waiting-list control group. METHODS: The following measures were performed at participant inclusion, as well as after a 2-week and a 3-month follow-up period: "Attitudes Towards Smoking Scale" (ATS-18), "Smoking Self-Efficacy Questionnaire" (SEQ-12), "Attitudes Towards Nicotine Replacement Therapy" scale (ANRT-12), number of cigarettes smoked per day, stages of change, quit attempts, and smoking status. Furthermore, participants were assessed for concurrent psychiatric disorders and for the severity of nicotine dependence with the Fagerström Test for Nicotine Dependence (FTND). RESULTS: A time × group effect was observed for subscales of the ANRT-12, ATS-18 and SEQ-12, as well as for the number of cigarettes smoked per day. At three months follow-up, compared to the participants allocated to the waiting list group, those on Pick-Klop group were less likely to remain smoker.Outcomes at 3 months were not predicted by gender, age, FTND, stage of change, or psychiatric disorders at inclusion. CONCLUSIONS: The board game seems to be a good option for smokers. The game led to improvements in variables known to predict quitting in smokers. Furthermore, it increased smoking-cessation rates at 3-months follow-up. The game is also an interesting alternative for smokers in the precontemplation stage.

Social value orientation as a moral intuition: Decision-making in the dictator game

We studied the decision making process in the Dictator Game and showed that decisions are the result of a two-step process. In a first step, decision makers generate an automatic, intuitive proposal. Given sufficient motivation and cognitive resources, they adjust this in a second, more deliberated phase. In line with the social intuitionist model, we show that one s Social Value Orientation determines intuitive choice tendencies in the first step, and that this effect is mediated by the dictator s perceived interpersonal closeness with the receiver. Self-interested concerns subsequently leadto a reduction of donation size in step 2. Finally, we show that increasing interpersonal closeness can promote pro-social decision-making.

A game theoretic simulation model for quality oriented timber supply to sawmills

Summary

Michael's Game ou le jeu des hypothèses

Basé sur les psychothérapies cognitives des psychoses, Michael's Game est un jeu de cartes qui propose à des patients de s'entraîner au raisonnement par hypothèses. Après une présentation théorique du jeu (cadre, déroulement, bénéfices attendus pour les patients...) les auteurs illustrent avec des réactions d'un groupe de patients.

A note on the coincidence between Stackelberg and Nash equilibria in a differential game between government and firms

[cat] A Navas i Marín Solano es va demostrar la coincidència entre els equilibris de Nash i de Stackelberg per a una versi´o modificada del joc diferencial proposat por Lancaster (1973). Amb l’objectiu d’obtenir una solució interior, es van imposar restriccions importants sobre el valors dels paràmetres del model. En aquest treball estenem aquest resultat, en el límit en que la taxa de descompte és igual a zero, eliminant les restriccions i considerant totes les solucions possibles.

The maximun and the addition of assigment games

[cat] En el context dels mercats a dues bandes, considerem, en primer lloc, que els jugadors poden escollir on dur a terme les seves transaccions. Mostrem que el joc corresponent a aquesta situació, que es representa pel màxim d’un conjunt finit de jocs d’assignació, pot ser un joc no equilibrat. Aleshores proporcionem condicions per a l’equilibri del joc i, per aquest cas, analitzem algunes propietats del core del joc. En segon lloc, considerem que els jugadors poden fer transaccions en diversos mercats simultàniament i, llavors, sumar els guanys obtinguts. El joc corresponent, representat per la suma d’un conjunt finit de jocs d’assignació, és equilibrat. A més a més, sota certes condicions, la suma dels cores dels dos jocs d’assignació coincideix amb el core del joc suma.