World agriculture outlook & situation /

Title varies slightly.

A guide to the resources of the American antiquarian society : a national library of American history.

"Resources for the story of the history and literature of western hemisphere."

Proceedings of the Democratic state convention : held in Columbus on the eighth of January, 1836 ; with an Address to the people of Ohio.

Mode of access: Internet.

Maps of the world's nations.

v. 1. Western hemisphere.--v. 2. Africa.

Documentary material on nature protection and wild life preservation in Latin America ... Prepared for the use of the Committee of experts on nature protection and wild life preservation, Pan American union, Washington, D.C., May 13-16, 1940 ...

Issued also in Spanish.

World agricultural situation.

Description based on: WAS-16 (July 1978).

The Nicaragua Canal. Is the Assessment in line with National Environmental Law?

In 2013, the Government of Nicaragua approved the concession for a 173-mile canal to the Hong Kong Nicaragua Canal Development Investment Group. As the Western Hemisphere's second poorest nation, Nicaragua is attracted the promises of economic growth that may come as a result of the Canal Project. However, potential economic benefits may be offset by environmental and social damages that would likely occur as a result of the project. The Canal would bisect 16 watersheds, 15 protected areas, and 25 percent of Nicaragua’s rainforest, which would have high impacts on biodiversity, watershed services, and indigenous communities. In 1996, Law No. 217 was enacted to standardize the use and conservation of the environment and natural resources of Nicaragua. My research compares the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment of the Nicaragua Canal to the Environmental provisions of Law No. 217. This analysis can help understand the legal viability of the ESIA under Nicaragua environmental laws.

Defense Expenditure: Central America and The Dominican Republic

It is often speculated that the high allocation of funds to retirement pension systems has influenced the capacity of Central American and Dominican Republic military to modernize. Yet, the comparative study of the allocation of pension and social funds in these particular countries suggest that there is not direct linkage between the poor funding of military modernization plans and the allocation of funds to military pension systems. The research conducted on this subject shows the following results: 1. The Dominican Republic is the only country that has embarked on a considerable procurement of modern equipment and still reports the largest proportion of social expenditures. 2. El Salvador’s defense budget allocates minimal funding to Social Welfare Institute, which as alternative sources of funding. In 2009, El Salvador increased 15 percent funding to the military to respond to increased role in domestic security issues. 3. The Guatemalan defense expenditure on social programs is fairly low, but it has grown during the past six years due to processes of demobilization. However, the Military Social Welfare Institute is administered by a decentralized institution funded directly by the Ministry of Finance. If it were to be considered as a part of the defense budget, its social expenses would account for almost 16% of it. 4. The Honduran Defense Budget has faced a considerable enlargement during the past four years, with social spending expenses taken precedence over modernization efforts. 2 5. The Nicaraguan system of military pensions is administered by a decentralized entity (IPSM) through a system of salary deductions. Information on the funding of this entity is inconclusive. The Nicaraguan Defense spending on social services has reported a drastic 90% drop since the year 2007.

Peru’s Shining Path: Recent Dynamics and Future Prospects

Although soundly defeated in the early to mid-1990s, Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) did not disappear. Over the past five years, it has reemerged in a substantially different form, with both a military and a political component. The organization, once again coordinated by jailed leader Abimael Guzmán Reynoso, has eschewed shorter-term military objectives in favor of a longer-term strategy of slowly rebuilding popular support and establishing a party within the Peruvian political system. In so doing, it has also moved from extreme Maoist ideological rigidity to a more pragmatic, though perhaps only tactical, approach. Financial support is derived once again from cocaine production and trafficking in the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV). Although there may be some individual exceptions, Shining Path is not a narcoterrorist organization. At the same time, Sendero is still very small, in no way a threat to the Peruvian state, and divided. The Lima-based political organization and the military wing in the UHV continue to follow Guzmán‟s leadership, while the Apurímac-Ene Valleys (VRAE) group remains committed to the armed struggle. The Government of Peru (GOP) response to date, both military and civilian, has been inadequate. VRAE military operations are hampered by poor leadership, ill-trained troops, and an outdated strategy. VRAE development resources have been cut, and the long-promised paved road remains in the planning stage. Without significant GOP adjustments, Shining Path is likely to continue to grow.

Climate Change and Regions at Risk: A Look at Central America

Climate change has been a security issue for mankind since Homo sapiens first emerged on the planet, driving him to find new and better food, water, shelter, and basic resources for survival and the advancement of civilization. Only recently, however, has the rate of climate change coupled with man’s knowledge of his own role in that change accelerated, perhaps profoundly, changing the security paradigm. If we take a ―decades‖ look at the security issue, we see competition for natural resources giving way to Cold War ideological containment and deterrence, itself giving way to non-state terrorism and extremism. While we continue to defend against these threats, we are faced with even greater security challenges that inextricably tie economic, food and human security together and where the flash points may not provide clearly discernable causes, as they will be intrinsically tied to climate change. Several scientific reports have revealed that the modest development gains that can be realized by some regions could be reversed by climate change. This means that climate change is not just a long-term environmental threat as was widely believed, but an economic and developmental disaster that is unfolding. As such, addressing climate change has become central to the development and poverty reduction by the World Bank and other financial institutions. In Latin America, poorer countries and communities, such as those found in Central America, will suffer the hardest because of weaker resilience and greater reliance on climatesensitive sectors such as agriculture. The US should attempt to deliver capability to assist these states to deal with the effects of climate change.

ALBA: A Political Tool for Venezuela’s Foreign Policy

Despite its founding by Hugo Chávez on the heels of the failed Free Trade Area for the Americas (FTAA) negotiations which took place November 2003, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA, as it is known for its Spanish acronym) has evolved into a political tool that uses “social power” to facilitate Venezuela‟s positioning as the leader of the anti-U.S. agenda in the region. Fostering political favors and goodwill through the financing of social development projects, ALBA has created a political environment whereby countries on the take and their respective leaders seem deterred from taking public opposing viewpoints to Chávez. To that end, it has provided billions in economic aid to several nations in Latin American and the Caribbean, winning their favor and support for its policies. To date, ALBA counts on eight member nations. Besides Venezuela, it includes Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. It also has several observer nations, among them, Grenada, Haiti, Paraguay, Uruguay, and a non-Latin American country, Syria. Throughout its recent history Venezuela has used its oil wealth to pursue political capital. Under the Chávez government it is doing so as part of a strategic effort countering the U.S. Following Cuba‟s demise in the region as the anti-American socialist camp leader, Chávez is attempting to step into Cuba‟s shoes, picking up where Cuba left off over a decade ago and has used the ALBA as a mechanism to help promote his foreign policy. Relying on its own resources, not those of the Soviet Union as Cuba once did, Venezuela has already shown its influence in the international arena, challenging U.S. positions at the Organization of American States (OAS), the United Nations, and even in matters having little if nothing to do with the region, such as Iran‟s nuclear proliferation. Taking advantage of Venezuela‟s oil prices bonanza, Chávez has been spreading economic aid throughout the region, funding several development projects. From stepping in to buy Bolivia‟s soy beans when the U.S. ceased doing so, to helping finance and construct an airport in Dominica, Venezuela‟s ALBA has provided assistance to many states in the region. As in the past, Venezuela has invested significantly both in time and money in the Caribbean, providing development assistance and oil at a discount to Haiti, St. Kitts and Nevis, and the Dominican Republic, although the latter two are neither member nor observer states of ALBA. The aid Chávez has been spreading around may be coming at a cost. It seems it has begun to cause cracks within the CARICOM community, where ALBA already counts on six of its 15 members, leading experts and leaders in the region to question traditional alliances to each other and the U.S. Yet, ALBA‟s ability to influence through aid is dependent on the Venezuelan economy. Its success hinges on continued Venezuelan oil sales at stable prices and the ability of Chávez to remain in power.

The Security Challenges for the 2016 Rio de Janeiro Olympic Games

Brazilians greeted the long-awaited decision of making Rio de Janeiro the host of the 2016 Olympic Games with tremendous exhilaration. Although Rio’s fantastic natural beauty certainly added to its attraction in hosting the games, its alarming rates of urban crime and violence largely associated with drug trafficking immediately triggered worldwide criticism, and put at issue its ability to guarantee the security for the games. Brazilians have been vying for a position as an emerging global economy and understand the importance of the Games for international prestige. This makes the stakes very high when hosting the Olympic Games in the wake of the 2014 Soccer World Cup, which will also be held in Brazil. This paper explores these criticisms and assesses Rio’s ability to prepare for this important event. The paper further explores the consensus that Brazilians will be more equipped to address actions taken by organized crime capable of affecting the Olympic Games than to face a terrorist attack. Brazil – and Rio – does not figure in the “terrorism map” as a region particularly linked to terrorism. Aside from uncorroborated suspicions of activities by terrorist organizations on the Tri-Border region (Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay), Brazil does not elicit many concerns regarding terrorism.1 Yet, there is no way to guarantee that terrorist organizations will not try to make use of the 2016 Rio Olympic Games to advance their agenda. This being in mind, Rio and Brazil in general face a long road ahead to prepare, prevent, protect and respond to a possible terrorist attack during the 2016 Olympics. It is clear that prevention and preparation towards potential threats to the Games must necessarily include cooperation and exchange of best practices with other countries. 1 U.S. Department of State has confirmed that this area may have been used to transport weapons and conduct financial affairs in the past. This type of activity has been made more difficult with the fortification of border controls in more recent times.

The Impact of the Internet in Six Latin American Countries

Access to the Internet has grown exponentially in Latin America over the past decade. The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) estimates that in 2009 there were 144.5 million Internet users in South America, 6.4 million in Central America, and 8.2 million in the Caribbean, or a total 159.2 million users in all of Latin America.1 At that time, ITU reported an estimated 31 million Internet users in Mexico, which would bring the overall number of users in Latin America to 190.2 million people. More recent estimates published by Internet World Stats place Internet access currently at an estimated 204.6 million out of a total population of 592.5 million in the region (this figure includes Mexico).2 According to those figures, 34.5 per cent of the Latin American population now enjoys Internet access. In recent years, universal access policies contributed to the vast increase in digital literacy and Internet use in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Costa Rica. Whereas the latter was the first country in the region to adopt a policy of universal access, the most expansive and successful digital inclusion programs in the region have taken hold in Brazil and Chile. These two countries have allocated considerable resources to the promotion of digital literacy and Internet access among low income and poor populations; in both cases, civil society groups significantly assisted in the promotion of inclusion at the grassroots level. Digital literacy and Internet access have come to represent, particularly in the area of education, a welcome complementary resource for populations chronically underserved in nations with a long-standing record of inadequate public social services. Digital inclusion is vastly expanding throughout the region, thanks to stabilizing economies, increasingly affordable technology, and the rapid growth in the supply of cellular mobile telephony. A recent study by the global advertising agency Razorfish revealed significant shifts in the demographics of digital inclusion in the major economies of South America, where Web access is rapidly increasing amid the lower middle class and the working poor.3 Several researchers have suggested that Internet access will bring about greater civic participation and engagement, although skeptics remain unsure this could happen in Latin America. Yet, there have been some recent instances of political mobilization facilitated through the use of the Web and social media applications, starting in Chile when “smart mobs” nationwide demonstrated against former Chilean President Michelle Bachelet when she failed to enact education reforms in May 2006. The Internet has also been used by marginalized groups and by guerrillas groups to highlight their stories. In sum, Internet access in Latin is no longer a medium restricted to the elite. It is rather a public sphere upon which civil society has staked its claim. Some of the examples noted in this study point toward a developing trend whereby civil society, through online grassroots movements, is able to effectively pressure public officials, instill transparency and demand accountability in government. Access to the Internet has also made it possible for voices on the margins to participate in the conversation in a way that was never previously feasible. 1 International Telecommunications Union [ITU], “Information Technology Public & Report,” accessed May 15, 2011, http://www.itu.int/. 2 Internet World Stats, “Internet Usage Statistics for the Americas,” accessed March 24, 2011, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats2.htm 3 J. Crump, “The finch and the fox,” London, UK (2010), http://www.slideshare.net/razorfishmarketing/the-finch-and-the-fox.

The Use of the Military for Law Enforcement Activities in Central America

Faced with the violence, criminality and insecurity now threatening peace and democratic governance in Central America, the region’s governments have decided to use the Armed Forces to carry out actions in response to criminal actions, looking to improve their performance. Although public demand for including the Armed Forces in these functions takes place within a legally legitimate framework, it is motivated by tangible circumstances such as increased levels of violence, delinquency and crime. Despite being coupled with the perception of institutional weakness within the security and judicial system (particularly police) and the recognition of prestige, efficiency, discipline and severity in fulfilling the Armed Forces’ missions, these arguments are insufficient to legitimize the use of the military as a police force. Within this context, this paper reflects on the implications or consequences of the use of the Armed Forces in duties traditionally assigned to the police in the Central American region with the goal of contributing to the debate on this topic taking place in the Americas. To achieve this end, first we will focus on understanding the actual context in which a decision is made to involve the Armed Forces in security duties in the region. Second, we will examine the effects and implications of this decision on the Armed Forces’ relations within their respective societies. Third and finally, considering this is already a reality in the region, this paper will provide recommendations. The main findings of this research, resulting from the application of an analyticaldescriptive and historically based study, are organized in three dimensions: the political dimension, by implication referring to the relationship between the ultimate political authority and the Armed Forces; the social dimension, by implication the opinion of citizens; and other implications not only affecting the structural and cultural organization of armies and police but also the complementary operational framework within a context of comprehensive response by the State. As a main conclusion, it poses there is an environment conducive to the use of the Armed Forces in citizen’s security, in view of the impact of threats provoked by criminal structures of a military nature currently operating in Central America. However, this participation creates an inevitable social and political impact if implemented in isolation or given a political leading role and/or operational autonomy. This participation poses risks to the institutions of the Armed Forces and the police as well. Finally, this paper identifies an urgent need for the Armed Forces’ role to be more clearly defined with regard to security matters, limiting it to threats that impact States’ governability and existence. Nonetheless, Central American States should seek a COMPREHENSIVE response to current crime and violence, using all necessary institutions to confront these challenges, but with defined roles and responsibilities for each and dynamic coordination to complement their actions.

Capabilities of Police and Military Forces in Central America -- A Comparative Analysis of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras an d Nicaragua

A difficult transition to a new paradigm of Democratic Security and the subsequent process of military restructuring during the nineties led El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Nicaragua to re-consider their old structures and functions of their armed forces and police agencies. This study compares the institutions in the four countries mentioned above to assess their current condition and response capacity in view of the contemporary security challenges in Central America. This report reveals that the original intention of limiting armies to defend and protect borders has been threatened by the increasing participation of armies in public security. While the strength of armies has been consolidated in terms of numbers, air and naval forces have failed to become strengthened or sufficiently developed to effectively combat organized crime and drug trafficking and are barely able to conduct air and sea operations. Honduras has been the only country that has maintained a proportional distribution of its armed forces. However, security has been in the hands of a Judicial Police, supervised by the Public Ministry. The Honduran Judicial Police has been limited to exercising preventive police duties, prohibited from carrying out criminal investigations. Nicaragua, meanwhile, possesses a successful police force, socially recognized for maintaining satisfactory levels of security surpassing the Guatemalan and El Salvadoran police, which have not achieved similar results despite of having set up a civilian police force separate from the military. El Salvador meanwhile, has excelled in promoting a Police Academy and career professional education, even while not having military attachés in other countries. Regarding budgetary issues, the four countries allocate almost twice the amount of funding on their security budgets in comparison to what is allocated to their defense budgets. However, spending in both areas is low when taking into account each country's GDP as well as their high crime rates. Regional security challenges must be accompanied by a professionalization of the regional armies focused on protecting and defending borders. Therefore, strong institutional frameworks to support the fight against crime and drug trafficking are required. It will require the strengthening of customs, greater control of illicit arms trafficking, investment in education initiatives, creating employment opportunities and facilitating significant improvements in the judicial system, as well as its accessibility to the average citizen.