A Philosophy of Operatic Storytelling

This dissertation presents the first theoretical model for understanding narration and point of view in opera, examining repertoire from Richard Wagner to Benjamin Britten. Prior music scholarship on musical narratives and narrativity has drawn primarily on continental literary theory and philosophy of the 1960s to the middle of the 1980s. This study, by contrast, engages with current debates in the analytic branch of aesthetic philosophy. One reason why the concept of point of view has not been more extensively explored in opera studies is the widespread belief that operas are not narratives. This study questions key premises on which this assumption rests. In so doing, it presents a new definition of narrative. Arguably, a narrative is an utterance intended to communicate a story, where "story" is understood to involve the representation of a particular agent or agents exercising their agency. This study explores the role of narrators in opera, introducing the first taxonomy of explicit fictional operatic narrators. Through a close analysis of Britten and Myfanwy Piper's Owen Wingrave, it offers an explanation of music's power to orient spectators to the points of view of opera characters by providing audiences with access to characters' perceptual experiences and cognitive, affective, and psychological states. My analysis also helps account for how our subjective access to fictional characters may engender sympathy for them. The second half of the dissertation focuses on opera in performance. Current thinking in music scholarship predominantly holds that fidelity is an outmoded concern. I argue that performing a work-for-performance is a matter of intentionally modelling one's performance on the work-for-performance's features and achieving a moderate degree of fidelity or matching between the two. Finally, this study investigates how the creative decisions of the performers and director impact the point of view from which an opera is told.

Constituintes Proposicionais Inarticulados

Algumas proposições parecem incluir constituintes não articulados (i.e., elementos proposicionais que não são o valor semântico de nenhum elemento gramatical do proferimento que expressa estas proposições). Isto chamou a atenção dos filósofos da linguagem por constituir um contraexemplo àquilo que Perry chamou de representação homomórfica da linguagem (i.e., cada elemento proposicional sendo o valor semântico de algum elemento gramatical). Se genuíno, este fenômeno também entra em choque com o chamado minimalismo semântico, de acordo com o qual a única forma de sensibilidade contextual sistemática que afeta o conteúdo proposicional originalmente expresso é a indexicalidade. Neste ensaio discuto algumas tentativas de incorporar a ideia de constituintes inarticulados na semântica e na epistemologia, bem como algumas críticas direcionadas a estas tentativas.

Are complex demonstratives synonymous with definite descriptions?

Neste artigo, discuto como o material descritivo dos demonstrativos complexos contribuipara o seu conteúdo literal relativo a um contexto de proferimento. Em filosofia da linguagem, uma hipótese tradicional sobre os demonstrativos complexos prevê que o material descritivo ‘F’ de um demonstrativo complexo faz uma contribuição ao conteúdo literal porque uma descrição definida contendo o nominal ‘F’ determina e expressa o conteúdo literal do demonstrativo complexo relativo ao contexto de proferimento. Assevero que este tipo de hipótese envolve erro porque nenhum tipo de descrição definida, descrições Gödelianas em particular, tem papel efetivo na determinação do conteúdo literal dos demonstrativos complexos. Em vez disso, sou favorável a uma abordagem segundo a qual o conteúdo literal de um demonstrativo complexo é exaustivamente composto pelo conteúdo nãoquantificacional da expressão demonstrativa (e.g., ‘esta’) e pelo conteúdo descritivo de seu nominal (e.g., ‘mesa’). Demonstrativos complexos são, portanto, designadores descritivos, termos que se referem e descrevem sem quantificar. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT

"Not one word of it made any sense" : Hyperbolic Synecdoche in the British National Corpus

A distinct metonymic pattern was discovered in the course of conducting a corpus-based study of figurative uses of WORD. The pattern involved examples such as Not one word of it made any sense and I agree with every word. It was labelled ‘hyperbolic synecdoche’, defined as a case in which a lexeme which typically refers to part of an entity (a) is used to stand for the whole entity and (b) is described with reference to the end point on a scale. Specifically, the speaker/writer selects the perspective of a lower-level unit (such as word for ‘utterance’), which is quantified as NOTHING or ALL, thus forming a subset of ‘extreme case formulations’. Hyperbolic synecdoche was found to exhibit a restricted range of lexicogrammatical patterns involving word, with the negated NOTHING patterns being considerably more common than the ALL patterns. The phenomenon was shown to be common in metonymic uses in general, constituting one-fifth of all cases of metonymy in word. The examples of hyperbolic synecdoche were found not to be covered by the oftquoted ‘abbreviation’ rationale for metonymy; instead, they represent a more roundabout way of expression. It is shown that other cases of hyperbolic synecdoche exist outside of word and the domain of communication (such as ‘time’ and ‘money’).