998 resultados para United States. Army. Connecticut Light Artillery Battery, 1st (1861-1865).


Relevância:

100.00% 100.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Relevância:

100.00% 100.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

As a consequence of the increased incidence of collaborative arrangements between firms, the competitive environment characterising many industries has undergone profound change. It is suggested that rivalry is not necessarily enacted by individual firms according to the traditional mechanisms of direct confrontation in factor and product markets, but rather as collaborative orchestration between a number of participants or network members. Strategic networks are recognised as sets of firms within an industry that exhibit denser strategic linkages among themselves than other firms within the same industry. Based on this, strategic networks are determined according to evidence of strategic alliances between firms comprising the industry. As a result, a single strategic network represents a group of firms closely linked according to collaborative ties. Arguably, the collective outcome of these strategic relationships engineered between firms suggest that the collaborative benefits attributed to interorganisational relationships require closer examination in respect to their propensity to influence rivalry in intraindustry environments. Derived in large from the social sciences, network theory allows for the micro and macro examination of the opportunities and constraints inherent in the structure of relationships in strategic networks, establishing a relational approach upon which the conduct and performance of firms can be more fully understood. Research to date has yet to empirically investigate the relationship between strategic networks and rivalry. The limited research that has been completed utilising a network rationale to investigate competitive patterns in contemporary industry environments has been characterised by a failure to directly measure rivalry. Further, this prior research has typically embedded investigation in industry settings dominated by technological or regulatory imperatives, such as the microprocessor and airline industries. These industries, due to the presence of such imperatives, are arguably more inclined to support the realisation of network rivalry, through subscription to prescribed technological standards (eg., microprocessor industry) or by being bound by regulatory constraints dictating operation within particular market segments (airline industry). In order to counter these weaknesses, the proposition guiding research - Are patterns of rivalry predicted by strategic network membership? – is embedded in the United States Light Vehicles Industry, an industry not dominated by technological or regulatory imperatives. Further, rivalry is directly measured and utilised in research, thus distinguishing this investigation from prior research efforts. The timeframe of investigation is 1993 – 1999, with all research data derived from secondary sources. Strategic networks were defined within the United States Light Vehicles Industry based on evidence of horizontal strategic relationships between firms comprising the industry. The measure of rivalry used to directly ascertain the competitive patterns of industry participants was derived from the traditional Herfindahl Index, modified to account for patterns of rivalry observed at the market segment level. Statistical analyses of the strategic network and rivalry constructs found little evidence to support the contention of network rivalry; indeed, greater levels of rivalry were observed between firms comprising the same strategic network than between firms participating in opposing network structures. Based on these results, patterns of rivalry evidenced in the United States Light Vehicle Industry over the period 1993 – 1999 were not found to be predicted by strategic network membership. The findings generated by this research are in contrast to current theorising in the strategic network – rivalry realm. In this respect, these findings are surprising. The relevance of industry type, in conjunction with prevailing network methodology, provides the basis upon which these findings are contemplated. Overall, this study raises some important questions in relation to the relevancy of the network rivalry rationale, establishing a fruitful avenue for further research.

Relevância:

100.00% 100.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

This study, part of a broader investigation of the history of exploitation of right whales, Balaena glacialis, in the western North Atlantic, emphasizes U.S. shore whaling from Maine to Delaware (from lat. 45°N to 38°30'N) in the period 1620–1924. Our broader study of the entire catch history is intended to provide an empirical basis for assessing past distribution and abundance of this whale population. Shore whaling may have begun at Cape Cod, Mass., in the 1620’s or 1630’s; it was certainly underway there by 1668. Right whale catches in New England waters peaked before 1725, and shore whaling at Cape Cod, Martha’s Vineyard, and Nantucket continued to decline through the rest of the 18th century. Right whales continued to be taken opportunistically in Massachusetts, however, until the early 20th century. They were hunted in Narragansett Bay, R.I., as early as 1662, and desultory whaling continued in Rhode Island until at least 1828. Shore whaling in Connecticut may have begun in the middle 1600’s, continuing there until at least 1718. Long Island shore whaling spanned the period 1650–1924. From its Dutch origins in the 1630’s, a persistent shore whaling enterprise developed in Delaware Bay and along the New Jersey shore. Although this activity was most profi table in New Jersey in the early 1700’s, it continued there until at least the 1820’s. Whaling in all areas of the northeastern United States was seasonal, with most catches in the winter and spring. Historically, right whales appear to have been essentially absent from coastal waters south of Maine during the summer and autumn. Based on documented references to specific whale kills, about 750–950 right whales were taken between Maine and Delaware, from 1620 to 1924. Using production statistics in British customs records, the estimated total secured catch of right whales in New England, New York, and Pennsylvania between 1696 and 1734 was 3,839 whales based on oil and 2,049 based on baleen. After adjusting these totals for hunting loss (loss-rate correction factor = 1.2), we estimate that 4,607 (oil) or 2,459 (baleen) right whales were removed from the stock in this region during the 38-year period 1696–1734. A cumulative catch estimate of the stock’s size in 1724 is 1,100–1,200. Although recent evidence of occurrence and movements suggests that right whales continue to use their traditional migratory corridor along the U.S. east coast, the catch history indicates that this stock was much larger in the 1600’s and early 1700’s than it is today. Right whale hunting in the eastern United States ended by the early 1900’s, and the species has been protected throughout the North Atlantic since the mid 1930’s. Among the possible reasons for the relatively slow stock recovery are: the very small number of whales that survived the whaling era to become founders, a decline in environmental carrying capacity, and, especially in recent decades, mortality from ship strikes and entanglement in fishing gear.

Relevância:

100.00% 100.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

The variability of summer precipitation in the southeastern United States is examined in this study using 60-yr (1948-2007) rainfall data. The Southeast summer rainfalls exhibited higher interannual variability with more intense summer droughts and anomalous wetness in the recent 30 years (1978-2007) than in the prior 30 years (1948-77). Such intensification of summer rainfall variability was consistent with a decrease of light (0.1-1 mm day-1) and medium (1-10 mm day-1) rainfall events during extremely dry summers and an increase of heavy (.10 mm day-1) rainfall events in extremely wet summers. Changes in rainfall variability were also accompanied by a southward shift of the region of maximum zonal wind variability at the jet stream level in the latter period. The covariability between the Southeast summer precipitation and sea surface temperatures (SSTs) is also analyzed using the singular value decomposition (SVD) method. It is shown that the increase of Southeast summer precipitation variability is primarily associated with a higher SST variability across the equatorial Atlantic and also SST warming in the Atlantic. © 2010 American Meteorological Society.

Relevância:

100.00% 100.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

Seldom have studies taken account of changes in lifestyle habits in the elderly, or investigated their impact on disease-free life expectancy (LE) and LE with cardiovascular disease (CVD). Using data on subjects aged 50+ years from three European cohorts (RCPH, ESTHER and Tromsø), we used multi-state Markov models to calculate the independent and joint effects of smoking, physical activity, obesity and alcohol consumption on LE with and without CVD. Men and women aged 50 years who have a favourable lifestyle (overweight but not obese, light/moderate drinker, non-smoker and participates in vigorous physical activity) lived between 7.4 (in Tromsø men) and 15.7 (in ESTHER women) years longer than those with an unfavourable lifestyle (overweight but not obese, light/moderate drinker, smoker and does not participate in physical activity). The greater part of the extra life years was in terms of "disease-free" years, though a healthy lifestyle was also associated with extra years lived after a CVD event. There are sizeable benefits to LE without CVD and also for survival after CVD onset when people favour a lifestyle characterized by salutary behaviours. Remaining a non-smoker yielded the greatest extra years in overall LE, when compared to the effects of routinely taking physical activity, being overweight but not obese, and drinking in moderation. The majority of the overall LE benefit is in disease free years. Therefore, it is important for policy makers and the public to know that prevention through maintaining a favourable lifestyle is "never too late".

Relevância:

100.00% 100.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

The Falkland Islands War of 1982 was fought over competing claims to sovereignty over a group of islands off the east coast of South America. The dispute was between Argentina and the United Kingdom. Argentina claims the islands under rights to Spanish succession, the fact that they lie off the Argentine coast line and that in 1833 Great Britain took the islands illegally and by force. The United Kingdom claims the islands primarily through prescription--the fact that they have governed the islands in a peaceful, continuous and public manner since 1833. The British also hold that the population living on the islands, roughly eighteen hundred British descendants, should be able to decide their own future. The United Kingdom also lays claim to the islands through rights of discovery and settlement, although this claim has always been challenged by Spain who until 1811 governed the islands. Both claims have legal support, and the final decision if there will ever be one is difficult to predict. Sadly today the ultimate test of sovereignty does not come through international law but remains in the idea that "He is sovereign who can defend his sovereignty." The years preceding the Argentine invasion of 1982 witnessed many diplomatic exchanges between The United Kingdom and Argentina over the future of the islands. During this time the British sent signals to Argentina that ii implied a decline in British resolve to hold the islands and demonstrated that military action did more to further the talks along than did actual negotiations. The Argentine military junta read these signals and decided that they could take the islands in a quick military invasion and that the United Kingdom would consider the act as a fait accompli and would not protest the invasion. The British in response to this claimed that they never signaled to Argentina that a military solution was acceptable to them and launched a Royal Navy task force to liberate the islands. Both governments responded to an international crisis with means that were designed both to resolve the international crisis and increase the domestic popularity of the government. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was facing an all-time low in popularity for post-War Prime Ministers while Argentine President General Galtieri needed to gain mass popular support so he could remain a viable President after he was scheduled to lose command of the army and a seat on the military junta that ran the country. The military war for the Falklands is indicative of the nature of modern warfare between Third World countries. It shows that the gap in military capabilities between Third and First World countries is narrowing significantly. Modern warfare between a First and Third World country is no longer a 'walk over' for the First World country.