Is there really a backlash against multiculturalism policies? New evidence from the multiculturalism policy index

In much of the western world, and particularly in Europe, there is a widespread perception that multiculturalism has ‘failed’ and that governments who once embraced a multicultural approach to diversity are turning away, adopting a strong emphasis on civic integration. This reaction, we are told, “reflects a seismic shift not just in the Netherlands, but in other European countries as well” (JOPPKE 2007). This paper challenges this view. Drawing on an updated version of the Multiculturalism Policy Index introduced earlier (BANTING and KYMLICKA 2006), the paper presents an index of the strength of multicultural policies for European countries and several traditional countries of immigration at three points in time (1980, 2000 and 2010). The results paint a different picture of contemporary experience in Europe. While a small number of countries, including most notably the Netherlands, have weakened established multicultural policies during the 2000s, such a shift is the exception. Most countries that adopted multicultural approaches in the later part of the twentieth century have maintained their programs in the first decade of the new century; and a significant number of countries have added new ones. In much of Europe, multicultural policies are not in general retreat. As a result, the turn to civic integration is often being layered on top of existing multicultural programs, leading to a blended approach to diversity. The paper reflects on the compatibility of multiculturalism policies and civic integration, arguing that more liberal forms of civic integration can be combined with multiculturalism but that more illiberal or coercive forms are incompatible with a multicultural approach.

Structural changes in the US economy: Bad Luck or Bad Policy?

This paper investigates the relationship between time variations in output and inflation dynamics and monetary policy in the US. There are changes in the structural coefficients and in the variance of the structural shocks. The policy rules in the 1970s and 1990s are similar as is the transmission of policy disturbances. Inflation persistence is only partly a monetary phenomena. Variations in the systematic component of policy have limited effects on the dynamics of output and inflation. Results are robust to alterations in the auxiliary assumptions.

Asymmetric information and trade policy

Economists understand protectionism as a costly mechanism to redistribute from the average citizen to special-interest groups; yet political platforms that deviate from free trade have surprising popular appeal. I present an explanation based on heterogeneous information across citizens whose voting decision has an intensive margin. For each politician and each sector, the optimal trade-policy choice caters to the preferences of those voters who are more likely to be informed of that proposal. An overall protectionist bias emerges because in every industry producers are better informed than consumers. This asymmetry emerges in equilibrium because co-workers share industry-specific knwoledge, and because producers have greater incentives to engage in costly learning about their sector. My model implies that more widespread information about trade policy for an industry is associated with lower protection. Cross-sectoral evidence on U.S. non-tariff barriers and newspaper coverage is consistent with this prediction.

Nominal Debt as a Burden on Monetary Policy

We study the effects of nominal debt on the optimal sequential choice of monetary policy. When the stock of debt is nominal, the incentive to generate unanticipated inflation increases the cost of the outstanding debt even if no unanticipated inflation episodes occur in equilibrium. Without full commitment, the optimal sequential policy is to deplete the outstanding stock of debt progressively until these extra costs disappear. Nominal debt is therefore a burden on monetary policy, not only because it must be serviced, but also because it creates a time inconsistency problem that distorts interest rates. The introduction of alternative forms of taxation may lessen this burden, if there is enough commtiment to fiscal policy. If there is full commitment to an optimal fiscal policy, then the resulting monetary policy is the Friedman rule of zero nominal interest rates.

Governor’s Office of Drug Control Policy Agency Performance Reporting, 2006

The Agency Performance Report for the Governor’s Office of Drug Control Policy is published in accordance with the Accountable Government Act. The information provided within this report is to aid in decision-making and to illustrate accountability to stakeholders and citizens. The report is indicative of the agency’s progress in meeting performance targets and achieving goals consistent with the enterprise strategic plan, the agency strategic plan and agency performance plan.

Governor’s Office of Drug Control Policy Agency Performance Reporting, 2007

The Agency Performance Report for the Governor’s Office of Drug Control Policy is published in accordance with the Accountable Government Act. The information provided within this report is to aid in decision-making and to illustrate accountability to stakeholders and citizens. The report is indicative of the agency’s progress in meeting performance targets and achieving goals consistent with the enterprise strategic plan, the agency strategic plan and agency performance plan.

Monetary policy with signal extraction from the bond market

Monetary policy is conducted in an environment of uncertainty. This paper sets upa model where the central bank uses real-time data from the bond market togetherwith standard macroeconomic indicators to estimate the current state of theeconomy more efficiently, while taking into account that its own actions influencewhat it observes. The timeliness of bond market data allows for quicker responsesof monetary policy to disturbances compared to the case when the central bankhas to rely solely on collected aggregate data. The information content of theterm structure creates a link between the bond market and the macroeconomythat is novel to the literature. To quantify the importance of the bond market asa source of information, the model is estimated on data for the United Statesand Australia using Bayesian methods. The empirical exercise suggests that thereis some information in the US term structure that helps the Federal Reserve toidentify shocks to the economy on a timely basis. Australian bond prices seemto be less informative than their US counterparts, perhaps because Australia is arelatively small and open economy.

First impressions matter: Signalling as a source of policy dynamics

We first establish that policymakers on the Bank of England's Monetary PolicyCommittee choose lower interest rates with experience. We then reject increasingconfidence in private information or learning about the structure of the macroeconomy as explanations for this shift. Instead, a model in which voters signal theirhawkishness to observers better fits the data. The motivation for signalling is consistent with wanting to control inflation expectations, but not career concerns orpleasing colleagues. There is also no evidence of capture by industry. The papersuggests that policy-motivated reputation building may be important for explainingdynamics in experts' policy choices.

Heterogeneous information and trade policy

Protectionism enjoys surprising popular support, in spite of deadweight losses. At thesame time, trade barriers appear to decline with public information about protection.This paper develops an electoral model with heterogeneously informed voters whichexplains both facts and predicts the pattern of trade policy across industries. In themodel, each agent endogenously acquires more information about his sector of employment. As a result, voters support protectionism, because they learn more about thetrade barriers that help them as producers than those that hurt them as consumers.In equilibrium, asymmetric information induces a universal protectionist bias. Thestructure of protection is Pareto inefficient, in contrast to existing models. The modelpredicts a Dracula effect: trade policy for a sector is less protectionist when there ismore public information about it. Using a measure of newspaper coverage across industries, I find that cross-sector evidence from the United States bears out my theoreticalpredictions.

Estimating overidentified, nonrecursive, time-varying coefficients structural VARs

This paper provides a method to estimate time varying coefficients structuralVARs which are non-recursive and potentially overidentified. The procedureallows for linear and non-linear restrictions on the parameters, maintainsthe multi-move structure of standard algorithms and can be used toestimate structural models with different identification restrictions. We studythe transmission of monetary policy shocks and compare the results with thoseobtained with traditional methods.

Statement of Inventment Policy for the Retirement Investors' Club, 2005

The Retirement Investors’ Club (RIC) (also referred to as 457/401(a) deferred compensation) is a voluntary retirement savings program designed to help you meet your need for income at retirement and lower your current income taxes. Your contributions to RIC are automatically withdrawn from your paycheck and you are credited with an employer match. You may enroll*and make changes at any time. Other advantages are explained below…keep reading about this excellent employee benefit!

Monetary policy in a systemic crisis

This paper examines the monetary policy followed during the current financial crisisfrom the perspective of the theory of the lender of last resort. It is argued that standardmonetary policy measures would have failed because the channels through whichmonetary policy is implemented depend upon the well functioning of the interbankmarket. As the crisis developed, liquidity vanished and the interbank market collapsed,central banks had to inject much more liquidity at low interest rates than predicted bystandard monetary policy models. At the same time, as the interbank market did notallow for the redistribution of liquidity among banks, central banks had to design newchannels for liquidity injection.

Introducing a first AIDS vaccine in Switzerland: a Policy Delphi analysis.

This preliminary exploration was limited by a number of factors. The format of the study has necessarily induced some form of selection bias of the panelists, because of the complexity of some questions, and the time required to complete the questionnaires. Several issues have not been addressed. One example could be the response to HIV infection occurring in a vaccinee. The study also did not address the difficulties related to the licensing of the vaccine. Indeed, the proposed scenario assumed that the vaccine had been registered as a starting point for the analysis. Finally, it has not been possible to conduct a sensitivity analysis, in order to evaluate how the responses would have been modified if some important characteristics of the vaccine had been modified.Very diverse evaluations were given in response to questions related with attitudes and perception of AIDS and AIDS vaccine. The possibility that vaccine availability or usage can be associated with an increased frequency in risky behaviors was spontaneously mentioned by half of the panelists. The estimation of the proportion of persons at highest risk who would choose to use this vaccine also indicated a high degree of uncertainty. This study offers important lessons. According to a broad and diverse panel of individuals, an incompletely effective AIDS vaccine would result in an additional level of complexity for the AIDS prevention strategy, rather than a simplification. The use of such a vaccine would have to be coupled with counselling. This implies a sustained emphasis on the recommendations which have been central to the STOP AIDS campaigns until now. In addition, consensual issues, as well as other issues more likely to be controversial have been identified. This should greatly help focusing the work of any committee designated to develop and implement a vaccination policy if an AIDS vaccine became available. Finally, our experience with the Policy Delphi indicates that this mode of structured communication could be usefully applied to other public health issues presenting a high visibility as well as a complex relationship with public perception.

On the timing of balance of payments crises: Disaggregated information and interest rate policy

This paper proposes a dynamic framework to study the timing of balance of paymentscrises. The model incorporates two main ingredients: (i) investors have private information; (ii)investors interact in a dynamic setting, weighing the high returns on domestic assets against the incentives to pull out before the devaluation. The model shows that the presence of disaggregated information delays the onset of BOP crises, giving rise to discrete devaluations. It also shows that high interest rates can be eective in delaying and possibly avoiding the abandonment of the peg. The optimal policy is to raise interest rates sharply as fundamentals become very weak. However, this policy is time inconsistent, suggesting a role for commitment devices such as currency boards or IMF pressure.

Nominal debt as a burden on monetary policy

We study the effects of nominal debt on the optimal sequential choice of monetary policy. When the stock of debt is nominal, the incentive to generate unanticipated inflation increases the cost of the outstanding debt even if no unanticipated inflation episodes occur in equilibrium. Without full commitment, the optimal sequential policy is to deplete the outstanding stock of debt progressively until these extra costs disappear. Nominal debt is therefore a burden on monetary policy, not only because it must be serviced, but also because it creates a time inconsistency problem that distorts interest rates. The introduction of alternative forms of taxation may lessen this burden, if there is enough commtiment to fiscal policy. If there is full commitment to an optimal fiscal policy, then the resulting monetary policy is the Friedman rule of zero nominal interest rates.