Are tax subsidies for private medical insurance self-financing? Evidence from a microsimulation model for outpatient and inpatient episodes

This paper analyses whether or not tax subsidies to private medicalinsurance are self-financing by means of a structural approach. Weconstruct a simulation routine based on a microeconometric discretechoice model that allows us to evaluate the impact of premium changeson the utilisation of outpatient and inpatient health care services. Wesimulate the 1999 Spanish tax reform that abolished the tax deductionfor expenditures on private health insurance using a representativesample of the Catalan population. Prior to this reform, foregone taxrevenue arising from deductions after the purchase of private insuranceamounted to 69.2 M. per year. In contrast, the elimination of thesubsidies to private policies is estimated to generate an extra costfor the public sector of about 8.9 M. per year.

Road Use Tax/Fund Primary Road Fund Budget: Reversions, September 11, 2008

Pursuant to Iowa Code Section 307.46(2) - This is the Iowa Department of Transportation's report on the use of reversions.

How different are returns to education? Evidence from German school choices

This study presents estimates of returns to post-secondary educationand wage differentials among graduates fromdifferent secondary schoolsin Germany. I use an empirical model that captures the basic features ofthe German education system. It controls for selection into post-secondaryeducation and treats latter as endogenous in the wage equation. Myresults show that OLS estimates are severely biased. The direction ofthe bias depends on the secondary school type. Annual returns topost-secondary education differ significantly: they are eight timeshigher for graduates from the highest secondary school than for graduatesfrom the lowest secondary school.

Serial defaults, serial profits: Returns to sovereign lending in Habsburg Spain, 1566-1600

Philip II of Spain accumulated debts equivalent to 60% of GDP. He also defaulted four times onhis short-term loans, thus becoming the first serial defaulter in history. Contrary to a commonview in the literature, we show that lending to the king was profitable even under worst-casescenario assumptions. Lenders maintained long-term relationships with the crown. Lossessustained during defaults were more than compensated by profits in normal times. Defaultswere not catastrophic events. In effect, short-term lending acted as an insurance mechanism,allowing the king to reduce his payments in harsh times in exchange for paying a premium intranquil periods. © 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Increasing returns, imperfect competition and factor prices

We show how, in general equilibrium models featuring increasing returns, imperfectcompetition and endogenous markups, changes in the scale of economic activity affectincome distribution across factors. Whenever final goods are gross-substitutes (gross-complements), a scale expansion raises (lowers) the relative reward of the scarce factoror the factor used intensively in the sector characterized by a higher degree of product differentiation and higher fixed costs. Under very reasonable hypothesis, our theory suggests that scale is skill-biased. This result provides a microfoundation for the secular increase in the relative demand for skilled labor. Moreover, it constitutes an important link among major explanations for the rise in wage inequality: skill-biased technical change, capital-skill complementarities and international trade. We provide new evidence on the mechanism underlying the skill bias of scale.

Increasing political returns and rural-urban migrations

This paper analyzes the different equilibria in rural-urban migrationsand political redistribution that result from the interaction betweenincreasing political returns, the distribution of land, and creditmarket imperfections. Governments that put a special weight on thewelfare of urban workers when setting agricultural prices generate apolitical externality in the urban sector, giving peasants anincentive to migrate in anticipation of policy determination. Ifcredit markets are imperfect, land ownership confers higherproductivity to peasants, who require large price changes to migrate.In this context, land inequality would lead to large migrations and tolarge policy change, while an egalitarian land distribution would leadto no migration and to a small policy change. This interaction shedslight on the contrasting experience of Latin America and East Asia atthe outset of World War II.

Tax simulation in the SHP

This paper describes a simulation package designed to estimate the annual income taxes paid by respondents of the Swiss Household Panel (SHP). In Switzerland, the 26 cantons have their own tax system. Additionally, tax levels vary between the over 2000 municipalities and over time. The simulation package takes account of this complexity by building on existing tables on tax levels which are provided by the Swiss Federal Tax Administration Office. Because these are limited to a few types of households and only 812 municipalities, they have to be extended to cover all households and municipalities. A further drawback of these tables is that they neglect several deductions. The tax simulation package fills this gap by taking additionally account of deductions for children, double-earner couples, third pillar and support for dependent persons according to cantonal legislation. The resulting variable on direct taxes not only serves to calculate household income net of taxes, but can also be a variable for analysis by its own account.

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Avoid Rapid Tax-Refund Loans December, 2008

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Avoid Rapid Tax-Refund Loans

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Avoid Rapid Tax-Refund Loans December, 2008

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Avoid Rapid Tax-Refund Loans

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Avoid Rapid Tax-Refund Loans February, 2009

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Avoid Rapid Tax-Refund Loans

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2008

Iowa Sales and Use Tax Annual Statistical Report 2008

Iowa Tax Expenditures Report 2005

Exemptions, exclusions, credits against tax and reductions in tax base that are tied to specific provisions in tax law; estimation of the annual dollar effect for each of those provisions.

Iowa Individual Income Tax Statistical Report, July 2007

Iowa Individual Income Tax Statistical Report 2007

Tax Credit Evaluation Study: Historic Preservation and Cultural and Entertainment District Tax Credit, March 2009

During the 2005 Legislative Session the Iowa Department of Revenue received an appropriation to establish the Tax Credits Tracking and Analysis Program (TCTAP) to track tax credit awards and claims. In addition, the Department was directed to perform periodic evaluations of tax credit programs. The purpose of these studies is three-fold: (1) To provide a comparison of the Iowa tax credit program to similar federal and other states’ programs (2) To summarize information related to the usage of the Iowa tax credit (3) To evaluate the economic impact of the tax credit program.

Tax Credit Evaluation Study: Iowa’s Earned Income Tax Credit, February 23007

During the 2005 Legislative Session the Iowa Department of Revenue received an appropriation to establish the Tax Credits Tracking and Analysis Program (TCTAP) to track tax credit awards and claims. In addition, the Department was directed to perform periodic evaluations of tax credit programs. The purpose of these studies is three-fold: (1) To provide a comparison of the Iowa tax credit program to similar federal and other states’ programs (2) To summarize information related to the usage of the Iowa tax credit (3) To evaluate the economic impact of the tax credit program.