Using Blogs to Share and Discuss Experimental Data - Cameron Neylon

This is one of a series of short case studies describing how academic tutors at the University of Southampton have made use of learning technologies to support their students.

Increasing Rail's Mode Share Within The Constraints of The Existing Network

This file contains the results of application of the model (4.6) and (4.8)

example share for INFO2009

This share is designed to show students how to create a share for their INFO2009 coursework includes link to example video at http://youtu.be/Bcr9AdL7ttc

Dalian Staff Share - RCS

A simple share of materials for Dalian staff

Re-measuring labor's share

Measuring labor's share of an economy's aggregate income seems straightforward, at least in principle. Count up wage and salary income, along with the value of benefits provided to employees, and divide it by total income. However, one fundamental concept of labor's share in macroeconomic theory is not the amount of aggregate income paid out to labor. Rather, it is the share of aggregate production that is attributable to "raw" units of labor. Or, otherwise stated, it is the share of aggregate income that would have been paid to laborers if they had no accumulated stocks of human capital.1 This share corresponds to an aggregate production function parameter: the elasticity of output with respect to physical (i.e. non-augmented or raw) units of labor (Robert Solow, 1957). In this paper we estimate annual raw labor’s share for the US, 1949 to 1996.

Information provision in procurement auctions

We analyze the optimal provision of information in a procurement auction with horizontally differentiated goods. The buyer has private information about her preferred location on the product space and has access to a costless communication device. A seller who pays the entry cost may submit a bid comprising a location and a minimum price. We characterize the optimal information structure and show that the buyer prefers to attract only two bids. Further, additional sellers are inefficient since they reduce total and consumer surplus, gross of entry costs. We show that the buyer will not find it optimal to send public information to all sellers. On the other hand, she may profit from setting a minimum price and that a severe hold-up problem arises if she lacks commitment to set up the rules of the auction ex-ante.

Thrills and chills : poems to share.

Una selección de clásicos y modernos poemas de diferentes culturas para todo el año. Objetivos: elegir y preparar poemas para: la identificación de expresiones adecuadas, tono, volumen y el uso de voces y otros sonidos; utilizar adjetivos para agregar detalle por escrito; experimentar con el efecto de los distintos adjetivos compartidos a través de la escritura; notar donde se ponen comas en la lectura y examinar sus funciones para ayudar al lector; utilizar el término coma adecuadamente en relación a la lectura.

Fliers and leapers: poems to share.

Una selección de clásicos y modernos poemas de diferentes culturas para todo el año. Objetivos: elegir y preparar poemas para: la identificación de expresiones adecuadas, tono, volumen y el uso de voces y otros sonidos; utilizar adjetivos para agregar detalle por escrito; experimentar con el efecto de los distintos adjetivos compartidos a través de la escritura; notar donde se ponen comas en la lectura y examinar sus funciones para ayudar al lector; utilizar el término coma adecuadamente en relación a la lectura.

Egalitarian behaviour in multi unit combinatorial auctions

En entornos donde los recursos son precederos y la asignación de recursos se repite en el tiempo con el mismo conjunto o un conjunto muy similar de agentes, las subastas recurrentes pueden ser utilizadas. Una subasta recurrente es una secuencia de subastas donde el resultado de una subasta puede influenciar en las siguientes. De todas formas, este tipo de subastas tienen problemas particulares cuando la riqueza de los agentes esta desequilibrada y los recursos son precederos. En esta tesis se proponen algunos mecanismos justos o equitativos para minimizar los efectos de estos problemas. En una subasta recurrente una solución justa significa que todos los participantes consiguen a largo plazo sus objetivos en el mismo grado o en el grado más parecido posible, independientemente de su riqueza. Hemos demostrado experimentalmente que la inclusión de justicia incentiva a los bidders en permanecer en la subasta minimizando los problemas de las subastas recurrentes.

Risk and price in the bidding process of contractors

Formal and analytical risk models prescribe how risk should be incorporated in construction bids. However, the actual process of how contractors and their clients negotiate and agree on price is complex, and not clearly articulated in the literature. Using participant observation, the entire tender process was shadowed in two leading UK construction firms. This was compared to propositions in analytical models and significant differences were found. 670 hours of work observed in both firms revealed three stages of the bidding process. Bidding activities were categorized and their extent estimated as deskwork (32%), calculations (19%), meetings (14%), documents (13%), off-days (11%), conversations (7%), correspondence (3%) and travel (1%). Risk allowances of 1-2% were priced in some bids and three tiers of risk apportionment in bids were identified. However, priced risks may sometimes be excluded from the final bidding price to enhance competitiveness. Thus, although risk apportionment affects a contractor’s pricing strategy, other complex, microeconomic factors also affect price. Instead of pricing in contingencies, risk was priced mostly through contractual rather than price mechanisms, to reflect commercial imperatives. The findings explain why some assumptions underpinning analytical models may not be sustainable in practice and why what actually happens in practice is important for those who seek to model the pricing of construction bids.