Nash equilibrium strategies in discrete-time finite-horizon dynamic games with risk-and effort-averse players

The objective of this paper is to re-examine the risk-and effort attitude in the context of strategic dynamic interactions stated as a discrete-time finite-horizon Nash game. The analysis is based on the assumption that players are endogenously risk-and effort-averse. Each player is characterized by distinct risk-and effort-aversion types that are unknown to his opponent. The goal of the game is the optimal risk-and effort-sharing between the players. It generally depends on the individual strategies adopted and, implicitly, on the the players' types or characteristics.

Catastrophic medical expenditure risk

Medical expenditure risk can pose a major threat to living standards. We derive decomposable measures of catastrophic medical expenditure risk from reference-dependent utility with loss aversion. We propose a quantile regression based method of estimating risk exposure from cross-section data containing information on the means of financing health payments. We estimate medical expenditure risk in seven Asian countries and find it is highest in Laos and China, and is lowest in Malaysia. Exposure to risk is generally higher for households that have less recourse to self-insurance, lower incomes, wealth and education, and suffer from chronic illness.

Detecting Heterogeneous Risk Attitudes with Mixed Gambles

We propose a task for eliciting attitudes toward risk that is close to real-world risky decisions which typically involve gains and losses. The task consists of accepting or rejecting gambles that provide a gain with probability p and a loss with probability 1−p . We employ finite mixture models to uncover heterogeneity in risk preferences and find that (i) behavior is heterogeneous, with one half of the subjects behaving as expected utility maximizers, (ii) for the others, reference-dependent models perform better than those where subjects derive utility from final outcomes, (iii) models with sign-dependent decision weights perform better than those without, and (iv) there is no evidence for loss aversion. The procedure is sufficiently simple so that it can be easily used in field or lab experiments where risk elicitation is not the main experiment.

Neural effects of cannabinoid CB1 neutral antagonist tetrahydrocannabivarin (THCv) on food reward and aversion in healthy volunteers

Disturbances in the regulation of reward and aversion in the brain may underlie disorders such as obesity and eating disorders. We previously showed that the cannabis receptor subtype (CB1) inverse agonist rimonabant, an antiobesity drug withdrawn due to depressogenic side effects, diminished neural reward responses yet increased aversive responses (Horder et al., 2010). Unlike rimonabant, tetrahydrocannabivarin is a neutral CB1 receptor antagonist (Pertwee, 2005) and may therefore produce different modulations of the neural reward system. We hypothesized that tetrahydrocannabivarin would, unlike rimonabant, leave intact neural reward responses but augment aversive responses. Methods: We used a within-subject, double-blind design. Twenty healthy volunteers received a single dose of tetrahydrocannabivarin (10mg) and placebo in randomized order on 2 separate occasions. We measured the neural response to rewarding (sight and/or flavor of chocolate) and aversive stimuli (picture of moldy strawberries and/or a less pleasant strawberry taste) using functional magnetic resonance imaging. Volunteers rated pleasantness, intensity, and wanting for each stimulus. Results: There were no significant differences between groups in subjective ratings. However, tetrahydrocannabivarin increased responses to chocolate stimuli in the midbrain, anterior cingulate cortex, caudate, and putamen. Tetrahydrocannabivarin also increased responses to aversive stimuli in the amygdala, insula, mid orbitofrontal cortex, caudate, and putamen. Conclusions: Our findings are the first to show that treatment with the CB1 neutral antagonist tetrahydrocannabivarin increases neural responding to rewarding and aversive stimuli. This effect profile suggests therapeutic activity in obesity, perhaps with a lowered risk of depressive side effects. Keywords: reward, THCv, obesity, fMRI, cannabinoid

Risk-taking for others under accountability

We let subjects take risky decisions that affect themselves and a passive recipient. Adding a requirement to justify their choices significantly reduces loss aversion. This indicates that such an accountability mechanism may be effective at debiasing loss aversion in agency relations.

Risk taking for oneself and others: a structural model approach

Economic theory makes no predictions about social factors affecting decisions under risk. We examine situations in which a decision maker decides for herself and another person under conditions of payoff equality, and compare them to individual decisions. By estimating a structural model, we find that responsibility leaves utility curvature unaffected, but accentuates the subjective distortion of very small and very large probabilities for both gains and losses. We also find that responsibility reduces loss aversion, but that these results only obtain under some specific definitions of the latter. These results serve to generalize and reconcile some of the still largely contradictory findings in the literature. They also have implications for financial agency, which we discuss.

Uncertainty aversion and the optmal choice of portfolio

In this paper we apply the theory of declsion making with expected utility and non-additive priors to the choice of optimal portfolio. This theory describes the behavior of a rational agent who i5 averse to pure 'uncertainty' (as well as, possibly, to 'risk'). We study the agent's optimal allocation of wealth between a safe and an uncertain asset. We show that there is a range of prices at which the agent neither buys not sells short the uncertain asset. In contrast the standard theory of expected utility predicts that there is exactly one such price. We also provide a definition of an increase in uncertainty aversion and show that it causes the range of prices to increase.

Aggregate uncertainty, disappointment aversion and the business cycle

We investigate the eff ect of aggregate uncertainty shocks on real variables. More speci fically, we introduce a shock in the volatility of productivity in an RBC model with long-run volatility risk and preferences that exhibit generalised disappointment aversion. We find that, when combined with a negative productivity shock, a volatility shock leads to further decline in real variables, such as output, consumption, hours worked and investment. For instance, out of the 2% decrease in output as a result of both shocks, we attribute 0.25% to the e ffect of an increase in volatility. We also fi nd that this e ffect is the same as the one obtained in a model with Epstein-Zin- Weil preferences, but higher than that of a model with expected utility. Moreover, GDA preferences yield superior asset pricing results, when compared to both Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences and expected utility.

Compensation, Incentives and Risk: Economic Theory and Russian Practise

Mr. Pechersky set out to examine a specific feature of the employer-employee relationship in Russian business organisations. He wanted to study to what extent the so-called "moral hazard" is being solved (if it is being solved at all), whether there is a relationship between pay and performance, and whether there is a correlation between economic theory and Russian reality. Finally, he set out to construct a model of the Russian economy that better reflects the way it actually functions than do certain other well-known models (for example models of incentive compensation, the Shapiro-Stiglitz model etc.). His report was presented to the RSS in the form of a series of manuscripts in English and Russian, and on disc, with many tables and graphs. He begins by pointing out the different examples of randomness that exist in the relationship between employee and employer. Firstly, results are frequently affected by circumstances outside the employee's control that have nothing to do with how intelligently, honestly, and diligently the employee has worked. When rewards are based on results, uncontrollable randomness in the employee's output induces randomness in their incomes. A second source of randomness involves the outside events that are beyond the control of the employee that may affect his or her ability to perform as contracted. A third source of randomness arises when the performance itself (rather than the result) is measured, and the performance evaluation procedures include random or subjective elements. Mr. Pechersky's study shows that in Russia the third source of randomness plays an important role. Moreover, he points out that employer-employee relationships in Russia are sometimes opposite to those in the West. Drawing on game theory, he characterises the Western system as follows. The two players are the principal and the agent, who are usually representative individuals. The principal hires an agent to perform a task, and the agent acquires an information advantage concerning his actions or the outside world at some point in the game, i.e. it is assumed that the employee is better informed. In Russia, on the other hand, incentive contracts are typically negotiated in situations in which the employer has the information advantage concerning outcome. Mr. Pechersky schematises it thus. Compensation (the wage) is W and consists of a base amount, plus a portion that varies with the outcome, x. So W = a + bx, where b is used to measure the intensity of the incentives provided to the employee. This means that one contract will be said to provide stronger incentives than another if it specifies a higher value for b. This is the incentive contract as it operates in the West. The key feature distinguishing the Russian example is that x is observed by the employer but is not observed by the employee. So the employer promises to pay in accordance with an incentive scheme, but since the outcome is not observable by the employee the contract cannot be enforced, and the question arises: is there any incentive for the employer to fulfil his or her promises? Mr. Pechersky considers two simple models of employer-employee relationships displaying the above type of information symmetry. In a static framework the obtained result is somewhat surprising: at the Nash equilibrium the employer pays nothing, even though his objective function contains a quadratic term reflecting negative consequences for the employer if the actual level of compensation deviates from the expectations of the employee. This can lead, for example, to labour turnover, or the expenses resulting from a bad reputation. In a dynamic framework, the conclusion can be formulated as follows: the higher the discount factor, the higher the incentive for the employer to be honest in his/her relationships with the employee. If the discount factor is taken to be a parameter reflecting the degree of (un)certainty (the higher the degree of uncertainty is, the lower is the discount factor), we can conclude that the answer to the formulated question depends on the stability of the political, social and economic situation in a country. Mr. Pechersky believes that the strength of a market system with private property lies not just in its providing the information needed to compute an efficient allocation of resources in an efficient manner. At least equally important is the manner in which it accepts individually self-interested behaviour, but then channels this behaviour in desired directions. People do not have to be cajoled, artificially induced, or forced to do their parts in a well-functioning market system. Instead, they are simply left to pursue their own objectives as they see fit. Under the right circumstances, people are led by Adam Smith's "invisible hand" of impersonal market forces to take the actions needed to achieve an efficient, co-ordinated pattern of choices. The problem is that, as Mr. Pechersky sees it, there is no reason to believe that the circumstances in Russia are right, and the invisible hand is doing its work properly. Political instability, social tension and other circumstances prevent it from doing so. Mr. Pechersky believes that the discount factor plays a crucial role in employer-employee relationships. Such relationships can be considered satisfactory from a normative point of view, only in those cases where the discount factor is sufficiently large. Unfortunately, in modern Russia the evidence points to the typical discount factor being relatively small. This fact can be explained as a manifestation of aversion to risk of economic agents. Mr. Pechersky hopes that when political stabilisation occurs, the discount factors of economic agents will increase, and the agent's behaviour will be explicable in terms of more traditional models.

Nat2, Xrcc1 And Hogg1 Polymorphisms, Cigarette Smoking, Alcohol Consumption And Risk Of Upper Aerodigestive Tract Cancer.

To evaluate associations between polymorphisms of the N-acetyltransferase 2 (NAT2), human 8-oxoguanine glycosylase 1 (hOGG1) and X-ray repair cross-complementing protein 1 (XRCC1) genes and risk of upper aerodigestive tract (UADT) cancer. A case-control study involving 117 cases and 224 controls was undertaken. The NAT2 gene polymorphisms were genotyped by automated sequencing and XRCC1 Arg399Gln and hOGG1 Ser326Cys polymorphisms were determined by Polymerase Chain Reaction followed by Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism (PCR-RFLP) methods. Slow metabolization phenotype was significantly associated as a risk factor for the development of UADT cancer (p=0.038). Furthermore, haplotype of slow metabolization was also associated with UADT cancer (p=0.014). The hOGG1 Ser326Cys polymorphism (CG or GG vs. CC genotypes) was shown as a protective factor against UADT cancer in moderate smokers (p=0.031). The XRCC1 Arg399Gln polymorphism (GA or AA vs. GG genotypes), in turn, was a protective factor against UADT cancer only among never-drinkers (p=0.048). Interactions involving NAT2, XRCC1 Arg399Gln and hOGG1 Ser326Cys polymorphisms may modulate the risk of UADT cancer in this population.

[association Between Breast Arterial Calcifications And Cardiovascular Risk Factors In Menopausal Women].

To analyze associations between mammographic arterial mammary calcifications in menopausal women and risk factors for cardiovascular disease. This was a cross-sectional retrospective study, in which we analyzed the mammograms and medical records of 197 patients treated between 2004 and 2005. Study variables were: breast arterial calcifications, stroke, acute coronary syndrome, age, obesity, diabetes mellitus, smoking, and hypertension. For statistical analysis, we used the Mann-Whitney, χ2 and Cochran-Armitage tests, and also evaluated the prevalence ratios between these variables and mammary artery calcifications. Data were analyzed with the SAS version 9.1 software. In the group of 197 women, there was a prevalence of 36.6% of arterial calcifications on mammograms. Among the risk factors analyzed, the most frequent were hypertension (56.4%), obesity (31.9%), smoking (15.2%), and diabetes (14.7%). Acute coronary syndrome and stroke presented 5.6 and 2.0% of prevalence, respectively. Among the mammograms of women with diabetes, the odds ratio of mammary artery calcifications was 2.1 (95%CI 1.0-4.1), with p-value of 0.02. On the other hand, the mammograms of smokers showed the low occurrence of breast arterial calcification, with an odds ratio of 0.3 (95%CI 0.1-0.8). Hypertension, obesity, diabetes mellitus, stroke and acute coronary syndrome were not significantly associated with breast arterial calcification. The occurrence of breast arterial calcification was associated with diabetes mellitus and was negatively associated with smoking. The presence of calcification was independent of the other risk factors for cardiovascular disease analyzed.

Urinary Tract Infection In Renal Transplant Recipients: Incidence, Risk Factors, And Impact On Graft Function.

Urinary tract infection (UTI) is the most common infection posttransplant. However, the risk factors for and the impact of UTIs remain controversial. The aim of this study was to identify the incidence of posttransplant UTIs in a series of renal transplant recipients from deceased donors. Secondary objectives were to identify: (1) the most frequent infectious agents; (2) risk factors related to donor; (3) risk factors related to recipients; and (4) impact of UTI on graft function. This was a retrospective analysis of medical records from renal transplant patients from January to December 2010. Local ethics committee approved the protocol. The incidence of UTI in this series was 34.2%. Risk factors for UTI were older age, (independent of gender), biopsy-proven acute rejection episodes, and kidneys from deceased donors (United Network for Organ Sharing criteria). For female patients, the number of pretransplant pregnancies was an additional risk factor. Recurrent UTI was observed in 44% of patients from the UTI group. The most common infectious agents were Escherichia coli and Klebsiella pneumoniae, for both isolated and recurrent UTI. No difference in renal graft function or immunosuppressive therapy was observed between groups after the 1-year follow-up. In this series, older age, previous pregnancy, kidneys from expanded criteria donors, and biopsy-proven acute rejection episodes were risk factors for posttransplant UTI. Recurrence of UTI was observed in 44%, with no negative impact on graft function or survival.

Falls Among The Elderly: Risk Factors In A Population-based Study.

The aim of the present study was to identify factors associated with the occurrence of falls among elderly adults in a population-based study (ISACamp 2008). A population-based cross-sectional study was carried out with two-stage cluster sampling. The sample was composed of 1,520 elderly adults living in the urban area of the city of Campinas, São Paulo, Brazil. The occurrence of falls was analyzed based on reports of the main accident occurred in the previous 12 months. Data on socioeconomic/demographic factors and adverse health conditions were tested for possible associations with the outcome. Prevalence ratios (PR) were estimated and adjusted for gender and age using the Poisson multiple regression analysis. Falls were more frequent, after adjustment for gender and age, among female elderly participants (PR = 2.39; 95% confidence interval (95% CI) 1.47 - 3.87), elderly adults (80 years old and older) (PR = 2.50; 95% CI 1.61 - 3.88), widowed (PR = 1.74; 95% CI 1.04 - 2.89) and among elderly adults who had rheumatism/arthritis/arthrosis (PR = 1.58; 95% CI 1.00 - 2.48), osteoporosis (PR = 1.71; 95% CI 1.18 - 2.49), asthma/bronchitis/emphysema (PR = 1,73; 95% CI 1.09 - 2.74), headache (PR = 1.59; 95% CI 1.07 - 2.38), mental common disorder (PR = 1.72; 95% CI 1.12 - 2.64), dizziness (PR = 2.82; 95% CI 1.98 - 4.02), insomnia (PR = 1.75; 95% CI 1.16 - 2.65), use of multiple medications (five or more) (PR = 2.50; 95% CI 1.12 - 5.56) and use of cane/walker (PR = 2.16; 95% CI 1.19 - 3,93). The present study shows segments of the elderly population who are more prone to falls through the identification of factors associated with this outcome. The findings can contribute to the planning of public health policies and programs addressed to the prevention of falls.