Beta-alanine supplementation improves jumping power and affects severe-intensity performance in professional alpine skiers.

INTRODUCTION Supplementation with beta-alanine may have positive effects on severe-intensity, intermittent, and isometric strength-endurance performance. These could be advantageous for competitive alpine skiers, whose races last 45 to 150 s, require metabolic power above the aerobic maximum, and involve isometric muscle work. Further, beta-alanine supplementation affects the muscle force-frequency relationship, which could influence explosiveness. We explored the effects of beta-alanine on explosive jump performance, severe exercise energy metabolism, and severe-intensity ski-like performance. METHODS Nine male elite alpine skiers consumed 4.8 g/d beta-alanine or placebo for 5 weeks in a double-blind fashion. Before and after, they performed countermovement jumps (CMJ), a 90-s cycling bout at 110% VO2max (CLT), and a maximal 90-s box jump test (BJ90). RESULTS Beta-alanine improved maximal (+7 ± 3%, d = 0.9) and mean CMJ power (+7 ± 2%, d = 0.7), tended to reduce oxygen deficit (-3 ± 8%, p = .06) and lactate accumulation (-12 ± 31%) and enhance aerobic energy contribution (+1.3 ± 2.9%, p = .07) in the CLT, and improved performance in the last third of BJ90 (+7 ± 4%, p = .02). These effects were not observed with placebo. CONCLUSIONS Beta-alanine supplementation improved explosive and repeated jump performance in elite alpine skiers. Enhanced muscle contractility could possibly explain improved explosive and repeated jump performance. Increased aerobic energy production could possibly help explain repeated jump performance as well.

Career adaptability development in adolescence: Multiple prdictors and effect on sense of power and life satisfaction

This longitudinal panel study investigated predictors of career adaptability development and its effect on development of sense of power and experience of life satisfaction among 330 Swiss eighth graders. A multivariate measure of career adaptability consisting of career choice readiness, planning, exploration, and confidence was applied. Based on Motivational Systems Theory four groups of predictors were assessed: positive emotional disposition, goal decidedness, capability beliefs and social context beliefs. Influence of gender, age, immigration background, parental educational level, and college-bound or vocational education plans were also assessed. Perceived social support and positive emotional disposition, non-immigration background, and continuing to vocational education were single significant predictors of more career adaptability development over the school year. Supporting the connection of career adaptability and positive youth development, increase in career adaptability over time predicted increase in sense of power and experience of life satisfaction.

Voting Power and Probability

Voting power is commonly measured using a probability. But what kind of probability is this? Is it a degree of belief or an objective chance or some other sort of probability? The aim of this paper is to answer this question. The answer depends on the use to which a measure of voting power is put. Some objectivist interpretations of probabilities are appropriate when we employ such a measure for descriptive purposes. By contrast, when voting power is used to normatively assess voting rules, the probabilities are best understood as classical probabilities, which count possibilities. This is so because, from a normative stance, voting power is most plausibly taken to concern rights and thus possibilities. The classical interpretation also underwrites the use of the Bernoulli model upon which the Penrose/Banzhaf measure is based.

Renal microvascular assembly and repair: power and promise of molecular definition.

Developmental assembly of the renal microcirculation is a precise and coordinated process now accessible to experimental scrutiny. Although definition of the cellular and molecular determinants is incomplete, recent findings have reframed concepts and questions about the origins of vascular cells in the glomerulus and the molecules that direct cell recruitment, specialization and morphogenesis. New findings illustrate principles that may be applied to defining critical steps in microvascular repair following glomerular injury. Developmental assembly of endothelial, mesangial and epithelial cells into glomerular capillaries requires that a coordinated, temporally defined series of steps occur in an anatomically ordered sequence. Recent evidence shows that both vasculogenic and angiogenic processes participate. Local signals direct cell migration, proliferation, differentiation, cell-cell recognition, formation of intercellular connections, and morphogenesis. Growth factor receptor tyrosine kinases on vascular cells are important mediators of many of these events. Cultured cell systems have suggested that basic fibroblast growth factor (bFGF), hepatocyte growth factor (HGF), and vascular endothelial growth factor (VEGF) promote endothelial cell proliferation, migration or morphogenesis, while genetic deletion experiments have defined an important role for PDGF beta receptors and platelet-derived growth factor (PDGF) B in glomerular development. Receptor tyrosine kinases that convey non-proliferative signals also contribute in kidney and other sites. The EphB1 receptor, one of a diverse class of Eph receptors implicated in neural cell targeting, directs renal endothelial migration, cell-cell recognition and assembly, and is expressed with its ligand in developing glomeruli. Endothelial TIE2 receptors bind angiopoietins (1 and 2), the products of adjacent supportive cells, to signals direct capillary maturation in a sequence that defines cooperative roles for cells of different lineages. Ultimately, definition of the cellular steps and molecular sequence that direct microvascular cell assembly promises to identify therapeutic targets for repair and adaptive remodeling of injured glomeruli.

Localising moralities: power and temporality in Southeastern Europe

Introduction to a special issue

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Executive Power and the People: Does the President Care What You Think?

I sought to examine the relationship between public approval of the president and his subsequent behavior. Specifically, I looked at the relationship between public approval and signing statement usage along with their usage following the 2006 outcry against President Bush's use of them.

The Geographic Distribution of the Size and Timing of Monetary Policy Actions

This paper examines the magnitude and timing of the effects of changes in the monetary base on the aggregate and regional changes in bank loans within the United States. We consider both Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) regions, and individual states and the District of Columbia for our regional analysis. The empirical analysis provides some insight on the bank-lending channel of monetary policy. We find strong evidence of a 4-quarter lag in the effect of changes in the monetary base on bank loans. That finding proves robust across all regions and nearly all states.

Effect of patient accrual patterns on power and size of log-rank test for time-to-event outcome in clinical trials

The determination of size as well as power of a test is a vital part of a Clinical Trial Design. This research focuses on the simulation of clinical trial data with time-to-event as the primary outcome. It investigates the impact of different recruitment patterns, and time dependent hazard structures on size and power of the log-rank test. A non-homogeneous Poisson process is used to simulate entry times according to the different accrual patterns. A Weibull distribution is employed to simulate survival times according to the different hazard structures. The current study utilizes simulation methods to evaluate the effect of different recruitment patterns on size and power estimates of the log-rank test. The size of the log-rank test is estimated by simulating survival times with identical hazard rates between the treatment and the control arm of the study resulting in a hazard ratio of one. Powers of the log-rank test at specific values of hazard ratio (≠1) are estimated by simulating survival times with different, but proportional hazard rates for the two arms of the study. Different shapes (constant, decreasing, or increasing) of the hazard function of the Weibull distribution are also considered to assess the effect of hazard structure on the size and power of the log-rank test. ^

Chemical and Sr isotopic compositions and timing of carbonate mineral precipitation, ODP Leg 115

The strontium isotope ratios of authigenic carbonates from Indian Ocean sea-floor basalts have been used to determine the timing of carbonate mineral precipitation and fluid flow. The samples include calcites from 57.2 Ma crust from Ocean Drilling Project (ODP) Site 715, and calcites, aragonites, and siderites from 63.7 Ma crust from ODP Site 707. At Site 715, calcite precipitation may have begun at any time after the basalts cooled, and it continued until approximately 31 Ma, or 26 m.y. after basalt eruption. At Site 707, aragonite and siderite did not begin to precipitate until about 36 Ma, almost 30 m.y. after basalt eruption, and continued to precipitate until at least 30 and 28 Ma, respectively. Calcite precipitation began at approximately 32 Ma and continued until 22 Ma. These ages suggest that vein mineral deposition and low-temperature fluid circulation in the ocean crust may continue for much longer periods of time than previously observed.