Federalism and the Concept of Political Territoriality: Towards an Analytical Framework for Comparative Territorial Politics

The core issues comparative territorial politics addresses are how and why territory is used to delimit, maintain, or create political power; and with what kind of consequences for efficiency (output) and legitimacy (input). The aim of this article is to integrate various research strands into the comparative study of territorial politics, with federal studies at its core. As an example of a conceptual payoff, ‘political territoriality’ refers the observer to three dimensions of the strategic use of areal boundaries for political power. By focusing on territory as a key variable of political systems, the actors, processes and institutions are first analytically separated and continuously measured, enhancing internal validity, and then theoretically integrated, which allows more valid external inferences than classic, legal-institutionalist federal studies. After discussing the boundaries and substance of comparative territorial politics as a federal discipline, political territoriality is developed towards an analytical framework applicable to politics at any governmental level. The claims are modest: political territoriality does not serve so much as an explanatory concept as rather an ‘attention-directing device’ for federal studies.

The Personal Foundations of Political Tolerance towards Immigrants

In this paper, we expand previous research on the psychological foundations of attitudes towards immigrants by evaluating the role of the Big Five personality traits with regard to the formation of political tolerance. Following the literature, we elaborate tolerance as a sequential concept of rejection and acceptance to uncover differentiating effects of personality on both immigrant-specific prejudices as well as on the assignment of the right to vote as a pivotal political privilege to this group. Using a representative sample of the Swiss population, with its distinctive history related to the immigration issue, our two-step Heckman selection models reveal that extroverts and people who score low in agreeableness exhibit negative attitudes towards immigrants. At the same time, only openness to experience is significantly connected to the likeliness of granting immigrants the right to vote.

Direct democracy and political trust: Enhancing trust, initiating distrust–or both?

This study investigates the relationship between direct democracy and political trust. We suggest a solution to the controversy in research centering on positive versus negative effects of direct democracy by analytically differentiating between the availability of direct democratic rights and the actual use of those rights. Theoretically, greater availability of direct democratic rights may enhance political trust by increasing citizens’ perception that political authorities can be controlled as well as by incentivizing political authorities to act trustworthily. In contrast, the actual use of the corresponding direct democratic instruments may initiate distrust as it signals to citizens that political authorities do not act in the public’s interest. We test both hypotheses for the very first time with sub-national data of Switzerland. The empirical results seem to support our theoretical arguments.

Exceptional or just well connected? Political entrepreneurs and brokers in policy making

Policy brokers and policy entrepreneurs are assumed to have a decisive impact on policy outcomes. Their access to social and political resources is contingent on their influence on other agents. In social network analysis (SNA), entrepreneurs are often closely associated with brokers, because both are agents presumed to benefit from bridging structural holes; for example, gaining advantage through occupying a strategic position in relational space. Our aim here is twofold. First, to conceptually and operationally differentiate policy brokers from policy entrepreneurs premised on assumptions in the policy-process literature; and second, via SNA, to use the output of core algorithms in a cross-sectional analysis of political brokerage and political entrepreneurship. We attempt to simplify the use of graph algebra in answering questions relevant to policy analysis by placing each algorithm within its theoretical context. In the methodology employed, we first identify actors and graph their relations of influence within a specific policy event; then we select the most central actors; and compare their rank in a series of statistics that capture different aspects of their network advantage. We examine betweenness centrality, positive and negative Bonacich power, Burt’s effective size and constraint and honest brokerage as paradigmatic. We employ two case studies to demonstrate the advantages and limitations of each algorithm for differentiating between brokers and entrepreneurs: one on Swiss climate policy and one on EU competition and transport policy.

In Search of Political Influence: Strategic Choices and Media Coverage of Political Parties, Interest Groups and Social Movements in Western European Countries

Outside lobbying is a key strategy for social movements, interest groups and political parties for mobilising public opinion through the media in order to pressure policymakers and influence the policymaking process. Relying on semi-structured interviews and newspaper content analysis in six Western European countries, this article examines the use of four outside lobbying strategies – media-related activities, informing (about) the public, mobilisation and protest – and the amount of media coverage they attract. While some strategies are systematically less pursued than others, we find variation in their relative share across institutional contexts and actor types. Given that most of these differences are not accurately mirrored in the media, we conclude that media coverage is only loosely connected to outside lobbying behaviour, and that the media respond differently to a given strategy when used by different actors. Thus, the ability of different outside lobbying strategies to generate media coverage critically depends on who makes use of them.

Political Sociology of Islam Integration: the Role of Liberal Law

In Europe and North America, migration and integration has become a busy subfield of political sociology. Of particular interest in this respect is the integration of Muslims and Islam, which has dominated the debate in Europe. Broadly conceived «political opportunity structures» have received much attention in this context. But the role of liberal law in the integration of Islam has been largely ignored, not by lawyers of course, but by political sociologists who have thus delivered far too negative and truncated pictures of Muslims and Islam in Europe. This is the deficit we sought to redress in Legal Integration of Islam; A Transatlantic Comparison (2013) (co-authored with John Torpey). Some of this study’s main ideas and findings are presented in the following.

How political economies affect immigrants' socio-economic incorporation. A comparative analysis of immigrants’ poverty risks across advanced industrialised countries

Immigration and the resulting increasing ethnic diversity have become an important characteristic of advanced industrialised countries. At the same time, the majority of the countries in question are confronted with structural transformation such as deindustrialisation and changes in family structures as well as economic downturn, which limit the capacities of nation-states in addressing rising inequality and supporting those individuals at the margins of the society. This paper addresses both issues, immigration and inequality, by focusing on immigrants’ socio-economic incorporation into the receiving societies of advanced industrialised countries. The aim of this paper is to explain cross-national variation in immigrants’ poverty risks. Drawing on the political economy as well as the migration literature, the paper develops a theoretical framework that considers how the impact of the national labour market and welfare system on immigrants’ poverty risks is moderated by the integration policies, which regulate immigrants’ access to the labour market and social programs (or immigrants’ economic and social rights). The empirical analysis draws on income surveys as well as a newly collected data set on economic and social rights of immigrants in 19 advanced industrialised countries, including European countries as well as Australia, and North America, for the year 2007. As the results from multilevel analysis show, integration policies concerning immigrants’ access to the labour market and social programs can partly explain cross-national variations in immigrants’ poverty risks. In line with the hypothesis, stricter labour market regulations such as minimum wage setting reduce immigrants’ poverty risks stronger in countries where they are granted easier access to the labour market. However, concerning the impact of more generous social programs the reductive poverty effect is stronger in countries with less inclusive access of immigrants to social programs. The paper concludes by discussing possible explanations for this puzzling finding.

The Role of Corruption in Explaining the Electoral Success of New Political Parties in Central and Eastern Europe

More than 20 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the electoral volatility in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is still remarkably high. A considerable part of the volatility derives from the votes for new political parties, since they are very often on the winning side of elections. This paper examines corruption as potential determinant of their electoral success. It argues that the effect of corruption is twofold: On the onehand, the historically-grown corruption level reduces the electoral success of new political parties due to strong clientelist structures that bind the electorate to the established parties. On the other hand, an increase of the perceived corruption above the traditional corruption level leads to a loss of trust in the political elite and therefore boosts the electoral success of new competitors. A statistical analysis of all democratic elections in CEE between 1996 and 2011 confirms these two counteracting effects.