Electricity without borders: a plan to make the internal market work. Bruegel Blueprint Series 20, 5 September 2013

The most straightforward European single energy market design would entail a European system operator regulated by a single European regulator. This would ensure the predictable development of rules for the entire EU, significantly reducing regulatory uncertainty for electricity sector investments. But such a first-best market design is unlikely to be politically realistic in the European context for three reasons. First, the necessary changes compared to the current situation are substantial and would produce significant redistributive effects. Second, a European solution would deprive member states of the ability to manage their energy systems nationally. And third, a single European solution might fall short of being well-tailored to consumers’ preferences, which differ substantially across the EU. To nevertheless reap significant benefits from an integrated European electricity market, we propose the following blueprint: First, we suggest adding a European system-management layer to complement national operation centres and help them to better exchange information about the status of the system, expected changes and planned modifications. The ultimate aim should be to transfer the day-to-day responsibility for the safe and economic operation of the system to the European control centre. To further increase efficiency, electricity prices should be allowed to differ between all network points between and within countries. This would enable throughput of electricity through national and international lines to be safely increased without any major investments in infrastructure. Second, to ensure the consistency of national network plans and to ensure that they contribute to providing the infrastructure for a functioning single market, the role of the European ten year network development plan (TYNDP) needs to be upgraded by obliging national regulators to only approve projects planned at European level unless they can prove that deviations are beneficial. This boosted role of the TYNDP would need to be underpinned by resolving the issues of conflicting interests and information asymmetry. Therefore, the network planning process should be opened to all affected stakeholders (generators, network owners and operators, consumers, residents and others) and enable the European Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) to act as a welfare-maximising referee. An ultimate political decision by the European Parliament on the entire plan will open a negotiation process around selecting alternatives and agreeing compensation. This ensures that all stakeholders have an interest in guaranteeing a certain degree of balance of interest in the earlier stages. In fact, transparent planning, early stakeholder involvement and democratic legitimisation are well suited for minimising as much as possible local opposition to new lines. Third, sharing the cost of network investments in Europe is a critical issue. One reason is that so far even the most sophisticated models have been unable to identify the individual long-term net benefit in an uncertain environment. A workable compromise to finance new network investments would consist of three components: (i) all easily attributable cost should be levied on the responsible party; (ii) all network users that sit at nodes that are expected to receive more imports through a line extension should be obliged to pay a share of the line extension cost through their network charges; (iii) the rest of the cost is socialised to all consumers. Such a cost-distribution scheme will involve some intra-European redistribution from the well-developed countries (infrastructure-wise) to those that are catching up. However, such a scheme would perform this redistribution in a much more efficient way than the Connecting Europe Facility’s ad-hoc disbursements to politically chosen projects, because it would provide the infrastructure that is really needed.

EU citizenship: Citizenship and identity beyond national borders. EU Centre Singapore Background Brief No. 10, October 2013

The 1992 Maastricht Treaty introduced the concept of European Union citizenship. All citizens of the 28 EU member states are also EU citizens through the very fact that their countries are members of the EU. Acquired EU citizenship gives them the right to free movement, settlement and employment across the EU, the right to vote in European elections, and also on paper the right to consular protection from other EU states' embassies when abroad. The concept of citizenship in Europe – and indeed anywhere in the world – has been evolving over the years, and continues to evolve. Against this time scale, the concept of modern citizenship as attached to the nation-state would seem ephemeral. The idea of EU citizenship therefore does not need to be regarded as a revolutionary phenomenon that is bound to mitigate against the natural inclination of European citizens towards national identities, especially in times of economic and financial crises. In fact, the idea of EU citizenship has even been criticised by some scholars as being of little substantive value in addition to whatever rights and freedoms European citizens already have. Nonetheless the ‘constitutional moment’ that the Maastricht Treaty achieved for the idea of EU citizenship has served more than just symbolic value – the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights is now legally binding, for instance. The idea of EU citizenship also put pressure on the Union and its leaders to address the perceived democratic deficit that the EU is often accused of. In attempts to cement the political rights of EU citizens, the citizens’ initiative was included in Lisbon Treaty allowing citizens to directly lobby the European Commission for new policy initiatives or changes.