Investigación sobre las causas que pudieron originar el hundimiento de la cubierta del tercer depósito del Canal de Isabel II en 1905

En la presente investigación se analiza la causa del hundimiento del cuarto compartimento del Tercer Depósito del Canal de Isabel II el 8 de abril de 1905, uno de los más graves de la historia de la construcción en España: fallecieron 30 personas y quedaron heridas otras 60. El Proyecto y Construcción de esta estructura era de D. José Eugenio Ribera, una de las grandes figuras de la ingeniería civil en nuestro país, cuya carrera pudo haber quedado truncada como consecuencia del siniestro. Dado el tiempo transcurrido desde la ocurrencia de este accidente, la investigación ha partido de la recopilación de la información relativa al Proyecto y a la propia construcción de la estructura, para revisar a continuación la información disponible sobre el hundimiento. De la construcción de la cubierta es interesante destacar la atrevida configuración estructural, cubriéndose una inmensa superficie de 74.000 m2 mediante una sucesión de bóvedas de hormigón armado de tan sólo 5 cm de espesor y un rebajamiento de 1/10 para salvar una luz de 6 m, que apoyaban en pórticos del mismo material, con pilares también muy esbeltos: 0,25 m de lado para 8 m de altura. Y todo ello en una época en la que la tecnología y conocimiento de las estructuras con este "nuevo" material se basaban en buena medida en el desarrollo de patentes. En cuanto a la información sobre el hundimiento, llama la atención en primer lugar la relevancia de los técnicos, peritos y letrados que intervinieron en el juicio y en el procedimiento administrativo posterior, poniéndose de manifiesto la trascendencia que el accidente tuvo en su momento y que, sin embargo, no ha trascendido hasta nuestros días. Ejemplo de ello es el papel de Echegaray -primera figura intelectual de la época- como perito en la defensa de Ribera, de D. Melquiades Álvarez -futuro presidente del Congreso- como abogado defensor, el General Marvá -uno de los máximos exponentes del papel de los ingenieros militares en la introducción del hormigón armado en nuestro país-, que presidiría la Comisión encargada del peritaje por parte del juzgado, o las opiniones de reconocidas personalidades internacionales del "nuevo" material como el Dr. von Emperger o Hennebique. Pero lo más relevante de dicha información es la falta de uniformidad sobre lo que pudo ocasionar el hundimiento: fallos en los materiales, durante la construcción, defectos en el diseño de la estructura, la realización de unas pruebas de carga cuando se concluyó ésta, etc. Pero la que durante el juicio y en los Informes posteriores se impuso como causa del fallo de la estructura fue su dilatación como consecuencia de las altas temperaturas que se produjeron aquella primavera. Y ello a pesar de que el hundimiento ocurrió a las 7 de la mañana... Con base en esta información se ha analizado el comportamiento estructural de la cubierta, permitiendo evaluar el papel que diversos factores pudieron tener en el inicio del hundimiento y en su extensión a toda la superficie construida, concluyéndose así cuáles fueron las causas del siniestro. De los resultados obtenidos se presta especial atención a las enseñanzas que se desprenden de la ocurrencia del hundimiento, enfatizándose en la relevancia de la historia -y en particular de los casos históricos de error- para la formación continua que debe existir en la Ingeniería. En el caso del hundimiento del Tercer Depósito algunas de estas "enseñanzas" son de plena actualidad, tales como la importancia de los detalles constructivos en la "robustez" de la estructuras, el diseño de estructuras "integrales" o la vigilancia del proceso constructivo. Por último, la investigación ha servido para recuperar, una vez más, la figura de D. José Eugenio Ribera, cuyo papel en la introducción del hormigón armado en España fue decisivo. En la obra del Tercer Depósito se arriesgó demasiado, y provocó un desastre que aceleró la transición hacia una nueva etapa en el hormigón estructural al abrigo de un mayor conocimiento científico y de las primeras normativas. También en esta etapa sería protagonista. This dissertation analyses the cause of the collapse of the 4th compartment of the 3th Reservoir of Canal de Isabel II in Madrid. It happened in 1905, on April 8th, being one of the most disastrous accidents occurred in the history of Spanish construction: 30 people died and 60 were injured. The design and construction supervision were carried out by D. José Eugenio Ribera, one of the main figures in Civil Engineering of our country, whose career could have been destroyed as a result of this accident. Since it occurred more than 100 years ago, the investigation started by compiling information about the structure`s design and construction, followed by reviewing the available information about the accident. With regard to the construction, it is interesting to point out its daring structural configuration. It covered a huge area of 74.000 m2 with a series of reinforced concrete vaults with a thickness of not more than 5 cm, a 6 m span and a rise of 1/10th. In turn, these vaults were supported by frames composed of very slender 0,25 m x 0,25 m columns with a height of 8 m. It is noteworthy that this took place in a time when the technology and knowledge about this "new" material was largely based on patents. In relation to the information about the collapse, its significance is shown by the important experts and lawyers that were involved in the trial and the subsequent administrative procedure. For example, Echegaray -the most important intellectual of that time- defended Ribera, Melquiades Álvarez –the future president of the Congress- was his lawyer, and General Marvá -who represented the important role of the military engineers in the introduction of reinforced concrete in our country-, led the Commission that was put in charge by the judge of the root cause analysis. In addition, the matter caught the interest of renowned foreigners like Dr. von Emperger or Hennebique and their opinions had a great influence. Nonetheless, this structural failure is unknown to most of today’s engineers. However, what is most surprising are the different causes that were claimed to lie at the root of the disaster: material defects, construction flaws, errors in the design, load tests performed after the structure was finished, etc. The final cause that was put forth during the trial and in the following reports was attributed to the dilatation of the roof due to the high temperatures that spring, albeit the collapse occurred at 7 AM... Based on this information the structural behaviour of the roof has been analysed, which allowed identifying the causes that could have provoked the initial failure and those that could have led to the global collapse. Lessons have been learned from these results, which points out the relevance of history -and in particular, of examples gone wrong- for the continuous education that should exist in engineering. In the case of the 3th Reservoir some of these lessons are still relevant during the present time, like the importance of detailing in "robustness", the design of "integral" structures or the due consideration of construction methods. Finally, the investigation has revived, once again, the figure of D. José Eugenio Ribera, whose role in the introduction of reinforced concrete in Spain was crucial. With the construction of the 3th Reservoir he took too much risk and caused a disaster that accelerated the transition to a new era in structural concrete based on greater scientific knowledge and the first codes. In this new period he would also play a major role.

The marine fishes of Panama. by Seth E. Meek and Samuel F. Hildebrand; Wilfred H. Osgood, editor

v.15:pt.2(1925)

The story of Panama. Hearings on the Rainey resolution before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

"The Panama libel suit": p. 299-311.

Just Cause : Marine operations in Panama, 1988-1990 /

Includes index.

C & O Canal : the making of a park /

Shipping list no.: 91-798-P.

Bulletin du canal interocéanique.

The Bulletin was discontinued after the second number of v. 10, Jan. 16, 1889; the company was dissolved in Feb. 1889.

MEMÓRIA TELEVISIVA COMO PRODUTO CULTURAL: um estudo de caso das telenovelas no Canal Viva

This research is aimed at studying the television memory, recovered and built by a pay-TV channel, Canal Viva, and the telenovelas from TV Globo displayed by the channel concerned, in order to verify its characteristics as a cultural product and its place in the plot of mediation and social interactions. In order to do so, the following theoretical bases are established, relating them to the concept of memory: culture, identity, imagination, history of TV and the Brazilian telenovelas, television reception (with a focus on mediation) and nostalgia. For this purpose, the methodology, as built-up, is divided into two steps: first, a bibliographic research and then a case study, on which techniques of documentary analysis are applied, guided interviews with representatives from the channel and, finally, a focus group with assiduous viewers of the Canal Viva telenovelas. The goal of this research is to contribute to studies on communication related to television memory, thus affirming its importance in social interactions.

Consolidating Security and Development in Colombia: Lessons for Peru and Panama

Colombia's increasingly effective efforts to mitigate the power of the FARC and other illegitimately armed groups in the country can offer important lessons for the Peruvian government as it strives to prevent a resurgence of Sendero Luminoso and other illegal non-state actors. Both countries share certain particular challenges: deep economic, social, and in the case of Peru ethnic divisions, the presence of and/or the effects of violent insurgencies, a large-scale narcotics production and trafficking, and a history of weak state presence in large tracts of isolated and scarcely-populated areas. Important differences exist, however in the nature of the insurgencies in the two countries, the government response to them and the nature of government and society that affects the applicability of Colombia's experience to Peru. The security threat to Panama from drug trafficking and Colombian insurgents --often a linked phenomenon-- are in many ways different from the drug/insurgent factor in Colombia itself and in Peru, although there are similar variables. Unlike the Colombian and Peruvian cases, the security threat in Panama is not directed against the state, there are no domestic elements seeking to overthrow the government -- as the case of the FARC and Sendero Luminoso, security problems have not spilled over from rural to urban areas in Panama, and there is no ideological component at play in driving the threat. Nor is drug cultivation a major factor in Panama as it is in Colombia and Peru. The key variable that is shared among all three cases is the threat of extra-state actors controlling remote rural areas or small towns where state presence is minimal. The central lesson learned from Colombia is the need to define and then address the key problem of a "sovereignity gap," lack of legitimate state presence in many part of the country. Colombia's success in broadening the presence of the national government between 2002 and the presence is owed to many factors, including an effective national strategy, improvements in the armed forces and police, political will on the part of government for a sustained effort, citizen buy-in to the national strategy, including the resolve of the elite to pay more in taxes to bring change about, and the adoption of a sequenced approach to consolidated development in conflicted areas. Control of territory and effective state presence improved citizen security, strengthened confidence in democracy and the legitimate state, promoted economic development, and helped mitigate the effect of illegal drugs. Peru can benefit from the Colombian experience especially in terms of the importance of legitimate state authority, improved institutions, gaining the support of local citizens, and furthering development to wean communities away from drugs. State coordinated "integration" efforts in Peru as practiced in Colombia have the potential for success if properly calibrated to Peruvian reality, coordinated within government, and provided with sufficient resources. Peru's traditionally weak political institutions and lack of public confidence in the state in many areas of the country must be overcome if this effort is to be successful.

Police officer directing traffic on Canal Street

Inscriptions: Verso: [stamped] Photograph by Freda Leinwand. [463 West Street, Studio 229G, New York, NY 10014].

The Columbia Canal study

The consulting firm of Wilbur Smith and Associates was contracted by the South Carolina Department of Archives and History and the city of Columbia through the City's Landmarks Commission to prepare a feasibility study and conceptual master plan for lands adjoining and related to the Columbia Canal. The study area for the project includes the waterfront on both sides of the three Columbia rivers from a mile south of the Blossom Street Bridge on the Congaree to about a half mile south of I-20 on the Broad, and to about a half mile above the Riverbanks Zoo on the Saluda. The recommendations resulting from this study appear in Chapter 10 and are the conclusions of the study team's evaluations summarized i n the nine preceding chapters.

Factores asociados a transfusión sanguínea en el manejo quirúrgico del canal lumbar estrecho en la Fundación Santa Fe de Bogotá 2003 - 2013

Introduccion: El canal lumbar estrecho es un motivo de consulta frecuente en el servicio de columna de la Fundación Santa Fe de Bogotá. Derivado del tratamiento quirurgico se pueden generar múltiples complicaciones, entre las que se encuentra la transfusión sanguínea. Objetivo: Identificar los factores sociodemográficos, antecedentes personales y factores quirúrgicos asociados a transfusión sanguínea en cirugía canal lumbar estrecho en la Fundación Santa Fe de Bogotá 2003- 2013. Materiales y métodos: Se aplicó en diseño de estudio observacional analítico transversal. Se incluyeron 367 pacientes sometidos a cirugía de canal lumbar estrecho a quienes se les analizaron variables de antecedentes personales, características sociodemograficas y factores quirúrgicos. Resultados: La mediana de la edad fue de 57 años y la mayoría de pacientes fueron mujeres (55,6%). La mediana del Índice de Masa Corporal (IMC) fue de 24,9 clasificado como normal. Entre los antecedentes patológicos, la hipertensión arterial fue el más común (37,3%). La mayoría de pacientes (59,1%) presentaron clasificación ASA de II. El tipo de cirugía más prevalente fue el de descompresión (55,6%). En el 79,8% de los pacientes se intervinieron 2 niveles. Se realizó transfusión de glóbulos rojos en 26 pacientes correspondiente a 7,1% del total. En la mayoría de procedimientos quirúrgicos (42,5%) el sangrado fue clasificado como moderado (50-500 ml). En el modelo explicativo transfusión sanguínea en cirugía de canal lumbar estrecho se incluyen: antecedente de cardiopatía (OR 4,68, P 0,034, IC 1,12 – 19,44), Sangrado intraoperatorio >500ml (OR 6,74, p 0,001, 2,09 – 21,74) y >2 niveles intervenidos (OR 3,97, p 0,023, IC 1,20 – 13,09). Conclusión: Como factores asociados a la transfusión sanguínea en el manejo quirúrgico del canal lumbar estrecho a partir de la experiencia de 10 años en la Fundación Santa Fe de Bogotá se encontraron: enfermedad cardiaca, sangrado intraoperatorio mayor de 500ml y más de dos niveles intervenidos.