991 resultados para Opava (Severomoravský kraj, Czechoslovakia). Congress, 1820.
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November 4, 1812. Read, and ordered to be printed. Includes Documents accompanying the Message of the President of the United States to the two Houses of Congress, at the opening of the second session of the twelfth Congress United States. 12th Congress, 2nd session, 1812-1813. House.; United States. 12th Congress, 2nd session, 1812-1813. Senate.; United States. Congress. House.; United States. Congress. Senate. Printed by A. and C. Way
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Document no. 1 in U.S. 13th Congress, 3d session, 1814-1815. House. September 20, 1814. Read and committed to a committee of the whole House on the State of the Union. Printed by Roger C. Weightman
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Printed by Roger C. Weightman
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February 13, 1815. Printed by order of the Senate of the United States. Printed by Roger C. Weightman
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John Miller (1774-1862) was a physician and politician who served in the United States Congress as a representative from New York from 1825-1827. He began his medical practice in Washington County, N.Y. in 1798. In 1801 he moved to Fabius, Onondaga County, N.Y. (now Truxton, Cortland County). He served as postmaster at Truxton from 1805-1825, a justice of the peace from 1812-1821 and in the State Assembly in 1817, 1820 and 1845. Archibald McIntire [McIntyre] (1772-1858) was a businessman and politician. He immigrated to the United States with his family and settled in New York City around 1773. He was a member of the New York State Assembly from 1798-1821 (intermittently), in the New York State Senate form 1822-1826 and was New York State Comptroller from 1806-1821.
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In 2003, an electoral reform changed the mechanism to assign seats in the Colombian Congress. I simulate the 2006 Senate elections using the previous assignment mechanism to determine which senators benefited from the reform, i.e. would have not been elected had the reform not been made. With the results of the simulation, I use a regression discontinuity design to compare the senators that would have been barely elected anyways with those who would have lost, but were near to be elected. I check the differences in the amount of law drafts presented, the attendance to voting sessions, and a discipline index for each senator as proxy of their legislative behavior. I find that the senators benefiting from the reform present a different legislative behavior during the 4-year term with respect to the senators that would have been elected anyways. Since the differential legislative behavior cannot be interpreted as being better (worse) politician, I examine if the behavioral difference gives them an electoral advantage. I find no difference in the electoral result of 2010 Senate election in terms of the probability of being (re)elected in 2010, the share of votes, the share of votes within their party list, and the concentration of their votes. Additionally, I check the probability of being investigated for links with paramilitary groups and I find no differences. The results suggest that political reforms can change the composition of governing or legislative bodies in terms of performance, but it does not necessarily translate into an electoral advantage.