913 resultados para Marginal Cost of Funds
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Rising greenhouse gas emissions (GHGEs) have implications for health and up to 30 % of emissions globally are thought to arise from agriculture. Synergies exist between diets low in GHGEs and health however some foods have the opposite relationship, such as sugar production being a relatively low source of GHGEs. In order to address this and to further characterise a healthy sustainable diet, we model the effect on UK non-communicable disease mortality and GHGEs of internalising the social cost of carbon into the price of food alongside a 20 % tax on sugar sweetened beverages (SSBs). Developing previously published work, we simulate four tax scenarios: (A) a GHGEs tax of £2.86/tonne of CO2 equivalents (tCO2e)/100 g product on all products with emissions greater than the mean across all food groups (0.36 kgCO2e/100 g); (B) scenario A but with subsidies on foods with emissions lower than 0.36 kgCO2e/100 g such that the effect is revenue neutral; (C) scenario A but with a 20 % sales tax on SSBs; (D) scenario B but with a 20 % sales tax on SSBs. An almost ideal demand system is used to estimate price elasticities and a comparative risk assessment model is used to estimate changes to non-communicable disease mortality. We estimate that scenario A would lead to 300 deaths delayed or averted, 18,900 ktCO2e fewer GHGEs, and £3.0 billion tax revenue; scenario B, 90 deaths delayed or averted and 17,100 ktCO2e fewer GHGEs; scenario C, 1,200 deaths delayed or averted, 18,500 ktCO2e fewer GHGEs, and £3.4 billion revenue; and scenario D, 2,000 deaths delayed or averted and 16,500 ktCO2e fewer GHGEs. Deaths averted are mainly due to increased fibre and reduced fat consumption; a SSB tax reduces SSB and sugar consumption. Incorporating the social cost of carbon into the price of food has the potential to improve health, reduce GHGEs, and raise revenue. The simple addition of a tax on SSBs can mitigate negative health consequences arising from sugar being low in GHGEs. Further conflicts remain, including increased consumption of unhealthy foods such as cakes and nutrients such as salt.
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In this paper Swedish listed companies’ use of capital budgeting and cost of capital estimation methods in 2005 and 2008 are examined. The relation between company characteristics and choice of methods is investigated and both within-country longitudinal and cross-country comparisons are made. Larger companies seem to have used capital budgeting methods more frequently than smaller companies. When compared to U.S. and continental European companies, Swedish listed companies employed capital budgeting methods less frequently. In 2005 the most common method for establishing the cost of equity was by asking the investors what return they required. By 2008 CAPM was instead the most utilised method, which could indicate greater sophistication. The use of project risk when evaluating investments also seems to have gained in popularity, while the use of company risk declined. Overall, the use of sophisticated capital budgeting and cost of capital estimation methods seem to be rising and the use of less sophisticated methods declining.
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This paper investigates the importance of ow of funds as an implicit incentive in the asset management industry. We build a two-period bi- nomial moral hazard model to explain the trade-o¤s between ow, per- formance and fees where e¤ort depends on the combination of implicit ( ow of funds) and explicit (performance fee) incentives. Two cases are considered. With full commitment, the investor s relevant trade-o¤ is to give up expected return in the second period vis-à-vis to induce e¤ort in the rst period. The more concerned the investor is with today s pay- o¤, the more willing he will be to give up expected return in the second period by penalizing negative excess return in the rst period. Without full commitment, the investor learns some symmetric and imperfect infor- mation about the ability of the manager to obtain positive excess return. In this case, observed returns reveal ability as well as e¤ort choices. We show that powerful implicit incentives may explain the ow-performance relationship with a numerical solution. Besides, risk aversion explains the complementarity between performance fee and ow of funds.
An ordering of measures of the welfare cost of inflation in economies with interest-bearing deposits
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This paper builds on Lucas (2000) and on Cysne (2003) to derive and order six alternative measures of the welfare costs of inflation (five of which already existing in the literature) for any vector of opportunity costs. The ordering of the functions is carried out for economies with or without interestbearing deposits. We provide examples and closed-form solutions for the log-log money demand both in the unidimensional and in the multidimensional setting (when interest-bearing monies are present). An estimate of the maximum relative error a researcher can incur when using any particular measure is also provided.
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Há décadas os economistas se preocupam com o problema de calcular o Custo Marginal do Financiamento Público (MCF, em inglês). Um dos maiores sucessos nessa área é o modelo de provisão de bem público com taxação distorciva de Wildasin (1984). Nós generalizamos o modelo de Wildasin para incluir uma cesta de bens públicos, ao invés de um único bem. Em seguida realizamos várias estimativas do MCF para o Brasil, algumas inclusive sem a hipótese de independência entre o nível de bem público e a oferta de trabalho, usual na literatura. Os resultados mostram que o Custo Marginal do Financiamento Público no Brasil é relativamente pequeno, entre outras causas devido à pequena sensibilidade da oferta de trabalho ao gasto governamental
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This paper presents three contributions to the literature on the welfare cost of ináation. First, it introduces a new sensible way of measuring this cost - that of a compensating variation in consumption or income, instead of the equivalent variation notion that has been extensively used in empirical and theoretical research during the past fiftt years. We Önd this new measure to be interestingly related to the proxy measure of the shopping-time welfare cost of ináation introduced by Simonsen and Cysne (2001). Secondly, it discusses for which money-demand functions this and the shopping-time measure can be evaluated in an economically meaningful way. And, last but not least, it completely orders a comprehensive set of measures of the welfare cost of ináation for these money-demand specification. All of our results are extended to an economy in which there are many types of monies present, and are illustrated with the log-log money-demand specification.
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This dissertation analyses quantitatively the costs of sovereign default for the economy, in a model where banks with long positions in government debt play a central role in the financial intermediation for private sector's investments and face financial frictions that limit their leverage ability. Calibration tries to resemble some features of the Eurozone, where discussions about bailout schemes and default risk have been central issues. Results show that the model captures one important cost of default pointed out by empirical and theoretical literature on debt crises, namely the fall in investment that follows haircut episodes, what can be explained by a worsening in banks' balance sheet conditions that limits credit for the private sector and raises their funding costs. The cost in terms of output decrease is though not significant enough to justify the existence of debt markets and the government incentives for debt repayment. Assuming that the government is able to alleviate its constrained budget by imposing a restructuring on debt repayment profile that allows it to cut taxes, our model generates an important difference for output path comparing lump-sum taxes and distortionary. For our calibration, quantitative results show that in terms of output and utility, it is possible that the effect on the labour supply response generated by tax cuts dominates investment drop caused by credit crunch on financial markets. We however abstract from default costs associated to the breaking of existing contracts, external sanctions and risk spillovers between countries, that might also be relevant in addition to financial disruption effects. Besides, there exist considerable trade-offs for short and long run path of economic variables related to government and banks' behaviour.
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The paper provides an alternative model for insurance market with three types of agents: households, providers of a service and insurance companies. Households have uncertainty about future leveIs of income. Providers, if hired by a household, perform a diagnoses and privately learn a signal. For each signal there is a procedure that maximizes the likelihood of the household obtaining the good state of nature. The paper assumes that providers care about their income and also about the likelihood households will obtain the good state of nature (sympathy assumption). This assumption is satisfied if, for example, they care about their reputation or if there are possible litigation costs in case they do not use the appropriate procedure. Finally, insurance companies offer contracts to both providers and households. The paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and shows that the sympathy assumption 1eads to a 10ss of welfare for the households due to the need to incentive providers to choose the least expensive treatment.
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The paper extends the cost of altruism model, analyzed in Lisboa (1999). There are three types of agents: households, providers of a service and insurance companies. Households have uncertainty about future leveIs of income. Providers, if hired by a household, have to choose a non-observable leveI of effort, perform a diagnoses and privately learn a signal. For each signal there is a procedure that maximizes the likelihood of the household obtaining the good state of nature. Finally, insurance companies offer contracts to both providers and households. The paper provides suflicient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and shows the optimal contract induces providers to care about their income and also about the likelihood households will obtain the good state of nature, which in Lisboa (1999) was stated as altruism assumption. Equilibrium is inefficient in comparison with the standard moral hazard outcome whenever high leveIs of effort is chosen precisely due to the need to incentive providers to choose the least expensive treatment for some signals. We show, however that an equilibrium is always constrained optimal.
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This paper evaluates how information asymmetry affects the strength of competition in credit markets. A theory is presented in which adverse selection softens competition by decreasing the incentives creditors have for competing in the interest rate dimension. In equilibirum, although creditors compete, the outcome is similar to collusion. Three empirical implications arise. First, interest rate should respond asymmetrically to changes in the cost of funds: increases in cost of funds should, on average, have a larger effect on interest rates than decreases. Second, aggressiveness in pricing should be associated with a worseing in the bank level default rates. Third, bank level default rates should be endogenous. We then verify the validity of these three empirical implications using Brazilian data on consumer overdraft loans. The results in this paper rationalize seemingly abnormallly high interest rates in unsecured loans.
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Attanasio et al. (JPE, 2002) have used microeconomic data on households to provide new estimates of the welfare costs of infiation using Bailey's unidimensional welfare measure as a basis for their calculations. Such a measure does not properly take into consideration lhe fact that the majority of households in their sample (58.7 percent) holds not only bank deposits and currency, but also a second type of interest-bearing assct. This work devises alternative formulas which account for the existence of bank deposits and a sccond interest-bearing asset in the economy, as well as for adoption decisions regarding alternative financiai technologies.
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Qual o efeito de eleições em ativos reais? É possível mensurar diretamente a diferença de preços mesmo que só possamos enxergar um dos resultados potenciais? Essa dissertação estima esses efeitos utilizando metodologia baseada em opções sobre ações. O modelo aqui desenvolvido adaptção tradicional Black-Scholes para incorporar dois novos parâmetros: um salto no preço do ativo perfeitamente antecipado e uma série de probabilidades diárias refletindo as crenças sobre quem venceria a corrida eleitoral. Aplicamos esse método para o caso brasileiro das Eleições Presidenciais de 2014 e a Petrobras - uma importante companhia do setor petrolífero do país -utilizando dados de bolsa do segundo turno das eleições. Os resultados encontrados mostram uma diferença de 65-77% para o valor da companhia, dependendo de quem vencesse nas urnas. Isso é equivalente a aproximadamente 2.5% do PIB de 2014 do país.
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Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq)