Government spending and re-election: Quasi-experimental evidence from Brazilian municipalities

Does additional government spending improve the electoral chances of incumbent politicalparties? This paper provides the first quasi-experimental evidence on this question. Our researchdesign exploits discontinuities in federal funding to local governments in Brazil around severalpopulation cutoffs over the period 1982-1985. We show that extra fiscal transfers resulted in a20% increase in local government spending per capita, and an increase of about 10 percentagepoints in the re-election probability of local incumbent parties. In the context of an agency modelof electoral accountability, as well as existing results indicating that the revenue jumps studiedhere had positive impacts on education outcomes and earnings, these results suggest that expectedelectoral rewards encouraged incumbents to spend additional funds in ways that were valued byvoters.

O poder local em Timor em contexto multicultural

O trabalho que agora se apresenta é fruto, antes de mais, de uma relação especial com Timor. Não necessariamente pela dimensão histórica das várias presenças naquele território mas, e acima de tudo, pela relação pessoal e afectiva com alguns dos responsáveis políticos e religiosos daquele jovem país. Um convite, formulado em 2007 por Xanana Gusmão, levou-nos a calcorrear todo o território num curto espaço de três semanas, corria o Verão de 2008. O objectivo era a análise, no terreno, da viabilidade da instalação de um poder local num país recentemente tornado independente. Timor, fruto da sua história e, muito em especial, das características antropológicas do seu povo, é uma nação assumidamente multicultural. Das origens ancestrais das suas comunidades, dos reinos dispersos que pulverizam o pequeno território, das suas lideranças e dos vários dilectos, associados à longa e marcante presença portuguesa, bem como outras ocupações de países estrangeiros, com destaque para a Indonésia, resulta um caldo cultural, a todos os níveis peculiar. Aqui e acolá ouvimos o povo, entrevistámos e reunimos com os 432 chefes de suco existentes no país, entrevistámos chefes de aldeia e anciãos, reunimos com políticos, sacerdotes, professores e jornalistas. Interpretámos, ou tentámos interpretar, as condicionantes e os cuidados que se devem observar na preparação do quadro jurídico para reger a municipalidade em Timor: as suas vertentes electivas, funcionais, financeiras e fiscalizadoras. Revistámos a História de Timor e passámos por Cabo Verde, país de referência internacional ao nível da sua gestão pública, muito em especial a autárquica. Fizemos, também, óbvia referência à história do poder local em Portugal. Das consultas, do muito que observámos e estudámos, resulta um desinteressado contributo para a implementação do poder local em Timor, com as conclusões que incorporam alertas e sugestões.

O poder local em Timor em contexto multicultural

This study, now on presentation, comes as a result of a special relationship established with East Timor. Not necessarily through the several historical presences in that territory but, above all, through the emotional and personal relationships with some of the political and religious leaders of this young country. An invitation, made in 2007 by Xanana Gusmão, led us throughout the whole territory in a short time of three weeks, running the summer of 2008. Its purpose was the analysis, on the ground, of the possibility of installing local administration in a country which had recently became independent. Timor, as a result of its history, but mostly of the anthropological characteristics of its people, is an openly multicultural nation. The ancestral origins of their communities, its scattered kingdoms that spray along such a small territory, its leaders and many dialects, associated with the long portuguese presence, as well as other occupations made by foreign countries, especially Indonesia, became a cultural melting pot truly unique. Here and there we heard the people and interviewed and met the 432 local elected leaders of the country. We interviewed village elders and meet with politicians, priests, teachers and journalists. We have interpreted, or tried to, the actual conditions and cautions that must be observed in preparing the legal framework to govern the municipality in East Timor: its elective, functional, financial and oversight aspects. We have reviewed Timor’s history and took Cape Verde’s example as an international reference on its public administration, mostly its local authorities. We made also the obvious reference to the portuguese local government’s history. From search, and much of the observed and studied, remains a selfless contribution to the implementation of local government in East Timor, with alerts that incorporate conclusions and suggestions.

Con la secularización «se abrió el campo; el que quería venía». La formación de un grupo dirigente en el ámbito local boliviano, 1938/39-1948

Objetivo del artículo es estudiar los cambios más significativos producidos en la región de Guarayos (Noroeste del departamento de Santa Cruz, Bolivia) como consecuencia de la secularización de las misiones franciscanas en la zona, aprobada en 1938/39, y la implantación de la Delegación Nacional de Guarayos encargada de completar el proceso de incorporación de la población guaraya a la «nacionalidad». En particular, se analiza el papel desempeñado por los «administradores », nuevos «gestores» de los territorios y bienes que entre 1939 y 1948 detentaron todo el poder en cada uno de los poblados y fueron los responsables principales de la decadencia económica y despoblación de la región con la connivencia de sus superiores jerárquicos y la incapacidad del Estado para hacerse presente en la convulsa política boliviana del período marcada por continuados golpes militares.

Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: recent evidence from Spain

We analyze whether local land supply is influenced by the degree of political competition, and interpret the findings as being indicative of the influence wielded by land development lobbies. We use a new database including both political and land supply data for more than 2,000 Spanish municipalities for the period 2003-2007. In Spain, land use policies are largely a local responsibility with municipalities having periodically to pass compre- hensive land use plans. The main policy variable in these plans, and the one analyzed here, is the amount of land classified for potential development. We measure local political competition as the margin of victory of the incumbent government. We instrument this variable using the number of votes obtained by parties represented in local government when standing at the first national legislative elections following the re-establishment of democracy, and the number of votes they actually obtained regionally at the national legislative elections. The results indicate that stiffer political competition does indeed reduce the amount of new land designated for development. This effect is found to be most marked in suburbs, in towns with a high percent of commuters and homeowners, and in municipalities governed by the left.

Citizens' control and the efficiency of local public services

Està àmpliament acceptat que la descentralització fiscal incrementa el control dels ciutadans sobre els polítics, fomenta el rendiment de comptes i augmenta l¿eficiència. Aquest treball té per objectiu identificar les característiques socio-econòmiques dels ciutadans (votants potencials) que generen un major control sobre els responsables polítics locals provocant, així, un major nivell d'eficiència en un context descentralitzat.També s'analitzen les característiques fiscals dels governs locals que fomenten aquest control i eficiència. L'estudi s'ha aplicat a una mostra de municipis catalans seguint la metodologia convencional basada en l'estimació en dues etapes. A la primera etapa s'estima l'eficiència en que operen els municipis mitjançant la tècnica DEA. La novetat rau en el càlcul d'una nova versió d'indicador global d¿output municipal. En la segona etapa, a través d¿una estimació tipus Tobit (models censurats) i de mètodes bootstrap, es mostra com els factors abans comentats poden influir sobre l¿eficiència. Els resultats suggereixen que la forta presencia de comerciants, jubilats i persones amb dret a vot afavoreixen el control dels ciutadans, el rendiment de comptes i l¿eficiència. Un factor que facilita aquest control, i per tant una major eficiència, és la presència de baixos costos d'oportunitat d'obtenir informació sobre la gestió local dels serveis públics.

Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: recent evidence from Spain

We analyze whether local land supply is influenced by the degree of political competition, and interpret the findings as being indicative of the influence wielded by land development lobbies. We use a new database including both political and land supply data for more than 2,000 Spanish municipalities for the period 2003-2007. In Spain, land use policies are largely a local responsibility with municipalities having periodically to pass compre- hensive land use plans. The main policy variable in these plans, and the one analyzed here, is the amount of land classified for potential development. We measure local political competition as the margin of victory of the incumbent government. We instrument this variable using the number of votes obtained by parties represented in local government when standing at the first national legislative elections following the re-establishment of democracy, and the number of votes they actually obtained regionally at the national legislative elections. The results indicate that stiffer political competition does indeed reduce the amount of new land designated for development. This effect is found to be most marked in suburbs, in towns with a high percent of commuters and homeowners, and in municipalities governed by the left.

Citizens' control and the efficiency of local public services

Està àmpliament acceptat que la descentralització fiscal incrementa el control dels ciutadans sobre els polítics, fomenta el rendiment de comptes i augmenta l¿eficiència. Aquest treball té per objectiu identificar les característiques socio-econòmiques dels ciutadans (votants potencials) que generen un major control sobre els responsables polítics locals provocant, així, un major nivell d'eficiència en un context descentralitzat.També s'analitzen les característiques fiscals dels governs locals que fomenten aquest control i eficiència. L'estudi s'ha aplicat a una mostra de municipis catalans seguint la metodologia convencional basada en l'estimació en dues etapes. A la primera etapa s'estima l'eficiència en que operen els municipis mitjançant la tècnica DEA. La novetat rau en el càlcul d'una nova versió d'indicador global d¿output municipal. En la segona etapa, a través d¿una estimació tipus Tobit (models censurats) i de mètodes bootstrap, es mostra com els factors abans comentats poden influir sobre l¿eficiència. Els resultats suggereixen que la forta presencia de comerciants, jubilats i persones amb dret a vot afavoreixen el control dels ciutadans, el rendiment de comptes i l¿eficiència. Un factor que facilita aquest control, i per tant una major eficiència, és la presència de baixos costos d'oportunitat d'obtenir informació sobre la gestió local dels serveis públics.

Local Public-Services Provision under Public-Private Partnerships : Contractual Design and Contracting Parties Incentives

When deciding to resort to a PPP contract for the provision of a local public service, local governments have to consider the demand risk allocation between the contracting parties. In this article, I investigate the effects of demand risk allocation on the accountability of procuring authorities regarding consumers changing demand, as well as on the cost-reducing effort incentives of the private public-service provider. I show that contracts in which the private provider bears demand risk motivate more the public authority from responding to customer needs. This is due to the fact that consumers are empowered when the private provider bears demand risk, that is, they have the possibility to oust the private provider in case of non-satisfaction with the service provision, which provides procuring authorities with more credibility in side-trading and then more incentives to be responsive. As a consequence, I show that there is a lower matching with consumers' preferences over time when demand risk is on the public authority rather than on the private provider, and this is corroborated in the light of two famous case studies. However, contracts in which the private provider does not bear demand risk motivate more the private provider from investing in cost-reducing efforts. I highlight then a tradeoff in the allocation of demand risk between productive and allocative efficiency. The striking policy implication of this article for local governments would be that the current trend towards a greater resort to contracts where private providers bear little or no demand risk may not be optimal. Local governments should impose demand risk on private providers within PPP contracts when they expect that consumers' preferences over the service provision will change over time.

Partisan targeting of inter-governmental transfers & state interference in local elections: evidence from Spain

[spa] En este trabajo examinamos si, en la asignación de transferencias, los gobernantes regionales discriminan a favor de los gobiernos locales controlados por el mismo partido político, y si las perspectivas electorales de los gobiernos locales mejoran si están políticamente alineados con el gobierno regional. Con una nueva base de datos que considera 3.000 municipios españoles durante el período 2000-07 y un diseño de discontinuidad en la regresión, documentamos un efecto robusto de importante magnitud: en elecciones ajustadas, los municipios alineados con el gobierno regional reciben, en media, un 83% más de transferencias per cápita y su gobernante obtiene un 10% más de votos en las elecciones locales. También demostramos que el efecto de la alineación política es mayor: (i) si las elecciones regionales y locales se celebran el mismo día, (ii) en regiones donde las elecciones regionales son menos competidas, y (iii) en regiones con más recursos presupuestarios.

Partisan targeting of inter-governmental transfers & state interference in local elections: evidence from Spain

[spa] En este trabajo examinamos si, en la asignación de transferencias, los gobernantes regionales discriminan a favor de los gobiernos locales controlados por el mismo partido político, y si las perspectivas electorales de los gobiernos locales mejoran si están políticamente alineados con el gobierno regional. Con una nueva base de datos que considera 3.000 municipios españoles durante el período 2000-07 y un diseño de discontinuidad en la regresión, documentamos un efecto robusto de importante magnitud: en elecciones ajustadas, los municipios alineados con el gobierno regional reciben, en media, un 83% más de transferencias per cápita y su gobernante obtiene un 10% más de votos en las elecciones locales. También demostramos que el efecto de la alineación política es mayor: (i) si las elecciones regionales y locales se celebran el mismo día, (ii) en regiones donde las elecciones regionales son menos competidas, y (iii) en regiones con más recursos presupuestarios.

La transformació d'una administració local cap a una administració electrònica sense papers

Aquest treball analitza en què consisteix l'administració electrònica i quines són les adaptacions que ha de realitzar una administració local per transformar-s'hi. El present document també recull quins són els elements clau que cal adaptar dins de l'organització, detallant-los i veient els beneficis d'utilitzar-los. Atès que la inversió econòmica per fer la transformació cap a l'e-Administració pot ser elevada, s'analitzen els serveis que ofereix de forma gratuïta el consorci d'Administració Oberta de Catalunya (AOC), els quals poden ajudar a abaratir la despesa.

Managing the crises : how did local governments react to the financial crisis in 2008 and what explains the differences ? The case of Swiss municipalities

Swiss municipalities are, to a large extent, responsible for their financial resources. Since these resources primarily depend on income and property taxes from individuals and enterprises, municipality budgets are likely to be directly affected by the current crisis in the financial sector and the economy. This article investigates how municipalities perceived this threat and how they reacted to it. In a nationwide survey conducted at the end of 2009 in all 2596 Swiss municipalities, we asked local secretaries which measures had been launched in order to cope with expected losses in tax income and a possible increase in welfare spending. Did the municipalities rely on Keynesian measures increasing public spending and accepting greater deficits, or did they try to avoid further deficits by using austerity measures and a withdrawal of planned investments? Our results show that only a few municipalities - mainly the bigger ones - expected to be greatly affected by the crisis. Their reactions, however, did not reveal any clear patterns that theory would lead one to expect. Preferences for austerity measures and deficit spending become visible but many municipalities took measures from both theories. The strongest explanatory factors for determining how/why municipalities react are: the municipality's level of affectedness followed by whether or not the municipality belongs to the French-speaking part of the country. Size also has an impact, whereas the strength of the Social Democrat party is negligible. Explaining what kind of measures municipalities are likely to take is more difficult. However, the more a municipality is affected, the more likely it is to stick to austerity measures.

Self-rule Index for Local Authorities (Release 1.0)

Local autonomy is a highly valued feature of good governance. The continuous attempts of many European countries to strengthen the autonomy of local government show the importance given to decentralisation and far-reaching competences at the lowest units of a state. Measuring and comparing local autonomy, however, has proven to be a difficult task. Not only are there diverging ideas about the core elements of local autonomy, there are also considerable difficulties to apply specific concepts to different countries. This project suggests a comprehensive methodology to measure local autonomy. It analyses 39 European countries and reports changes between 1990 and 2014. A network of experts on local government assessed the autonomy of local government of their respective countries on the basis of a common code book. The eleven variables measured are located on seven imensions and can be combined to a "Local Autonomy Index" (LAI). The data show an increase of local autonomy between 1990 and 2005, especially in the new Central and Eastern European countries. Countries with a particularly high degree of local autonomy are Switzerland, the Nordic countries, Germany and Poland.

Online and Offline Participation at the Local Level : A Quantitative Analysis of the Catalan Municipalities

This paper presents a first analysis on local electronic participatory experiences in Catalonia. The analysis is based on a database constructed and collected by the authors. The paper carries out an explanatory analysis of local initiatives in eparticipationand off line participation taking into account political variables (usually not considered in this kind of analysis) but also classical socio-economic variables that characterise municipalities. Hence, we add a quantitative analysis to the numerous case studies on local e-participation experiences. We have chosen Catalonia because is one of the European regions with more initiatives and one that has enjoyed considerable local governmental support to citizen participation initiatives since the 80s. The paper offers a characterisation of these experiences and a first explanatory analysis, considering: i) the institutional context in which these experiences are embedded, ii) the characteristics of the citizen participation processes and mechanisms on-line, and iii) a set of explanatory variables composed by the population size, thepolitical adscription of the mayor, the electoral abstention rate, age, income and level ofeducation in the municipality. The model that we present is explanatory for the municipalities with more than 20,000 inhabitants but it is not for the fewer than 20,000inhabitants. Actually, the number of participatory activities developed by these last municipalities is very low. Among all the variables, population size becomes the mostinfluential variable. Political variables such as political party of the mayor and the localabstention rate have a certain influence but that have to be controlled by population size.