"Minimálbér-paradoxon" versenyzői munkaerőpiacon? ("Minimum-wage paradox" in a competitive labour market? Lessons from an experimental line of thought)

A versenyzői munkaerőpiac hagyományos kereslet-kínálati modellje az egyensúlyi bérszintet meghaladó minimálbér következményeként az egyensúlyi bérszint mellettinél alacsonyabb foglalkoztatást jósol; minél magasabb a minimálbér, annál alacsonyabbat. Empirikus vizsgálatok szerint ugyanakkor a minimálbér-emelés nem feltétlenül csökkenti a foglalkoztatást - ezt nevezik minimálbér-paradoxonnak -, ami legkézenfekvőbben a munkáltatók munkaerő-piaci monopszonerejével látszik magyarázhatónak. Ezzel szemben az a gondolatkísérlet, amelyről ez a cikk beszámol, általánosabb érvényű, versenyzői munkaerőpiacot feltételező magyarázat kidolgozására irányul. / === / In the conventional textbook demand/supply model of competitive labour markets, the introduction of a minimum wage above market-clearing level must reduce employment. Empirical findings suggest, however, that this may not always be the case, a finding most readily explained by monopsonistic competition in the labour market. The experimental line of thought reported here explores an alternative root, interpreting the "minimum-wage paradox" as the outcome of a competitive labour market that displays friction.

Információs paradoxon a vállalkozások hitelezésében nem fizető vevő esetén (An innovation paradox in enterprise financing where buyers fail to pay)

Cikkünkben a vállalkozók külső finanszírozásának modelljét terjesztjük ki arra az - irodalom által eddig nem tárgyalt - esetre, amikor a vállalkozónak van nem fizető vevője. Szerződéselméleti megközelítésünkben a vállalkozó hitelképességére vonatkozó információ aszimmetrikus a tranzakcióban részt vevő felek között, s ez morális kockázatnak ad teret. Megfigyelhető, hogy ilyenkor a pontosan fizető vevők számára is hitelszűke lép fel. A vállalkozó és a finanszírozó közötti optimális szerződés nem fizető vevő hatására további hitelszűkösséget generál. Két esetet vizsgálunk: az egyikben a vállalkozó információs előnyben van a vevő nemfizetésére vonatkozóan, a másikban nincs ilyen előny. A két modellváltozat alapján információs paradoxon jellemzi a kialakuló finanszírozási helyzetet: a vállalkozó kisebb összegű hitelhez jut az említett információs előnye esetén, mint amikor közte és a finanszírozó között szimmetrikus az információ. A modell azt a - magyar kis- és középvállalkozóknál látott - jelenséget írja le, amikor nem transzparens a szállító-vevő viszonya, és a finanszírozó bank e miatt az információs hátrány miatt kevesebb hitelt nyújt kis- és középvállalati ügyfeleinek. _____ The model of external financing of the firm is extended here to cases where there may be defaults on account receivables. Information asymmetry between entrepreneur and lender on a firm's creditworthiness leads to moral hazard and credit rationing, even in the absence of default risk. The authors show an optimal debt contract that formulates the situation, and focus on two cases: where the entrepreneur has an information advantage on defaults on receivables, and where the information is symmetric. A comparison of these cases revealed a paradoxical knowledge issue in external financing: a better informed entrepreneur may be able to afford a smaller financing ability. The model describes a frequent phenomenon in small businesses, when the relationship between buyer and seller lacks transparency, and lenders offer lower amount of lending to small and medium-sized enterprises.

The paradox of the binomial Ixodes ricinus activity and the observed unimodal Lyme borreliosis season in Hungary

The change of ambient temperature plays a key role in determining the run of the annual Lyme season. Our aim was to explain the apparent contradiction between the annual unimodal Lyme borreliosis incidence and the bimodal Ixodes ricinus tick activity run – both observed in Hungary – by distinguishing the temperaturedependent seasonal human and tick activity, the temperature-independent factors, and the multiplicative effect of human outdoor activity in summer holiday, using data from Hungary in the period of 1998–2012. This separation was verified by modeling the Lyme incidence based on the separated factors, and comparing the run of the observed and modeled incidence. We demonstrated the bimodality of tick season by using the originally unimodal Lyme incidence data. To model the outdoor human activity, the amount of camping guest nights was used, which showed an irregular run from mid-June to September. The human outdoor activity showed a similar exponential correlation with ambient temperature to that what the relative incidence did. It was proved that summer holiday has great influence on Lyme incidence.

The paradox of the binomial Ixodes ricinus activity and the observed unimodal Lyme borreliosis season in Hungary

The change of ambient temperature plays a key role in determining the run of the annual Lyme season. Our aim was to explain the apparent contradiction between the annual unimodal Lyme borreliosis incidence and the bimodal Ixodes ricinus tick activity run – both observed in Hungary – by distinguishing the temperaturedependent seasonal human and tick activity, the temperature-independent factors, and the multiplicative effect of human outdoor activity in summer holiday, using data from Hungary in the period of 1998–2012. This separation was verified by modeling the Lyme incidence based on the separated factors, and comparing the run of the observed and modeled incidence. We demonstrated the bimodality of tick season by using the originally unimodal Lyme incidence data. To model the outdoor human activity, the amount of camping guest nights was used, which showed an irregular run from mid-June to September. The human outdoor activity showed a similar exponential correlation with ambient temperature to that what the relative incidence did. It was proved that summer holiday has great influence on Lyme incidence.

Intellectual Capital Paradox

The authors have analysed the economic growth and its determining factors in countries of the European Union, particularly in Hungary and Ukraine. We applied quantitative methods by analysing topic related database. We have found that the Central-Eastern European Periphery has not finished its transition, and this change is heading in the direction of the Southern Periphery of the European Union. As the Southern Periphery is the area of economic crises right now, it is obvious that something should be done in order to avoid falling to the same fate for the Central-Eastern European Periphery. The authors introduced a new production function and with its help they identified the bottlenecks of growth in Hungary and Ukraine, namely the organizational and human capital that in its present development stage, do not correspond to the needs of creating state of the art larger companies. The present crisis pushes both countries to postpone long-term developments, such as investments into human capital, and in this way makes the solution of the crisis more difficult.

Dynamic capabilities and strategic paradox: a case study

Today’s business leaders must constantly review and develop their firm’s abilities to adapt to and benefit from external changes. Dynamic capabilities are the capacity of an organization to purposefully create, extend or modify its resource base. They enable it to exploit business, technological and market opportunities and adapt to market changes, an ability more often observed in highly dynamic industries, such as consumer electronics or telecommunications. Using the case study method, this article identifies dynamic capabilities in traditional, less dynamic industries when faced with a sudden drop of revenue. Four distinct routines emerge, namely structure and practices enduring time-sensitive strategic decision-making by the tice, and a culture encouraging learning and coevolving. Seemingly strategic paradox objectives encourage the management team to question the status quo and, when managed well, transform the tensions between old and new into an ability to advance superior ideas faster.

Self-employment and the paradox of the contented female worker

Peer reviewed

The paradox of German power. By Hans Kundnani

Book review: The paradox of German power. By Hans Kundnani. London: Hurst. 2014. 147pp. £17.90. isbn 978 1 84904 415 8.

The paradox of competition for airline passengers with reduced mobility (PRM)

Airline competition with customer service as product differentiator has forced down costs, air fares and investor returns. Two passenger markets operate in aviation: (a) able-bodied passengers for whom airlines compete and (b) passengers with reduced mobility (PRMs) – disabled by age, obesity or medical problems – for whom airlines do not compete. Government interference in the market intended to protect a minority of narrowly-defined PRMs has had unintended consequences of enabling increasing numbers of more widely-defined PRMs to access complimentary airline provisions. With growing ageing and overweight populations and long-haul travelling medical tourists such regulation could lead to even lower investors’ returns. The International Air Transport Association (IATA) (2013) examined the air transport value chain for competitiveness using Porter’s (2008) five forces but did not distinguish between able-bodied passengers and PRMs. Findings during an investigation of these two markets concurred with IATA-Porter that the markets for the bargaining powers of PRM buyers and PRM suppliers were highly competitive. However, in contrast to the IATA conclusions, intensity of competition, and threats from new entrants and substitute products for PRM travel were low. The conclusion is that airlines are strategically PRM defensive by omission. Paradoxically, the airline which delivers the best PRM customer service could become the least profitable.

The paradox of competition for airline passengers with reduced mobility (PRM)

Airline competition with customer service as product differentiator has forced down costs, air fares and investor returns. Two passenger markets operate in aviation: (1) able-bodied passengers for whom airlines openly compete and (2) passengers with reduced mobility (PRMs) – disabled by age, obesity or medical problems – for whom airlines do not compete. Government interference in the market intended to protect a minority of narrowly-defined PRMs has had unintended consequences of enabling increasing numbers of more widely-defined PRMs to access complimentary airline provisions. With growing ageing and overweight populations and long-haul travelling medical tourists such regulation could lead to even lower investors’ returns. The International Air Transport Association (IATA) (2013) examined the air transport value chain for competitiveness using Porter’s (2008) five forces but did not distinguish between able-bodied passengers and PRMs. Findings during an investigation of these two markets concurred with IATA-Porter that the markets for the bargaining powers of PRM customers and PRM suppliers were ‘highly competitive’. However, in contrast to the IATA conclusions the threats posed by new entrants, substitute products and intensity of competition for PRM passengers were all ‘low’. The conclusion is that airlines are strategically PRM defensive by omission. Paradoxically, the airline which delivers the best PRM customer service could become the least profitable.

Resilience and the ‘everyday’: beyond the paradox of ‘liberal peace’

Over the last decade there has been a shift towards critical understandings of ‘liberal peace’ approaches to international intervention, which argue that local culture holds the key to the effectiveness of peace interventions. In this ‘bottom-up’ approach, peace, reconciliation, and a ‘culture of law’ then become secondary effects of sociocultural norms and values. However, these liberal peace critiques have remained trapped in the paradox of liberal peace: the inability to go beyond the binaries of liberal universalism and cultural relativism. This understanding will be contrasted with the rise of ‘resilience’ approaches to intervention – which build on this attention to the particular context of application but move beyond this paradox through philosophical pragmatism and the focus on concrete social practices. This article clarifies the nature of this shift through the focus on the shifting understanding of international intervention to address the failings of the ‘war on drugs’ in the Americas.

The Adolescent Empathy Paradox and Juvenile Offending

Thesis (Master's)--University of Washington, 2016-08

The Privacy Paradox: Privacy, Surveillance, and Encryption

Thesis (Master's)--University of Washington, 2016-08

The visibility/invisibility paradox of trust: Developing distributed educational leadership for online communities

A visibility/invisibility paradox of trust operates in the development of distributed educational leadership for online communities. If trust is to be established, the team-based informal ethos of online collaborative networked communities requires a different kind of leadership from that observed in more formal face-to-face positional hierarchies. Such leadership is more flexible and sophisticated, being capable of encompassing both ambiguity and agile response to change. Online educational leaders need to be partially invisible, delegating discretionary powers, to facilitate the effective distribution of leadership tasks in a highly trusting team-based culture. Yet, simultaneously, online communities are facilitated by the visibility and subtle control effected by expert leaders. This paradox: that leaders need to be both highly visible and invisible when appropriate, was derived during research on 'Trust and Leadership' and tested in the analysis of online community case study discussions using a pattern-matching process to measure conversational interactions. This paper argues that both leader visibility and invisibility are important for effective trusting collaboration in online distributed leadership. Advanced leadership responses to complex situations in online communities foster positive group interaction, mutual trust and effective decision-making, facilitated through the active distribution of tasks.

The Smart Paradox : Stimulate the deployment of Smart grids with effective regulatory instruments

The concept of SG (Smart Grids) encompasses a set of technologies that raise the intelligence of the electrical networks, such as smart meters or instruments of communication, sensing and auto-correction of networks. Nevertheless, the cost is still an important obstacle for the transformation of the current electricity system into a smarter one. Regulation can have an important role in setting up a favorable framework that fosters investments. However, the novelty with SG is the disembodied character of the technology, which may change the incentives of the regulated network companies to invest, affecting the effectiveness of the regulatory instruments (“cost plus” or “price cap”). This paper demonstrates that the solution to this “Smart” paradox requires strong incentive regulation mechanisms able to stimulate the adoption of SG technologies. Moreover, the regulation should not jeopardize conventional investments that are unable to be substituted by SG. Thus, a combination of performance regulation and efficiency obligations may be necessary.