The secret to legal foretelling: generic and inter-generic aspects of vagueness in contracts, patents and regulations

In this genre analysis research paper, we compare U.S. patents, contracts, and regulations on technical matters with a focus upon the relation between vagueness and communicative purposes and subpurposes of these three genres. Our main interest is the investigation of intergeneric conventions across the three genres, based on the software analysis of three corpora (one for each genre, 1 million words per corpus). The result of the investigation is that intergeneric conventions are found at the level of types of expressed linguistic vagueness, but that intergeneric conventions at the level of actual formulations are rare. The conclusion is that at this latter level the influence from the situation type underlying the individual genre is more important than the overarching legal character of the genres, when we talk about introducing explicit vagueness in the text.

Origen y evolución histórico-legal del club deportivo en la Comunidad de Madrid (1833-1936)

Cuando se inició el trabajo para obtener el título de doctora, el proyecto era acerca de la financiación público privada de los clubes deportivos madrileños. El punto uno de ese primer índice, versaba sobre el origen del club deportivo en la Comunidad de Madrid (en este sentido, es preciso tener en cuenta que el territorio sufrió modificaciones, lo que antes eran pueblos hoy son distritos y lo que antes era provincia hoy es Comunidad Autónoma de Madrid, nuestro ámbito territorial de estudio). Al leer la doctrina autorizada que coincidía en su totalidad en que los primeros clubes deportivos fueron de origen inglés (el Recreativo de Huelva en el año1889 era considerado el primer club de España) y recordar dudas e inquietudes al respecto que surgieron durante la licenciatura, la investigación se tornó incómoda, por no decir temeraria. ¿Por qué había que limitarse a recoger las ideas de una doctrina, sin duda hoy y entonces prestigiosa, cuando se pensaba que aquella teoría del origen británico no podía ser, aunque fuera dentro de un marco teórico? No parecía tener sentido que no hubiera habido asociacionismo en España antes de la llegada de las compañías inglesas, pero sobre todo en Madrid, siempre bulliciosa en cuanto a participación ciudadana, por varios motivos: existían juegos y deportes populares autóctonos antes de que llegara el fútbol. ¿No se asociaban los madrileños para poder competir con otros?, ¿Se equivocó Goya al pintar estampas de juegos populares?, ¿Por qué existía entonces una Ley de Asociaciones de 1887, evidentemente anterior al Recreativo de Huelva (1889)? Las leyes se elaboran en respuesta a una necesidad social o a una costumbre anterior, o a las dos cosas. ¿Nadie pensó en la costumbre, siendo fuente del Derecho junto con la Ley y los principios generales?, ¿Nadie, estando tan cerca?, ¿Nadie, figurando en el artículo 1 del Código Civil? De esta forma, la justificación y objetivos cambiaron, la investigación se volvió otra, se tenía necesidad de probar la lógica o nada. Sólo hacían falta las pruebas documentales que aportaran luz y fueran tangibles para la argumentación jurídica. Así, entre las reglas del juego de la norma jurídica, la jurisprudencia y la doctrina, se desenvuelve el marco teórico de este trabajo. Es necesario para ello conocer cómo funciona la legislación que afecta a los clubes deportivos en la actualidad para entender las similitudes con los clubes pioneros. Es preciso comprender que una Ley nunca se encuentra aislada de otras, que todas están relacionadas, que los cruces son inevitablemente ilimitados y los resultados inmensos. Se ha realizado un análisis de una realidad compleja que trasciende de lo jurídico y lo deportivo. Respecto al material y método, no se encontraban referencias de estudios comparados, desde el punto de vista jurídico, de los Estatutos de los primeros clubes deportivos madrileños, ni nombrarlos hasta que a principios del año 2013 digitalizamos en la Biblioteca Nacional el Reglamento del Instituto de Gimnástica, Equitación y Esgrima (Villalobos, 1842); la prueba documental que se buscaba para apoyar la teoría ya era tangible. Luego se encontrarían otros para añadir a la muestra y también documentación probatoria complementaria. Tampoco había trabajos sobre la documentación emanada de la Administración Pública, por lo que se han estudiado Expedientes administrativos así como su comparativa con la legislación coetánea y la actual, lo que ha permitido concretar más la forma y tipología de las primeras formas jurídicas deportivas. Para la búsqueda de documentación se ha recurrido a bibliotecas, archivos e incluso depósitos que tenían legajos sin clasificar, habían sufrido las inundaciones y carcoma que azotaron a los sótanos de Madrid e incluso a alguno el fuego le miró de reojo. La documentación encontrada ha permitido convivir con los personajes que habitaron los clubes pioneros en los primeros domicilios sociales; historias reales con banda sonora propia. Y es que el nacimiento del asociacionismo deportivo madrileño no se podría haber gestado en mejor momento; durante el Romanticismo, ni en mejor lugar, en las encrucijadas de las callejuelas estrechas cercanas a las grandes arterias de la Capital; un paseo por las calles Libertad, Barbieri, Minas, Hortaleza y Montera. Los resultados de la investigación confirman la teoría de que el primer club deportivo madrileño nada tuvo que ver con los clubes que posteriormente vinieron en los equipajes de las compañías inglesas. Ni en tiempo, son anteriores; ni en lugar, Madrid; ni en forma, la comparativa con un club británico de la época denota diferencias o mejor, deficiencias, pero más que nada en el fondo. Los clubes madrileños tenían una naturaleza que reflejaba el sentir de los primeros socios y el espíritu de la Capital: beneficencia, espectáculo, participación ciudadana y trabajo en equipo. También se demuestra, tanto en los resultados como en la discusión, las particularidades de los primeros clubes madrileños en cuanto a su relación con la imprenta, la docencia, la prensa, las instalaciones deportivas siempre compartidas con la cultura como la terminología y las equipaciones, pero sobre todo la especial relación con el inherente derecho de reunión. Difícil pensar en un principio que la prueba de la costumbre se encontrara en la cartelería teatral, y que un programa de una competición deportiva escondiera unos Estatutos durante siglos. ABSTRACT When work for a doctorate degree began, the project was about public-private financing of sports clubs Madrid. At point one of the first index, concerned the origin of the sports club in Madrid ( Keep in mind that the territory was modified, which were towns before today are districts and what was once the province is now Community Autonomous of Madrid, our territorial area of study). When reading the authoritative doctrine which coincided entirely in the first sports clubs were of English origin (Huelva Recreation Club, 1889) and remember about questions and concerns raised during the undergraduate research became awkward, if not reckless. Why it had to be limited to collecting the ideas of a doctrine certainly prestigious now and then, when it was thought that this theory could not be British origin, albeit within a framework? It did not seem to make sense that there had been associations in Spain before the arrival of British companies, but especially in Madrid, always busy in terms of citizen participation, for several reasons; and indigenous games were popular sports before the football do the locals are not associated to compete with other?, Goya was wrong to paint pictures of popular games?, Why then was no Associations Act, 1887, clearly previous Huelva Recreation Club (1889)? The laws are developed in response to a social need or a past practice, or both. No one thought of being a source of law practice with the law and the general principles? No, being so close? No one appearing in Article 1 of the Civil? Thus the rationale and objectives of the research turned back, it was necessary to try logic or anything. Only documentary evidence was needed that provide light and were tangible to the legal arguments. Thus, among the rules of the legal rule, jurisprudence and doctrine, the theoretical framework of this work develops, we need to know how legislation affects sports clubs at present to understand the similarities with clubs works pioneers, we must understand that a law is never isolated from others, they are all related, intersections are inevitably unlimited and the immense results. It has made an analysis of a complex reality that transcends the legal and sports. Regarding the material and method, no references to studies were compared, from the legal point of view, of the Statute of the first Madrid sports clubs, or name them until early 2013 digitized at the National Library of the Institute of Regulation Gymnastics, Riding and Fencing (Villalobos, 1842); the documentary evidence that was sought to support the theory was already tangible. Then they find others to add to the sample and further supporting documentation. There was also no work on the documentation issued by the Public Administration, which have been studied administrative records and their comparison with the contemporary legislation and the current, allowing more concrete form and type of the first sports legal forms. Search for documentation we have turned to libraries, archives and even deposits that were not rated bundles, had suffered flooding and decay in the basement of Madrid and even fire some looked askance. The found documents have enabled us to live with the characters that inhabited the early clubs in the first addresses; real stories with its own soundtrack. And the birth of the Madrid sports associations could not have been gestated at a better time ; during the Romantic period , or in a better place ; at the crossroads of the nearby narrow streets of the great arteries of the Capital; a walk along the Libertad, Barbieri, Minas, Hortaleza and Montera. The research results confirm the theory that the first Madrid sports club had nothing to do with the clubs that later came in the luggage of British companies, nor in time; They predate, or rather; Madrid, or in the form; the comparison with a British club denotes the time differences or rather shortcomings, but more than anything in the background; the Madrid club had a nature that reflect the sentiments of the first members and the spirit of the Capital; charity, show, citizen participation and teamwork. It is also shown in the results and discussion the particularities of the first locals clubs in their relationship with the press, teaching, media, sports facilities always shared with the culture and terminology and the kits, but all the special relationship with the inherent right of assembly; hard to think at first that the test of habit were in the theater posters, and a program of a sports competition hide Statutes for centuries.

Investigating and Understanding Student Learning Outcomes in an Online and Face-to-Face Graduate Level Legal Administration Course: An Embedded Mixed Methods Design

Online education is a new teaching and learning medium with few current guidelines for faculty, administrators or students. Its rapid growth over the last decade has challenged academic institutions to keep up with the demand, while also providing a quality education. Our understanding of the factors that determine quality and effective online learning experiences that lead to student learning outcomes is still evolving. There is a lack of consensus on the effectiveness of online versus face-to-face education in the current research. The U.S. Department of Education conducted a meta-analysis in 2009 and concluded that student-learning outcomes in online courses were equal to and, often times, better than face-to-face traditional courses. Subsequent research has found contradictory findings, and further inquiry is necessary. The purpose of this embedded mixed methods design research study is to further our understanding of the factors that create quality and successful educational outcomes in an online course. To achieve this, the first phase of this study measured and compared learning outcomes in an online and in class graduate-level legal administration course. The second phase of the study entailed interviews with those students in both the online and face-to-face sections to understand their perspectives on the factors contributing to learning outcomes. Six themes emerged from the qualitative findings: convenience, higher order thinking, discussions, professor engagement, professor and student interaction, and face-to-face interaction. Findings from this study indicate the factors students perceive as contributing to learning outcomes in an online course are consistent among all students and are supported in the existing literature. Higher order thinking, however, emerged as a stronger theme than indicated in the current research, and the face-to-face nature of the traditional classroom may be more an issue of familiarity than a factor contributing to learning outcomes. As education continues to reach new heights and developments in technology advance, the factors found to contribute to student learning outcomes will be refined and enhanced. These developments will continue to transform the ways in which we deliver and receive knowledge in both traditional and online classrooms. While there is a growing body of research on online education, the field’s evolution has unsettled earlier findings and posed new areas to investigate.

John Dorr legal documents,

Legal document from Commonwealth of Massachusetts relating to the case between John Dorr and Paschal P. Pope; it empowers Tudor to take the depositions of Eliphalet Smith and Henry D. Tracy, and includes questions by the attorneys for each, Charles Loring (Pope, defendant) and Bradford Summers (Dorr, plaintiff).

The European Court of Justice and process-oriented review. Research Paper in Law, 01/2012

Structuralism is a theory of U.S. constitutional adjudication according to which courts should seek to improve the decision-making process of the political branches of government so as to render it more democratic.1 In words of John Hart Ely, courts should exercise their judicial-review powers as a ‘representation-reinforcing’ mechanism.2 Structuralism advocates that courts must eliminate the elements of the political decision-making process that are at odds with the structure set out by the authors of the U.S. Constitution. The advantage of this approach, U.S. scholars posit, lies in the fact that it does not require courts to second-guess the policy decisions adopted by the political branches of government. Instead, they limit themselves to enforcing the constitutional structure within which those decisions must be adopted. Of course, this theory of constitutional adjudication, like all theories, has its shortcomings. For example, detractors of structuralism argue that it is difficult, if not impossible, to draw the dividing line between ‘substantive’ and ‘structural’ matters.3 In particular, they claim that, when identifying the ‘structure’ set out by the authors of the U.S. Constitution, courts necessarily base their determinations not on purely structural principles, but on a set of substantive values, evaluating concepts such as democracy, liberty and equality. 4 Without claiming that structuralism should be embraced by the ECJ as the leading theory of judicial review, the purpose of my contribution is to explore how recent case-law reveals that the ECJ has also striven to develop guiding principles which aim to improve the way in which the political institutions of the EU adopt their decisions. In those cases, the ECJ decided not to second-guess the appropriateness of the policy choices made by the EU legislator. Instead, it preferred to examine whether, in reaching an outcome, the EU political institutions had followed the procedural steps mandated by the authors of the Treaties. Stated simply, I argue that judicial deference in relation to ‘substantive outcomes’ has been counterbalanced by a strict ‘process review’. To that effect, I would like to discuss three recent rulings of the ECJ, delivered after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, where an EU policy measure was challenged indirectly, i.e. via the preliminary reference procedure, namely Vodafone, Volker und Markus Schecke and Test-Achats.5 Whilst in the former case the ECJ ruled that the questions raised by the referring court disclosed no factor of such a kind as to affect the validity of the challenged act, in the latter cases the challenged provisions of an EU act were declared invalid.

Member State BITS after the Treaty of Lisbon: solid foundation or first victims of EU investment policy? Research Paper in Law, 02/2012

[Introduction.] This paper discusses the uncertain future of Member State BITs with third countries in the light of the developing EU investment policy. The question will be examined on the basis of the proposed Regulation establishing transitional arrangements for bilateral investment agreements between Member States and third countries presented by the Commission on 7 July 20101 and the European Parliament’s Position adopted at first reading on 10 May 2011.2 The proposed Regulation and the Commission Communication of the same day are meant to be the “first steps in the development of an EU international investment policy”.3 The first chapters present the legal framework relevant for this question and its evolution to better understand the particular challenges of this transition process. The second chapter examines the relationship of EU law and investment law, with a brief introduction of the notion of investment law and the scope of the EU’s new investment competence. The third chapter outlines the legal framework for the continuation and termination of treaties under international and EU law. The fourth chapter concerns BITs, first covering the particular nature of BITs and then the CJEU’s judgments in the BIT Cases of 2009. The fifth chapter consists of a step by step analysis of the different provisions of the proposed Regulation.

Reflections on the institutional balance, the Community Method and the interplay between jurisdictions after Lisbon. Research Papers in Law, 04/2012

[Introduction.] Over the last two years, not only inside but also outside the framework of the EU treaties, far reaching measures have been taken at the highest political level in order to address the financial and economic crisis in Europe and in particular the sovereign debt crisis in the Euro area. This has triggered debates forecasting the “renationalisation of European politics.” Herman Van Rompuy, the President of the European Council, countered the prediction that Europe is doomed because of such a renationalisation: “If national politics have a prominent place in our Union, why would this not strengthen it?” He took the view that not a renationalisation of European politics was at stake, but an Europeanization of national politics emphasising that post war Europe was never developed in contradiction with nation states.1 Indeed, the European project is based on a mobilisation of bundled, national forces which are of vital importance to a democratically structured and robust Union that is capable of acting in a globalised world. To that end, the Treaty of Lisbon created a legal basis. The new legal framework redefines the balance between the Union institutions and confirms the central role of the Community method in the EU legislative and judiciary process. This contribution critically discusses the development of the EU's institutional balance after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, with a particular emphasis on the use of the Community Method and the current interplay between national constitutional courts and the Court of Justice. This interplay has to date been characterised by suspicion and mistrust, rather than by a genuine dialogue between the pertinent judicial actors.

The concept of 'economic activity' in the EU treaty: from ideological dead-ends to workable judicial concepts. Research Paper in Law 06/2011

[From the Introduction]. The economic rules, or put more ambitiously, the economic constitution of the Treaty,1 only apply to economic activities. This general principle remains valid, even if some authors strive to demonstrate that certain Treaty rules also apply in the absence of an economic activity,2 and despite the fact that non-economic (horizontal) Treaty provisions (e.g. principle of nondiscrimination, rules on citizenship) are also applicable in the absence of any economic activity.3 Indeed, the exercise of some economic activity transcends the concepts of ‘goods’ (having positive or negative market value),4 workers (even if admitted in an extensive manner),5 and services (offered for remuneration).6 It is also economic activity or ‘the activity of offering goods and services into the market’7 that characterises an ‘undertaking’ thus making the competition rules applicable. Further, it is for regulating economic activity that Article 115 TFEU, Article 106(3) TFEU and most other legal bases in the TFEU provide harmonisation powers in favour of the EU. Last but not least, Article 14 TFEU on the distinction between services of general economic interest (SGEIs) and non-economic services of general interest (NESGIs), as well as Protocol n. 26 on Services of General Interest (SGIs) confirm the constitutional significance of the distinction between economic and non-economic: a means of dividing competences between the EU and the member states. The distinction between economic and non-economic activities is fraught with legal and technical intricacies – the latter being generated by dynamic technological advances and regulatory experimentation. More importantly, however, the distinction is overcharged with political and ideological significations and misunderstandings and, even, terminological confusions.8

Talking with the “pouvoir constituant” in times of constitutional reform: The European Court of Justice on Private Applicants’ Access to Justice. Research Paper in Law 3/2003

[From the Introduction]. European lawyers, at least those dealing predominantly with institutional matters, are living particularly interesting times since the setting-up of the “European Convention on the Future of Europe” in December 2001.1 As the Convention’s mandate, spelled out in rather broad terms in the European Council’s declaration of Laeken,2 is potentially unlimited, and as the future constitution of the European Union (EU) will be ultimately adopted by the subsequent Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), there appears to be a great possibility to clarify, to simplify and also to reform many of the more controversial elements in the European legal construction. The present debate on the future of the European constitution also highlights the relationship between the pouvoir constituant3 and the European Courts, the Court of Justice (ECJ) and its Court of First Instance (CFI), who have to interpret the basic rules and principles of the EU.4 In that light, the present article will focus on a classic theme of the Court’s case law: the relationship between judges and pouvoir constituant. In the EU, this relationship has traditionally been marked by the ECJ’s role as driving force in the “constitutionalisation” of the EC Treaties – which has, to a large extent, been accepted and even codified by the Member States in subsequent treaty revisions. However, since 1994, the ECJ appears to be more reluctant to act as a “law-maker.”5 The recent judgment in Unión de Pequeños Agricultores (UPA)6 – an important decision by which the ECJ refused to liberalize individuals’ access to the Community Courts – is also interesting in this context. UPA may be seen as another proof of judicial restraint - or even as indicator of the beginning of a new phase in the “constitutional dialogue” between the ECJ and the “Masters of the Treaties.”