Lessons for the EU from the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Crisis. IES Policy Brief Issue 2013/01 • February 2013

Summary. From April until October 2012, China witnessed a series of public protests against the Japanese purchase of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Besides providing further evidence of growing Chinese nationalism, this unrest is interesting for other reasons relevant to EU policy. The Beijing leadership, which is traditionally perceived as the only source of foreign policy decisions in China, faces a changing domestic constellation. Domestic opinion increasingly constrains Chinese foreign policy, and it becomes obvious that foreign policy decision-making in Beijing is not insulated from larger social developments. Even if foreign policy decisions in China are still made without direct input from civil society, the influence of social forces on Chinese foreign policies has to be taken seriously. The EU thus might want to reconsider its approach to China: as long as EU concerns about human rights are met with a rather uncompromising attitude by the Chinese political elites, Brussels should double its efforts to reach Chinese civil society.

The Sahel Crisis: Where do European and African Perspectives Meet? IES Policy Brief Issue 2013/02/March 2013

Summary. The crisis in Mali has brought the Sahel to the centre of international attention. This fragile region not only suffers from longstanding development challenges, but also from an acute security vacuum that has triggered military intervention. Many questions have arisen as a consequence of the crisis. Has the European Union the ability to cope with such a complex and dynamically evolving security environment? How have divergent views on the political roadmap to be adopted, and the lack of resources at the African level, impacted the crisis response? Can the different players involved agree on what are the most pertinent needs and challenges to be addressed? Are they ready for long-term engagement? Can regional organisations effectively collaborate and are they able to successfully integrate different agendas? Following a conference organised by the Institute for European Studies, the Egmont Institute and the Observatoire de l’Afrique on these questions this Policy Brief builds on the findings of the conference and provides an analytical overview of the regional crisis by focusing on the main challenges facing the Sahel, the local and regional dynamics at play and the military and security response.

The European Union Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020: How to do more for less? IES Policy Brief Issue 2013/05 • May 2013

The European Council meeting on 7 and 8 February 2013 attracted an unusual level of attention from media and citizens. For a couple of days, Europe played a more important role in national politics and news. Sensation-frenzied media and excited politicians spouted notions of ‘a battle’, ‘winners’, ‘losers’ or ‘striking deals’, as if Europe had gone back to the time when its military powers still conflicted. After more than 24 hours of intense negotiations, the respective Member States leaders left Brussels with ‘good news’ for their citizens. However, those with more Euro-federalist feelings were left with a sense of non-accomplishment and missed opportunities, not only because the EU budget for the first time in history was set for a net decrease, but also because the European Council’s conclusions did not contain any ground-breaking changes to this system. Nevertheless, the European Parliament (EP) immediately reminded Europe about its role and outlined its conditions for further negotiations. Thus, the supporters of a modern and stronger EU budget still see a chance in the consent procedure and hope to shift the focus of the debate from the juste retour spirit to the consideration of the European common good. Is there still a chance for such a shift? What issues are at stake?

The Strategic Planning of EU Military Operations - The Case of EUFOR TCHAD / RCA. IES WORKING PAPER 5/2008

On 28 January 2008 the European Union launched the military operation EUFOR in Chad and the Central African Republic. Its mandate was to contribute to the security of the civilian population, the numerous refugees from neighboring Darfur and the local presence of the United Nations. This paper describes and analyses the planning process of this operation at the political-strategic and military-strategic levels with the aim of understanding how the military instrument was intended to generate the desired political effects. The paper argues that, from a military perspective, the EUFOR operation is based on the concept of humanitarian deterrence: the threat of military force is used to discourage potential spoilers from targeting the civilian population. As with any military operation, the planning of EUFOR was plagued by various elements of friction. At least some of this friction seems to flow from the mismatch in expectations between the political-strategic and military-strategic levels. The various political and military-technical constraints within which the operation was planned resulted in an operational posture that is less decisive than what the political ambitions would have suggested.

Still together, but apart? Kyiv’s policy towards the Donbas. OSW Commentary No. 160, February 6 2015

From the Introduction. The peace deal agreed on 5 September 2014 concerning the ceasefire in the region covered by the conflict in the Donbas brought about a significant reduction in the scale of military clashes. However, in mid-January the separatist forces, supported by the Russian military, started an offensive along the entire front line. For example, they seized the airport in Donetsk and the village of Krasnyi Partyzan. About a third of the Donetsk and the Lugansk oblasts currently remain outside Kyiv’s control (see Map). Before the war, these areas were inhabited by 6.6 million residents, 15% of Ukraine’s total population. The process launched in September 2014 in Minsk, which was intended to regulate the conflict within the so-called trilateral contact group (Ukraine, Russia, the OSCE and representatives of the separatists), resulted in an exchange of some prisoners of war, although it failed to have any political effects. Attempts at regulating the political situation were additionally complicated by the illegal ‘elections’ of leaders of the two separatist regions, the so-called Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics (the DPR and LPR).

European Foreign and Security Policy since the Lisbon Treaty – From Common to single? ZEI Discussion Paper C226, 2014

Since the Lisbon Treaty, all organizational conditions have been created for the systematic use of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Military and civil structures, especially the operational headquarters and associated common structures like transport command, have been established. Until now there has been limited activity in crisis resolution, outside of Bosnia and Macedonia, and therefore little has been done in replacement of NATO. It is therefore difficult to assess the development of the common policy on conflict prevention and crisis management and it has been shown that in all cases NATO should come into play as planned from the outset.

Does Europe Need a Common Foreign & Security Policy? CES Germany & Europe Working Papers, No. 06.1, 15 September, 1996

CFSP's performance is widely regarded as weak. Why did Europe's stance in world politics not improve with the Treaty of Maastricht? The article analyses the present policy approach and the institutionalist and militarystrategic reform proposals. It is argued that policy and proposals suffer from drawbacks leading to an uncomprehensive formulation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy. Both do not provide CFSP with a necessary strategy but instead largely duplicate existing organizations. Furthermore, they propose concepts that are not viable because member states do not agree on a common defense policy. In addition, they fail to offer answers adequate to today's challenges, which are not primarily military in nature. Instead, a socioeconomic security policy appears to be a more realistic option. It is necessary because no other organization provides it sufficiently; it is viable because member states could agree on iti and it is adequate because the stabilization of countries in Eastern Europe is best achieved by social and economic policy-and not by military deterrence.

The devil is in the details. Information warfare in the light of Russia's military doctrine. OSW Point of View 50, May 2015

By highlighting informational threats and giving them a military dimension, the authors of the Russian Federation's military doctrine have outlined the concept of information warfare. It is a kind of combat conducted by both conventional and indirect methods, open and concealed, using military and civilian structures. It has two dimensions: broader ("non-nuclear containment", i.e. combat waged on various levels - political, economic, diplomatic, humanitarian, military) and narrower (as an element supporting of action). An analysis of these issues enables us to identify several rising trends over the period 2000-2014 in Russian security policy. These boil down to a blurring of the boundaries between internal and external threats, introducing non-military methods and organisational structures to armed combat, and conferring an ideological character on this combat. This leads to a blurring of the contours of inter-state conflicts, which allows Russia to take part in armed conflicts in which it is not officially a party.

The Common Security and Defence Policy: National Perspectives. Egmont Paper No. 79, May 2015

FOREWORD. When one looks at the present state of the CSDP, one cannot help but look on with disenchantment at the energy that appears to have abandoned both institutions and Member States. Commentators increasingly take for granted that nothing much should be expected from this field of EU policy. The reasons for this state of mind are well known: the recent economic and financial strains, which have impacted all EU action since 2008, means that most of the Member States will struggle to keep their defence budgets at their present level in the future, and we may even see reductions. Furthermore, and to put it mildly, most of the recent CSDP operations have also experienced a lack of enthusiasm. Adding to this overall trend, the EU is far from presenting a common vision of what security and defence should really mean. Many of the Member States do not want to be involved in all of today’s international turmoils, and they rarely share the strategic culture which inspires those Member States who see themselves as having special responsibilities in dealing with these crises. In the end it may be that Member States diverge fundamentally on the simple question of whether it is relevant for the EU to engage in most of the ‘hot’ crises Europe faces; many prefer to see Europe as a soft power, mostly dedicated to intervening on less dramatic fronts and more inclined to mend than to fight. For whatever reason given, it remains that if there is a lack of common understanding on what CSDP should really be about, it should not come as a surprise if this policy is presently in stalemate. As an additional blow, the Ukrainian crisis, which dragged on for the whole of last year, could only add to the downward spiral the EU has been experiencing, with a new Russia aggressively confronting Europe in a manner not too distant from the Cold War days. This attitude has triggered the natural reaction among EU Member States to seek reassurances from NATO about their own national security. Coupled with the return of France a few years ago into the integrated military command, NATO’s renewed relevance has sent a strong message to Europe about the military organisation’s credibility with regard to collective defence. Surprisingly, this overall trend was gathering momentum at the same time as other more positive developments. The European Council of December 2013 dedicated its main session to CSDP: it underlined Europe’s role as a ‘security provider’ while adopting a very ambitious road map for Europe in all possible dimensions of the security sector. Hence the impression of a genuine boost to all EU institutions, which have been invited to join efforts and give CSDP a reinvigorated efficiency. In the same way, the increasing instability in Europe’s neighbourhood has also called for more EU operations: most recently in Iraq, Libya, Northern Nigeria or South Sudan. Pressure for further EU engagement has been one of the most constant features of the discussions taking place around these crises. Moreover, a growing number of EU partners in Asia, Latin America or Eastern Europe have shown a renewed eagerness to join CSDP missions in what sounds like a vote of confidence for EU capacities. What kind of conclusion should be drawn from this contradictory situation? Probably that the EU has much more potential than it can sometimes figure out itself, if only it would be ready to adapt to the new global realities. But, more than anything else, an enhanced CSDP needs from all Member States strong political will and a clear vision of what they want this policy to be. Without this indispensable ingredient CSDP may continue to run its course, as it does today. It may even grow in efficiency but it will keep lacking the one resource that would definitely help it overcome all the present shortcomings that have prevented Europe from finding its true role and mission through the CSDP. Member States remain central to EU security and defence policy. This is why this collection of essays is so valuable for assessing in no uncertain way the long road that lies ahead for any progress to be made. Pierre VIMONT Senior Associate at Carnegie Europe Former Executive Secretary-General of the European External Action Service

Time to think about a European Union operated airlift capability? Security Policy Brief No. 62, April 2015

The European Council of June 2015 will assess concrete progress regarding its conclusions of December 2013 and provide further guidance in the most promising areas. This could be the right time to propose innovative solutions to long-lasting issues and shortfalls - strategic airlift being one of them – and increased civil/military synergies. Could the A400M become part of the answer?

The Ukraine crisis and the demise of the European Security order. EPC Policy Brief, 1 December 2015

The annexation of Crimea by Russia and the subsequent war in the Donbas have delivered a severe blow to the European security order, and have increased tensions between the West and Russia to a level unprecedented since the end of the Cold War. In this context, it would be difficult to start negotiating a new commitment to the principles of the European security order. In this Policy Brief, Paul Ivan analyses the Ukraine crisis and its effect on European security and calls for the EU and NATO to stand firm on their own principles, but also to engage carefully with Russia to develop mechanisms to contain risks and avoid escalation and military confrontation, whether in Syria, the Baltic, the Mediterranean or the Black seas. The recent shooting down of a Russian jet by Turkish forces makes clear the need to prevent such incidents with potential rapid escalatory dynamics.

Between continuation and adaptation: The Baltic states’ security policy and armed forces. OSW COMMENTARY 190/23.11.2015

The Baltic states have responded to the annexation of Crimea and the increased Russian military activity in the Nordic and Baltic region by taking measures to strengthen their own military potential. At the same time, they have intensified efforts to have the USA and NATO step up their military presence on their respective territories. Changes concerning the security policies and the armed forces of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have included increases in defence spending, the number of soldiers and members of volunteer Territorial Defence Forces, speeding up modernisation programmes, and – in the case of Lithuania – the reintroduction of conscription. In the coming years the Baltic states will focus on developing those of their military capabilities directly related to the defence of the country’s territory. However, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia will not stop participating in the foreign missions of NATO, which is the guarantor of their security. The extent to which these plans can be implemented will depend primarily on the economic and demographic situations of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.

The next step after Japan? (Virtual reality, training and crisis management). Transatlantic Security Paper No. 2, June 2012

The recent crisis in Japan, which combined tsunami and technological events, shows that any crisis, especially those in developed and developing countries, is from here out a hybrid crisis, mixing natural factors and human/technological (NATECH). Faced with such dramatic events, which exceed any means available for emergency rescue service, it is necessary a) to remain prudent and b) to prepare. One of the means for preparing is unquestionably training. However, here, undoubtedly there are important constraints: How to train, for example, while reproducing vividly and realistically, an event? How to exceed the admittedly useful, although very limited, level of the table-top exercise? How also to avoid the unnecessary mobilization of dozens, even hundreds, of field and operation staffers to take part in an exercise which could lead to a disappointing outcome? A major crisis, a major exercise, in effect. The solution of virtual reality has emerged, in Europe and in the United States. It is also sometimes called “serious game”.

On the Road to Democracy? Political Liberalization in Myanmar. Asia Policy Brief 2014/01, January 2014

Myanmar’s liberalizing reforms initiated by President Thein Sein after taking office in March 2011 are raising high hopes of peace and democracy in the country. Progress, after nearly three years, has however been uneven: there have been positive developments in the area of press freedom, with regard to political prisoners and in dealing with the political opposition. At the same time the dialogue with ethnic groups has stagnated and ethnic and religious violence has escalated. This Asia Policy Brief critically assesses the reform policy and weighs up the chances of democratization of the long-time military regime.

The Coup One Year on: Thailand's "Ugly German" Constitution. Asia Policy Brief 2015/02, May 2015

A year after becoming a military dictatorship once more, Thailand’s new constitution – the 20th since 1932 – is taking shape. In it, the arch-conservative charter drafters stipulate that future elections will be conducted using a variant of Germany’s mixed-member proportional representation system. Their hope is that the resulting coalition governments will prevent future administrations from turning into populist one-man shows. The drafters may be hoping in vain.