Combined Report on the Institutions under the control of the Iowa Department of Human Services, Schedules, Findings and Recommendations, June 30, 2005

State Audit Reports

Combined Report on the Institutions under the control of the Iowa Department of Corrections, Schedules, Findings and Recommendations, June 30, 2005

State Audit Reports

Institutions, Public Debt and Foreign Finance

We study the role of domestic financial institutions in sustaining capital flows to the private and public sector of a country whose government can default on its debt. As in recent public debt crises, in our model public defaults weaken banks' balance sheets, disrupting domestic financial markets. This effect leads to a novel complementarity between private capital inflows and public borrowing, where the former sustain the latter by boosting the government's cost of default. Our key message is that, by shaping the direction of private capital flows, financial institutions determine whether financial integration improves or reduces government discipline. We explore the implications of this complementarity for financial liberalization and debt-financed bailouts of banks. We present some evidence consistent with complementarity.

Pitfalls to Avoid when Measuring Institutions: Is 'Doing Business' Damaging Business?

Over recent years, both governments and international aid organizations have been devoting large amounts of resources to "simplifying" the procedures for setting up and formalizing firms. Many of these actions have focused on reducing the initial costs of setting up the firm, disregarding the more important role of business registers as a source of reliable information for judges, government departments and, above all, other firms. This reliable information is essential for reducing transaction costs in future dealings with all sorts of economic agents, both public and private. The priorities of reform policies should therefore be thoroughly reviewed, stressing the value of the legal institutions rather than trivializing them as is often the case.

Toward a theory of labor market institutions

Standard economic analysis holds that labor market rigidities are harmfulfor job creation and typically increase unemployment. But many orthodoxreforms of the labor market have proved difficult to implement because ofpolitical opposition. For these reasons it is important to explain why weobserve such regulations. In this paper I outline a theory of how they may arise and why they fit together. This theory is fully developed in aforthcoming book (Saint-Paul (2000)), to which the reader is referred forfurther details.

Combined audit report on the institutions under the control of the Iowa Department of Corrections for the five years ended June 30, 2006

Combined audit report on the institutions under the control of the Iowa Department of Corrections for the five years ended June 30, 2006

Combined audit report on the institutions under the control of the Iowa Department of Human Services including findings and recommendations and average cost per resident/patient information for the five years ended June 30, 2006

Combined audit report on the institutions under the control of the Iowa Department of Human Services including findings and recommendations and average cost per resident/patient information for the five years ended June 30, 2006

Do institutions and culture matter for business cycles?

We examine the relationship between institutions, culture and cyclical fluctuations for a sampleof 45 European, Middle Eastern and North African countries. Better governance is associated withshorter and less severe contractions and milder expansions. Certain cultural traits, such as lack ofacceptance of power distance and individualism, are also linked business cycle features. Businesscycle synchronization is tightly related to similarities in the institutional environment. Mediterraneancountries conform to these general tendencies.

Determinants of organizational form: Transaction costs and institutions in the European trucking industry

We explain why European trucking carriers are much smaller and rely more heavily on owner-operators(as opposed to employee drivers) than their US counterparts. Our analysis begins by ruling outdifferences in technology as the source of those disparities and confirms that standard hypothesesin organizational economics, which have been shown to explain the choice of organizational form inUS industry, also apply in Europe. We then argue that the preference for subcontracting oververtical integration in Europe is the result of European institutions particularly, labor regulationand tax laws that increase the costs of vertical integration.

Réforme de la péréquation financière et de la répartition des tâches : incidences du transfert du domaine des institutions pour personnes handicapées aux cantons : [analyse comparative entre les cantons de Neuchâtel, Vaud, du Valais, de Bâle-Ville et de Bâle-Campagne]

La réforme de la péréquation financière et de la répartition des tâches entre la Confédération et les cantons (RPT) entrera en vigueur le 1er janvier 2008. Elle prévoit notamment le transfert de la responsabilité des institutions pour personnes handicapées de la Confédération aux cantons. Ce mémoire se concentre sur ce domaine particulier en décrivant de quelle manière les cantons se préparent pour assumer leurs nouvelles responsabilités et comment ils envisagent de redéfinir leurs relations avec les institutions spécialisées et les personnes handicapées. Par une analyse comparative menée dans les cantons de Neuchâtel, Vaud, Valais, Bâle-Ville et Bâle-Campagne des différences intercantonales importantes sont mise en évidence et permettent d'aborder la problématique générale de la mise en oeuvre d'une politique sociale dans un Etat fédéral.

Designing institutions for financial stability: Regulation and supervision by objective for the Euro area

In this paper, we discuss pros and cons ofdifferent models for financial market regulationand supervision and we present a proposal forthe re-organisation of regulatory and supervisoryagencies in the Euro Area. Our arguments areconsistent with both new theories and effectivebehaviour of financial intermediaries inindustrialized countries. Our proposed architecturefor financial market regulation is based on theassignment of different objectives or "finalities"to different authorities, both at the domesticand the European level. According to thisperspective, the three objectives of supervision- microeconomic stability, investor protectionand proper behaviour, efficiency and competition- should be assigned to three distinct Europeanauthorities, each one at the centre of a Europeansystem of financial regulators and supervisorsspecialized in overseeing the entire financialmarket with respect to a single regulatoryobjective and regardless of the subjective natureof the intermediaries. Each system should bestructured and organized similarly to the EuropeanSystem of Central Banks and work in connectionwith the central bank which would remain theinstitution responsible for price and macroeconomicstability. We suggest a plausible path to buildour 4-peak regulatory architecture in the Euro area.