Discrete public goods with incomplete information

We analyze simultaneous discrete public good games wi.th incomplete information and continuous contributions. To use the terminology of Admati and Perry (1991). we consider comribution and subscription games. In the former. comrioutions are :1ot rcfunded if the project is not completed. while in thp. iatter they are. For the special case whp.re provision by a single player is possible we show the existence of an equilibrium in Doth cootribution and subscription games where a player decides to provide the good by himself. For the case where is not feasible for a single player to provide the good by himself, we show that any equilibriwn of both games is inefficient. WE also provide a sufficient condition for "contributing zero" to be the unique equilibrium of the contribution garoe with n players and characterize e

Discrete public goods with incomplete information

We analyze simultaneous discrete public good games with incomplete information and continuous contributions. To use the tenninology of Admati and Perry (1991), we consider contribution and subscription games. In the former, contributions are not refunded ifthe project is not completed, while in the latter they are. For the special case where provision by a single player is possible we show the existence of an equihbrium in both contnbution and subscription games where a player decides to provide the good by himself. For the case where is not feasible for a single player to provide the good by himself: we show that there exist equilibria of the subscription game where each participant pays the same amount. Moreover, using the technical apparatus from Myerson (1981) we show that neither the subscription nor the contribution games admit ex-post eÁ cient equibbria. hl addition. we provide a suÁ cient condition for êontributing zero 'to be the unique equihbrium of the contnbution game with n players.

Yet another reason to tax goods

When, in a dynamic model, choices by an agent : i) are not observed, and; ii) affect preferences conditional on the realization of types, new and unexpected features come up in Mirrlees’ (1971) optimal taxation frame- work. In the simplest possible model where a non-trivial filtration may be incorporated, we show how these two characteristics make it neces- sary for IC constraints to be defined in terms of strategies rather than pure announcements. Tax prescriptions are derived, and we are able to show that uniform taxation prescription of Atkinson and Stiglitz fails to hold, in general. Clean results regarding capital income taxation are not easy to come about because usual assumption on preferences do not allow for determining which constraints bind at the optimum. However, in the most ’natural’ cases, we show that return on capital ought to be taxed.

SMEs in the environmental goods and services market: identifying areas of opportunity, policies and instruments: case studies: Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Mexico

Includes bibliography

Patterns of penetration of ICT goods and services in Latin American and Caribbean households: analysis based on data from national population and housing censuses, round 2000

Includes bibliography

The liberalization of environmental goods and services: overview and implications for Latin America and the Caribbean

Includes Bibliography

Latin American South-South integration and cooperation: from a regional public goods perspective

Includes bibliography

Macroeconomic policies, sector performance and firm response: the case of Chile's textile goods market

Includes bibliography

A case study of concurrent engineering application on the development of parts for the white goods industry in Brazil

This classical way to manage product development processes for massive production seems to be changing: high pressure for cost reduction, higher quality standards, markets reaching for innovation lead to the necessity of new tools for development control. Into this, and learning from the automotive and aerospace industries factories from other segments are starting to understand and apply manufacturing and assembly oriented projects to ease the task of generate goods and from this obtain at least a part of the expected results. This paper is intended to demonstrate the applicability of the concepts of Concurrent Engineering and DFM/DFA (Design for Manufacturing and Assembly) in the development of products and parts for the White Goods industry in Brazil (major appliances as refrigerators, cookers and washing machines), showing one case concerning the development and releasing of a component. Finally is demonstrated in a short term how was reached a solution that could provide cost savings and reduction on the time to delivery using those techniques.

The capital goods industry: situation and challenges

Includes bibliography

An appraisal of capital goods policy in Argentina

Includes bibliography

The structure and competitiveness of the Brazilian capital goods industry

Includes bibliography

Capital goods: size of markets, sectoral structure and demand prospects in Latin America

Includes bibliography