La gestion des services environnementaux: entre règles et régulation négociée. Six études de cas de services forestiers pour la production d'eau potable dans trois pays

Cette thèse est construite en quatre parties : trois annexes qui présentent six études de cas (env. 800 pages), précédées par une analyse transversale, plus synthétique (env. 150 pages), dont traite ce résumé. Chaque annexe contient une synthèse détaillée des études de cas. Cette thèse aborde la « gestion des ressources naturelles » en affirmant d'emblée que l'appellation est inappropriée, car ce ne sont pas les ressources qui sont gérées, mais leurs usages. Il s'agit donc d'identifier et d'analyser ce qui influence les comportements humains en lien avec la ressource. Cette affirmation fonde la perspective des sciences sociales sur la gestion des ressources naturelles, dans laquelle s'inscrit cette thèse. L'approche néo-institutionnaliste considère que les usages sont influencés par des institutions, qui sont elles-mêmes influencées par les usagers. Ces institutions sont des constructions humaines qui composent le contexte institutionnel dans lequel les acteurs décident de leurs usages (abattre un arbre, prélever de l'eau, etc.). Les usages des ressources ne sont donc jamais libres et il s'agit de comprendre comment ces règles du jeu influencent les pratiques. Elles sont nombreuses, interdépendantes et forment la trame sur laquelle se décident les usages. Pour saisir cette complexité, l'auteur applique le cadre d'analyse des régimes institutionnels des ressources (RIR) qui se limite à l'analyse de deux types de droits d'usages : ceux issues des règles de la propriété (titres de propriété, servitudes, etc.) et ceux issus des politiques publiques (lois, ordonnances, etc.). Le RIR permet d'identifier un « régime institutionnel », spécifique à la ressource étudiée, dont les évolutions peuvent être comparées dans le temps ou entre plusieurs lieux. Dans cette recherche, ce cadre d'analyse a été appliqué au même objet - la gestion forestière dans les zones de captage d'eau souterraine destinée au réseau public - dans trois pays : en France, en Suisse et en Indonésie. Trois années de recherche de terrain ont permis à l'auteur de s'intéresser non seulement aux règles prédéterminées (la réglementation), mais aussi aux règles effectivement activées sur le terrain (la régulation) par les acteurs rencontrés. Les études de cas montrent que les règles prévues sont inégalement activées et que les acteurs privilégient parfois la négociation directe pour résoudre leurs rivalités d'usages, à la place d'invoquer leurs droits acquis. Ce constat conduit l'auteur à proposer un élargissement de la focale du RIR, qui constitue le coeur de sa thèse. On ne s'intéresse plus seulement à ce qui « est » régulé, mais aussi à ce qui ne l'« est pas » et qui échappe à l'application classique du RIR. Ce renversement de perspective est crucial pour comprendre les usages concrets des ressources dans les régimes peu intégrés, où les pratiques s'expliquent davantage par la marge de manoeuvre laissée aux acteurs que par les règles prédéterminées. Cette relecture, testée avec succès dans cette thèse, permet d'intégrer la marge de manoeuvre à l'analyse au moyen du RIR. Elle se concrétise par l'identification des lacunes et incohérences dans les régimes institutionnels étudiés. Le champ d'application du RIR s'en trouve élargi et sa vulgarisation pour des non-spécialistes est facilitée, notamment pour les environnementalistes. La complémentarité entre les approches s'en trouve renforcée. Les résultats montrent deux choses : premièrement les acteurs disposent toujours d'une marge de manoeuvre pour négocier des régulations ponctuelles, qui sont autant d'alternatives à l'application des règles prévues. Deuxièmement, la conclusion d'accords issus de la négociation bi-/multilatérale dépend directement de la marge de manoeuvre laissée par le contexte institutionnel. Ceci explique pourquoi la négociation entre les propriétaires forestiers et les exploitants de captages s'imposent en Indonésie, est envisageable en France, mais n'aboutit pas en Suisse. Les nombreuses tentatives infructueuses de mise en oeuvre de solutions négociées, notamment sous forme de paiements pour services environnementaux (PSE), trouvent ici une explication. - This thesis (written in French) is built in four parts: three annexes that present six case studies (approx. 800 pages), preceded by a transverse, more conceptual analysis (approx. 150 pages), which this summary is about. Each annexe contains a detailed summary of the case studies. 'Natural resource management' is an inappropriate designation because it is not the resources that are managed but the uses made of them, therefore this thesis addresses the identification and analysis of the influences on human behaviour in relation to the resource. This statement roots the social sciences perspective on the management of natural resources, in which this thesis fits. A neoinstitutionalist approach considers that the uses are influenced by institutions, which are themselves influenced by users. These institutions are human constructions that form the institutional context in which the actors decide on the use of resources (felling a tree, collecting water, etc.). Thus, the uses of resources are never independent from institutional influences and it becomes necessary to understand how these rules of the game affect practices. They are numerous, interrelated and form the basis for the uses of resources. To understand this complexity, the author applies the institutional regime resource framework (IRR) which limits the analysis to two types of use rights: those resulting from the property rights (deeds, easements, etc.) and those from public policies (laws, ordinances, etc.). The IRR identifies an 'institutional regime', specific to the resource, from which developments can be compared over time or between several places. In this research, this analytical framework has been applied to the same topic - forest management in the recharging areas of groundwater piped for public supply - in three countries: France, Switzerland and Indonesia. Three years of field research allow the author to look not only at predetermined rules (rules), but also at regulations that are actually activated on the ground (rules-in-use). The case studies show that the predetermined rules are unevenly applied and that sometimes actors favour direct negotiation to resolve their rivalry of uses, instead of invoking their vested rights. From this observation the author proposes an enlargement of the IRR's scope, forming the core of his thesis. The interest covers not only what 'is' regulated, but what 'is not' and so is beyond the classical application of the IRR. This shift in perspective is crucial to understand the concrete uses of resources in poorly integrated regimes, where practices are explained by the margin of manoeuvre left to the actors rather than predetermined rules. This reinterpretation, tested successfully in this research, allows the margin of manoeuvre to be integrated in the analysis using the IRR and is made concrete by the identification of gaps and inconsistencies in the investigated institutional context. The new interpretation of the IRR in this thesis complements and enhances its classical application. In particular, its use and understanding by non-specialists, especially environmentalists, is facilitated. The results show two things: first the actors always have leeway to negotiate ad hoc regulations, which are alternatives to the application of the predefined rules. Second, the conclusion of bi/multilateral negotiated agreements depends directly on the leeway left by the institutional context. This explains why the negotiation between forest owners and operators of water catchments is needed in Indonesia, is possible in France, but does not succeed in Switzerland. This offers an explanation for many unsuccessful attempts to implement negotiated solutions, notably payments for environmental services (PES).

Innovation or Imitation? The effect of spillovers and competitive pressure on firms' R&D strategy choice

This article provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of a firm's optimal R&D strategy choice. In this paper a firm's R&D strategy is assumed to be endogenous and allowed to depend on both internal firms. characteristics and external factors. Firms choose between two strategies, either they engage in R&D or abstain from own R&D and imitate the outcomes of innovators. In the theoretical model this yields three types of equilibria in which either all firms innovate, some firms innovate and others imitate, or no firm innovates. Firms'equilibrium strategies crucially depend on external factors. We find that the efficiency of intellectual property rights protection positively affects firms'incentives to engage in R&D, while competitive pressure has a negative effect. In addition, smaller firms are found to be more likely to become imitators when the product is homogeneous and the level of spillovers is high. These results are supported by empirical evidence for German .rms from manufacturing and services sectors. Regarding social welfare our results indicate that strengthening intellectual property protection can have an ambiguous effect. In markets characterized by a high rate of innovation a reduction of intellectual property rights protection can discourage innovative performance substantially. However, a reduction of patent protection can also increase social welfare because it may induce imitation. This indicates that policy issues such as the optimal length and breadth of patent protection cannot be resolved without taking into account specific market and firm characteristics. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C35, D43, L13, L22, O31. Keywords: Innovation; imitation; spillovers; product differentiation; market competition; intellectual property rights protection.

U.S. National Parks and "The Tragedy of the Commons" : A contribution to the characterization of U.S. mountain guides' professional practice

This paper aims at presenting the stakes related to the access to protected land in the United States and to its conservation, through the analysis of the professional practice of U.S. mountain guides. From a methodological standpoint, this research is based both on a theoretical analysis grounded in the field of environmental economics and on an empirical study. The authors' starting point is Garrett Hardin's paper, "The Tragedy of the Commons" (Science, 1968), even if it introduces some confusion on the notion of common goods. So as to avoid this confusion, the authors use two theoretical tools pertaining to a typology of common goods and the different property rights that can be applied in National Parks. Finally, they apply this framework to the observations made on the field in Colorado in July 2009.

War and Natural Resource Exploitation

We build a theoretical framework that allows for endogenous conflict behaviour (i.e., fighting efforts) and for endogenous natural resource exploitation (i.e., speed, ownership, and investments). While depletion is spread in a balanced Hotelling fashion during peace, the presence of conflict creates incentives for rapacious extraction, as this lowers the stakes of future contest. This voracious extraction depresses total oil revenue, especially if world oil demand is relatively elastic and the government's weapon advantage is weak. Some of these political distortions can be overcome by bribing rebels or by government investment in weapons. The shadow of conflict can also make less efficient nationalized oil extraction more attractive than private extraction, as insecure property rights create a holdup problem for the private firm and lead to a lower license fee. Furthermore, the government fights less intensely than the rebels under private exploitation, which leads to more government turnover. Without credible commitment to future fighting efforts, private oil depletion is only lucrative if the government's non-oil office rents are large and weaponry powerful, which guarantees the government a stronger grip on office and makes the holdup problem less severe.

Analyse comparée de régimes institutionnels de gestion des réseaux urbains de l'eau en station touristique de montagne : les cas de Crans-Montana (Suisse) et de Morzine-Avoriaz (France)

La station touristique représente un espace urbain consacré principalement au tourisme, tout en comprenant également une population résidente permanente. Du point de vue de la gestion des réseaux urbains de l'eau, cette caractéristique induit pour ce type de lieu des usages propres à tout espace urbain mais également des spécificités liées à la forte fluctuation saisonnière de la population résidente ou encore à la présence d'usages particuliers tels que l'irrigation des golfs, la production de neige artificielle ou le thermalisme. Dès lors, la planification de l'approvisionnement est délicate et peu prévisible. Ces difficultés sont renforcées par le fait que les concentrations temporelles de la demande coïncident généralement avec des périodes de stress hydrique notable. Dans le cas de stations balnéaires, les pics de fréquentation interviennent en général durant l'été lorsque la ressource en eau est peu disponible. Le problème est similaire dans les stations touristiques de montagne où l'eau est généralement indisponible car stockée sous forme de neige durant les mois de forte fréquentation. De plus, ces difficultés sont souvent renforcées par la localisation géographique des stations touristiques, fréquemment situées dans des espaces sensibles du point de vue de la ressource en eau, avec des situations de pénuries temporelles, voire structurelles. Ces problématiques propres à la plupart des stations touristiques mènent souvent à de fortes rivalités entre, d'une part, les différents usages touristiques de la ressource, et d'autre part, les usages autochtones et touristiques. Les particularités liées au tourisme tendent ainsi à renforcer les rivalités entre différents types de secteurs d'activité (approvisionnement en eau potable, tourisme, hydroélectricité, enneigement artificiel, irrigation, etc.). Ces différents usages de la ressource mis en concurrence nécessitent dès lors la mise en oeuvre de réglementations structurées à travers des politiques publiques ainsi que des droits de propriété et selon des composantes nationales, régionales et locales ; soit un cadre institutionnel que nous proposons d'appeler Régime Institutionnel de Ressource (RIR) (Knoepfel et al. 2001, 2007). A travers cette thèse de doctorat, nous répondons à différentes questions de recherche. Nous tentons d'abord de comprendre comment ces différents RIR sont-ils mis en oeuvre dans le cadre d'espaces touristiques ? Comment ceux-ci sont-ils concrétisés par les acteurs et quels sont leurs effets en termes de durabilité technique, environnementale, sociale et économique des réseaux urbains de l'eau ? Nous questionnons ensuite les effets du tourisme sur la gestion des infrastructures de réseau à l'échelle de la station touristique et de son bassin versant et nous interrogeons sur les effets du tourisme en termes de gestion des eaux urbaines. Nous portons notre attention sur deux stations touristiques situées dans deux contextes institutionnels différents (Crans-Montana en Suisse et Morzine-Avoriaz en France) et y étudions trois types de régimes institutionnels en particulier : la régie directe (gestion publique), l'affermage (gestion déléguée) et la gestion privée des infrastructures. Les résultats de cette thèse de doctorat indiquent tout d'abord dans quelle mesure le tourisme modifie de façon significative la perception et les modalités de gestion de la ressource en eau et des infrastructures. Ils montrent ensuite que l'espace fonctionnel de la gestion de ces infrastructures correspond rarement aux limites du réseau hydrographique naturel et quelles en sont les implications en termes de durabilité. Enfin, la comparaison de différents régimes institutionnels révèle les forces et les faiblesses de chaque modèle de gestion dans le cas spécifique des stations touristiques et également les différentes solutions adoptées localement pour la mise en oeuvre d'un arrangement institutionnel permettant un usage plus ou moins durable des infrastructures de réseau et du réseau hydrographique naturel. - Tourism resort represents an urban area mainly dedicated to tourism while including at the same time a permanent residential population. From the point of view of urban water networks, this characteristic induces a strong seasonal fluctuation of residential population and involves special water uses such as golf irrigation, production of artificial snow or functioning of thermal baths. Therefore, water supply planning can be tricky and difficult to predict. These difficulties are reinforced by the fact that temporary concentrations of water demand coïncidé generally with periods of water stress. In the case of seaside resorts, frequenting peaks arise in general during summer when water resource is less available. The problem is similar in mountainous tourist resorts where water is generally unavailable as it is stored as snow during months of highest frequenting. Furthermore, these difficulties are often reinforced by resorts' geographical localisations, which are often situated in sensitive areas in terms of temporary or structural water shortages. These problematic issues often lead to strong rivalries between tourists' water uses on the one hand, and between locals and tourists uses on the other hand. Thus, features of tourism tend to reinforce rivalries between different sectors of activity (supply of drinking water, tourism, hydroelectricity, artificial snow, irrigation, etc.). These different and competing water uses need the implementation of rules structured through public policies and property rights and through national, regional and local legal components; We propose to call this framework as an Institutional Resource Regime (IRR) (Knoepfel et al. 2001, 2007, 2009). Through this PhD thesis, we answer different research questions. We firstly aim to understand how those different IRR are implemented within tourism spaces? How do actors materialize them and what are their effects in term of technical, environmental, social and economical sustainability of urban water networks? We then, investigate effects of tourism on water networks infrastructures' management at the scale of the tourist resort and its river basin. We focus our attention on two tourist resorts situated within two different institutional contexts (Crans-Montana, Switzerland and Morzine-Avoriaz, France) and study three types of institutional regime in particular: public, delegated and private management of infrastructures. Results of this PhD thesis indicate firstly how tourism modifies in a significant way the perception and management modalities of water resource and infrastructures. Results also show that functional space of infrastructures management rarely matches with the limits of the natural river basin and indicates what it means in terms of sustainability. Finally, the comparison of different institutional regimes reveals the strengths and weakness of each management model in the specific case of tourist resorts and shows the different solutions in locally implementing an institutional arrangement for a more or less sustainable management of network infrastructures and natural water system.

One kind of lawlessness: estimating the welfare cost of Somali piracy

This paper estimates the effect of piracy attacks on shipping costs using a unique data set on shipping contracts in the dry bulk market. We look at shipping routes whose shortest path exposes them to piracy attacks and find that the increase in attacks in 2008 lead to around a ten percent increase in shipping costs. We use this estimate to get a sense of the welfare loss imposed by piracy. Our intermediate estimate suggests that the creation of $120 million of revenue for pirates in the Somalia area led to a welfare loss of over $1.5 billion.

Institutional regimes for sustainable collective housing stocks

The influence of public policy, property rights and contracts on the sustainability of residential buildings remains largely unknown. This research will use the analytical framework of the housing institutional regime to study the sustainability over time of the housing stock. We aim to produce an inventory of the housing institutional regime in Switzerland, a comparison with the German and Catalan regimes, and policy suggestions to achieve a better sustainability of the housing stock.

Understanding the hierarchy governance choice of some wineries in Brazil - case study of 3 Brazilian wineries

ABSTRACT This study aims to contribute towards understanding the multiple factors, which influence firm's governance decisions. To identify some of these factors, three cases in the Brazilian wine industry were analyzed: Miolo located in Vale dos Vinhedos (South of Brazil) and in Vale do Rio São Francisco (Northeast of Brazil); Don Laurindo located in Vale dos Vinhedos; and ViniBrasil located in Vale do Rio São Francisco. For the most part, all three firms procure the grapes they use for their wine production in-house. Only Miolo purchases an insignificant amount of grapes outside of its production. By Brazilian standards, these regions have a long tradition of grape production and it is not difficult to purchase sufficient quantity of grapes to produce wine. However, the wineries are concerned also about the quality of the grapes they use and purchasing high-quality grapes might be critical issue. On the other hand, the quality of grapes is easily measured and the cost to buy in the market is cheaper than producing in-house. Furthermore, also the level of asset specificity present in the grape-grower-wine-producer transaction seems, by itself, insufficient to justify the use of hierarchical governance forms. Then, the aim of the article is to analyze the reasons why these wineries largely rely on hierarchy governance forms to procure their grape-inputs. What explains their use of hierarchy governance, given that both asset specificity and measurement problems appear to be relatively low?

PANACEA (Platform for Automatic, Normalised Annotation and Cost-Effective Acquisition of Language Resources for Human Language Technologies)

The objective of PANACEA is to build a factory of LRs that automates the stages involved in the acquisition, production, updating and maintenance of LRs required by MT systems and by other applications based on language technologies, and simplifies eventual issues regarding intellectual property rights. This automation will cut down the cost, time and human effort significantly. These reductions of costs and time are the only way to guarantee the continuous supply of LRs that MT and other language technologies will be demanding in the multilingual Europe.

The Law of Impersonal Transactions: Meaning and Difficulties

Most economic interactions happen in a context of sequential exchange in which innocent third parties suffer information asymmetry with respect to previous "originative" contracts. The law reduces transaction costs by protecting these third parties but preserves some element of consent by property right holders to avoid damaging property enforcement-e.g., it is they as principals who authorize agents in originative contracts. Judicial verifiability of these originative contracts is obtained either as an automatic byproduct of transactions or, when these would have remained private, by requiring them to be made public. Protecting third parties produces a sort of legal commodity which is easy to trade impersonally, improving the allocation and specialization of resources. Historical delay in generalizing this legal commoditization paradigm is attributed to path dependency-the law first developed for personal trade-and an unbalance in vested interests, as luddite legal professionals face weak public bureaucracies.

Globalization, Divergence and Stagnation

In a world where poor countries provide weak protection for intellectual property rights, market integration shifts technical change in favor of rich nations. Through this channel, free trade may amplify international income differences. At the same time, integration with countries where intellectual property rights are weakly protected can slow down the world growth rate. A crucial implication of these results is that protection of intellectual property is most beneficial in open countries. This prediction, which is novel in the literature, finds support in the data on a panel of 53 countries observed in the years 1965-1990.

The Vaccine Formulation Laboratory: a platform for access to adjuvants.

Adjuvants are increasingly used by the vaccine research and development community, particularly for their ability to enhance immune responses and for their dose-sparing properties. However, they are not readily available to the majority of public sector vaccine research groups, and even those with access to suitable adjuvants may still fail in the development of their vaccines because of lack of knowledge on how to correctly formulate the adjuvants. This shortcoming led the World Health Organization to advocate for the establishment of the Vaccine Formulation Laboratory at the University of Lausanne, Switzerland. The primary mission of the laboratory is to transfer adjuvants and formulation technology free of intellectual property rights to academic institutions, small biotechnology companies and developing countries vaccine manufacturers. In this context, the transfer of an oil-in-water emulsion to Bio Farma, an Indonesian vaccine manufacturer, was initiated to increase domestic pandemic influenza vaccine production capacity as part of the national pandemic influenza preparedness plan.

Common law and civil law as pro-market adaptations

We argue that in the development of the Western legal system, cognitive departures are themain determinant of the optimal degree of judicial rule-making. Judicial discretion, seen here as the main distinguishing feature between both legal systems, is introduced in civil law jurisdictions to protect, rather than to limit, freedom of contract against potential judicial backlash. Such protection was unnecessary in common law countries, where free-market relations enjoyed safer judicial ground mainly due to their relatively gradual evolution, their reliance on practitioners as judges, and the earlier development of institutional checks and balances that supported private property rights. In our framework, differences in costs and benefits associated with self-interest and lack of information require a cognitive failure to be active.

Market and institutional determinants in the regulation of conveyancers

Demand for law professionals in the conveyancing of property is decreasing because of market and institutional changes. On the market side, many transactions feature large, well-known parties and standardized transactions, which make professionals less effective or necessary for protecting the parties to private contracts. On the institutional side, public titling makes it possible to dispense with a broadening set of their former functions. Recording of deeds made professionals redundant as depositories of deeds and reduced demand for them to design title guarantees. Effective registration of rights increasingly substitutes professionals for detecting title conflicts with third parties and gathering their consent. Market changes undermine the information asymmetry rationale for regulating conveyancing, while institutional changes facilitate liberalizing not only conduct but also license regulations. These arguments are supported here by disentangling the logic of titling systems and presenting empirical evidence from the European and USA markets.

Competing engines of growth: Innovation and standardization

We study a dynamic general equilibrium model where innovation takes theform of the introduction of new goods whose production requires skilled workers.Innovation is followed by a costly process of standardization, whereby these newgoods are adapted to be produced using unskilled labor. Our framework highlightsa number of novel results. First, standardization is both an engine of growth anda potential barrier to it. As a result, growth is an inverse U-shaped function ofthe standardization rate (and of competition). Second, we characterize the growthand welfare maximizing speed of standardization. We show how optimal protection of intellectual property rights affecting the cost of standardization vary withthe skill-endowment, the elasticity of substitution between goods and other parameters. Third, we show that, depending on how competition between innovatingand standardizing firms is modelled and on parameter values, a new type of multiplicity of equilibria may arise. Finally, we study the implications of our model forthe skill-premium and we illustrate novel reasons for linking North-South trade tointellectual property rights protection.