Someone else's boom but always our bust: Australia as a derivative economy, implications for regions

This paper examines the socio-economic impact of mineral and agricultural resource extraction on local communities and explores policy options for addressing them. An emphasis on the marketisation of services together with tight fiscal control has reinforced decline in many country communities in Australia and elsewhere. However, the introduction by the European Union of Regional Policy which emphasises ‘smart specialisation’ can enhance greatly the capacity of local people to generate decent livelihoods. For this to have real effect, the innovative state has to enable partnerships between communities, researchers and industry. For countries like Australia, this would be a substantive policy shift.

Regulating ride-sharing in the peer economy

The rise of the peer economy poses complex new regulatory challenges for policy-makers. The peer economy, typified by services like Uber and AirBnB, promises substantial productivity gains through the more efficient use of existing resources and a marked reduction in regulatory overheads. These services are rapidly disrupting existing established markets, but the regulatory trade-offs they present are difficult to evaluate. In this paper, we examine the peer economy through the context of ride-sharing and the ongoing struggle over regulatory legitimacy between the taxi industry and new entrants Uber and Lyft. We first sketch the outlines of ride-sharing as a complex regulatory problem, showing how questions of efficiency are necessarily bound up in questions about levels of service, controls over pricing, and different approaches to setting, upholding, and enforcing standards. We outline the need for data-driven policy to understand the way that algorithmic systems work and what effects these might have in the medium to long term on measures of service quality, safety, labour relations, and equality. Finally, we discuss how the competition for legitimacy is not primarily being fought on utilitarian grounds, but is instead carried out within the context of a heated ideological battle between different conceptions of the role of the state and private firms as regulators. We ultimately argue that the key to understanding these regulatory challenges is to develop better conceptual models of the governance of complex systems by private actors and the available methods the state has of influencing their actions. These struggles are not, as is often thought, struggles between regulated and unregulated systems. The key to understanding these regulatory challenges is to better understand the important regulatory work carried out by powerful, centralised private firms – both the incumbents of existing markets and the disruptive network operators in the peer-economy.

Regulating ride-sharing in the peer economy

The rise of the peer economy poses complex new regulatory challenges for policy-makers. The peer economy, typified by services like Uber and AirBnB, promises substantial productivity gains through the more efficient use of existing resources and a marked reduction in regulatory overheads. These services are rapidly disrupting existing established markets, but the regulatory trade-offs they present are difficult to evaluate. In this paper, we examine the peer economy through the context of ride-sharing and the ongoing struggle over regulatory legitimacy between the taxi industry and new entrants Uber and Lyft. We first sketch the outlines of ride-sharing as a complex regulatory problem, showing how questions of efficiency are necessarily bound up in questions about levels of service, controls over pricing, and different approaches to setting, upholding, and enforcing standards. We outline the need for data-driven policy to understand the way that algorithmic systems work and what effects these might have in the medium to long term on measures of service quality, safety, labour relations, and equality. Finally, we discuss how the competition for legitimacy is not primarily being fought on utilitarian grounds, but is instead carried out within the context of a heated ideological battle between different conceptions of the role of the state and private firms as regulators. We ultimately argue that the key to understanding these regulatory challenges is to develop better conceptual models of the governance of complex systems by private actors and the available methods the state has of influencing their actions. These struggles are not, as is often thought, struggles between regulated and unregulated systems. The key to understanding these regulatory challenges is to better understand the important regulatory work carried out by powerful, centralised private firms – both the incumbents of existing markets and the disruptive network operators in the peer-economy.

A Deweyan experience economy for higher education : The case of the Australian Indie 100 Music Event

In this essay we argue that a Deweyan experience economy will best support the higher education (HE) sector in the future, and we draw a contrast between that economy and the sector’s current focus on informational concerns, as expressed by the recent rush to Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs) and other mass online informational offerings. We base our argument on current developments in music education and music technology that we see as being preemptive of wider trends. We use examples from a three-year study of online and offline music pedagogies and outline a four-year experiment in developing a pedagogical experience economy to illustrate a theoretical position informed by John Dewey’s theory of experience,Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of habitus and capital, and recent work in economic geography on epistemic communities. We argue further that the future of the HE sector is local rather than global, experiential rather than informational, and that therefore a continued informational approach to the future of HE risks undermining the sector.

On food security and alternative food networks: Understanding and performing food security in the context of urban bias

This paper offers one explanation for the institutional basis of food insecurity in Australia, and argues that while alternative food networks and the food sovereignty movement perform a valuable function in building forms of social solidarity between urban consumers and rural producers, they currently make only a minor contribution to Australia’s food and nutrition security. The paper begins by identifying two key drivers of food security: household incomes (on the demand side) and nutrition-sensitive, ‘fair food’ agriculture (on the supply side). We focus on this second driver and argue that healthy populations require an agricultural sector that delivers dietary diversity via a fair and sustainable food system. In order to understand why nutrition-sensitive, fair food agriculture is not flourishing in Australia we introduce the development economics theory of urban bias. According to this theory, governments support capital intensive rather than labour intensive agriculture in order to deliver cheap food alongside the transfer of public revenues gained from rural agriculture to urban infrastructure, where the majority of the voting public resides. We chart the unfolding of the Urban Bias across the twentieth century and its consolidation through neo-liberal orthodoxy, and argue that agricultural policies do little to sustain, let alone revitalize, rural and regional Australia. We conclude that by observing food system dynamics through a re-spatialized lens, Urban Bias Theory is valuable in highlighting rural–urban socio-economic and political economy tensions, particularly regarding food system sustainability. It also sheds light on the cultural economy tensions for alternative food networks as they move beyond niche markets to simultaneously support urban food security and sustainable rural livelihoods.

Global business services: Increasing specialization and integration of the world economy as drivers of economic growth

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to explore the contribution of global business services to improved productivity and economic growth of the world economy, which has gone largely unnoticed in service research. Design/methodology/approach The authors draw on macroeconomic data and industry reports, and link them to the non-ownership-concept in service research and theories of the firm. Findings Business services explain a large share of the growth of the global service economy. The fast growth of business services coincides with shifts from domestic production towards global outsourcing of services. A new wave of global business services are traded across borders and have emerged as important drivers of growth in the world’s service sector. Research limitations/implications This paper advances the understanding of non-ownership services in an increasingly global and specialized post-industrial economy. The paper makes a conceptual contribution supported by descriptive data, but without empirical testing. Originality/value The authors integrate the non-ownership concept and three related economic theories of the firm to explain the role of global business services in driving business performance and the international transformation of service economies.

Energy productivity and decarbonization of the global economy: Factor five resource productivity

In the 21st Century much of the world will experience untold wealth and prosperity that could not even be conceived only some three centuries before. However as with most, if not all, of the human civilisations, increases in prosperity have accumulated significant environmental impacts that threaten to result in environmentally induced economic decline. A key part of the world’s response to this challenge is to rapidly decarbonise economies around the world, with options to achieve 60-80 per cent improvements (i.e. in the order of Factor 5) in energy and water productivity now available and proven in every sector. Drawing upon the 2009 publication “Factor 5”, in this paper we discuss how to realise such large-scale improvements, involving complexity beyond technical and process innovation. We begin by considering the concept of greenhouse gas stabilisation trajectories that include reducing current greenhouse gas emissions to achieve a ‘peaking’ of global emissions, and subsequent ‘tailing’ of emissions to the desired endpoint in ‘decarbonising’ the economy. Temporal priorities given to peaking and tailing have significant implications for the mix of decarbonising solutions and the need for government and market assistance in causing them to be implemented, requiring careful consideration upfront. Within this context we refer to a number of examples of Factor 5 style opportunities for energy productivity and decarbonisation, and then discuss the need for critical economic contributions to take such success from examples to central mechanisms in decarbonizing the global economy.

Information feudalism: Who owns the knowledge economy? A book review

Back in 1995, Peter Drahos wrote a futuristic article called ‘Information feudalism in the information society’. It took the form of an imagined history of the information society in the year 2015. Drahos provided a pessimistic vision of the future, in which the information age was ruled by the private owners of intellectual property. He ended with the bleak, Hobbesian image: "It is unimaginable that the information society of the 21st century could be like this. And yet if abstract objects fall out of the intellectual commons and are enclosed by private owners, private, arbitrary, unchecked global power will become a part of life in the information society. A world in which seed rights, algorithms, DNA, and chemical formulas are owned by a few, a world in which information flows can be coordinated by information-media barons, might indeed be information feudalism (p. 222)." This science fiction assumed that a small number of states would dominate the emerging international regulatory order set up under the World Trade Organization. In Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge Economy?, Peter Drahos and his collaborator John Braithwaite reprise and expand upon the themes first developed in that article. The authors contend: "Information feudalism is a regime of property rights that is not economicallyefficient, and does not get the balance right between rewarding innovation and diffusing it. Like feudalism, it rewards guilds instead of inventive individual citizens. It makes democratic citizens trespassers on knowledge that should be the common heritage of humankind, their educational birthright. Ironically, information feudalism, by dismantling the publicness of knowledge, will eventually rob the knowledge economy of much of its productivity (p. 219)." Drahos and Braithwaite emphasise that the title Information Feudalism is not intended to be taken at face value by literal-minded readers, and crudely equated with medieval feudalism. Rather, the title serves as a suggestive metaphor. It designates the transfer of knowledge from the intellectual commons to private corporation under the regime of intellectual property.

Patenting free energy: The BlackLight litigation and the hydrogen economy

Legal Context In the wake of the Copenhagen Accord 2009 and the Cancun Agreements 2010, a number of patent offices have introduced fast-track mechanisms to encourage patent applications in relation to clean technologies - such as those pertaining to hydrogen. However, patent offices will be under increasing pressure to ensure that the granted patents satisfy the requisite patent thresholds, as well as to identify and reject cases of fraud, hoaxes, scams, and swindles. Key Points This article examines the BlackLight litigation in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Patent Office, and considers how patent offices and courts deal with patent applications in respect of clean energy and perpetual motion machines. Practical Significance The capacity of patent offices to grant sound and reliable patents is critical to the credibility of the patent system, particularly in the context of the current focus upon promoting clean technologies.

Rio+ 20: Who owns the green economy?

The Rio+20 summit has raised a number of difficult questions about law and technology: what is the relationship between intellectual property and the environment? What role does intellectual property play in sustainable development? Who will own and control the Green Economy? What is the best way to encourage the transfer of environmentally sound technologies? Should intellectual property provide incentives for fossil fuels? What are the respective roles of the public sector and the private sector in green innovation? How should biodiversity, traditional knowledge and Indigenous intellectual property be protected?