Withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment : criminal responsibility for established medical practice?

The law recognises the right of a competent adult to refuse medical treatment even if this will lead to death. Guardianship and other legislation also facilitates the making of decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment in certain circumstances. Despite this apparent endorsement that such decisions can be lawful, doubts have been raised in Queensland about whether decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment would contravene the criminal law, and particularly the duty imposed by the Criminal Code (Qld) to provide the “necessaries of life”. This article considers this tension in the law and examines various arguments that might allow for such decisions to be made lawfully. It ultimately concludes, however, that criminal responsibility may still arise and so reform is needed.

Advance Directives and the Promotion of Autonomy: a Comparative Australian Statutory Analysis

Legislation regulating advance directives exists in six Australian jurisdictions. In all of these jurisdictions, legislation was enacted to enshrine the common law right of a competent adult to refuse treatment in advance, even if that treatment was required to sustain life. It was thought that enshrining the common law would also enshrine the principle of autonomy on which the common law was based. This article explores whether this is the case by examining the legislative restrictions that are imposed on a competent adult who wishes to complete an advance directive refusing treatment. The article reviews the legislation in all Australian jurisdictions and concludes that, while many of the legislative restrictions can be justified, many cannot as they effectively erode rather than promote the right of a competent adult to refuse treatment.

Advance Directives Refusing Treatment as an Expression of Autonomy: Do the Courts Practise What They Preach?

The principle of autonomy is at the heart of the right of a competent individual to make an advance directive that refuses life-sustaining medical treatment, and to have that directive complied with by medical professionals. That right is protected by both the common law and, to an extent, by legislation that has been enacted in the United Kingdom and many jurisdictions in Australia. The courts have a critical role in protecting that autonomy, both in those jurisdictions in which the common law continues to operate, and in those jurisdictions which are now governed by statute, and in which judicial determinations will need to be made about legislative provisions. The problem explored in this article is that while the judiciary espouses the importance of autonomy in its judgments, that rhetoric is frequently not reflected in the decisions that are reached. In the United Kingdom and Australia, there is a relatively small number of decisions that consider the validity and applicability of advance directives that refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. This article critically evaluates all of the publicly available decisions and concludes that there is cause for concern. In some cases, there has been an unprincipled evolution of common law principles, while in others there has been inappropriate adjudication through operational irregularities or failure to apply correct legal principles. Further, some decisions appear to be based on a strained interpretation of the facts of the case. The apparent reluctance of some members of the judiciary to give effect to advance directives that refuse treatment is also evidenced by the language used in the judgments. While the focus of this article is on common law decisions, reference will also be made to legislation and the extent to which it has addressed some of the problems identified in this article.

Adults who lack capacity : substitute decision-making

• Mechanisms to facilitate consent to healthcare for adults who lack capacity are necessary to ensure that these adults can lawfully receive appropriate medical treatment when needed. • In Australia, the common law plays only a limited role in this context, through its recognition of advance directives and through the parens patriae jurisdiction of superior courts. • Substitute decision-making for adults who lack capacity is facilitated primarily by guardianship and other related legislation. This legislation, which has been enacted in all Australian States and Territories, permits a range of decision-makers to make different types of healthcare decisions. • Substitute decision-makers can be appointed by the adult or by a guardianship or other tribunal. Where there is no appointed decision-maker, legislation generally empowers those close to the adult to make the relevant decision. Most Australian jurisdictions have also provided for statutory advance directives. • For the most serious of decisions, such as non-therapeutic sterilisations, consent can only be provided by a Tribunal. Other decisions can generally be made by a range of substitute decision-makers. Some treatment, such as very minor treatment or that which is needed in an emergency, can be provided without consent. • Guardianship legislation generally establishes a set of principles and/or other criteria to guide healthcare decisions. Mechanisms to resolve disputes as to who is the appropriate decision-maker and how a decision should be made have also been established.

Withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining medical treatment

• At common law, a competent adult can refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, either contemporaneously or through an advance directive which will operate at a later time when the adult’s capacity is lost. • Legislation in most Australian jurisdictions also provides for a competent adult to complete an advance directive that refuses life-sustaining medical treatment. • At common law, a court exercising its parens patriae jurisdiction can consent to, or authorise, the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining medical treatment from an adult or child who lacks capacity if that is in the best interests of the person. A court may also declare that the withholding or withdrawal of treatment is lawful. • Guardianship legislation in most jurisdictions allows a substitute decision-maker, in an appropriate case, to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment for an adult who lacks capacity. • In terms of children, a parent may refuse life-sustaining medical treatment for his or her child if it is in the child’s best interests. • While a refusal of life-sustaining medical treatment by a competent child may be valid, this decision can be overturned by a court. • At common law and generally under guardianship statutes, demand for futile treatment need not be complied with by doctors.

The doctrine of double effect

• The doctrine of double effect is an exception to the general rule that taking active steps that end life is unlawful. • The essence of the doctrine at common law is intention. • Hastening a patient’s death through palliative care will be lawful provided the primary intention is to relieve pain, and not cause death, even if that death is foreseen. • Some States have enacted legislative excuses that deal with the provision of palliative care. • These statutory excuses tend to be stricter than the common law as they impose other requirements in addition to having an appropriate intent, such as adherence to some level of recognised medical practice.

Everyday life and the edges of existence : wrongs with no name or the wrong name?

Actions for wrongful life, as they have come unfortunately to be styled, encompass various types of claim. These include claims for alleged negligence after conception, those based on negligent advice or diagnosis prior to conception concerning possible effects of treatment given to the child's mother, contraception or sterilisation, or genetic disability. This distinguishes such claims from those for so called wrongful birth, which are claims by parents for the cost of raising either a healthy or a disabled child where the unplanned birth imposes costs on the parents as a result of clinical negligence. Two of the more controversial cases to have reached the High Court of Australia which are if interest to us here in the past decade are Cattanach v Melchior where the court, by a narrow majority (McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Callinan JJ; Gleeson CJ, Hayne and Heydon dissenting) acknowledged recovery for wrongful birth. In the second joined appeals of Harriton v Stephens and Waller v James; Waller v Hoolahan the court overwhelmingly precluded a ‘wrongful life’ claim (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ; Kirby J dissenting). Both cases raised issues around the sanctity and value of life and the nature of harm and the assessment of damages, and this brief note affords us the opportunity to consider the way in which the ‘life as legal loss’ arguments were treated by the various judges in both cases.

Standardization and omics science : technical and social dimensions are inseparable and demand symmetrical study

Standardization is critical to scientists and regulators to ensure the quality and interoperability of research processes, as well as the safety and efficacy of the attendant research products. This is perhaps most evident in the case of “omics science,” which is enabled by a host of diverse high-throughput technologies such as genomics, proteomics, and metabolomics. But standards are of interest to (and shaped by) others far beyond the immediate realm of individual scientists, laboratories, scientific consortia, or governments that develop, apply, and regulate them. Indeed, scientific standards have consequences for the social, ethical, and legal environment in which innovative technologies are regulated, and thereby command the attention of policy makers and citizens. This article argues that standardization of omics science is both technical and social. A critical synthesis of the social science literature indicates that: (1) standardization requires a degree of flexibility to be practical at the level of scientific practice in disparate sites; (2) the manner in which standards are created, and by whom, will impact their perceived legitimacy and therefore their potential to be used; and (3) the process of standardization itself is important to establishing the legitimacy of an area of scientific research.

Regulating IVF and pre-implantation tissue-typing for the creation of "saviour siblings" : a harm analysis

Scientific discoveries, developments in medicine and health issues are the constant focus of media attention and the principles surrounding the creation of so called ‘saviour siblings’ are of no exception. The development in the field of reproductive techniques has provided the ability to genetically analyse embryos created in the laboratory to enable parents to implant selected embryos to create a tissue-matched child who may be able to cure an existing sick child. The research undertaken in this thesis examines the regulatory frameworks overseeing the delivery of assisted reproductive technologies (ART) in Australia and the United Kingdom and considers how those frameworks impact on the accessibility of in vitro fertilisation (IVF) procedures for the creation of ‘saviour siblings’. In some jurisdictions, the accessibility of such techniques is limited by statutory requirements. The limitations and restrictions imposed by the state in relation to the technology are analysed in order to establish whether such restrictions are justified. The analysis is conducted on the basis of a harm framework. The framework seeks to establish whether those affected by the use of the technology (including the child who will be created) are harmed. In order to undertake such evaluation, the concept of harm is considered under the scope of John Stuart Mill’s liberal theory and the Harm Principle is used as a normative tool to judge whether the level of harm that may result, justifies state intervention or restriction with the reproductive decision-making of parents in this context. The harm analysis conducted in this thesis seeks to determine an appropriate regulatory response in relation to the use of pre-implantation tissue-typing for the creation of ‘saviour siblings’. The proposals outlined in the last part of this thesis seek to address the concern that harm may result from the practice of pre-implantation tissue-typing. The current regulatory frameworks in place are also analysed on the basis of the harm framework established in this thesis. The material referred to in this thesis reflects the law and policy in place in Australia and the UK at the time the thesis was submitted for examination (December 2009).

Identifying child sexual abuse within school contexts : policy problems and solutions, and a landmark case

As a strategy to identify child sexual abuse, most Australian States and Territories have enacted legislation requiring teachers to report suspected cases. Some Australian State and non-State educational authorities have also created policy-based obligations to report suspected child sexual abuse. Significantly, these can be wider than non-existent or limited legislative duties, and therefore are a crucial element of the effort to identify sexual abuse. Yet, no research has explored the existence and nature of these policy-based duties. The first purpose of this paper is to report the results of a three-State study into policy-based reporting duties in State and non-State schools in Australia. In an extraordinary coincidence, while conducting the study, a case of failure to comply with reporting policy occurred with tragic consequences. This led to a rare example in Australia (and one of only a few worldwide) of a professional being prosecuted for failure to comply with a legislative duty. It also led to disciplinary proceedings against school staff. The second purpose of this paper is to describe this case and connect it with findings from our policy analysis.

Children and consent to medical treatment

This chapter deals with the law concerning children and consent to medical treatment. Where a child under the age of 18 requires medical treatment, issues arise as to who may lawfully consent to the treatment and under what circumstances. Depending on the circumstances, consent may be given by the child’s parent or guardian; the child; or a court. The chapter provides a thorough treatment of Australian law about these issues and circumstances.

Finding a way through the ethical and legal maze : withdrawing medical treatment and euthanasia

This article examines Finnis' and Keown's claim that the intention/foresight distinction should be used as the basis for the lawfulness of withholding and withdrawing medical treatment, rather than the act/omission distinction which is currently used. I argue that whilst the intention/foresight distinction is sound and can apply to palliative pain relief hastening death, it cannot be applied to withholding and withdrawing medical treatment. Instead, the act/omission distinction remains the better basis for the lawfulness of withholding and withdrawal, and law reform is consequently unnecessary.

Recent developments : loss of chance in medical litigation : Tabet v Gett [2010] HCA 12.

Following the judgement of the High Court in Tabet v Gett [2010]HCA 12 handed down on 21 April 2010 it appears that in Australia there is now very limited scope for recovery in negligence for the loss of a chance of a better medical outcome.