Renewables: The great uncertainty of the EU energy strategy. Egmont Paper No. 71, November 2014

Summary. For more than two decades, the development of renewable energy sources (RES) has been an important aim of EU energy policy. It accelerated with the adoption of a 1997 White Paper and the setting a decade later of a 20% renewable energy target, to be reached by 2020. The EU counts on renewable energy for multiple purposes: to diversify its energy supply; to increase its security of supply; and to create new industries, jobs, economic growth and export opportunities, while at the same time reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Many expectations rest on its development. Fossil fuels have been critical to the development of industrial nations, including EU Member States, which are now deeply reliant upon coal, oil and gas for nearly every aspect of their existence. Faced with some hard truths, however, the Member States have begun to shelve fossil fuel. These hard truths are as follows: firstly, fossil fuels are a finite resource, sometimes difficult to extract. This means that, at some point, fossil fuels are going to be more difficult to access in Europe or too expensive to use.1 The problem is that you cannot just stop using fossil fuels when they become too expensive; the existing infrastructure is profoundly reliant on fossil fuels. It is thus almost normal that a fierce resistance to change exists. Secondly, fossil fuels contribute to climate change. They emit GHG, which contribute greatly to climate change. As a consequence, their use needs to be drastically reduced. Thirdly, Member States are currently suffering a decline in their own fossil fuel production. This increases their dependence on increasingly costly fossil fuel imports from increasingly unstable countries. This problem is compounded by global developments: the growing share of emerging economies in global energy demand (in particular China and India but also the Middle East) and the development of unconventional oil and gas production in the United States. All these elements endanger the competitiveness of Member States’ economies and their security of supply. Therefore, new indigenous sources of energy and a diversification of energy suppliers and routes to convey energy need to be found. To solve all these challenges, in 2008 the EU put in place a strategy based on three objectives: sustainability (reduction of GHG), competitiveness and security of supply. The adoption of a renewable energy policy was considered essential for reaching these three strategic objectives. The adoption of the 20% renewable energy target has undeniably had a positive effect in the EU on the growth in renewables, with the result that renewable energy sources are steadily increasing their presence in the EU energy mix. They are now, it can be said, an integral part of the EU energy system. However, the necessity of reaching this 20% renewable energy target in 2020, combined with other circumstances, has also engendered in many Member States a certain number of difficulties, creating uncertainties for investors and postponing benefits for consumers. The electricity sector is the clearest example of this downside. Subsidies have become extremely abundant and vary from one Member State to another, compromising both fair competition and single market. Networks encountered many difficulties to develop and adapt. With technological progress these subsidies have also become quite excessive. The growing impact of renewable electricity fluctuations has made some traditional power plants unprofitable and created disincentives for new investments. The EU does clearly need to reassess its strategy. If it repeats the 2008 measures it will risk to provoke increased instability and costs.

The Common Security and Defence Policy: National Perspectives. Egmont Paper No. 79, May 2015

FOREWORD. When one looks at the present state of the CSDP, one cannot help but look on with disenchantment at the energy that appears to have abandoned both institutions and Member States. Commentators increasingly take for granted that nothing much should be expected from this field of EU policy. The reasons for this state of mind are well known: the recent economic and financial strains, which have impacted all EU action since 2008, means that most of the Member States will struggle to keep their defence budgets at their present level in the future, and we may even see reductions. Furthermore, and to put it mildly, most of the recent CSDP operations have also experienced a lack of enthusiasm. Adding to this overall trend, the EU is far from presenting a common vision of what security and defence should really mean. Many of the Member States do not want to be involved in all of today’s international turmoils, and they rarely share the strategic culture which inspires those Member States who see themselves as having special responsibilities in dealing with these crises. In the end it may be that Member States diverge fundamentally on the simple question of whether it is relevant for the EU to engage in most of the ‘hot’ crises Europe faces; many prefer to see Europe as a soft power, mostly dedicated to intervening on less dramatic fronts and more inclined to mend than to fight. For whatever reason given, it remains that if there is a lack of common understanding on what CSDP should really be about, it should not come as a surprise if this policy is presently in stalemate. As an additional blow, the Ukrainian crisis, which dragged on for the whole of last year, could only add to the downward spiral the EU has been experiencing, with a new Russia aggressively confronting Europe in a manner not too distant from the Cold War days. This attitude has triggered the natural reaction among EU Member States to seek reassurances from NATO about their own national security. Coupled with the return of France a few years ago into the integrated military command, NATO’s renewed relevance has sent a strong message to Europe about the military organisation’s credibility with regard to collective defence. Surprisingly, this overall trend was gathering momentum at the same time as other more positive developments. The European Council of December 2013 dedicated its main session to CSDP: it underlined Europe’s role as a ‘security provider’ while adopting a very ambitious road map for Europe in all possible dimensions of the security sector. Hence the impression of a genuine boost to all EU institutions, which have been invited to join efforts and give CSDP a reinvigorated efficiency. In the same way, the increasing instability in Europe’s neighbourhood has also called for more EU operations: most recently in Iraq, Libya, Northern Nigeria or South Sudan. Pressure for further EU engagement has been one of the most constant features of the discussions taking place around these crises. Moreover, a growing number of EU partners in Asia, Latin America or Eastern Europe have shown a renewed eagerness to join CSDP missions in what sounds like a vote of confidence for EU capacities. What kind of conclusion should be drawn from this contradictory situation? Probably that the EU has much more potential than it can sometimes figure out itself, if only it would be ready to adapt to the new global realities. But, more than anything else, an enhanced CSDP needs from all Member States strong political will and a clear vision of what they want this policy to be. Without this indispensable ingredient CSDP may continue to run its course, as it does today. It may even grow in efficiency but it will keep lacking the one resource that would definitely help it overcome all the present shortcomings that have prevented Europe from finding its true role and mission through the CSDP. Member States remain central to EU security and defence policy. This is why this collection of essays is so valuable for assessing in no uncertain way the long road that lies ahead for any progress to be made. Pierre VIMONT Senior Associate at Carnegie Europe Former Executive Secretary-General of the European External Action Service

Consensus, contradiction, and conciliation of interests: the geo-economics of the Energy Union. EPC Policy Brief, 8 July 2015

European Union energy policy calls for nothing less than a profound transformation of the EU's energy system: by 2050 decarbonised electricity generation with 80-95% fewer greenhouse gas emissions, increased use of renewables, more energy efficiency, a functioning energy market and increased security of supply are to be achieved. Different EU policies (e.g., EU climate and energy package for 2020) are intended to create the political and regulatory framework for this transformation. The sectorial dynamics resulting from these EU policies already affect the systems of electricity generation, transportation and storage in Europe, and the more effective the implementation of new measures the more the structure of Europe's power system will change in the years to come. Recent initiatives such as the 2030 climate/energy package and the Energy Union are supposed to keep this dynamic up. Setting new EU targets, however, is not necessarily the same as meeting them. The impact of EU energy policy is likely to have considerable geo-economic implications for individual member states: with increasing market integration come new competitors; coal and gas power plants face new renewable challengers domestically and abroad; and diversification towards new suppliers will result in new trade routes, entry points and infrastructure. Where these implications are at odds with powerful national interests, any member state may point to Article 194, 2 of the Lisbon Treaty and argue that the EU's energy policy agenda interferes with its given right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, the choice between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply. The implementation of new policy initiatives therefore involves intense negotiations to conciliate contradicting interests, something that traditionally has been far from easy to achieve. In areas where this process runs into difficulties, the transfer of sovereignty to the European level is usually to be found amongst the suggested solutions. Pooling sovereignty on a new level, however, does not automatically result in a consensus, i.e., conciliate contradicting interests. Rather than focussing on the right level of decision making, European policy makers need to face the (inconvenient truth of) geo-economical frictions within the Union that make it difficult to come to an arrangement. The reminder of this text explains these latter, more structural and sector-related challenges for European energy policy in more detail, and develops some concrete steps towards a political and regulatory framework necessary to overcome them.

Rethinking the security of the European Union’s gas supply. Bruegel Policy Contribution, Issue 2016/01 January 2016

Highlights: • The security of the European Union’s gas supplies is crucial to ensuring that supplies to households are not disrupted in freezing winters, that industry can flourish and that the EU cannot be blackmailed in vital foreign policy questions. • Gas supply security should be addressed at EU level because a joint solution would be cheaper, national approaches could undermine the internal energy market and have adverse effects on other countries, and the EU Treaty explicitly calls for energy solidarity. • The current focus on supply diversification and reduction of dependence on imported gas is expensive and does not constitute a systemic response. • Instead of doing everything to reduce gas supplies from key suppliers, gas supply security could more effectively be safeguarded by ensuring that unused alternatives are maintained so that they can be tapped into for an indefinite period in case of supply disruption from a key supplier.This Policy Contribution outlines a market approach that could safeguard gas supply security at very low cost.

Energy and water development appropriations for 2012 : hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, One Hundred Twelfth Congress, first session /

Shipping list number: 2011-0290-P (pt. 1), 2011-0295-P (pt. 2), 2011-0289-P (pt. 3), 2011-0325-P (pt. 4), 2012-0066-P (pt. 5), 2012-0308-P (pt. 6), 2012-0320-P (pt. 7), 2012-0014-P (pt. 8), 2011-0356-P (pt. 9).

DOD future energy resources : proceedings of workshops held at the National Defense University /

"The enclosed CD contains Adobe PDF files of this report and presentations delivered at two workshops on DOD future energy resources"--P. [2] of cover.

Proposed United States-Australia agreement for nuclear cooperation : hearing before the Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on International Economic Policy and Trade of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-sixth Congress, first session, October 11, 1979.

Mode of access: Internet.

Rising oil prices, executive branch policy, and U.S. security implications : hearing before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Sixth Congress, second session, March 24, 2000.

Shipping list no.: 2000-0331-P (pt. [1]), 2001-0033-P (pt. 2).

RSA-Grid: A grid computing based framework for power system reliability and security analysis

Grid computing is an emerging technology for providing the high performance computing capability and collaboration mechanism for solving the collaborated and complex problems while using the existing resources. In this paper, a grid computing based framework is proposed for the probabilistic based power system reliability and security analysis. The suggested name of this computing grid is Reliability and Security Grid (RSA-Grid). Then the architecture of this grid is presented. A prototype system has been built for further development of grid-based services for power systems reliability and security assessment based on probabilistic techniques, which require high performance computing and large amount of memory. Preliminary results based on prototype of this grid show that RSA-Grid can provide the comprehensive assessment results for real power systems efficiently and economically.

Transforming the eastern neighbourhood: the security implications of European Union Activity in Ukraine 2000-2006

This thesis examines the external activities of the European Union conducted in the wider Europe against the backdrop of eastern enlargement. It focuses on the technical aspects of EU diplomacy, using qualitative research methodology to study the programmes and initiatives launched since the year 2000 in the countries lying along the Union’s new border to the east. Drawing on evidence from Ukraine, it hypothesises that the EU is an agent of transformation in the eastern neighbourhood and that this transformation has important implications for the regional order in the post-Soviet space. The thesis constitutes an investigation into the transformational activities engaged by the EU in Ukraine conducted with an eye to their strategic implications. It documents and analyses three instances of EU intervention in Ukraine’s internal processes that relate to management of cross-border traffic in the Ukrainian-Russian borderland, restructuring of the country’s energy sector, and conduct of its contentious presidential election in 2004. It is argued that while these interventions have explicitly sought to advance the Union’s security with respect to certain twenty-first century transnational threats, they have at the same time served to confer important strategic advantages on the EU that include giving the bloc greater knowledge and control over developments in Ukraine and that contribute to the dismantling of infrastructural, institutional and other ties between Kiev and the other Soviet successor states, notably Russia. The effect of the European Union’s actions in the region, whether intended or not, has thus been to undermine any competing regional initiatives that cut across its own functions, and thereby to assert itself as the primary integration project in Europe. By showing how technical interventions in the politics, economics and administration of Ukraine can yield important geopolitical dividends, this thesis demonstrates that, in the context of EU external relations, high and low politics are interlinked.

Beyond securitisation : Western Mediterranean international relations from a security perspective 1989-2002

Following the end of the Cold War and the ensuing changes to the international landscape, thinking about security has tended to become more discursive and interpretative in nature. What counts as security has increasingly derived from security discourses (that is, 'securitisation') and uncertainty about the multi-faceted future facing various countries and regions. Within this post-Cold War discourse, the Western Mediterranean has emerged as a region fraught with latent and manifest threats in the economic, political, societal and military sectors. Improved access to EU markets for Maghrebi exports; the security of energy supplies to the EU from Algeria and Libya; lack of democracy and the advance of political Islam; the flow of northward migration and worries about law and order in France, Italy and Spain; the growth in military expenditure and weapons proliferation in the Maghreb; all have been central to the securitisation agenda. However, this agenda has often lacked credibility especially when inter-linkages have purportedly been established between economic underdevelopment and political instability, between the advance of political Islam and the threat to energy supplies, or between immigration and the threat to national identity. Such inter-sectoral linkages distract from the credibility of those 'securitisation instances' which correspond to reality; the former linkages have often been exploited by extremist politicians in south-west European countries as well as by regimes in the Maghreb to advance their respective interests. Thus, securitisation may defeat its main purpose; it may generate responses out of keeping with the aims proclaimed at the outset, aims centred on the countering of real threats and the ensuring of greater stability.

The Kim Dynasty and North-East Asian security:breaking the cycle of crises?

Purpose—This article considers North Korea and the notion of crisis, by linking historical development over the Korean peninsula to the conflict resolution literature, and investigates why despite a large number of destabilizing events, a war involving Pyongyang has yet to erupt. Design/methodology—This article uses historical data and a framework developed by Aggarwal et al., in order to highlight patterns of interaction between states such as the United States, North Korea and South Korea, organizations such as the United Nations, as well as processes such as the Six- Party Talks and the Agreed Framework. The article then develops a crisis framework based on conflict resolution and negotiation literature, and applies it to three North Korean administrations. Findings—Findings suggest that an open- ended understanding of time (for all parties involved on the peninsula) leads to an impossibility to reach a threshold where full- scale war would be triggered, thus leaving parties in a stable state of crisis for which escalating moves and de- escalating techniques might become irrelevant. Practical implications—It is hoped that this article will help further endeavors linking conflict resolution theoretical frameworks to the Korean peninsula security situation. In the case of the Korean peninsula, time has been understood as open-ended, leading parties to a lingering state of heightened hostilities that oscillates toward war, but that is controlled enough not to reach it. In-depth analysis of particular security sectors such as nuclear energy, food security, or missile testing would prove particularly useful in understanding the complexity of the Korean peninsula situation to a greater extent. It is hoped that this paper will help further endeavours linking conflict resolution theoretical frameworks to the Korean peninsula security situation. Originality/value—This research suggests that regarding the Korean peninsula, time has been understood as open- ended, leading parties to a lingering state of heightened.

Development of hardware in the loop real-time control techniques for hybrid power systems involving distributed demands and sustainable energy sources

The future power grid will effectively utilize renewable energy resources and distributed generation to respond to energy demand while incorporating information technology and communication infrastructure for their optimum operation. This dissertation contributes to the development of real-time techniques, for wide-area monitoring and secure real-time control and operation of hybrid power systems. ^ To handle the increased level of real-time data exchange, this dissertation develops a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system that is equipped with a state estimation scheme from the real-time data. This system is verified on a specially developed laboratory-based test bed facility, as a hardware and software platform, to emulate the actual scenarios of a real hybrid power system with the highest level of similarities and capabilities to practical utility systems. It includes phasor measurements at hundreds of measurement points on the system. These measurements were obtained from especially developed laboratory based Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU) that is utilized in addition to existing commercially based PMU’s. The developed PMU was used in conjunction with the interconnected system along with the commercial PMU’s. The tested studies included a new technique for detecting the partially islanded micro grids in addition to several real-time techniques for synchronization and parameter identifications of hybrid systems. ^ Moreover, due to numerous integration of renewable energy resources through DC microgrids, this dissertation performs several practical cases for improvement of interoperability of such systems. Moreover, increased number of small and dispersed generating stations and their need to connect fast and properly into the AC grids, urged this work to explore the challenges that arise in synchronization of generators to the grid and through introduction of a Dynamic Brake system to improve the process of connecting distributed generators to the power grid.^ Real time operation and control requires data communication security. A research effort in this dissertation was developed based on Trusted Sensing Base (TSB) process for data communication security. The innovative TSB approach improves the security aspect of the power grid as a cyber-physical system. It is based on available GPS synchronization technology and provides protection against confidentiality attacks in critical power system infrastructures. ^

Ecohydrological separation in wet, low energy northern environments? A preliminary assessment using different soil water extraction techniques

Funded by European Research Council ERC. Grant Number: project GA 335910 VEWA