Essays on Procurement, Scoring Auction, and Quality Manipulation Corruption

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-06

Corruption in the post-Soviet workplace: the experiences of recent graduates in contemporary Ukraine

While Ukraine was bestowed market economy status by the European Union in 2005 its labour market still endures many structural problems. By exploring the experiences of young graduate employees this article highlights the difficultly in obtaining work within Ukraine's labour market and the problems they face once they have secured employment. Rather than seeing the development of a transparent labour market the collapse of the command economy has seen a relatively closed system develop. The article demonstrates how many jobs are secured through the use of connections or the demanding, and payment, of bribes.The situation does not improve once graduates obtain long-term employment. Interviewees discuss the lack of job security, the informal payment of wages and the lack of legal protection from corrupt employer practices. The article has broader resonance outside of the Ukrainian case study as the discussion of workplace corruption highlights how the issue is concerned with much more than simply cash based transactions and how those that endure it are likely to turn to the informal economy for employment.

Governance regimes, corruption and growth: theory and evidence

We study the role of political accountability as a determinant of corruption and economic growth. Our model identifies two governance regimes defined by the quality of political institutions and shows that the relationship between corruption and growth is regime specific. We use a threshold model to estimate the impact of corruption on growth where corruption is treated as an endogenous variable. We find two governance regimes, conditional on the quality of political institutions. In the regime with high quality political institutions, corruption has a substantial negative impact on growth. In the regime with low quality institutions, corruption has no impact on growth.

The problems of corruption in Post-Soviet Ukraine's Higher Education sector

This article provide an in-depth examination into how the existence of "informal" work practices, in a particular location, namely, the higher education system in Ukraine impacts the everyday lives of a specific population group, namely, students. The article provides a comprehensive overview of corruption in post-Soviet education systems, suggesting some historical and contemporary reasons for its current scale. In particular, the article focuses on students' experiences of corruption, first, exploring the difficulties that many individuals face when trying to gain access to the higher education system, and second, outlining students' experiences while progressing through the course. The article's concluding section examines the wider outcome of these processes on Ukrainian society as a whole as well as the impacts on individual students.

Foreign direct investment and corruption

In the last few decades, the world has witnessed an enormous growth in the volume of foreign direct investment (FDI). The global stock of FDI reached US$ 7.5 trillion in 2003 and accounted for 11% of world Gross Domestic Product, up from 7% in 1990. The sales of multinational enterprises at around US$ 19 trillion were more than double the level of world exports. Substantial FDI inflows went into transition countries. Inflows into one of the region's largest recipient, the Russian Federation, almost doubled, enabling Russia to become one of the five top FDI destinations in 2005-2006. FDI inflows in Russia have increased almost threefold from 13.6% in 2003 to 35% in 2007. In 2003, these flows were twice greater than those into China; whilst in 2007 they were six times larger. Russia's FDI inflows were also about 2.5 times greater than those of Brazil. Efficient government institutions are argued by many economists to foster FDI and growth as a result. However, the magnitude of this effect has yet to be measured. This thesis takes a Political Economy approach to explore, empirically, the potential impact of malfunctioning governmental institutions, proxied by three indices of perceived corruption, on FDI stocks accumulation/distribution within Russia over the period of 2002-2004. Using a regional data-set it concentrates on three areas relating to FDI. Firstly, it considers the significance, the size and the sign of the impact of perceived corruption on accumulation of FDI stocks within Russia. Secondly, it quantifies the impact of perceived corruption on the volume of FDI stocks simultaneously estimating the impact of the investment in public capital such as telecommunications and transportation networks on FDI in the presence of corruption. In particular, it addresses the question whether more corrupt regions in Russia are also those that could have accumulated more of FDI stocks, and investigates whether those 'more corrupt' regions would have had lower level of public capital investment. Finally, it examines whether decentralisation increases or decreases corruption and whether a larger extent of decentralisation has a positive or negative impact on FDI (stocks). The results of three studies are as follows. Firstly, along with market potential, corruption is found to be one of the key factors in explaining FDI distribution within Russia between 2002 and 2004. Secondly, corruption on average is found to be related to FDI positively suggesting that it may act as speed money: to save their time foreign direct investors might be willing to bribe the regional authorities so to move in front of the bureaucratic lines. Thirdly, although when corruption is controlled for, the impact of the latter on unobservable FDI is found to be on average positive, no association between FDI and public investment is observed with the only exception of transportation infrastructure (i.e., railway). The results might suggest therefore that it is possible that not only regions with high levels of perceived corruption attract more FDI but also that expansions in public capital investments are not accompanied by an increase of the volume of FDI (stocks) in regions with high levels of corruption. This casts some doubt on the productivity of the investment in public capital in these regions as it might be that bureaucrats may prefer to use these infrastructural projects for rent extraction. Finally, we find decentralisation to have a significant and positive impact on both FDI stock accumulation and corruption, suggesting that local governments may spend more on public goods to make the area more attractive to foreign investors but at the same time they may be interested into extracting rents from foreign investors. These results support the idea that the regulation of FDI is associated with and facilitated by a larger public sector, which distorts competition and introduces opportunities for rent-seeking by particular economic and political factors.

The effect of corruption on FDI:a parametric and non-parametric analysis

This paper analyses the effect of corruption on Multinational Enterprises' (MNEs) incentives to undertake FDI in a particular country. We contribute to the existing literature by modelling the relationship between corruption and FDI using both parametric and non-parametric methods. We report that the impact of corruption on FDI stock is different for the different quantiles of the FDI stock distribution. This is a characteristic that could not be captured in previous studies which used only parametric methods. After controlling for the location selection process of MNEs and other host country characteristics, the result from both parametric and non-parametric analyses offer some support for the ‘helping-hand’ role of corruption.

Bridging the gap? Corruption, knowledge and foreign ownership

We argue that in addition to host corruption per se, as accounted for by the existing literature, an explanation of inter-country variation in FDI needs to account for the distance between the host and home corruption, which we call relative corruption. We use a large matched home-host firm-level panel data-set for 1998-2006 from CEE transition countries. Year-specific selectivity corrected estimates suggest that, ceteris paribus, higher relative ‘grand’ corruption lowers foreign ownership as the returns to investment tends to be lower in more corrupt environment. However, after controlling for the selectivity bias, knowledge-intensive parent firms are found to hold controlling ownership, as the difficulty of successful joint venture looms large in more corrupt environment. Results are robust to alternative specifications.

"No longer at ease":corruption as an institution in West Africa

This article traces the historical genesis of corruption in two West African countries: Ghana and Nigeria. It argues that corruption in Africa is an institution that emerged in direct response to colonial systems of rule which super-imposed an imported institutional system with different norms and values on an existing institutional landscape, despite the fact that both deeply conflicted and contradicted each other. During decolonization and after independence, corruption, although dysfunctional, fully evolved into an institution that allowed an uneasy cohabitation of colonial and domestic African institutions to grow into a composite, syncretic system facilitated by generalized corruption.

A közvetlen külföldi befektetések és a korrupció közötti kapcsolat (The connection of Foreign Direct Investment and corruption)

A szerzők tanulmányának középpontjában a közvetlen külföldi befektetések és a korrupció kapcsolata áll. Feltételezésük az, hogy a közvetlen külföldi befektetők a kevésbé korrupt országokat kedvelik, mivel a korrupció egy további kockázati tényezőt jelent a befektetők számára, amely növelheti a befektetések költségeit. Megítélésük szerint ezt kvantitatív módszerekkel érdemes vizsgálni, így elemzésük során 79 országot vizsgálnak meg tíz évre vonatkozó átlagokkal a Gretl-program és az OLS becslőfüggvény segítségével. Több modell lefuttatása után azt az eredményt kapták, hogy a közvetlen külföldi befektetők döntéseiben a korrupció szignifikáns tényező, a két változó között negatív korrelációt figyeltek meg. / === / The study focuses on the connection of Foreign Direct Investment and corruption. The authors assume that investors prefer countries where corruption level is lower, as corruption an additional risk factor that might increase the cost of investment. They believe that the best way to prove the previous statement if they use quantitative methods, so they set up a model where 79 countries are tested for 10 years averages, with the help of the Gretl and OLS estimator. After running several models their finding was that corruption is a significant factor in the decisions of foreign investors, and there is a negative correlation between corruption and FDI.

Korrupció: mérhetőség és modellezés = In the core of our study we focus on the connection of Foreign Direct Investment and corruption.

Tanulmányunk középpontjában a közvetlen külföldi befektetések és a korrupció kapcsolata áll. Feltételezésünk az, hogy a közvetlen külföldi befektetők a kevésbé korrupt országokat kedvelik, mivel a korrupció egy további kockázati tényezőt jelent a befektetők számára, amely növelheti a befektetések költségeit. Megítélésünk szerint ezt kvantitatív módszerekkel lehet a leginkább vizsgálni, így elemzésünk során 79 országot vizsgálunk meg 10 évre vonatkozó átlagokkal a GRETL program és az OLS becslőfüggvény segítségével. Több modell lefuttatása után azt az eredményt kaptuk, hogy a közvetlen külföldi befektetők döntéseiben a korrupció szignifikáns tényező, a két változó között negatív korrelációt figyelhetünk meg. ____ We assume that investors prefer countries where corruption level is lower, as corruption an additional risk factor that might increase the cost of investment. We believe that the best way to prove the previous statement if we use quantitative methods, so we set up a model where 79 countries are tested for 10 years averages, with the help of the GRETL and OLS estimator. After running several models our finding was that corruption is a significant factor in the decisions of foreign investors, and there is a negative correlation between corruption and FDI.

The corruption risks of EU funds in Hungary

In corruption, a group of players gain an economic advantage without providing any socially beneficial services in return, therefore corruption is considered to be a form of rent-seeking. Similar to other forms of rent-seeking, corruption causes losses on a societal level, due to the less efficient allocation of resources, as well as the costs of operation and prosecution. Fighting corruption is important not just because of ethical but also economic considerations. Contributions from the European Union are making possible the use of more funds than ever, and spending the full amount of this money is a priority preference of the government. The abundance of funds and the pressure on absorption increase corruption, by the managers of the funds overplanning the amount of money to be allocated to individual tender invitations, setting generous rules on eligible costs, and specifying low rates of own contribution wherever possible. As a result, the opportunities for rent-seeking are increased, as it is worth it for beneficiaries to carry out the project even after relinquishing part of the funds they have been awarded. Thus, the abundance of funds generates a sphere of corruption in which rent-seekers may appear on various levels of the system, often even without the knowledge or approval of those on higher decisionmaking levels.

Political corruption in the Caribbean Basin: A comparative analysis of Jamaica and Costa Rica

Political corruption in the Caribbean Basin retards state economic growth and development, undermines government legitimacy, and threatens state security. In spite of recent anti-corruption efforts of intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations (IGO/NGOs), Caribbean political corruption problems appear to be worsening in the post-Cold War period. This dissertation discovers why IGO/NGO efforts to arrest corruption are failing by investigating the domestic and international causes of political corruption in the Caribbean. The dissertation's theoretical framework centers on an interdisciplinary model of the causes of political corruption built within the rule-oriented constructivist approach to social science. The model first employs a rational choice analysis that broadly explains the varying levels of political corruption found across the region. The constructivist theory of social rules is then used to develop the structural mechanisms that further explain the region's levels of political corruption. The dissertation advances its theory of the causes of political corruption through qualitative disciplined-configurative case studies of political corruption in Jamaica and Costa Rica. The dissertation finds that IGO/NGO sponsored anti-corruption programs are failing because they employ only technical measures (issuing anti-corruption laws and regulations, providing transparency in accounting procedures, improving freedom of the press, establishing electoral reforms, etc.). While these IGO/NGO technical measures are necessary, they are not sufficient to arrest the Caribbean's political corruption problems. This dissertation concludes that to be successful, IGO/NGO anti-corruption programs must also include social measures, e.g., building civil societies and modernizing political cultures, for there to be any hope of lowering political corruption levels and improving Caribbean social conditions. The dissertation also highlights the key role of Caribbean governing elite in constructing the political and economic structures that cause their states' political corruption problems. ^