Economics of public governance with strategic production of information: four essays

SUMMARY This paper analyses the outcomes of the EEA and bilateral agreements vote at the level of the 3025 communities of the Swiss Confederation by simultaneously modelling the vote and the participation decisions. Regressions include economic and political factors. The economic variables are the aggregated shares of people employed in the losing, Winning and neutral sectors, according to BRUNETTI, JAGGI and WEDER (1998) classification, Which follows a Ricardo-Viner logic, and the average education levels, which follows a Heckscher-Ohlin approach. The political factors are those used in the recent literature. The results are extremely precise and consistent. Most of the variables have the predicted sign and are significant at the l % level. More than 80 % of the communities' vote variance is explained by the model, substantially reducing the residuals when compared to former studies. The political variables do have the expected signs and are significant as Well. Our results underline the importance of the interaction between electoral choice and participation decisions as well as the importance of simultaneously dealing with those issues. Eventually they reveal the electorate's high level of information and rationality. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG Unser Beitrag analysiert in einem Model, welches gleichzeitig die Stimm- ("ja" oder "nein") und Partizipationsentscheidung einbezieht, den Ausgang der Abstimmungen über den Beitritt zum EWR und über die bilateralen Verträge für die 3025 Gemeinden der Schweiz. Die Regressionsgleichungen beinhalten ökonomische und politische Variabeln. Die ökonomischen Variabeln beinhalten die Anteile an sektoriellen Arbeitsplatzen, die, wie in BRUNETTI, JAGGIl.1I1d WEDER (1998), in Gewinner, Verlierer und Neutrale aufgeteilt Wurden, gemäß dem Model von Ricardo-Viner, und das durchschnittliche Ausbildungsniveau, gemäß dem Model von Heckscher-Ohlin. Die politischen Variabeln sind die in der gegenwärtigen Literatur üblichen. Unsere Resultate sind bemerkenswert präzise und kohärent. Die meisten Variabeln haben das von der Theorie vorausgesagte Vorzeichen und sind hoch signifikant (l%). Mehr als 80% der Varianz der Stimmabgabe in den Gemeinden wird durch das Modell erklärt, was, im Vergleich mit früheren Arbeiten, die unerklärten Residuen Wesentlich verkleinert. Die politischen Variabeln haben auch die erwarteten Vorzeichen und sind signifikant. Unsere Resultate unterstreichen die Bedeutung der Interaktion zwischen der Stimm- und der Partizipationsentscheidung, und die Bedeutung diese gleichzeitig zu behandeln. Letztendlich, belegen sie den hohen lnformationsgrad und die hohe Rationalität der Stimmbürger. RESUME Le présent article analyse les résultats des votations sur l'EEE et sur les accords bilatéraux au niveau des 3025 communes de la Confédération en modélisant simultanément les décisions de vote ("oui" ou "non") et de participation. Les régressions incluent des déterminants économiques et politiques. Les déterminants économiques sont les parts d'emploi sectoriels agrégées en perdants, gagnants et neutres selon la classification de BRUNETTI, JAGGI ET WEDER (1998), suivant la logique du modèle Ricardo-Viner, et les niveaux de diplômes moyens, suivant celle du modèle Heckscher-Ohlin. Les déterminants politiques suivent de près ceux utilisés dans la littérature récente. Les résultats sont remarquablement précis et cohérents. La plupart des variables ont les signes prédits par les modèles et sont significatives a 1%. Plus de 80% de la variance du vote par commune sont expliqués par le modèle, faisant substantiellement reculer la part résiduelle par rapport aux travaux précédents. Les variables politiques ont aussi les signes attendus et sont aussi significatives. Nos résultats soulignent l'importance de l'interaction entre choix électoraux et décisions de participation et l'importance de les traiter simultanément. Enfin, ils mettent en lumière les niveaux élevés d'information et de rationalité de l'électorat.

Cooperatives and Contracting in Agriculture: The Case of West Liberty Foods, October 2005

The West Liberty Foods turkey cooperative was formed in 1996 to purchase the assets and assume operations of Louis Rich Foods (an investor-owned processing rm), which, at the time, announced the imminent shutdown of its West Liberty, Iowa, processing facility. We study the creation and performance of this �new generation� cooperative using eld interviews with grower members and company management. We describe changes, before and after the buyout, in the contractual apparatus used for procuring live turkeys, and in the communication requirements, work expectations, and nancial positions of growers. During the private ownership period, most of the inputs (except labor and facilities) were provided by the rm; there was substantial supervision of the growers' actions; growers faced little price and production risk; and growers' equity was due largely to ownership of land and other farm assets. Our interviews reveal that, after cooperative formation, growers were exposed to considerable additional risk; monitoring of growers by the rm was less intensive; grower time and effort commitments to turkey production increased substantially; and a signicant fraction of rm (cooperative) equity came from growers' willingness to leverage their farm and personal assets (and hence indirectly their existing relationships with local lenders). We argue that some of these changes are consistent with a nancial contract where asset pledging and its corollary risk generate higher work effort by growers and a reduction in agency rents. These economies likely compensate for an organizational deadweight loss traditionally associated with cooperative governance.

Iowa Technology Governance Board Annual Report, January 9, 2006

This is the annual report of the Technology Governance Board that is established in Iowa Code Section 8A.204. This annual report was produced in compliance with Iowa Code §8A.204(3a) and was submitted to the Governor, the Department of Management, and the General Assembly on January 9, 2006.

The short arm of the law: judicial institutions and local governance in Brazil

This paper estimates the effect of judicial institutions on governance at the local level in Brazil. Our estimation strategy exploits a unique institutional feature of state judiciary branches which assigns prosecutors and judges to the most populous among contiguous counties forming a judiciary district. As a result of this assignment mechanism there are counties with nearly identical populations, some with and some without local judicial presence, which we exploit to impute counterfactual outcomes. Conditional on observable county characteristics, offenses per civil servant are about 35% lower in counties that have a local seat of the state judiciary. The lower incidence of infractions stems mostly from fewer violations of financial management regulations by local administrators, fewer instances of problems in project execution and project managment, fewer cases of non-existent or ineffective civil society oversight and fewer cases of improper handling of remittances to local residents.

Towards Integrated Governance of Landscape Development : The Swiss Model of Regional Nature Parks

Coherent regulation of landscape as a resource is a major challenge. How can the development interests of some actors (eg cable car operators and property developers) be reconciled with those of others (agriculture, forestry) and with conservation of biodiversity and scenic value? To help understand how the newly introduced Regional Nature Parks (RNPs) can improve the coherence of the regulation regime in Switzerland, we highlight current direct mechanisms for regulation of landscape as a resource (bans, inventories, subsidies) as well as indirect mechanisms (taking place through the regulation of the physical basis of landscapes, eg forest, land, and water planning policies). We show that RNPs are fundamentally innovative because they make it possible to manage and coordinate indirect strategies for appropriate regulation of resources at a landscape scale. In other words, RNPs enable organization of governance of landscape as a resource in a perimeter that is not necessarily restricted to administrative boundaries.

O Papel das Demonstrações Financeiras na Corporate Governance: O caso da Cabo Verde Telecom

O fenómeno da Corporate Governance tem vindo a ocupar um lugar importante na literatura moderna dada a sua importância no mercado global e competitivo em que vivemos. A partir do final dos anos 80, esta matéria ganhou um grande relevo devido ao aumento da participação activa dos investidores institucionais e pequenos investidores individuais nos mercados de capitais e sua crescente exigência por uma gestão mais rigorosa, transparente e que defende os interesses dos accionistas ou shareholders. Os grandes escândalos financeiros, envolvendo diversas empresas nos EUA e na Europa, que causaram prejuízos incomensuráveis ao mercado, despertaram a atenção do mundo para a relevância das boas práticas de Corporate Governance. O maior destaque para este tema aconteceu em 2002, após a ocorrência os escândalos com as multinacionais Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat, entre outros. Naturalmente, para os países em desenvolvimento, a qualidade da Corporate Governance local é de fundamental importância para o crescimento económico duradouro. Essa visão global e transversal da Corporate Governance veio acentuar a procura de soluções para o alinhamento dos interesses entre gestores e accionistas. A solução para os conflitos de agência e a melhoria dos mecanismos de gestão estão no cerne do debate sobre o tema. Este estudo faz uma análise das teorias da Corporate Governance, a sua evolução e importância e o papel das demonstrações financeiras como um dos elementos que suportam a boa Corporate Governance, aplicada na gestão de uma empresa cabo-verdiana – A CVTelecom. Pretende-se, assim, identificar os benefícios advindos da aplicação das boas práticas de Corporate Governace para a gestão da empresa e para a sociedade como um todo. A escolha da CVTelecom, operadora de telecomunicações, prende-se com dois aspectos fundamentais: i) ser a empresa privada que exerce maior impacto sobre a economia cabo-verdiana, empregando cerca de 1,3% do total dos trabalhadores do sector privado no País; ii) o crescimento da economia cabo-verdiana estar suportado, mais do que nunca, nas TIC, constituindo, por essa razão, num dos principais desafios do País. Concluiu-se que a CVTelecom, embora esteja localizada num país onde ainda não existe uma entidade com a responsabilidade de fazer a avaliação da gestão das empresas no quadro das normas que enformam a Corporate Governance, encontra-se bem encaminhada ao nível da implementação de normas e procedimentos que favoreçam uma boa Corporate Governance.

Technology Governance Board Information Technology Strategic Plan, 2006

The Technology Governance Board (TGB), established pursuant to Iowa Code Section 8A.204, developed and published this strategic information technology plan in December 2006. This plan contains the TGB's vision, mission, goals, and strategies that will lead the executive branch to an information technology infrastructure and policies that will enhance and unify the technology infrastructure to support business operations for electronic government, consistent with the vision of providing sustained support for “extraordinary customer service”.

Iowa Technology Governance Board Annual Report, January 8, 2007

This Technology Governance Board Annual Report provides information o the total annual executive branch information technology expenditures (hardware, software, and personnel) and estimates for the amount of technology spending to be requested for the succeeding fiscal year. The report contains a projection of technology cost savings, an accounting of the level of technology cost savings for the current fiscal year, and a comparison of the level of technology cost savings for the current fiscal year with that of the previous fiscal year. This report was produced in compliance with Iowa Code §8A.204(3a) and was submitted to the Governor, the Department of Management, and the General Assembly on January 8, 2007.

Standardized enforcement: Access to justice vs contractual innovation

We model the different ways in which precedents and contract standardization shapethe development of markets and the law. In a setup where more resourceful parties candistort contract enforcement to their advantage, we find that the introduction of astandard contract reduces enforcement distortions relative to precedents, exerting twoeffects: i) it statically expands the volume of trade, but ii) it crowds out the use ofinnovative contracts, hindering contractual innovation. We shed light on the largescale commercial codification occurred in the 19th century in many countries (evenCommon Law ones) during a period of booming commerce and long distance trade.

Contractual resolutions of financial distress

In a financial contracting model, we study the optimal debt structure to resolve financial distress. Weshow that a debt structure where two distinct debt classes co-exist - one class fully concentrated andwith control rights upon default, the other dispersed and without control rights - removes the controllingcreditor's liquidation bias when investor protection is strong. These results rationalize the use and theperformance of floating charge financing, debt financing where the controlling creditor takes the entirebusiness as collateral, in countries with strong investor protection. Our theory predicts that the efficiency ofcontractual resolutions of financial distress should increase with investor protection.