943 resultados para Continuity axiom, Discrete Choice Experiments, Lexicographic Preferences


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Using the method of quantum trajectories we show that a known pure state can be optimally monitored through time when subject to a sequence of discrete measurements. By modifying the way that we extract information from the measurement apparatus we can minimize the average algorithmic information of the measurement record, without changing the unconditional evolution of the measured system. We define an optimal measurement scheme as one which has the lowest average algorithmic information allowed. We also show how it is possible to extract information about system operator averages from the measurement records and their probabilities. The optimal measurement scheme, in the limit of weak coupling, determines the statistics of the variance of the measured variable directly. We discuss the relevance of such measurements for recent experiments in quantum optics.

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Shoaling with familiar individuals may have many benefits including enhanced escape responses or increased foraging efficiency. This study describes the results of two complimentary experiments. The first utilised a simple binary choice experiment to determine if rainbowfish (Melanotaenia spp.) preferred to shoal with familiar individuals or with strangers. The second experiment used a free range situation where familiar and unfamiliar individuals were free to intermingle and were then exposed to a predator threat. Like many other small species of fish, rainbowfish were capable of identifying and distinguishing between individuals and choose to preferentially associate with familiar individuals as opposed to strangers. Contrary to expectations. however. rainbowrish did not significantly increase their preference for familiar individuals in the presence of a stationary predator model. Griffiths [J Fish Biol (1997) 51:489-4951 conducted similar studies under semi-natural conditions examining, the shoaling preferences of European minnows and showed similar results. Both the current study and that of Griffiths were conducted using predator wary populations of fish. It is suggested that, in predator sympatric populations, the benefits of shoaling with familiar individuals are such that it always pays to stay close to familiar individuals even when the probability If predator attack is remote.

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This paper tests the explanatory capacities of different versions of new institutionalism by examining the Australian case of a general transition in central banking practice and monetary politics: namely, the increased emphasis on low inflation and central bank independence. Standard versions of rational choice institutionalism largely dominate the literature on the politics of central banking, but this approach (here termed RC1) fails to account for Australian empirics. RC1 has a tendency to establish actor preferences exogenously to the analysis; actors' motives are also assumed a priori; actor's preferences are depicted in relatively static, ahistorical terms. And there is the tendency, even a methodological requirement, to assume relatively simple motives and preference sets among actors, in part because of the game theoretic nature of RC1 reasoning. It is possible to build a more accurate rational choice model by re-specifying and essentially updating the context, incentives and choice sets that have driven rational choice in this case. Enter RC2. However, this move subtly introduces methodological shifts and new theoretical challenges. By contrast, historical institutionalism uses an inductive methodology. Compared with deduction, it is arguably better able to deal with complexity and nuance. It also utilises a dynamic, historical approach, and specifies (dynamically) endogenous preference formation by interpretive actors. Historical institutionalism is also able to more easily incorporate a wider set of key explanatory variables and incorporate wider social aggregates. Hence, it is argued that historical institutionalism is the preferred explanatory theory and methodology in this case.

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The play of children with autistic spectrum disorder (ASD) is a valuable medium for assessment and intervention, and its analysis has the potential to aid diagnosis. This study investigated spontaneous play behavior and play object preferences for 24 preschool children with ASD in a typical occupational therapy clinical environment. Play behavior was rated and choice of play object noted at 10-second intervals from a 15-minute video recording of unstructured play. Statistical analyses indicated that play behavior was consistent with descriptions in the literature. In addition, the children demonstrated clear preferences for play objects in the form of popular characters (e.g., Thomas the Tank Engine) and those with sensorimotor properties. We propose that the inclusion of preferred play objects in a clinical environment may increase intrinsic motivation to play, and thereby enhance assessment and intervention.

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Dissertação para obtenção do grau de Mestre em Engenharia de Eletrónica e Computadores

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A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

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A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters Degree in Management from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics

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As estratégias de malevolência implicam que um indivíduo pague um custo para infligir um custo superior a um oponente. Como um dos comportamentos fundamentais da sociobiologia, a malevolência tem recebido menos atenção que os seus pares o egoísmo e a cooperação. Contudo, foi estabelecido que a malevolência é uma estratégia viável em populações pequenas quando usada contra indivíduos negativamente geneticamente relacionados pois este comportamento pode i) ser eliminado naturalmente, ou ii) manter-se em equilíbrio com estratégias cooperativas devido à disponibilidade da parte de indivíduos malevolentes de pagar um custo para punir. Esta tese propõe compreender se a propensão para a malevolência nos humanos é inerente ou se esta se desenvolve com a idade. Para esse efeito, considerei duas experiências de teoria de jogos em crianças em ambiente escolar com idades entre os 6 e os 22 anos. A primeira, um jogo 2x2 foi testada com duas variantes: 1) um prémio foi atribuído a ambos os jogadores, proporcionalmente aos pontos acumulados; 2), um prémio foi atribuído ao jogador com mais pontos. O jogo foi desenhado com o intuito de causar o seguinte dilema a cada jogador: i) maximizar o seu ganho e arriscar ter menos pontos que o adversário; ou ii) decidir não maximizar o seu ganho, garantindo que este não era inferior ao do seu adversário. A segunda experiência consistia num jogo do ditador com duas opções: uma escolha egoísta/altruísta (A), onde o ditador recebia mais ganho, mas o seu recipiente recebia mais que ele e uma escolha malevolente (B) que oferecia menos ganhos ao ditador que a A mas mais ganhos que o recipiente. O dilema era que se as crianças se comportassem de maneira egoísta, obtinham mais ganho para si, ao mesmo tempo que aumentavam o ganho do seu colega. Se fossem malevolentes, então prefeririam ter mais ganho que o seu colega ao mesmo tempo que tinham menos para eles próprios. As experiências foram efetuadas em escolas de duas áreas distintas de Portugal (continente e Açores) para perceber se as preferências malevolentes aumentavam ou diminuíam com a idade. Os resultados na primeira experiência sugerem que (1) os alunos compreenderam a primeira variante como um jogo de coordenação e comportaram-se como maximizadores, copiando as jogadas anteriores dos seus adversários; (2) que os alunos repetentes se comportaram preferencialmente como malevolentes, mais frequentemente que como maximizadores, com especial ênfase para os alunos de 14 anos; (3) maioria dos alunos comportou-se reciprocamente desde os 12 até aos 16 anos de idade, após os quais começaram a desenvolver uma maior tolerância às escolhas dos seus parceiros. Os resultados da segunda experiência sugerem que (1) as estratégias egoístas eram prevalentes até aos 6 anos de idade, (2) as tendências altruístas emergiram até aos 8 anos de idade e (3) as estratégias de malevolência começaram a emergir a partir dos 8 anos de idade. Estes resultados complementam a literatura relativamente escassa sobre malevolência e sugerem que este comportamento está intimamente ligado a preferências de consideração sobre os outros, o paroquialismo e os estágios de desenvolvimento das crianças.************************************************************Spite is defined as an act that causes loss of payoff to an opponent at a cost to the actor. As one of the four fundamental behaviours in sociobiology, it has received far less attention than its counterparts selfishness and cooperation. It has however been established as a viable strategy in small populations when used against negatively related individuals. Because of this, spite can either i) disappear or ii) remain at equilibrium with cooperative strategies due to the willingness of spiteful individuals to pay a cost in order to punish. This thesis sets out to understand whether propensity for spiteful behaviour is inherent or if it develops with age. For that effect, two game-theoretical experiments were performed with schoolboys and schoolgirls aged 6 to 22. The first, a 2 x 2 game, was tested in two variants: 1) a prize was awarded to both players, proportional to accumulated points; 2), a prize was given to the player with most points. Each player faced the following dilemma: i) to maximise pay-off risking a lower pay-off than the opponent; or ii) not to maximise pay-off in order to cut down the opponent below their own. The second game was a dictator experiment with two choices, (A) a selfish/altruistic choice affording more payoff to the donor than B, but more to the recipient than to the donor, and (B) a spiteful choice that afforded less payoff to the donor than A, but even lower payoff to the recipient. The dilemma here was that if subjects behaved selfishly, they obtained more payoff for themselves, while at the same time increasing their opponent payoff. If they were spiteful, they would rather have more payoff than their colleague, at the cost of less for themselves. Experiments were run in schools in two different areas in Portugal (mainland and Azores) to understand whether spiteful preferences varied with age. Results in the first experiment suggested that (1) students understood the first variant as a coordination game and engaged in maximising behaviour by copying their opponent’s plays; (2) repeating students preferentially engaged in spiteful behaviour more often than maximising behaviour, with special emphasis on 14 year-olds; (3) most students engaged in reciprocal behaviour from ages 12 to 16, as they began developing higher tolerance for their opponent choices. Results for the second experiment suggested that (1) selfish strategies were prevalent until the age of 6, (2) altruistic tendencies emerged since then, and (3) spiteful strategies began being chosen more often by 8 year-olds. These results add to the relatively scarce body of literature on spite and suggest that this type of behaviour is closely tied with other-regarding preferences, parochialism and the children’s stages of development.

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An infinite-horizon discrete time model with multiple size-class structures using a transition matrix is built to assess optimal harvesting schedules in the context of Non-Industrial Private Forest (NIPF) owners. Three model specifications accounting for forest income, financial return on an asset and amenity valuations are considered. Numerical simulations suggest uneven-aged forest management where a rational forest owner adapts her or his forest policy by influencing the regeneration of trees or adjusting consumption dynamics depending on subjective time preference and market return rate dynamics on the financial asset. Moreover she or he does not value significantly non-market benefits captured by amenity valuations relatively to forest income.

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A Socioecological Field Study.This monograph reports on a 26 month socioecological study of black spider monkeys (Ateles paniscus paniscus)in the Raleigh-vallen — Voltzberg Nature Reserve, Surinam. It recognizes the fundamental importance of food to the behavior and the regulation of population density fox this primate. It clarifies the complex temporal and spatial effects of tropical rain forest food sources on the behavior of a group of spider monkeys, concentrating on food category, food plant identity and phenology, and quantity, density and dispersion of the most important food sources. In addition, the present study describes habitat choice, optimal feeding strategy and sexual behavior of the spider monkey, and discusses implications of diet for social behavior. This study is also fundamental to conservation. Specialized in eating mature fruits, the spider monkey is a very important dispersal agent for many trees and lianes, particularly canopy species. However, the spider monkey is probably the most vulnerable monkey species in Surinam and it is disappearing rapidly throughout the remainder of its range. Unfortunately, it is large and noisy and can be easily tracked and hunted. It is largely restricted to undisturbed high forest, and consequently habitat destruction has more effect on it than on most other species. Together with its slow reproductive rate (a female gives birth only once every four or five years), this means that the species is poorly adapted to recover from exploitation. In order to implement proper measures for conservation, data on forest type preferences, diet and social behavior of the species, or on closely related species, in undisturbed areas, such as the one described in this monograph, are essential tools for assessing the potential of proposed protected areas.

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The alimentary preferences of five species of wood-feeding termites of the genus Nasutitermes that coexist in the inundated forests of the floodplains of the Amazon river várzea for species of fresh wood and for wood in different stages of decomposition was evaluated in laboratory tests. Wood of low density was generally preferred; the decay stages were preferred over fresh wood. The five termite species differ in the amplitude of their choices, indicating a strong differentiation in food choice among them. Differences in feeding preferences may be a niche-separating factor for these five Nasutitermes species of the floodplains.

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Modeling clays have been used in several ecological experiments and have proved to be an important tool to variables control. The objective of our study was to determine if fruit color in isolated and grouped displays influences the fruit selection by birds in the field using artificial fruits. Data were collected in six plots distributed homogeneously in 3 km long trails with a minimum distance of 0.5 km. We used a paired experimental design to establish our experiments, so that all treatments were available to the local bird community in each plot. Overall, red was more pecked than brown and white. Isolated red and brown displays were significantly more pecked than others display. Even though our study was conducted in small spatial scales, artificial fruits appeared to be efficient in register fruit consumption attempts by bird. Although inconclusive about selective forces that sharp the dynamics of fruit color polymorphisms and choice by frugivorous birds, our findings corroborate recent studies wherein birds showed preferences by high- over low-contrast fruit signals.

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The aim of this paper is to find normative foundations of Approval Voting. In order to show that Approval Voting is the only social choice function that satisfies anonymity, neutrality, strategy-proofness and strict monotonicity we rely on an intermediate result which relates strategy-proofness of a social choice function to the properties of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and monotonicity of the corresponding social welfare function. Afterwards we characterize Approval Voting by means of strict symmetry, neutrality and strict monotonicity and relate this result to May's Theorem. Finally, we show that it is possible to substitute the property of strict monotonicity by the one efficiency of in the second characterization.

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The division problem consists of allocating an amount M of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, the uniform rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. Ching and Serizawa (1998) extended this result by showing that the set of single-plateaued preferences is the largest domain, for all possible values of M, admitting a rule (the extended uniform rule) satisfying strategy-proofness, efficiency and symmetry. We identify, for each M and n, a maximal domain of preferences under which the extended uniform rule also satisfies the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, continuity, and "tops-onlyness". These domains (called weakly single-plateaued) are strictly larger than the set of single-plateaued preferences. However, their intersection, when M varies from zero to infinity, coincides with the set of single-plateaued preferences.

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We consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose an alternative from a finite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. An allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set of its users. Agents have gregarious preferences over allocations: given an allocation, they prefer that the set of users becomes larger. We require that the final allocation be efficient and stable (no agent can be forced to be a user and no agent who wants to be a user can be excluded). We propose a two-stage sequential mechanism whose unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is an efficient and stable allocation which also satisfies a maximal participation property.