On commercial media bias

Within the spokes model of Chen and Riordan (2007) that allowsfor non-localized competition among arbitrary numbers of media outlets, we quantify the effect of concentration of ownership on qualityand bias of media content. A main result shows that too few commercial outlets, or better, too few separate owners of commercial outlets can lead to substantial bias in equilibrium. Increasing the number of outlets (commercial and non-commercial) tends to bring down this bias; but the strongest effect occurs when the number of owners is increased. Allowing for free entry provides lower bounds on fixed costs above which substantial commercial bias occurs in equilibrium.

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, How to register -- and cut unwanted commercial telemarketing calls, January 2008

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: How to register -- and cut unwanted commercial telemarketing calls.

Iowa Commercial Banking, Strategic Plan, 2003

This report outlines the strategic plan for Iowa Alcoholic Beverages Division including, goals and mission.

Concentration and self-censorship in commercial media

Within a simple model of non-localized, Hotelling-type competitionamong arbitrary numbers of media outlets we characterize qualityand content of media under different ownership structures. Assumingadvertising-sponsored, profit-maximizing outlets, we show that (i) topicssensitive to advertisers can be underreported (self-censored) by alloutlets in the market, (ii) self-censorship increases with the concentrationof ownership, (iii) adding outlets, while keeping the number ofowners fixed, may even increase self-censorship; the latter result relieson consumers' most preferred outlets being potentially owned by thesame media companies. We argue that externalities resulting fromself-censorship could be empirically large.