UCPR 229 - defamation proceedings – damages to be assessed – application to interrogate as to defendant’s motive - implications of Defamation ACT 2005 - application to interrogate before action - when in the interests of justice

In Hogan v Ellery [2009] QDC 154 McGill DCJ considered two applications for leave to deliver interrogatories under r 229 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (UCPR). The judgment provides useful analysis of the circumstances in which a plaintiff may obtain leave to deliver interrogatories to a defendant in defamation proceedings, and also to a non-party before action.

Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) s 253 - leave to appeal costs orders - appeal against substantive judgment insufficient - must be arguable case that discretion will be overturned on appeal

The recent decision of the Court of Appeal in AGL Sales (Qld) Pty Ltd v Dawson Sales Pty Ltd [2009] QCA 262 provides clear direction on the Court’s expectations of a party seeking leave to appeal a costs order.This decision is likely to impact upon common practice in relation to appeals against costs orders. It sends a clear message to trial judges that they should not give leave as of course when giving a judgment in relation to costs, and that parties seeking leave under s 253 of the Supreme Court Act 1995 (Qld) should make a separate application. The application should be supported by material presenting an arguable case that the trial judge made an error in the exercise of the discretion of the kind described in House v King (1936) 55 CLR 499. A different, and interesting, aspect of this appeal is that it was the first wholly electronic civil appeal. The court-provided technology had been adopted at trial, and the Court of Appeal dispensed with any requirement for hard copy appeal record books.

Volunteers 'piggy-backing' on their private insurance : an uncertain protection against liability

Volunteering is a very important part of life in Australia with an estimated 36% of the adult population volunteering in 2010. Voluntary work generates economic benefits, addresses community needs and develops the social networks that form the backbone of civil society. Without volunteers, many essential services would either cease to exist or become too expensive for many people to afford. These volunteers, who by definition are not in receipt of any remuneration for their work and services, are exposed to personal injury and to legal liability in the discharge of their functions. It is therefore appropriate that statutory protection is extended to volunteers and that volunteer organisations procure public liability and personal accident cover where possible. However, given the patchwork quilt of circumstances where statutory or institutional cover is available to volunteers and the existence of many and diverse exclusions, it is important to have regard also to what scope a volunteer may have to avail themselves of protection against liability for volunteering activity by relying upon their own personal insurance cover. This article considers the extent of private insurance cover and its availability to volunteers under home and contents insurance and under comprehensive motor vehicle insurance. The most common policies in the Australian market are examined and the uncertain nature of protection against liability afforded by these policies is discussed. This uncertainty could be reduced should the Federal Government through amendments to the Insurance Contracts Regulations standardise the circumstances and extent to which liability protection was afforded to an insured holding home and contents insurance and comprehensive motor vehicle insurance cover.

Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 s45 - whether obligation to co-operate may authorise order requiring commencement of proceedings by minor prior to expiration of limitation period

In Australian Associated Motor Insurers Ltd v McPaul; Council of the City of Gold Coast v McPaul [2005] QSC 278 the applicant insurer sought an order requiring a claimant who had been injured in a motor vehicle accident some years earlier when he was five years old to commence a proceeding to determine the question of the applicant's liability to him. The applicant's interest in seeking the order was to avoid the prejudice which could follow from further delay, particularly delay until the respondent became obliged to commence proceedings to avoid a limitations bar.

Practice and procedure : Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 s56

In Amos v Brisbane City Council [2005] QCA 433 the Queensland Court of Appeal was called upon to determine the scope of s56 of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002. The decision makes it clear that the section does not provide a complete code governing awards of damages and does not deprive the court of power to award costs against a plaintiff who fails to succeed on liability.

Review of penalties and additional damages : Trade Marks Act 1995

Effective enforcement of intellectual property (IP) rights has become a significant issue due to concerns about the effects of IP infringement, including trade mark counterfeiting. It is an important issue for the Australian Government as IP rights underpin a strong, modern economy. Criminal offences and civil remedies can be an important element of an enforcement regime. This review of penalties and additional damages in the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) (Trade Marks Act) has been prompted by a recommendation made by the Advisory Council on Intellectual Property (ACIP), recent changes to the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) (Copyright Act) and concerns raised by stakeholders. The purpose of this paper is to elicit comments on options which IP Australia is considering recommending to Government.

OHS liability, corporate officers and corporate groups

This article examines the new model for corporate officer liability under section 144 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 (Vic), and explores the extent to which this might effectively extend responsibility for OHS offences to members of corporate groups, such as holding companies. In doing so, the authors canvass the failure of corporate law to impose such obligations on corporate officers in general, and on holding companies as shadow officers. It is argued that provisions such as section 144 of the Victorian Act should be included in all OHS legislation.

Insurance and transport law : controlling insurance contract terms : Section 54 of the Insurance Contracts Act – compliance, recovery and accountability

Commonwealth legislation covering insurance contracts contains numerous provisions designed to control the operation and effect of terms in life and general insurance contracts. For example, the Life Insurance Act 1995 (Cth) contains provisions regulating the consequences attendant upon incorrect statements in proposals [1] and non-payment of premiums, [2] provides that an insurer may only exclude liability in the case of suicide if it has made express provision for such contingency in its policy, [3] and severely restricts the efficacy of conditions as to war risks. [4] The Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) is even more intrusive and has a major impact upon contractual provisions in the general insurance field. It is beyond the scope of this note to explore all of these provisions in any detail but examples of controls and constraints imposed upon the operation and effect of contractual provisions include the following. A party is precluded from relying upon a provision in a contract of insurance if such reliance would amount to a failure to act with the utmost good faith. [5] Similarly, a policy provision which requires differences or disputes arising out of the insurance to be submitted to arbitration is void, [6] unless the insurance is a genuine cover for excess of loss over and above another specified insurance. [7] Similarly clause such as conciliation clauses, [8] average clauses, [9] and unusual terms [10] are given qualified operation. [11] However the provision in the Insurance Contracts Act that has the greatest impact upon, and application to, a wide range of insurance clauses and claims is s 54. This section has already generated a significant volume of case law and is the focus of this note. In particular this note examines two recent cases. The first, Johnson v Triple C Furniture and Electrical Pty Ltd [2012] 2 Qd R 337, (hereafter the Triple C case), is a decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal; and the second, Matthew Maxwell v Highway Hauliers Pty Ltd [2013] WASCA 115, (hereafter the Highway Hauliers case), is a decision of the Court of Appeal in Western Australia. This latter decision is on appeal to the High Court of Australia. The note considers too the decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Prepaid Services Pty Ltd v Atradius Credit Insurance NV [2013] NSWCA 252 (hereafter the Prepaid Services case).These cases serve to highlight the complex nature of s 54 and its application, as well as the difficulty in achieving a balance between an insurer and an insured's reasonable expectations.

Duty and control in intermediary copyright liability: An Australian perspective

In the internet age, copyright owners are increasingly looking to online intermediaries to take steps to prevent copyright infringement. Sometimes these intermediaries are closely tied to the acts of infringement; sometimes – as in the case of ISPs – they are not. In 2012, the Australian High Court decided the Roadshow Films v iiNet case, in which it held that an Australian ISP was not liable under copyright’s authorization doctrine, which asks whether the intermediary has sanctioned, approved or countenanced the infringement. The Australian Copyright Act 1968 directs a court to consider, in these situations, whether the intermediary had the power to prevent the infringement and whether it took any reasonable steps to prevent or avoid the infringement. It is generally not difficult for a court to find the power to prevent infringement – power to prevent can include an unrefined technical ability to disconnect users from the copyright source, such as an ISP terminating users’ internet accounts. In the iiNet case, the High Court eschewed this broad approach in favor of focusing on a notion of control that was influenced by principles of tort law. In tort, when a plaintiff asserts that a defendant should be liable for failing to act to prevent harm caused to the plaintiff by a third party, there is a heavy burden on the plaintiff to show that the defendant had a duty to act. The duty must be clear and specific, and will often hinge on the degree of control that the defendant was able to exercise over the third party. Control in these circumstances relates directly to control over the third party’s actions in inflicting the harm. Thus, in iiNet’s case, the control would need to be directed to the third party’s infringing use of BitTorrent; control over a person’s ability to access the internet is too imprecise. Further, when considering omissions to act, tort law differentiates between the ability to control and the ability to hinder. The ability to control may establish a duty to act, and the court will then look to small measures taken to prevent the harm to determine whether these satisfy the duty. But the ability to hinder will not suffice to establish liability in the absence of control. This article argues that an inquiry grounded in control as defined in tort law would provide a more principled framework for assessing the liability of passive intermediaries in copyright. In particular, it would set a higher, more stable benchmark for determining the copyright liability of passive intermediaries, based on the degree of actual, direct control that the intermediary can exercise over the infringing actions of its users. This approach would provide greater clarity and consistency than has existed to date in this area of copyright law in Australia.

Integrated reporting and directors’ concerns about personal liability exposure: Law reform options

Integrated reporting () holds significant promise as a new reporting paradigm that is holistic, strategic, responsive, material, and relevant across multiple time frames. However, its uptake in Australia is being hampered by directors’ concerns about personal liability exposure, particularly for forward-looking statements that subsequently prove to be unfounded. This article seeks to illuminate the bases for these liability concerns by outlining the similarities between and the operating and financial review requirements under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), and the relevant grounds for liability for misleading and deceptive disclosures, and breach of directors’ duties. In light of this discussion, this article proposes four possible reform options, ranging from minor adaptations to the Framework to far-reaching reforms of the Corporations Act. As assurance is desirable to ensure that reliance can be placed on integrated reports, the development of a legal safe harbour for auditors of forward-looking information is also canvassed.

Trick or treaty?: The Australian debate over the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement

The secretive 2011 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement – known in short by the catchy acronym ACTA – is a controversial trade pact designed to provide for stronger enforcement of intellectual property rights. The preamble to the treaty reads like pulp fiction – it raises moral panics about piracy, counterfeiting, organised crime, and border security. The agreement contains provisions on civil remedies and criminal offences; copyright law and trademark law; the regulation of the digital environment; and border measures. Memorably, Susan Sell called the international treaty a TRIPS Double-Plus Agreement, because its obligations far exceed those of the World Trade Organization's TRIPS Agreement 1994, and TRIPS-Plus Agreements, such as the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement 2004. ACTA lacks the language of other international intellectual property agreements, which emphasise the need to balance the protection of intellectual property owners with the wider public interest in access to medicines, human development, and transfer of knowledge and technology. In Australia, there was much controversy both about the form and the substance of ACTA. While the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade was a partisan supporter of the agreement, a wide range of stakeholders were openly critical. After holding hearings and taking note of the position of the European Parliament and the controversy in the United States, the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties in the Australian Parliament recommended the deferral of ratification of ACTA. This was striking as representatives of all the main parties agreed on the recommendation. The committee was concerned about the lack of transparency, due process, public participation, and substantive analysis of the treaty. There were also reservations about the ambiguity of the treaty text, and its potential implications for the digital economy, innovation and competition, plain packaging of tobacco products, and access to essential medicines. The treaty has provoked much soul-searching as to whether the Trick or Treaty reforms on the international treaty-making process in Australia have been compromised or undermined. Although ACTA stalled in the Australian Parliament, the debate over it is yet to conclude. There have been concerns in Australia and elsewhere that ACTA will be revived as a ‘zombie agreement’. Indeed, in March 2013, the Canadian government introduced a bill to ensure compliance with ACTA. Will it be also resurrected in Australia? Has it already been revived? There are three possibilities. First, the Australian government passed enhanced remedies with respect to piracy, counterfeiting and border measures in a separate piece of legislation – the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Act 2012 (Cth). Second, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade remains supportive of ACTA. It is possible, after further analysis, that the next Australian Parliament – to be elected in September 2013 – will ratify the treaty. Third, Australia is involved in the Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations. The government has argued that ACTA should be a template for the Intellectual Property Chapter in the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The United States Trade Representative would prefer a regime even stronger than ACTA. This chapter provides a portrait of the Australian debate over ACTA. It is the account of an interested participant in the policy proceedings. This chapter will first consider the deliberations and recommendations of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties on ACTA. Second, there was a concern that ACTA had failed to provide appropriate safeguards with respect to civil liberties, human rights, consumer protection and privacy laws. Third, there was a concern about the lack of balance in the treaty’s copyright measures; the definition of piracy is overbroad; the suite of civil remedies, criminal offences and border measures is excessive; and there is a lack of suitable protection for copyright exceptions, limitations and remedies. Fourth, there was a worry that the provisions on trademark law, intermediary liability and counterfeiting could have an adverse impact upon consumer interests, competition policy and innovation in the digital economy. Fifth, there was significant debate about the impact of ACTA on pharmaceutical drugs, access to essential medicines and health-care. Sixth, there was concern over the lobbying by tobacco industries for ACTA – particularly given Australia’s leadership on tobacco control and the plain packaging of tobacco products. Seventh, there were concerns about the operation of border measures in ACTA. Eighth, the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties was concerned about the jurisdiction of the ACTA Committee, and the treaty’s protean nature. Finally, the chapter raises fundamental issues about the relationship between the executive and the Australian Parliament with respect to treaty-making. There is a need to reconsider the efficacy of the Trick or Treaty reforms passed by the Australian Parliament in the 1990s.

A Comparison of the Implementation of the Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) in the United States and the Disability Discrimination Act (DDA) 1995 in the United Kingdom

This summarizes the results of recently conducted surveys in the United States and Britain to assess employer response in each of these countries to their respective employment disability nondiscrimination legislation.

Duty and Control in Intermediary Copyright Liability: An Australian Perspective

In the internet age, copyright owners are increasingly looking to online intermediaries to take steps to prevent copyright infringement. Sometimes these intermediaries are closely tied to the acts of infringement; sometimes – as in the case of ISPs – they are not. In 2012, the Australian High Court decided the Roadshow Films v iiNet case, in which it held that an Australian ISP was not liable under copyright’s authorization doctrine, which asks whether the intermediary has sanctioned, approved or countenanced the infringement. The Australian Copyright Act 1968 directs a court to consider, in these situations, whether the intermediary had the power to prevent the infringement and whether it took any reasonable steps to prevent or avoid the infringement. It is generally not difficult for a court to find the power to prevent infringement – power to prevent can include an unrefined technical ability to disconnect users from the copyright source, such as an ISP terminating users’ internet accounts. In the iiNet case, the High Court eschewed this broad approach in favor of focusing on a notion of control that was influenced by principles of tort law. In tort, when a plaintiff asserts that a defendant should be liable for failing to act to prevent harm caused to the plaintiff by a third party, there is a heavy burden on the plaintiff to show that the defendant had a duty to act. The duty must be clear and specific, and will often hinge on the degree of control that the defendant was able to exercise over the third party. Control in these circumstances relates directly to control over the third party’s actions in inflicting the harm. Thus, in iiNet’s case, the control would need to be directed to the third party’s infringing use of BitTorrent; control over a person’s ability to access the internet is too imprecise. Further, when considering omissions to act, tort law differentiates between the ability to control and the ability to hinder. The ability to control may establish a duty to act, and the court will then look to small measures taken to prevent the harm to determine whether these satisfy the duty. But the ability to hinder will not suffice to establish liability in the absence of control. This chapter argues that an inquiry grounded in control as defined in tort law would provide a more principled framework for assessing the liability of passive intermediaries in copyright. In particular, it would set a higher, more stable benchmark for determining the copyright liability of passive intermediaries, based on the degree of actual, direct control that the intermediary can exercise over the infringing actions of its users. This approach would provide greater clarity and consistency than has existed to date in this area of copyright law in Australia.

O novo perfil da culpa na responsabilidade civil: a culpa como critério para gradação da indenização

A presente tese propõe um estudo teórico dos perfis estrutural e funcional da culpa a partir do novo marco normativo introduzido no direito brasileiro pelo parágrafo único, do artigo 944 do Código Civil. Por meio de uma análise da disciplina normativa da culpa na seara da responsabilidade civil extracontratual, demonstra-se, neste trabalho que, a despeito do incremento das hipóteses de responsabilidade objetiva, a culpa ainda detém papel relevante no Direito Civil brasileiro. Além de atuar como fator de surgimento do dever de indenizar, a culpa também desempenha hoje a importante função de critério para fixação do valor da indenização. Os estudos realizados comprovam que esses diferentes papéis da culpa lhe imprimem contornos normativos distintos, não sendo mais possível hoje a adoção de uma teoria unitária para a descrição desse instituto jurídico. Ao contrário de seu perfil na esfera das regras de imputação de responsabilidade, onde é apreciada de forma abstrata e objetiva, no plano em que atua como critério de definição da extensão da indenização, a culpa assume feições concretas e pessoais. O estudo foi realizado mediante pesquisa bibliográfica, que compreendeu levantamento de doutrina, jurisprudência e legislação pertinentes.

A concepção de liberdade civil utilitarista em John Stuart Mill e suas contribuições

A vida impõe decisões às pessoas o tempo todo, e as pessoas as tomam de acordo com seus valores considerando as particularidades de cada situação. Valo-res são quaisquer aspectos da decisão que sejam considerados desejáveis, indese-jáveis, relevantes e importantes como: ser preferido, desejável, agradável, promis-sor, seguro, emocionante, justo, bom, correto, fácil, incerto, etc. Com base nestes valores, entendemos que o fundamento último do utilitarismo é o princípio da maximização da felicidade. Segundo esta concepção, uma ação é considerada correta, logo válida, se ela promover maior felicidade dos implicados. A felicidade é entendida como o alcance do prazer e do bem-estar. Nesta corrente encontramos uma perspectiva eudamonista e hedonista, uma vez que tem em vista como objectivo final a felicidade que consiste no prazer. Qualquer utilitarista tem de se importar, sobretudo com a promoção da felicidade geral. A partir de Mill, a moralidade passa a ser realização de cada ser humano neste mundo, aqui e agora. O princípio de utilidade exige que cada um de nós faça o que for necessário e estiver ao seu alcançe para promover a felicidade e evitar a dor. Ao analisarmos as consequências previsíveis de uma ação, temos que considerar não apenas a quantidade, mas a qualidade de prazer que dela possa resultar. Para os utilitaristas o que importa são as consequências das ações, elas devem visar ao prazer, e somente isso permite avaliar se uma ação é correta ou não, logo é uma perspectiva consequencialista. O que importa são as consequências e não os motivos das nossas ações, desde que isso promova a felicidade ao maior número de pessoas possível. Mas, o ato só é permissível se, e apenas se, maximiza imparcialmente o bem. A filosofia Utilitarista costuma dividir seus leitores. É exaltada por alguns, que defendem o mérito de ser um ponto de vista que oferece melhores subsídios para melhor lidarmos com as questões éticas que realmente importam e estão associadas às condições que tornam possível uma vida feliz e se possível, isenta de sofrimentos. Por outro lado, há aqueles que apontam para o perigo de uma filosofia que estima a qualidade moral de ações levando em consideração apenas as suas consequências. Esta corrente não é uma escola filosófica, uma vez que se trata de uma filosofia que constantemente se reinventa e se adapta a fim de ir sempre ao encontro de novos desafios que uma ética não pode deixar de enfrentar.