855 resultados para CREEP MECHANISMS
Resumo:
Abstract Cardiac remodeling is defined as a group of molecular, cellular and interstitial changes that manifest clinically as changes in size, mass, geometry and function of the heart after injury. The process results in poor prognosis because of its association with ventricular dysfunction and malignant arrhythmias. Here, we discuss the concepts and clinical implications of cardiac remodeling, and the pathophysiological role of different factors, including cell death, energy metabolism, oxidative stress, inflammation, collagen, contractile proteins, calcium transport, geometry and neurohormonal activation. Finally, the article describes the pharmacological treatment of cardiac remodeling, which can be divided into three different stages of strategies: consolidated, promising and potential strategies.
Resumo:
Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Naturwiss., Diss., 2010
Resumo:
Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Naturwiss., Diss., 2010
Resumo:
Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Naturwiss., Diss., 2012
Resumo:
Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Naturwiss., Diss., 2013
Resumo:
Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Naturwiss., Diss., 2013
Resumo:
Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Maschinenbau, Diss., 2009
Resumo:
Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Maschinenbau, Diss., 2014
Resumo:
Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Maschinenbau, Diss., 2014
Resumo:
This paper examines the governance of Spanish Banks around two main issues. First, does a poor economic performance activate those governance interventions that favor the removal of executive directors and the merger of non-performing banks? And second, does the relationship between governance intervention and economic performance vary with the ownership form of the bank? Our results show that a bad performance does activate governance mechanisms in banks, although for the case of Savings Banks intervention is confined to a merger or acquisition. Nevertheless, the distinct ownership structure of Savings Banks does not fully protect non-performing banks from disappearing. Product-market competition compensates for those weak internal governance mechanisms that result from an ownership form which gives voice to several stakeholder groups.
Resumo:
Ma (1996) studied the random order mechanism, a matching mechanism suggested by Roth and Vande Vate (1990) for marriage markets. By means of an example he showed that the random order mechanism does not always reach all stable matchings. Although Ma's (1996) result is true, we show that the probability distribution he presented - and therefore the proof of his Claim 2 - is not correct. The mistake in the calculations by Ma (1996) is due to the fact that even though the example looks very symmetric, some of the calculations are not as ''symmetric.''
Resumo:
For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q-separable preferences over subsets of workers we show that the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers. In order to prove this result, we also show that under this domain of preferences (which contains the domain of responsive preferences of the college admissions problem) the workers-optimal stable matching is weakly Pareto optimal for the workers and the Blocking Lemma holds as well. We exhibit an example showing that none of these three results remain true if the preferences of firms are substitutable but not quota q-separable.
Resumo:
This paper studies behavior in experiments with a linear voluntary contributions mechanism for public goods conducted in Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and the USA. The same experimental design was used in the four countries. Our 'contribution function' design allows us to obtain a view of subjects' behavior from two complementary points of view. If yields information about situations where, in purely pecuniary terms, it is a dominant strategy to contribute all the endowment and about situations where it is a dominant strategy to contribute nothing. Our results show, first, that differences in behavior across countries are minor. We find that when people play "the same game" they behave similarly. Second, for all four countries our data are inconsistent with the explanation that subjects contribute only out of confusion. A common cooperative motivation is needed to explain the date.
Resumo:
According to the account of the European Union (EU) decision making proposed in this paper, this is a bargaining process during which actors shift their policy positions with a view to reaching agreements on controversial issues.