Opportunistic Scheduling in Cellular Systems in the Presence of Noncooperative Mobiles

A central scheduling problem in wireless communications is that of allocating resources to one of many mobile stations that have a common radio channel. Much attention has been given to the design of efficient and fair scheduling schemes that are centrally controlled by a base station (BS) whose decisions depend on the channel conditions reported by each mobile. The BS is the only entity taking decisions in this framework. The decisions are based on the reports of mobiles on their radio channel conditions. In this paper, we study the scheduling problem from a game-theoretic perspective in which some of the mobiles may be noncooperative or strategic, and may not necessarily report their true channel conditions. We model this situation as a signaling game and study its equilibria. We demonstrate that the only Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) of the signaling game are of the babbling type: the noncooperative mobiles send signals independent of their channel states, the BS simply ignores them, and allocates channels based only on the prior information on the channel statistics. We then propose various approaches to enforce truthful signaling of the radio channel conditions: a pricing approach, an approach based on some knowledge of the mobiles' policies, and an approach that replaces this knowledge by a stochastic approximations approach that combines estimation and control. We further identify other equilibria that involve non-truthful signaling.

Fair Scheduling in Cellular Systems in the Presence of Noncooperative Mobiles

We consider the problem of ``fair'' scheduling the resources to one of the many mobile stations by a centrally controlled base station (BS). The BS is the only entity taking decisions in this framework based on truthful information from the mobiles on their radio channel. We study the well-known family of parametric alpha-fair scheduling problems from a game-theoretic perspective in which some of the mobiles may be noncooperative. We first show that if the BS is unaware of the noncooperative behavior from the mobiles, the noncooperative mobiles become successful in snatching the resources from the other cooperative mobiles, resulting in unfair allocations. If the BS is aware of the noncooperative mobiles, a new game arises with BS as an additional player. It can then do better by neglecting the signals from the noncooperative mobiles. The BS, however, becomes successful in eliciting the truthful signals from the mobiles only when it uses additional information (signal statistics). This new policy along with the truthful signals from mobiles forms a Nash equilibrium (NE) that we call a Truth Revealing Equilibrium. Finally, we propose new iterative algorithms to implement fair scheduling policies that robustify the otherwise nonrobust (in presence of noncooperation) alpha-fair scheduling algorithms.

Understanding the ex-ante cost of liquidity in the limit order book: A note

This paper estimates a new measure of liquidity costs in a market driven by orders. It represents thecost of simultaneously buying and selling a given amount of shares, and it is given by a single measure of ex-ante liquidity that aggregates all available information in the limit order book for a given number of shares. The cost of liquidity is an increasing function relating bid-ask spreads with the amounts available for trading. This measure completely characterizes the cost of liquidity of any given asset. It does not suffer from the usual ambiguities related to either the bid-ask spread or depth when they are considered separately. On the contrary, with a single measure, we are able to capture all dimensions of liquidity costs on ex-ante basis.

ICSF guide book: understanding the Work in Fishing Convention, 2007

This guidebook attempts to provide a quick overview of the Work in Fishing Convention, 2007, which was adopted in Geneva, Switzerland, in June 2007 at the 96th International Labour Conference (ILC) of the International Labour Organization (ILO). It does not purport to provide interpretation of any provisions of the Convention and should not in any way be treated as a substitute for the actual provisions it contains. This guidebook is intended mainly to help those unfamiliar with the Convention and the working of the ILO and the ILC, gain some understanding of the relevant issues. In particular, it is hoped that the guidebook will aid fish workers and their organizations understand the possible benefits and implications of the Convention for artisanal and small-scale fisheries in developing countries.

Towards accessible e-book platforms

Outcomes of a piece of research into the accessibility of e-books. LTD

Towards accessible e-book platforms

A small scale project was funded to explore the accessibility of e-book platforms, offer specific confidential advice for participating partners and provide generic guidance for publishers and aggregators.

Good practice guidance for library and information professionals - moving towards accessible e-book platforms

Good practice guidance for publishers and procurers of e-book platforms based on the benefits and barriers identified by robust testing using real people with disabilities