O Programa de Ajustamento Estrutural na República da Guiné-Bissau: Uma avaliação política e Ética

Os guineenses assumiram o desenvolvimento como uma das metas a atingir e a estabilização e o ajustamento foi-lhes imposta como solução para os problemas estruturais existentes. No entanto, a forma como têm vindo a ser concebidos pelo Banco Mundial e pelo Fundo Monetário Internacional, direccionada sobretudo para a área económica, acabou por limitar o papel dos Programas de Ajustamento Estrutural (PAE) tidos como indutores do desenvolvimento, tornando-os num agregado de premissas austeras, com resultados não esperados. As propostas do FMI e do BM, tendendo para a liberalização económica e estímulo dos mercados em detrimento da intervenção estatal, traduzem-se em medidas de redução de taxas de utilização dos serviços públicos, supressão de subsídios, redimensionamento da administração pública, cortes, congelamentos salariais e privatizações. Os resultados destas reformas foram catastróficos, porquanto não só não melhoraram o défice orçamental, como os efeitos negativos das restrições orçamentais sobre o bem-estar, geraram um ambiente de promiscuidade social e o agravamento do sector informal como estratégia de sobrevivência Tendo em conta o objecto em estudo, isto é, a relação de forças que encontrámos entre o relacionamento entre os actores políticos guineenses e as Instituições Financeiras Internacionais, notámos que a ausência de comportamentos éticos também influiu nos resultados. Por um lado, o BM e o FMI, perante um Estado fragilizado, apresentaram condicionalismos à obtenção de empréstimos e ajudas, por outro lado, os actores guineenses, mesmo perante este dilema, não se coibiram do exercício da corrupção, do clientelismo e do neo-patrimonialismo, como estratégia para o enriquecimento fácil.

Audit report on the Iowa Judicial Retirement System for the year ended June 30, 2006

Audit report on the Iowa Judicial Retirement System for the year ended June 30, 2006

Principis ètics de l’assessorament a la instància judicial

Arran de les exposicions de la jornada de treball desenvolupada el passat 30 de novembre de 2007 es va veure que hi havia una preocupació comuna dels tècnics entorn dels dilemes ètics que es generen en el nostre entorn professional. De les dotze dimensions que es recollien en el qüestionari sobre com pensem que hauria de ser un bon professional, hi destacàvem: responsable, honest, coherent, competent, veraç i rigorós. D’altra banda, sobre com pensem que actuem els mateixos professionals, hi trobàvem prioritzats els valors: actitud crítica, veracitat, competència, comunicació i competències socials. El manual de bones pràctiques, que tot seguit us presentem, és el resultat de l’experiència de la pràctica professional i de l’anàlisi, discussió i revisió de documentació pel grup de tècnics que ha integrat aquest grup, com també, de totes les aportacions recollides abans i durant la jornada esmentada, esperant poder continuar-ne recollint dins el marc del Programa Compartim. Pretenem doncs, garantir-ne el seu compliment i supervisió, mitjançant el seguiment, amb els mecanismes i eines per a compartir inquietuds i objectius.

Audit report on the Iowa Judicial Branch for the year ended June 30, 2006

Audit report on the Iowa Judicial Branch for the year ended June 30, 2006

Combined audit report on the eight Judicial District Departments of Correctional Services for the year ended June 30, 2006

Combined audit report on the eight Judicial District Departments of Correctional Services for the year ended June 30, 2006

Audit report on the Iowa Judicial Branch – County Clerks of District Courts, a part of the State of Iowa, for the year ended June 30, 2006

Audit report on the Iowa Judicial Branch – County Clerks of District Courts, a part of the State of Iowa, for the year ended June 30, 2006

Judicial presence and rent extraction

We estimate the effect of state judiciary presence on rent extraction in Brazilian local governments.We measure rents as irregularities related to waste or corruption uncovered by auditors.Our unique dataset at the level of individual inspections allows us to separately examine extensiveand intensive margins of rent extraction. The identification strategy is based on an institutionalrule of state judiciary branches according to which prosecutors and judges tend to be assigned tothe most populous among contiguous counties forming a judiciary district. Our research designexploits this rule by comparing counties that are largest in their district to counties with identicalpopulation size from other districts in the same state, where they are not the most populous. IVestimates suggest that state judiciary presence reduces the share of inspections with irregularitiesrelated to waste or corruption by about 10 percent or 0.3 standard deviations. In contrast, we findno effect on the intensive margin of rent extraction. Finally, our estimates suggest that judicialpresence reduces rent extraction only for first-term mayors.

Report on a special investigation of the Fifth and Eighth Judicial Districts Department of Correctional Services (Districts) for the period January 1, 2003 through June 30, 2006

Report on a special investigation of the Fifth and Eighth Judicial Districts Department of Correctional Services (Districts) for the period January 1, 2003 through June 30, 2006

Audit report on the Iowa Judicial Retirement System for the year ended June 30, 2007

Audit report on the Iowa Judicial Retirement System for the year ended June 30, 2007

Report on the Iowa Judicial Branch for the year ended June 30, 2007

Report on the Iowa Judicial Branch for the year ended June 30, 2007

Report on the Iowa Judicial Branch – County Clerks of District Courts, a part of the State of Iowa, for the year ended June 30, 2007

Report on the Iowa Judicial Branch – County Clerks of District Courts, a part of the State of Iowa, for the year ended June 30, 2007

Combined report on the eight Judicial District Departments of Correctional Services for the year ended June 30, 2007

Combined report on the eight Judicial District Departments of Correctional Services for the year ended June 30, 2007

Audit report on the Iowa Judicial Retirement System for the year ended June 30, 2008

Audit report on the Iowa Judicial Retirement System for the year ended June 30, 2008

Market institutions and judicial rulemaking

Assuming that the degree of discretion granted to judges was the main distinguishing feature between common and civil law until the 19th century, we argue that constraining judicial discretion was instrumental in protecting freedom of contract and developing the market order in civil law. We test this hypothesis by analyzing the history of Western law. In England, a unique institutional balance between the Crown and the Parliament guaranteed private property and prompted the gradual evolution towards a legal framework that facilitated market relationships, a process that was supported by the English judiciary. On the Continent, however, legal constraints on the market were suppressed in a top-down fashion by the founders of the liberal state, often against the will of the incumbent judiciary. Constraining judicial discretion there was essential for enforcing freedom of contract and establishing the legal order of the market economy. In line with this evidence, our selection hypothesis casts doubts on the normative interpretation of empirical results that proclaim the superiority of one legal system over another, disregarding the local conditions and institutional interdependencies on which each legal system was grounded.