Savitri y Orfeo : La argumentación en la lógica india y en la retórica clásica

Los mitos de Savitri (Mahabharata 3.293-299) y Orfeo (Ovidio. Metamorfosis 10.1-85), pertenecientes al ámbito cultural indoeur opeo, presentan algunos puntos en común: narran la historia del amante que rescata a su ser amado de la muerte, y combinan el encuentro con los dioses de la muerte y el discurso mediante el poder de la palabra. En esta propuesta, se analizan los discursos de los protagonistas a partir de las convenciones propias de cada contexto de enunciación. Para el caso indio, se sigue el modelo lógico de la escuela Nyaya; para el greco-latino, el de la retórica clásica. De este modo, sobre la base de la estructura argumentativa del silogismo aristotélico, se plantean dos variaciones, respectivamente, el silogismo hindú y el silogismo retórico. Se trata de dos aproximaciones argumentativas con métodos distintos pero con un mismo fin: (con)vencer al oponente

La ontología aristotélica a la luz del problema de la definición

El presente trabajo aborda la controversia actual sobre la continuidad del concepto de "substancia primera" en el pensamiento aristotélico. La discusión tiene como eje a los tratados Categorías y Metafísica Z-H, puesto que en el primero Aristóteles sostiene que los individuos son las substancias primeras, mientras que en el segundo reserva dicho título para la forma. Nuestra tesis es que ambos tratados no son incompatibles debido a que responden a interrogantes distintos: cuáles son los sujetos últimos de inherencia y cuál es la causa de dichas entidades. Las conclusiones obtenidas se sostienen en un análisis de la evolución de la concepción de la definición de un tratado a otro. En otras palabras, el problema de la definición es el hilo conductor utilizado para el abordaje de dichos tratados

Ni lo uno, ni lo otro: posibilidad de lo neutro en arquitectura

Esta investigación se ocupa de comprobar la viabilidad de un término, un concepto que se detecta como posible instrumento para nombrar algunas operaciones en arquitectura. Ese concepto es Lo Neutro. Frente al sistema de dualidades con el que enunciamos lo real, lo Neutro se sitúa, no tanto en el punto medio, como en el punto opuesto a ambos términos. No es la conjunción de contrarios, sino aquello que desvía la propia pregunta que obliga a elegir. Próximo a los conceptos de indefinición, indiferencia e inacción, lo Neutro se revela como un mecanismo fundamental de disolución. Reconociendo en la lengua varios sentidos para el término, con cada capítulo, la tesis va construyendo una definición ampliada de lo Neutro hasta configurar un conjunto de significados aplicables a la arquitectura. El primero de ellos es el que se deriva del concepto de indiferencia funcional. Tras un análisis del contexto teórico sobre el que se asienta la dialéctica bi-direccional forma-función, su consolidación en los primeros años del siglo XX y también su puesta en crisis mediante la introducción de nociones multi-relacionales como ‘entorno’ y ‘sistema’, la investigación propone tres modelos de estudio: la Planta Tipo, la Planta Única y la Planta de Equivalencias. En cada uno de estos casos, aunque el tema fundamental es la neutralidad programática, se reconoce también la presencia de los mecanismos geométricos y operaciones conceptuales que lo Neutro utiliza para generar respectivamente condiciones de ‘soporte’, de ‘marco’ o de ‘campo’. Estas tres condiciones espaciales apuntan a un entendimiento de lo Neutro que asocia su fórmula de doble negación (ni lo uno, ni lo otro) con el estado más incipiente de la materia, aquel en el que todavía no es pero que contiene ya todos los elementos de posibilidad de ser: lo Neutro como potencia. Aquello que la lógica nos impide afirmar, que una cosa es y no-es al mismo tiempo, nos lo concede la categoría aristotélica de la potencia. Por ello, en la última parte de la tesis se desarrollan de forma más autónoma aquellos temas vinculados con estos tres tipos de espacio que se basan en la renuncia, abordando la cuestión de la potencialidad desde la negación. Partiendo de dos condiciones superficiales básicas, la del muro vertical y la del suelo horizontal, se analizan algunos discursos basados en una restricción radical a estos dos elementos. Así, el muro ciego encuentra su precedente artístico en el lienzo en blanco y la tabula rasa se pone en relación con el concepto de ‘terrain vague’. Por último, la posibilidad de toda potencia de no actualizarse lleva a explorar el no-hacer como renuncia voluntaria y su capacidad de transformarse en acto de resistencia. ABSTRACT The concern of this research is to test the feasibility of a term, a concept that has been detected as a potential tool to name some architectural operations. That concept is the Neutral. In front of the dualities system with which we enounce the real, the Neutral places itself, not so much in the midpoint as in the opposite point of both terms. It is not the conjunction of the contraries, but that which deflects the question itself that compels us to make a choice. Recognizing the multiple interpretations of the term in the common language, with each chapter, the thesis builds an expanded definition of the Neutral to configure a set of meanings applicable to architecture. The first of them is the one that derives from the concept of functional indifference. After an analysis of the theoretical context in which the two-way dialectic between form and function lies, its consolidation in the early twentieth century and its call into crisis by the introduction of multi-relational concepts such as 'environment' and 'system', the research suggests three study models: the Typical Plan, the Single Plan and the Equivalents Plan. In each of these cases, although the fundamental issue is programmatic neutrality, it also recognizes the presence of geometric mechanisms and conceptual operations that the Neutral uses to generate respectively 'support', 'frame' or 'field' conditions. These three spatial conditions point to an understanding of the Neutral which associates its double negation formula (neither one nor the other) with the most incipient state of matter, that in which it not yet is, but already contains every element of the possibility of being: the neutral as potentiality. That which logic does not allow us to affirm, that one thing is and is-not at the same time, it is granted by the Aristotelian category of potentiality. Therefore, in the last part of the thesis, the topics relating these three types of space which are based on renouncement are more autonomously developed, addressing the issue of potentiality from the standpoint of denial. Starting from two basic surface conditions, the vertical wall and the horizontal floor, some speeches based on a radical restriction on these two elements are analyzed. Thus, the blind wall finds its artistic precedent in the blank canvas and the tabula rasa attitude gets in relation to the concept of ‘terrain vague’. Finally, the possibility of any potency of not being updated leads to explore the not-doing as voluntary resignation and its ability to transform itself into an act of resistance.

Ni lo uno, ni lo otro: posibilidad de lo neutro en arquitectura

Esta investigación se ocupa de comprobar la viabilidad de un término, un concepto que se detecta como posible instrumento para nombrar algunas operaciones en arquitectura. Ese concepto es Lo Neutro. Frente al sistema de dualidades con el que enunciamos lo real, lo Neutro se sitúa, no tanto en el punto medio, como en el punto opuesto a ambos términos. No es la conjunción de contrarios, sino aquello que desvía la propia pregunta que obliga a elegir. Próximo a los conceptos de indefinición, indiferencia e inacción, lo Neutro se revela como un mecanismo fundamental de disolución. Reconociendo en la lengua varios sentidos para el término, con cada capítulo, la tesis va construyendo una definición ampliada de lo Neutro hasta configurar un conjunto de significados aplicables a la arquitectura. El primero de ellos es el que se deriva del concepto de indiferencia funcional. Tras un análisis del contexto teórico sobre el que se asienta la dialéctica bi-direccional forma-función, su consolidación en los primeros años del siglo XX y también su puesta en crisis mediante la introducción de nociones multi-relacionales como ‘entorno’ y ‘sistema’, la investigación propone tres modelos de estudio: la Planta Tipo, la Planta Única y la Planta de Equivalencias. En cada uno de estos casos, aunque el tema fundamental es la neutralidad programática, se reconoce también la presencia de los mecanismos geométricos y operaciones conceptuales que lo Neutro utiliza para generar respectivamente condiciones de ‘soporte’, de ‘marco’ o de ‘campo’. Estas tres condiciones espaciales apuntan a un entendimiento de lo Neutro que asocia su fórmula de doble negación (ni lo uno, ni lo otro) con el estado más incipiente de la materia, aquel en el que todavía no es pero que contiene ya todos los elementos de posibilidad de ser: lo Neutro como potencia. Aquello que la lógica nos impide afirmar, que una cosa es y no-es al mismo tiempo, nos lo concede la categoría aristotélica de la potencia. Por ello, en la última parte de la tesis se desarrollan de forma más autónoma aquellos temas vinculados con estos tres tipos de espacio que se basan en la renuncia, abordando la cuestión de la potencialidad desde la negación. Partiendo de dos condiciones superficiales básicas, la del muro vertical y la del suelo horizontal, se analizan algunos discursos basados en una restricción radical a estos dos elementos. Así, el muro ciego encuentra su precedente artístico en el lienzo en blanco y la tabula rasa se pone en relación con el concepto de ‘terrain vague’. Por último, la posibilidad de toda potencia de no actualizarse lleva a explorar el no-hacer como renuncia voluntaria y su capacidad de transformarse en acto de resistencia. ABSTRACT The concern of this research is to test the feasibility of a term, a concept that has been detected as a potential tool to name some architectural operations. That concept is the Neutral. In front of the dualities system with which we enounce the real, the Neutral places itself, not so much in the midpoint as in the opposite point of both terms. It is not the conjunction of the contraries, but that which deflects the question itself that compels us to make a choice. Recognizing the multiple interpretations of the term in the common language, with each chapter, the thesis builds an expanded definition of the Neutral to configure a set of meanings applicable to architecture. The first of them is the one that derives from the concept of functional indifference. After an analysis of the theoretical context in which the two-way dialectic between form and function lies, its consolidation in the early twentieth century and its call into crisis by the introduction of multi-relational concepts such as 'environment' and 'system', the research suggests three study models: the Typical Plan, the Single Plan and the Equivalents Plan. In each of these cases, although the fundamental issue is programmatic neutrality, it also recognizes the presence of geometric mechanisms and conceptual operations that the Neutral uses to generate respectively 'support', 'frame' or 'field' conditions. These three spatial conditions point to an understanding of the Neutral which associates its double negation formula (neither one nor the other) with the most incipient state of matter, that in which it not yet is, but already contains every element of the possibility of being: the neutral as potentiality. That which logic does not allow us to affirm, that one thing is and is-not at the same time, it is granted by the Aristotelian category of potentiality. Therefore, in the last part of the thesis, the topics relating these three types of space which are based on renouncement are more autonomously developed, addressing the issue of potentiality from the standpoint of denial. Starting from two basic surface conditions, the vertical wall and the horizontal floor, some speeches based on a radical restriction on these two elements are analyzed. Thus, the blind wall finds its artistic precedent in the blank canvas and the tabula rasa attitude gets in relation to the concept of ‘terrain vague’. Finally, the possibility of any potency of not being updated leads to explore the not-doing as voluntary resignation and its ability to transform itself into an act of resistance.

The Double‐Edged Sword Of Interdict: Some More Warnings From History

In this paper I revisit the age-old question of the relationship between philosophy and theology by rejecting the claim that throughout the history of the Christian Church, whenever Christian thinkers have baptized philosophy, they have done so to the detriment of theology. Church history reveals just the opposite, i. e., that sometimes theologians have creatively and fruitfully used philosophical language, concepts, methods, and conclusions to understand and express the faith. In addition, church history records numerous attempts to limit philosophical enquiry for theological reasons that proved unsuccessful and counter-productive. Both types of interaction between philosophy and theology occurred at the University of Paris during the thirteenth century. Despite repeated efforts of some officials to place philosophy under interdict, that is, to ban the reading of particular philosophical works or the teaching of philosophical propositions from the university faculties, a series of university theologians applied Aristotelian tools of enquiry to questions about the Christian faith with positive and constructive results. If academic theology at Paris during the thirteenth century has anything to teach us, it is that interdict cuts both ways. It might protect some theological claims from philosophical contamination or compromise, but it can also insulate theological claims from much needed critical analysis. The thinkers and developments surveyed in this paper suggest that perhaps instead of placing deconstruction under interdict, today’s Christian thinkers should use some of the language, concepts, methods and conclusions of Derrida to further theological understanding.

Machiavelli's reading of Aristotle. A Reassessment

La tesi si propone di dimostrare la presenza e l'utilizzo nel pensiero di Niccolò Machiavelli di categorie e concettualizzazioni derivate dalla riflessione aristotelica.

A divisão dos regimes políticos em Aristóteles

Trata-se de um estudo sobre a filosofia política de Aristóteles, sobretudo no que toca à divisão dos regimes políticos. Como se sabe, segundo Aristóteles seis são os regimes políticos, três justos (realeza, aristocracia e república) e três corruptos (tirania, oligarquia e democracia). O autor se propõe a demonstrar que a distinção entre essas seis formas de constituição, no pensamento político aristotélico, não é primeiramente pelo número dos que exercem o mando ou pela finalidade com que governam, mas resulta da aplicação de certos princípios à distribuição do poder pelas diversas partes da comunidade política. Assim, a distribuição do poder segundo o estado de liberdade constituiria a democracia; a distribuição segundo o critério da riqueza, a oligarquia; a distribuição segundo o critério da virtude, a aristocracia e a realeza; a exacerbação dos princípios da democracia e da oligarquia culminaria na tirania; e a república ou governo constitucional seria constituída pela combinação harmônica de instituições democráticas, oligárquicas e aristocráticas, resultando no regime mais apropriado à maioria das comunidades políticas.

El uso aristotélico de variables en lógica y sus supuestos ontológicos

A logical reading on Aristotle’s Organon discovers some inconsistencies in the text which have to be solved by reducing them to metaphysical decisions of the author, if they are not just identified as deficiencies in the exposition that should be corrected. The present article tries to display a line of reading paying attention to those so-called inconsistencies, in an attempt to understand them as specific steps in Aristotle’s research. In order to this goal it focuses on the exposition procedure of the Aristotelian figures: the use of variables, whose introduction by Aristotle has been celebrated all over logical tradition. An analysis of the distinctive and internal features in this procedure will allow us to link Aristotle’s logos research and the “being qua being” investigation, and to determine also –though in a negative way– the connection between this reading and the logical-traditional one on Aristotle’s Organon.

Le livre de éthiques d'Aristote;

"This first French translation of the Nicomachean ethics was the earliest complete version of an authentic Aristotelian work in any of the modern languages. Completed in 1370, it was published by Verard at Paris in 1488." Pref.

Supplementary volume.

Vols. for 1918-<1992> contain the papers read at the joint session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association. The sessions of 1918-<1919> include the British Psychological Society.

A GUERRA JUSTA NA CRISTIANIZAÇÃO DA AMÉRICA LATINA (1492-1566): ORIGEM DO CONCEITO, DESLOCAMENTOS E RESSIGNIFICAÇÕES

Em 1492, com o objetivo de adquirir riquezas e expansão territorial, os espanhóis chegaram à América Latina. Para tanto, rapidamente implantaram o seu sistema de governo, cultura e religião. Este processo só foi possível por meio da guerra. Para legitimá-la, foi necessário a reelaboração e a inversão de um antigo conceito de guerra e a sua consequente instauração nas terras recém ocupadas. O uso do conceito de Guerra Justa na América Latina, entre os anos1492 a 1566, fundamentava-se na história das conquistas romanas, filosofia de Aristóteles, teologia de Agostinho e Tomás de Aquino, nas leis jurídicas, Escrituras Sagradas e nas armas. Ao ser aplicado nas províncias indígenas, o conceito de Guerra Justa proporcionou efeitos trágicos pela sua violência. Ocorreram mortes de inocentes, invasão das terras, posse das riquezas, escravidão, destruição da cultura e da religião dos indígenas. Diante destes fatores, as divergências e debates tornaram-se inevitáveis. Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, o autor do Democrates Alter, tratado que hospeda o conceito de Guerra Justa, teve como opositor tanto na Espanha quanto na América Latina, o frei dominicano Bartolomé de Las Casas que lutou a favor dos indígenas frente a injustiça da guerra deflagrada pelos conquistadores espanhóis e da cristianização por meio das armas. Entre esses dois controversistas encontra-se outro teólogo-jurista, catedrático da Universidade de Salamanca, Francisco de Vitoria. Vitoria elaborou o Derecho Natural y de Gentes, obra que concedeu a Sepúlveda e Las Casas argumentos para fundamentar suas doutrinas. A julgar pelos resultados duradouros da conquista, Sepúlveda atingiu seus objetivos. A cristandade foi implantada em substituição às religiões dos nativos e os interesses políticos e econômicos dos conquistadores, entrementes, foram concretizados. Las Casas, por sua vez, ao discordar desse método, propôs, em sua obra, Del único modo de atraer a todos los pueblos a la verdadera religión, uma cristianização pacífica que se conduzisse somente por meio da pregação do evangelho e da fé cristã. Para chegarem a essa posição, ambos os controversistas analisaram as fontes e tradições literárias aristotélica, agostiniana e tomista, em especial. O projeto missionário colonial vislumbrado por Sepúlveda e Las Casas, definiu as duas hermenêuticas eclesiásticas presentes na América Latina que se estenderam até o século XIX quando aportou-se na América uma nova proposta de missão através dos protestantes.

Imagined relationships: political leadership in contemporary democracies

The image and style of political leaders are important elements of leadership, and of politics generally. They are related to both political culture and institutions, and are framed in ritual and ceremony. In democratic policies, where there is choice rather than coercion, the mediation of leadership/people relations creates imagined relationships between imagined leaders and their equally imagined interlocutors, the people or the electorate (who also, of course, actually exist). These relationships form part of the political process. By identifying, and adapting, classical Aristotelian distinctions in rhetorical studies, we can better understand this element or moment of the process, in particular the creation of an imagined intimacy in contemporary politics between leaders and followers. Political science should draw upon other disciplines and subdisciplines such as political psychology, cultural studies, rhetorical analysis, and social anthropology in order to understand how mediated relationships are inscribed into political institutions and exchange.

Contradictory reasoning network:an EEG and FMRI study

Contradiction is a cornerstone of human rationality, essential for everyday life and communication. We investigated electroencephalographic (EEG) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in separate recording sessions during contradictory judgments, using a logical structure based on categorical propositions of the Aristotelian Square of Opposition (ASoO). The use of ASoO propositions, while controlling for potential linguistic or semantic confounds, enabled us to observe the spatial temporal unfolding of this contradictory reasoning. The processing started with the inversion of the logical operators corresponding to right middle frontal gyrus (rMFG-BA11) activation, followed by identification of contradictory statement associated with in the right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG-BA47) activation. Right medial frontal gyrus (rMeFG, BA10) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC, BA32) contributed to the later stages of process. We observed a correlation between the delayed latency of rBA11 response and the reaction time delay during inductive vs. deductive reasoning. This supports the notion that rBA11 is crucial for manipulating the logical operators. Slower processing time and stronger brain responses for inductive logic suggested that examples are easier to process than general principles and are more likely to simplify communication. © 2014 Porcaro et al.

Of madness and many-valuedness: an investigation into Suszko's Thesis

Suszko’s Thesis is a philosophical claim regarding the nature of many-valuedness. It was formulated by the Polish logician Roman Suszko during the middle 70s and states the existence of “only but two truth values”. The thesis is a reaction against the notion of many-valuedness conceived by Jan Łukasiewicz. Reputed as one of the modern founders of many-valued logics, Łukasiewicz considered a third undetermined value in addition to the traditional Fregean values of Truth and Falsehood. For Łukasiewicz, his third value could be seen as a step beyond the Aristotelian dichotomy of Being and non-Being. According to Suszko, Łukasiewicz’s ideas rested on a confusion between algebraic values (what sentences describe/denote) and logical values (truth and falsity). Thus, Łukasiewicz’s third undetermined value is no more than an algebraic value, a possible denotation for a sentence, but not a genuine logical value. Suszko’s Thesis is endorsed by a formal result baptized as Suszko’s Reduction, a theorem that states every Tarskian logic may be characterized by a two-valued semantics. The present study is intended as a thorough investigation of Suszko’s thesis and its implications. The first part is devoted to the historical roots of many-valuedness and introduce Suszko’s main motivations in formulating the double character of truth-values by drawing the distinction in between algebraic and logical values. The second part explores Suszko’s Reduction and presents the developments achieved from it; the properties of two-valued semantics in comparison to many-valued semantics are also explored and discussed. Last but not least, the third part investigates the notion of logical values in the context of non-Tarskian notions of entailment; the meaning of Suszko’s thesis within such frameworks is also discussed. Moreover, the philosophical foundations for non-Tarskian notions of entailment are explored in the light of recent debates concerning logical pluralism.

Restoring phronesis and practice: marketing's forgotten p's

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the evolution of marketing’s philosophical conversation over the past 120 years, focusing on the emergent meaning of the notion that marketing should become more “scientific”. Design/methodology/approach – This paper focuses on the US academic marketing literature, primarily journal articles and books published in the first half of the 20th century. Findings – The Aristotelian distinction between techné, epistemé and phronesis provides a rich basis for framing philosophical discussion in marketing, and should supplant the art-science debate and Anderson’s distinction between science1 and science2. Prior to 1959, the marketing journals provided a forum for phronesis, though this diminished as the academic marketing community largely abandoned the inductive, contextual approach in favour of a deductive, “scientific” methodology. The Ford Foundation played an important role in effecting this change. Practical implications – The paper highlights the importance of forums where practitioners can reflect on the ethical and social implications of their practices and then work to enhance these practices for the greater social good. Social implications – Questions the value of distinctions between marketing theorists and practitioners and the consequential focus of marketing journals. Originality/value – Advances the concept of phronesis in the marketing literature and distinguishes it from epistemé, which has dominated academic marketing discourse over the past 60 years.