871 resultados para Agglomeration economies
Resumo:
In this paper we report on a major empirical study of centripetal and centrifugal forces in the City of London financial services agglomeration. The study sheds light on (1) the manner and magnitude of firm interaction in the agglomeration; (2) the characteristics of the agglomeration that aid the competitiveness of incumbent firms; and (3) the problems associated with agglomeration. In addressing these issues, we use the data to (1) test emerging theory that explains the high productivity and innovation of agglomerations in terms of their ability to generate and diffuse knowledge; and (2) evaluate the ‘end of geography’ thesis.
Resumo:
This paper examines the determinacy implications of forecast-based monetary policy rules that set the interest rate in response to expected future inflation in a Neo-Wicksellian model that incorporates real balance effects. We show that the presence of such effects in closed economies restricts the ability of the Taylor principle to prevent indeterminacy of the rational expectations equilibrium. The problem is exacerbated in open economies, particularly if the policy rule reacts to consumer-price, rather than domestic-price, inflation. However, determinacy can be restored in both closed and open economies with the addition of monetary policy inertia.
Resumo:
We examine the internal equity financing of the multinational subsidiary which retains and reinvests its own earnings. Internal equity financing is a type of firm-specific advantage (FSA) along with other traditional FSAs in innovation, research and development, brands and management skills. It also reflects subsidiary-level financial management decision-making. Here we test the contributions of internal equity financing and subsidiary-level financial management decision-making to subsidiary performance, using original survey data from British multinational subsidiaries in six emerging countries in the South East Asia region. Our first finding is that internal equity financing acts as an FSA to improve subsidiary performance. Our second finding is that over 90% of financing sources (including capital investment by the parent firms) in the British subsidiaries come from internal funding. Our third finding is that subsidiary-level financial management decision-making has a statistically significant positive impact on subsidiary performance. Our findings advance the theoretical, empirical and managerial analysis of subsidiary performance in emerging economies.
Resumo:
The aim of this paper is to examine the differences and similarities in housing policies in the four Latin American countries of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Colombia. The article uses the welfare regime approach, modified by a recognition of path dependence, to identify a number of phases that each country has passed through. However, attention is drawn to the substantial differences in the circumstances in each country and the extent and duration of the different phases. It is concluded that it can be beneficial to use the concept of a Latin American housing regime, but that this general picture has to be used with an understanding of the path dependence caused by the different context in the individual countries.
Resumo:
This paper studies the impact of exogenous and endogenous shocks (exogenous shock is used interchangeably with external shock; endogenous shock is used interchangeably with domestic shock) on output fluctuations in post-communist countries during the 2000s. The first part presents the analytical framework and formulates a research hypothesis. The second part presents vector autoregressive estimation and analysis model proposed by Pesaran (2004) and Pesaran and Smith (2006) that relates bank real lending, the cyclical component of output and spreads and accounts for cross-sectional dependence (CD) across the countries. Impulse response functions show that exogenous positive shock lead to a drop in output sustainability for 9 over 12 Central Eastern European countries and Russia, when the endogenous shock is mild and ambiguous. Moreover, the effect of exogenous shock is more significant during the crises. Variance decompositions show that exogenous shock in the aftermath of crisis had a substantial impact on economic activity of emerging economies.
Resumo:
The objective of this study was to select the optimal operational conditions for the production of instant soy protein isolate (SPI) by pulsed fluid bed agglomeration. The spray-dried SPI was characterized as being a cohesive powder, presenting cracks and channeling formation during its fluidization (Geldart type A). The process was carried out in a pulsed fluid bed, and aqueous maltodextrin solution was used as liquid binder. Air pulsation, at a frequency of 600 rpm, was used to fluidize the cohesive SPI particles and to allow agglomeration to occur. Seventeen tests were performed according to a central composite design. Independent variables were (i) feed flow rate (0.5-3.5 g/min), (ii) atomizing air pressure (0.5-1.5 bar) and (iii) binder concentration (10-50%). Mean particle diameter, process yield and product moisture were analyzed as responses. Surface response analysis led to the selection of optimal operational parameters, following which larger granules with low moisture content and high process yield were produced. Product transformations were also evaluated by the analysis of size distribution, flowability, cohesiveness and wettability. When compared to raw material, agglomerated particles were more porous and had a more irregular shape, presenting a wetting time decrease, free-flow improvement and cohesiveness reduction. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Resumo:
We consider exchange economies with a continuum of agents and differential information about finitely many states of nature. It was proved in Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2001) that if we allow for free disposal in the market clearing (feasibility) constraints then an irreducible economy has a competitive (or Walrasian expectations) equilibrium, and moreover, the set of competitive equilibrium allocations coincides with the private core. However when feasibility is defined with free disposal, competitive equilibrium allocations may not be incentive compatible and contracts may not be enforceable (see e.g. Glycopantis, Muir and Yannelis (2002)). This is the main motivation for considering equilibrium solutions with exact feasibility. We first prove that the results in Einy et al. (2001) are still valid without freedisposal. Then we define an incentive compatibility property motivated by the issue of contracts’ execution and we prove that every Pareto optimal exact feasible allocation is incentive compatible, implying that contracts of competitive or core allocations are enforceable.
An ordering of measures of the welfare cost of inflation in economies with interest-bearing deposits
Resumo:
This paper builds on Lucas (2000) and on Cysne (2003) to derive and order six alternative measures of the welfare costs of inflation (five of which already existing in the literature) for any vector of opportunity costs. The ordering of the functions is carried out for economies with or without interestbearing deposits. We provide examples and closed-form solutions for the log-log money demand both in the unidimensional and in the multidimensional setting (when interest-bearing monies are present). An estimate of the maximum relative error a researcher can incur when using any particular measure is also provided.
Resumo:
In this paper we look at various alternatives for monetary regimes: dollarization, monetary union and local currency. We use an extension of the debt crisis model of Cole and Kehoe ([3], [4] and [5]), although we do not necessarily follow their sunspot interpretation. Our focus is to appraise the welfare of a country which is heavily dependent on international capital due to low savings, for example, and might suffer a speculative attack on its external public debt. We study the conditions under which countries will be better off adopting each one of the regimes described above. If it belongs to a monetary union or to a local currency regime, a default may be avoided by an ination tax on debt denominated in common or local currency, respectively. Under the former regime, the decision to inate depends on each member country's political inuence over the union's central bank, while, in the latter one, the country has full autonomy to decide about its monetary policy. The possibility that the government inuences the central bank to create ination tax for political reasons adversely affects the expected welfare of both regimes. Under dollarization, ination is ruled out and the country that is subject to an external debt crisis has no other option than to default. Accordingly, one of our main results is that shared ination control strengthens currencies and a common-currency regime is superior in terms of expected welfare to the local-currency one and to dollarization if external shocks that member countries suffer are strongly correlated to each other. On the other hand, dollarization is dominant if the room for political ination under the alternative regime is high. Finally, local currency is dominant if external shocks are uncorrelated and the room for political pressure is mild. We nish by comparing Brazil's and Argentina's recent experiences which resemble the dollarization and the local currency regimes, and appraising the incentives that member countries would have to unify their currencies in the following common markets: Southern Common Market, Andean Community of Nations and Central American Common Market.
Resumo:
We unify and generalize the existence results in Werner (1987), Dana, Le Van and Magnien (1999), Allouch, Le Van and Page (2006) and Allouch and Le Van (2008). We also show that, in terms of weakening the set of assumptions, we cannot go too far.
Resumo:
We consider exchange economies with a continuum of agents and differential information about finitely many states of nature. It was proved in Einy, Moreno and Shitovitz (2001) that if we allow for free disposal in the market clearing (feasibility) constraints then an irreducible economy has a competitive (or Walrasian expectations) equilibrium, and moreover, the set of competitive equilibrium allocations coincides with the private core. However when feasibility is defined with free disposal, competitive equilibrium allocations may not be incentive compatible and contracts may not be enforceable (see e.g. Glycopantis, Muir and Yannelis (2002)). This is the main motivation for considering equilibrium solutions with exact feasibility. We first prove that the results in Einy et al. (2001) are still valid without free-disposal. Then we define an incentive compatibility property motivated by the issue of contracts’ execution and we prove that every Pareto optimal exact feasible allocation is incentive compatible, implying that contracts of a competitive or core allocations are enforceable.
Resumo:
A motivação para este trabalho vem dos principais resultados de Carvalho e Schwartzman (2008), onde a heterogeneidade surge a partir de diferentes regras de ajuste de preço entre os setores. Os momentos setoriais da duração da rigidez nominal são su cientes para explicar certos efeitos monetários. Uma vez que concordamos que a heterogeneidade é relevante para o estudo da rigidez de preços, como poderíamos escrever um modelo com o menor número possível de setores, embora com um mínimo de heterogeneidade su ciente para produzir qualquer impacto monetário desejado, ou ainda, qualquer três momentos da duração? Para responder a esta questão, este artigo se restringe a estudar modelos com hazard-constante e considera que o efeito acumulado e a dinâmica de curto-prazo da política monetária são boas formas de se resumir grandes economias heterogêneas. Mostramos que dois setores são su cientes para resumir os efeitos acumulados de choques monetários, e economias com 3 setores são boas aproximações para a dinâmica destes efeitos. Exercícios numéricos para a dinâmica de curto prazo de uma economia com rigidez de informação mostram que aproximar 500 setores usando apenas 3 produz erros inferiores a 3%. Ou seja, se um choque monetário reduz o produto em 5%, a economia aproximada produzirá um impacto entre 4,85% e 5,15%. O mesmo vale para a dinâmica produzida por choques de nível de moeda em uma economia com rigidez de preços. Para choques na taxa de crescimento da moeda, a erro máximo por conta da aproximação é de 2,4%.