Germany in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict: a political or a humanitarian mission? OSW Commentary No. 163, 2015-02-18

Since the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, profound changes in Germany’s thinking about Russia, its political elite and foreign policy, can be observed. The trust most German politicians had in their former strategic partner has now lessened. At the same time, Germany has been particularly involved in the process of resolving the conflict, which was demonstrated by the intensive diplomatic actions it undertook. When these failed, Chancellor Angela Merkel did not hesitate to force through the introduction and maintenance of economic sanctions. At the same time, however, this evolution in Germany’s thinking about Russia has not translated into any change in the two basic assumptions of the German attitude towards a possible solution to the conflict. First, Germany supports the concept of ‘strategic patience’ in politics in the context of Russia’s aggression. Second, it is convinced that Europe is fated to cooperate with the Russian Federation, and Europe’s welfare and security are only possible with Russia as a partner in cooperation, not against it or without it. Therefore, in the immediate future no radical change in Germany’s policy as pursued so far should be expected. This provokes questions concerning not only the effectiveness of Berlin’s current actions, but also – in a broader sense – Germany’s ability to negotiate and achieve real, political solutions to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, reaching beyond (another) ceasefire. The Minsk agreements of 12 February can be considered a success worthy of a humanitarian mission carried out in the hope of reducing the number of casualties. However, the political mission undertaken by Chancellor Merkel and Foreign Minister Steinmeier aimed at “ensuring Europe’s security order”[1] has so far resulted in the sense of helplessness and frustration which have recently dominated Germany’s policy towards Russia[2].

Geochemistry and isotopic ratios of basalts from ODP Leg 163 sites

Voluminous, subaerial magmatism resulted in the formation of extensive seaward-dipping reflector sequences (SDRS) along the Paleogene Southeast Greenland rifted margin. Drilling during Leg 163 recovered basalts from the SDRS at 66ºN (Site 988) and 63ºN (Sites 989 and 990). The basalt from Site 988 is light rare-earth-element (REE) enriched (La(n)/Yb(n) = 3.4), with epsilon-Nd(t=60) = 5.3, 87Sr/86Sr = 0.7034, and 206Pb/204Pb = 17.98. It is similar to tholeiites recovered from the Irminger Basin during Leg 49 and to light-REE-enriched tholeiites from Iceland. Drilling at Site 989, the innermost of the sites on the 63ºN transect, was proposed to extend recovery of the earliest part of the SDRS initiated during Leg 152. These basalts are, however, younger than those from Site 917 and are compositionally similar to basalts from the more seaward Sites 990 and 915. Many of the basalts from Sites 989 and 990 show evidence of contamination by continental crust (e.g., epsilon-Nd(t=60) extends down to -3.7, 206Pb/204Pb extends down to 15.1). We suggest that the contaminant is a mixture of Archean granulite and amphibolite and that the most contaminated basalts have assimilated ~5% of crust. Uncontaminated basalts are isotopically similar to basalts from Site 918, on the main body of the SDRS, and are light-REE depleted. Consistent with previous models of the development of this margin, we show that at the time of formation of the basalts from Sites 989 and 990 (1) melting was at relatively shallow levels in a fully-fledged rift zone; (2) fragments of continental crust were present in the lithosphere above the zones of melt generation; and (3) the sublithospheric mantle was dominated by a depleted Icelandic plume component.