The Swiss Schools have been Governed by Local Lay Authorities

After the introduction of the liberal-democratic constitutions in the Swiss cantons in the first half of the 1830ies the grid of existing schools has been systemized and broadly expanded. The school systems have ever since been characterized by one key element: a special local authority type called „Schulkommission“ or „Schulpflege“. They take the form of committees consisting of laymen that are appointed by democratic elections like all the other executive bodies on the different federal levels in Switzerland. When it comes to their obligations and activities these community level school committees conform very much to the school boards in the American and Canadian school systems. They are accountable for the selection and supervision of the teachers. They approve decisions about the school careers of pupils and about curricular matters like the choice of school books. Normally their members are elected by the local voters for four year terms of office (reelection remains possible) and with regard to pedagogics they normally are non-professionals. The board members are responsible for classes and teachers assigned to them and they have to go to see them periodically. These visitations and the board meetings each month together with the teachers enable the board members to attain a deep insight into what happens in their schools over the course of their term of office. But they are confronted as laymen with a professional teaching staff and with educational experts in the public administration. Nevertheless this form of executive power by non-professionals is constitutive for the state governance in the Swiss as well as in other national political environments. It corresponds to the principles of subsidiarity and militia and therefore allows for a strong accentuation of liberty and the right of self-determination, two axioms at the very base of democratic federalist ideology. This governance architecture with this strong accent on local anchorage features substantial advantages for the legitimacy and acceptability of political and administrative decisions. And this is relevant especially in the educational area because the rearing of the offspring is a project of hope and, besides, quite costly. In the public opinion such supervision bodies staffed by laymen seem to have certain credibility advances in comparison with the professional administration. They are given credit to be capable of impeding the waste of common financial resources and of warranting the protection and the fostering of the community’s children at once. Especially because of their non-professional character they are trusted to be reliably immune against organizational blindness and they seem to be able to defend the interests of the local community against the standardization and centralization aspirations originating from the administrational expertocracy. In the paper these common rationales will be underpinned by results of a comprehensive historical analysis of the Session protocols of three Bernese school commissions from 1835 to 2005.

Food Insecurity in America: A Call to Action

When 1 in 6 people in the country is living in a food insecure household, that is an outrage. A country as wealthy as ours– wealthy enough to end hunger even in hard times like those we have been experiencing– should not countenance the moral blight of hunger. Those of us who work to reduce and eventually end hunger in this country cannot succeed, however, by making moral arguments alone. What is needed in addition to move voters, policymakers and institutions to act is a strong evidence base that establishes the causes of hunger, the consequences of hunger for individuals involved, the breadth of the population affected, and the practical strategies to address hunger. The articles in this journal illuminate many of these topics while exploring the impacts of federal nutrition programs and deepening the case that economic and nutrition supports for families reduce food insecurity and mediate the impacts of poverty and food insecurity, particularly for children.

Do Ads Add Up? The Impact of Parties' Advertisements on the Stability of Vote Choice at the Swiss National Elections 2011

Our contribution analyses the influence of campaign advertisements on vote choice in the 2011 elections to the Swiss National Council. Concretely, we ask whether and to what extent the relative exposure to party ads of a preferred party exerts a reinforcing effect on an individual's party choice. We make use of the two-wave panel structure contained in the RCS survey data of the Selects 2011 and combine it with data on advertisements in 20 important national and regional newspapers. We find that increasing exposure to the campaign of one's preferred party may reinforce individuals with strong party attachment in their initial vote choice. Yet this effect only materializes with substantial campaign duration and exposure. Additional and exploratory analyses revealed that particularly the two recently emerged parties, the GLP and BDP, might have made a slight difference by potentially persuading defecting voters with the help of their campaign.

Essays on behavioral aspects of the design and disclosure of compensation contracts

This thesis consists of four essays on the design and disclosure of compensation contracts. Essays 1, 2 and 3 focus on behavioral aspects of mandatory compensation disclosure rules and of contract negotiations in agency relationships. The three experimental studies develop psychology- based theory and present results that deviate from standard economic predictions. Furthermore, the results of Essay 1 and 2 also have implications for firms’ discretion in how to communicate their top management’s incentives to the capital market. Essay 4 analyzes the role of fairness perceptions for the evaluation of executive compensation. For this purpose, two surveys targeting representative eligible voters as well as investment professionals were conducted. Essay 1 investigates the role of the detailed ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’, which is part of the Security and Exchange Commission’s 2006 regulation, on investors’ evaluations of executive performance. Compensation disclosure complying with this regulation clarifies the relationship between realized reported compensation and the underlying performance measures and their target achievement levels. The experimental findings suggest that the salient presentation of executives’ incentives inherent in the ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’ makes investors’ performance evaluations less outcome dependent. Therefore, investors’ judgment and investment decisions might be less affected by noisy environmental factors that drive financial performance. The results also suggest that fairness perceptions of compensation contracts are essential for investors’ performance evaluations in that more transparent disclosure increases the perceived fairness of compensation and the performance evaluation of managers who are not responsible for a bad financial performance. These results have important practical implications as firms might choose to communicate their top management’s incentive compensation more transparently in order to benefit from less volatile expectations about their future performance. Similar to the first experiment, the experiment described in Essay 2 addresses the question of more transparent compensation disclosure. However, other than the first experiment, the second experiment does not analyze the effect of a more salient presentation of contract information but the informational effect of contract information itself. For this purpose, the experiment tests two conditions in which the assessment of the compensation contracts’ incentive compatibility, which determines executive effort, is either possible or not. On the one hand, the results suggest that the quality of investors’ expectations about executive effort is improved, but on the other hand investors might over-adjust their prior expectations about executive effort if being confronted with an unexpected financial performance and under-adjust if the financial performance confirms their prior expectations. Therefore, in the experiment, more transparent compensation disclosure does not lead to more correct overall judgments of executive effort and to even lower processing quality of outcome information. These results add to the literature on disclosure which predominantly advocates more transparency. The findings of the experiment however, identify decreased information processing quality as a relevant disclosure cost category. Firms might therefore carefully evaluate the additional costs and benefits of more transparent compensation disclosure. Together with the results from the experiment in Essay 1, the two experiments on compensation disclosure imply that firms should rather focus on their discretion how to present their compensation disclosure to benefit from investors’ improved fairness perceptions and their spill-over on performance evaluation. Essay 3 studies the behavioral effects of contextual factors in recruitment processes that do not affect the employer’s or the applicant’s bargaining power from a standard economic perspective. In particular, the experiment studies two common characteristics of recruitment processes: Pre-contractual competition among job applicants and job applicants’ non-binding effort announcements as they might be made during job interviews. Despite the standard economic irrelevance of these factors, the experiment develops theory regarding the behavioral effects on employees’ subsequent effort provision and the employers’ contract design choices. The experimental findings largely support the predictions. More specifically, the results suggest that firms can benefit from increased effort and, therefore, may generate higher profits. Further, firms may seize a larger share of the employment relationship’s profit by highlighting the competitive aspects of the recruitment process and by requiring applicants to make announcements about their future effort. Finally, Essay 4 studies the role of fairness perceptions for the public evaluation of executive compensation. Although economic criteria for the design of incentive compensation generally do not make restrictive recommendations with regard to the amount of compensation, fairness perceptions might be relevant from the perspective of firms and standard setters. This is because behavioral theory has identified fairness as an important determinant of individuals’ judgment and decisions. However, although fairness concerns about executive compensation are often stated in the popular media and even in the literature, evidence on the meaning of fairness in the context of executive compensation is scarce and ambiguous. In order to inform practitioners and standard setters whether fairness concerns are exclusive to non-professionals or relevant for investment professionals as well, the two surveys presented in Essay 4 aim to find commonalities in the opinions of representative eligible voters and investments professionals. The results suggest that fairness is an important criterion for both groups. Especially, exposure to risk in the form of the variable compensation share is an important criterion shared by both groups. The higher the assumed variable share, the higher is the compensation amount to be perceived as fair. However, to a large extent, opinions on executive compensation depend on personality characteristics, and to some extent, investment professionals’ perceptions deviate systematically from those of non-professionals. The findings imply that firms might benefit from emphasizing the riskiness of their managers’ variable pay components and, therefore, the findings are also in line with those of Essay 1.

The structure of the debate on EU integration issues. A comparative analysis of party communication in the EP 2014 elections

The results of Eurosceptic parties in the recent European parliament election provide further evidence that the “permissive consensus” on European integration blurred. This paper focuses on the structure of the debate on EU integration issues. Which EU integration issues and positions do parties put forward? Can the debate on EU integration issues be subsumed in one or several dimensions? Do they reflect national political conflicts such as the left-right and the ‘new politics’/cultural divide? Or do they form one unique or several EU-specific dimensions, e.g. national sovereignty versus integration? In order to address these questions, this paper departs from the assumption that debate on European integration is multidimensional in its nature and therefore entails a multitude of issue areas. In other words, it does not look at how socio-economic and cultural issues are related to European integration but focuses on its components, i.e. particular EU-specific policies such as EU-wide employment, environment, immigration and monetary policy. The paper departs from the cleavage theory on political di-visions and different approaches transferring them to EU politics. Two points should be noted; first, this paper does not compare the debate on European integration issues between the national level and the EU level, but whether domestic divisions are reflected at the EU level. Second, it is not concerned with the general ideo-logical profile of political parties on EU integration issues, but on EU issues that parties communicated through press releases. By doing this, the paper is concerned with the salient EU issues that parties touch upon.

Überlegungen zum Berner Stichprobenplan

Fritschi, Meyer und Schweizer haben vor drei Jahrzehnten in der Schweizerischen Zeitschrift für Soziologie ein elegantes Stichprobenverfahren für ein gesamtschweizerisches Sample vorgeschlagen, bei dem die Befragungspersonen mit Hilfe kommunaler Wahl- oder Einwohnerregister bestimmt werden. Ungeachtet der Vorzüge dieser Methode beruhen heute die meisten Bevölkerungsumfragen in der Schweiz aber auf Telefonregisterstichproben, die bezüglich der Abdeckung der Grundgesamtheit als problematisch anzusehen sind. Sozusagen als Wiederbelebungsversuch möchte ich deshalb hier einige Überlegungen zum Stichprobenplan von Fritschi et al. präsentieren. Die theoretischen Eigenschaften des Stichprobenplans werden besprochen und ein vereinfachtes Verfahren, die ex ante geteilte Stichprobe, wird vorgeschlagen. Mit Hilfe einer Simulationsstudie werden sodann die Vorzüge des "Berner Stichprobenplans" gegenüber einer einfachen Klumpenstichprobe illustriert.

The use of evidence in public debates in the media: the case of Swiss direct-democratic campaigns in the health policy sector

This article analyses the reporting of evidence in Swiss direct-democratic campaigns in the health policy sector, assuming that an informed public helps democracy function successfully. A content analysis of the media’s news reporting shows that of 5030 media items retrieved, a reference to evidence is found in 6.8%. The voter receives evidence in the form of substantiating arguments, equally distributed among proponents and opponents. Experts have the highest chance of providing evidence, but appear most rarely. Integrating more evidence might provide voters with the diversity of arguments needed to make a truly informed decision.

Direct Democracy and Institutional Trust: Relationships and Differences across Personality Traits

Direct democracy plays a prominent role in the explanation of institutional trust. To date, however, empirical findings on the effects of direct democracy remain inconclusive. In this article, we argue that this inconclusiveness can be partly ascribed to the diverse effects direct democracy has on individuals. In other words, direct democracy influences institutional trust, but how and to what degree depends on individuals’ personality traits. Running hierarchical analyses of unique survey data from a random sample of eligible Swiss voters, we document three findings: First, we show that the number of ballot measures is not directly associated with institutional trust. Second, we demonstrate that the Big Five personality traits affect the propensity to trust. Third, some of these traits also alter the relationship between direct democracy and institutional trust, suggesting that certain personality types are more likely to be sensitive to popular votes than others and that not everyone is equally likely to respond to political stimuli, even in highly democratic environments.

Political Education and First-Time Voting in Switzerland

The proposed paper investigates the effect of political education on first-time voting in Switzerland. Theoretically, the paper takes up assumptions of recent research that political education is positively related to political interest, and hence to political participation. Thereby, the paper adds to the literature in two aspects: First, in Switzerland, education is a cantonal matter presenting a unique opportunity to investigate the impact of political education on voting on individual as well as cantonal level. Second, political education is not only measured by political knowledge, but also by civic skills and attitudes acquired in school. Conceptually, the study adopts a multilevel approach permitting a simultaneous testing of the influence of individual and contextual determinants on electoral participation. This paper corresponds closely to the panel topic by examining the important question of how political education affects the voting behaviour of first-time voters not only on individual, but also on contextual level.

Intergenerational Conflict and the Political Economy of School Spending

In this paper we use survey data to examine support among voters from different age cohorts for public school spending. The survey asked potential voters in California how they intended to vote on two initiatives, one a statewide initiative that would increase spending on public schools throughout the state and the other a local initiative that would increase spending only in the respondent's local school district. We find that older voters without children generally oppose increases in state spending but are much more willing to support local spending. We examine two explanations for this voting pattern, namely the capitalization of local spending into housing values and intergenerational altruism. Our results do not strongly favor one explanation over the other. Consequently, we conclude that both factors (capitalization and intergenerational altruism) probably play important roles in sustaining support among older voters for local school spending.

A Median Voter Theorem for Postelection Politics

We analyze a model of 'postelection politics', in which (unlike in the more common Downsian models of 'preelection politics') politicians cannot make binding commitments prior to elections. The game begins with an incumbent politician in office, and voters adopt reelection strategies that are contingent on the policies implemented by the incumbent. We generalize previous models of this type by introducing heterogeneity in voters' ideological preferences, and analyze how voters' reelection strategies constrain the policies chosen by a rent-maximizing incumbent. We first show that virtually any policy (and any feasible level of rent for the incumbent) can be sustained in a Nash equilibrium. Then, we derive a 'median voter theorem': the ideal point of the median voter, and the minimum feasible level of rent, are the unique outcomes in any strong Nash equilibrium. We then introduce alternative refinements that are less restrictive. In particular, Ideologically Loyal Coalition-proof equilibrium also leads uniquely to the median outcome.

Is the Median Voter Decisive? Evidence of 'Ends Against the Middle' From Referenda Voting Patterns

This paper examines whether the voter with the median income is decisive in local spending decisions. Previous tests have relied on cross-sectional data while we make use of a pair of California referenda to estimate a first difference specification. The referenda proposed to lower the required vote share for passing local educational bonding initiatives from 67 to 50 percent and 67 to 55 percent, respectively. We find that voters rationally consider future public service decisions when deciding how to vote on voting rules, but the empirical evidence strongly suggests that an income percentile below the median is decisive for majority voting rules. This finding is consistent with high income voters with weak demand for public educational services voting with the poor against increases in public spending on education.